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ABSTRACT
The main focus of this thesis is to provide an analysis of foreign direct investment inflows 
during the Bulgarian transition period from a planned to a market economy. The 
macroeconomic development, the legal framework, the privatisation deals and foreign 
participation in the Bulgarian banking system have been examined in the years 1989-2001 
under the scope of FDI. Bulgaria has gone through significant changes in the years in 
question, initiated with the abolishment of communism in 1989 and the country’s effort to 
become a market economy. FDI, on the other hand is an economic activity that assists 
countries in transition with a significant inflow of capital, technology and knowledge. The 
author analysed the reasons for the low FDI inflows in Bulgaria paying attention to the 
delayed transition, adverse initial conditions of the country, geographical distance from 
western countries, political instability and governmental inability and limited 
macroeconomic development. The analysis is also based on the consideration of Bulgarian 
historical elements, the legacy of the communist regime, the legal framework, the policies 
and reforms that have been used in the privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
in the banking system, and reference to the special role of Greek FDI outflows in Bulgaria 
has been made. Using a questionnaire survey we specified the most important incentives 
and barriers that an MNE considers when it decides to establish an FDI project in Bulgaria. 
The results were of great significance since we conclude that there is a “régionalisation” in 
the determination of FDI inflows in Bulgaria (dominant Greek investment interest). 
Moreover, with the help of a statistical analysis it was found that the sector that each MNE 
belongs to plays a decisive role in the determination of Bulgarian FDI inflows.
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
I. Im portance o f the study - M otivation  of choosing B ulgaria  as a case 
study
The fall of communism in Central and Eastern European countries gave rise to an intense 
interest to economists, entrepreneurs and multinational enterprises (MNEs) to analyse and 
exploit the potential of these markets. Bulgaria is one of these countries, which has not 
been studied yet. At the same time, it displays the following specific characteristics: 
geographical distance from the Western markets, cultural distance from the West, strong 
dependence on the ex -Soviet Union and its subsequent dissolution, strong dependence on 
the CMEA trade organisation and its collapse, adverse initial conditions (adverse 
macroeconomic indicators, external shocks that the Bulgarian economy has suffered from), 
political instability up to 1997 and inability of the governments in order to succeed in the 
whole transition process.
The aim of this thesis is to provide a detailed analysis of the macro-economic and financial 
development of Bulgaria to enable the reader to understand that its transition process and 
its steps towards stabilisation, liberalisation policies and structural reforms, need a sound 
and stable macroeconomic environment. In order for a country to attract significant foreign 
direct investment inflows, thus, during the transition period from a planned to a market 
economy there is a need for a country to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to 
help its transition policy. The foreign participation in the Bulgarian banking sector and 
the privatisation deals which are a significant part of foreign direct investment 
inflows together with all the FDI projects, have been thoroughly discussed in the thesis in 
relation with the theoretical background for FDI. Actually, the participation of an MNE 
in a privatisation program is an entry mode (an alternative of acquisition). All the 
privatisation deals are part of the total FDI deals, thus part of the total FDI inflows in 
one country. The direct acquisition of a bank, the founding of a foreign branch or the 
acquisition of a state bank using a Bulgarian privatisation program and thus the foreign 
participation in the Bulgarian banking system are also a significant part of the total FDI 
inflows in Bulgaria. All the above can be proved by the Bulgarian official statistical data. 
Accordingly, 32% of the total FDI inflows in Bulgaria (end 2001) are flows derived from 
finalised privatisation deals with foreign participation (around 1.5 billion USDS out of 4.5 
billion USDS - source: Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency (BFIA)).
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The author has chosen to discuss a former communist county in transition because, despite 
the substantial literature on FDI with particular emphasis on determining the reasons and 
the barriers for foreign direct investment, this has not been the case for Bulgaria, a small 
country, isolated from western interest Also, the potential role of FDI in encouraging 
and supporting successful transition is well known. FDI in transition economies appears to 
be an effective tool for several reasons such as transfer of knowledge, increase of 
productivity, upgrading of managerial and labour force skills, improving the state balance, 
balancing the deficits, accelerating privatisation of state-owned enterprises and quick 
restructuring of them.
Economists and investors have dealt through the years with countries mainly from Latin 
America and Asia such as Argentine, Mexico, Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, China, and a few others like the UK, the USA, Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece for their inward investment activities. After 1989 and the 
collapse of communism, Central and Eastern European countries have been an “attractive 
area” for business together with the Baltic States and the CIS. The interest is always on 
countries that open their borders, their economies, offer great opportunities, incentives and 
challenges for inward FDI. In the decade (1990-2000), the interest of foreign investors 
focused on the Central and Eastern European Economies. Bulgaria has been selected as a 
case study in analysing the above because of some unique characteristics:
• Bulgaria has received very little consideration in the available economic literature so 
far.
• Bulgaria had one of the worst initial conditions in the region.
• Bulgaria has received limited FDI inflows during its economic transition from a 
planned to a market economy.
• The geographical proximity of Bulgaria with Greece (researcher’s home country) and
the special role of the Greek investments during the transition.
• The legacy of the communist regime that created significant drawbacks, which were
difficult for the Bulgarian governments to overcome.
• The strong dependence of Bulgaria on the CMEA and the USSR trade.
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•  The Bulgarian relations with the West, which were insignificant during the communist 
era.
• The physical distance of the Bulgarian market from the Western markets.
• The slow structural and privatisation progress and the inadequate macroeconomic 
stabilisation reform during the transition period.
• The choice of the shock therapy model of transition method and the Heterodox-Money- 
based stabilisation programme at the beginning of the transition period and the failure 
of both
• The significant political instability within the country (nine different Prime Ministers 
and four Presidents during the post-communist period 1989-2001.
• The fact that although Bulgaria had one of the most favourable and less complicated 
transition from the old communist regime to a post-communist regime with the so- 
called disguised reform, at the same time, it presented one of the worst market 
potentials and very unfavourable conditions for a successful economic reform and 
attraction of significant FDI inflows.
• Bulgaria has a fair chance of succeeding in the transition to market economy and to 
become a member of the European Union in the future (2004) if its government 
achieves political and economic stabilisation and development (Copenhagen Criteria).
• The geographical and strategic position of Bulgaria is of great significance; it is close 
enough to CIS and Greece, which is a member of EU and a crucial link in the 
European-Asiatic transportation.
• A stable Bulgaria in the European region could play a major role in the connection of 
Europe with Middle East, and Greece with the EU and Middle East. The results of the 
survey on this thesis will confirm that a considerable number of European 
multinational enterprises have considered this factor as the major reason to invest in 
Bulgaria.
In centrally planned Eastern European economies, the private ownership was severely
limited and the economy was co-ordinated through bureaucratic plans, Prices were
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administrated, fixed and changed rarely and natural resources were seriously under-priced. 
Macro-economic balance was sustained by direct control and foreign trade was dominated 
by a few monopolistic organisations. Autarkic trade patterns emphasised bilateral 
exchange among the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 
Passive, monopolistic state banks lacked the capability to evaluate creditworthiness. The 
risk was socialised and the government played the financial role, intermediating between 
enterprises and households through subsidies and transfer programs, therefore spending 
more than half of GDP.^ Industry was “overbuilt”, especially machine building and heavy 
industry. Medium-size and large state enterprises dominated output and employment. 
Before the collapse of this regime, wages exceeded the value of consumer goods, which 
were sold at fixed prices and goods were rationed, resulting in the development of 
monetary overhang in the form of excess household assets.
The transformation of centrally planned economies into market economies is a long and 
complex process. The early phases of this transformation involve a great degree of 
uncertainty and vulnerability. In the transition period, the economy is no longer centrally 
planned, but at the same time has not yet achieved the outcomes of a market economy. 
Therefore, the economy in this period can be labelled as “Previously Centrally Planned 
Economy”.^  The items in question in this transition are: the sequence of the reform, the 
optimal path, the measures for a successful transition and the delay between the time of the 
political decision to launch the program until the time of its actual application and 
implementation. The duration, intensity of reforms, choice of stabilisation policy, degree of 
external financing and political stability are significant factors for the outcomes of the 
transition.
This thesis is divided into the following five chapters, The first chapter presents the 
Bulgarian transition process together with its adverse initial conditions as well as criticism 
regarding the chosen transition of Bulgaria policies. Moreover, attention is given to its 
political instability during the transition and its strong dependence on the ex -  Soviet 
Union and the CMEA trade organisation during the communist years. Finally, analysis of 
the Bulgarian banking system, before and after the transition, is also presented. In the 
second chapter, there is a literature review regarding FDI theories. In chapter three there is 
a presentation of a questionnaire survey based on Dunning’s theory regarding the 
determination of incentives for doing business in Bulgaria and exploring the unfavourable 
conditions (barriers/obstacles) of discouraging establishing FDI projects in Bulgaria. FDI 
inflows in Bulgaria are also presented and there is a literature review regarding other
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questionnaire surveys carried out by other researchers, A presentation of the questionnaire 
and the research methodology used along with the results from the survey are discussed. 
The fourth chapter focuses on all the privatisation deals in Bulgaria and the results of the 
questionnaire survey regarding privatisation are also revealed. The foreign participation in 
the banking system is also presented and analysed. Finally, results from the questionnaire 
survey regarding the foreign participation in the banking system are disclosed. The fifth 
chapter focuses on the special role of Greek investments in Bulgaria. The specific 
incentives and barriers for the Greek entrepreneurs which preferred to establish FDI 
projects in Bulgaria are also mentioned in this chapter. Finally, in the last part of this 
thesis, the conclusions are provided.
More specifically.
Chapter 1, ''The Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy and the Legacy o f the 
Communist Regime which may Affect FDI Inflows in a Host Country: the case o f  Bulgaria: 
1989-200F . A quick review of the economic development of Bulgaria during the 20^ *^  
century and prior to 1989, the legacy of the communist regime and the strong dependence 
of Bulgaria on the CMEA and the Soviet Union^ trade are presented along with some other 
specific factors which led Bulgaria to have one of the worst initial conditions in the region, 
making the road for the transition to a market economy a hard task. An analysis is offered 
of the political instability in Bulgaria that created significant delay in the privatisation 
process, in the establishment and application of the new legal status and in the avoidance 
of the expansion of the nomenklatura, Mafia or/and other illegal actions.
Moreover, the means and outcomes of the transformation of centrally planned economies 
into market economies, the choice of a stabilisation policy, modes of transition and the 
speed of economic reforms in general and specifically for Bulgaria are also discussed. The 
process of transition contains elements of 1) macro-economic stabilisation or adjustment, 
together with monetary, credit, fiscal and income policy, 2) economic liberalisation of 
prices, trade, capital account, currency convertibility and exchange rates. The liberalisation 
provides competition opportunities and creates alternatives to the market and a more 
competitive environment for a successful integration into the world market, 3) systemic 
reform of institutions, market and bankruptcy mechanism and competition. Furthermore, 
institutional reform of financial sector, legal, accounting, tax, pension system and system 
of unemployment compensation, ownership, social safety net, restmcturing and 
privatisation of the state-owned enterprises.
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The development of the banking sector and the financial reform, in general, contain 
elements from both the institutional reform and liberalisation policy. In addition, the 
exchange rate policy also includes liberalisation of the rate, currency convertibility along 
with systemic reform of the foreign exchange market in Bulgaria. Therefore, the structural- 
systemic reform has been embodied in each of the following chapters in this thesis, 
whenever necessary.
Chapter 1, also analyses the macro-economic development in Bulgaria compared to other 
Central and East European countries, as well as the adverse initial conditions, causes and 
consequences of the three economic crises of the 1990s, the monetary policy, income 
policy, currency board, monetary overhang, re-allocation of capital and labour from 
industry toward services, and the economic obstacles and problems in choosing the road to 
the transition. It primarily analyses the liberalisation of foreign trade, exchange rates and 
prices. Bulgarian foreign trade partners, imports, exports, tariffs and its trade balance are 
studied. An important component of trade policy is the exchange rate, because a change in 
the level of the exchange rate immediately changes the competitiveness of exporters and 
importers and thus affects trade flows. There is also a presentation of the Bulgarian 
banking system and an analysis of statistical data, tables and graphs about GDP, output, 
employment & unemployment rates, balance of payments, debt, current account, budget 
balance, wages, unit labour cost, etc.
Chapter 2, "Foreign Direct Investment as an entry mode’\  In this chapter there is a 
literature review regarding the FDI theories.
Chapter 3, "The Determinants o f Foreign Direct Investment inflows in Bulgaria: 1989- 
2001” presents a questionnaire survey. This survey was based on Dunning’s theoiy which 
helped the author of this thesis to run and examine the questionnaire survey regarding the 
determination of incentives for doing business in Bulgaria and exploring the unfavourable 
conditions (barriers/obstacles) of discouraging establishment of FDI projects in Bulgaria.
Moreover, a questionnaire regarding the FDI inflows in Bulgaria has been constructed and 
its results critically analysed and discussed. This research, underpins the incentives and 
barriers that most influence the decision of multinationals in making investments or not in 
Bulgaria during its transition period. A complete and very extensive analysis of the 
questionnaire results, with the help of the statistical computerized package SPSS, has been 
made. All the statistical results and data together with tables and graphs have been 
presented in this chapter. Moreover, all the FDI laws and the Bulgarian legal framework
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methods of privatisation. In addition, there is a discussion about the development of small 
and medium enterprises, property rights, and corporate governance, ownership and private 
sector development. All the privatisation laws are presented together with graphs and 
examples of all the privatisation and FDI deals and the progress from the beginning until 
the end of 2001 are presented in this chapter.
Case studies with foreign MNEs that participated in the privatisation process, together with 
all the BCC deals taking part in the Bulgarian privatisation of the banking system, are 
found in this chapter.
Chapter 5, "The Determinants o f Greek FDI and the Role o f  the Greek Investments in the 
Bulgarian Transition to a Market Economy”. Strong emphasis is placed on Greek 
investments due to the fact that Greece appears to be a unique case among the other foreign 
investors in Bulgaria. Greece ranks first in the number of foreign direct investments in 
Bulgaria among the members of EU. Greece is a neighbour country with cultural and 
geographic proximity with Bulgaria and already had played an important role in the 
economic development of Bulgaria. At the end of 2002, Greece appeared to be in the 1  ^
place in volume of investing dollars. All the specific incentives and barriers for the Greek 
entrepreneurs who invested in Bulgaria are also presented and discussed.
Conclusion sets out the "Final Conclusions” of the overall thesis
regarding foreign participation in the whole economic environment have been presented 
and analysed.
Chapter 4, "Incentives fo r  an increased Foreign Participation in the Bulgarian 
Privatisation Process and Banking System and the Role o f Financial Intermediaries during 
the Privatisation Process”. This chapter examined topics such as the privatisation and 
restructuring process in Bulgaria as part of foreign direct investment. Incentives and 
barriers regarding the whole privatisation process have been considered. Moreover, topics 
such as financial reform in general, cleaning up of the balances of the banks, their debt 
cancellation and the problem of bad loans have been discussed. The role of financial 
institutions and commercial banks in the privatisation process (if any) together with the 
stock market development, legal framework and the presence of foreign banks in Bulgaria '
are also examined. j1
Criticism is made of the slow privatisation process in Bulgaria, and its choice of different W!
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II. R esearch M ethodology
The first step of the research was to present and examine all the theoretical issues found 
in the thesis as accurately as possible. A careful study of the sources provided the author 
with a comprehensive understanding of the different theories which have been presented. 
Moreover, it was a primary goal to consider Bulgarian FDI inflows during its transition 
period and the practical use of the country in each theoretical issue in order to understand 
the country case study, which has been chosen.
Then the author carried out an extensive literature review regarding the topic of the 
transition from a planned to a market economy. The author came to realise that there are 
tremendous gaps in the theory of transition and there is no finalised theory describing the 
path of transition (shock therapy or gradualism). The issues if privatisation must take place 
before restructuring or the opposite, if the fixed or flexible exchange rates are better, if 
there is a need for a quick or slow privatisation, if the mass privatisation programs are 
necessary, etc. are also examined.
Furthermore, the author studied most of the FDI theories presented in the International 
Business area together with the entry modes in order to gain the necessary background for 
constructing the questionnaire and completing the statistical analysis of this survey.
The second step was the accumulation and constant updating of the official data 
concerning Bulgaria and other related countries (CEE countries), from official sources like 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), OECD, UNCTAD -  UN, EBRD, Bulgarian 
Foreign Investment Agency (BFIA), World Bank, the Bulgarian Government, the 
Bulgarian Privatisation Agency, etc. This was accomplished mainly through their internet 
wed sites, but also through mail and E-mail correspondence with competent authorities and 
personal contacts.
The third step was the analysis of more regional studies and works such as papers, books, 
newspapers and surveys published in the Bulgarian, Greek and English language. At this 
point the author did a significant survey of the Bulgarian legal framework, which has been 
analysed and presented in the thesis in order to discuss the possible absence of western 
investment interest and to connect this absence with the inadequate Bulgarian laws on FDI 
and privatisation.
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The fourth step was the empirical research. The initial stage in the research process was 
the identification of what might determine the research question. Hence, the research was 
based on the issue of what the determinants, incentives and barriers of FDI are for a small 
economy such as Bulgaria.
III. C onstruction  of the q u estion n aire
A questionnaire was designed to extract valuable information regarding the determination 
of FDI in Bulgaria during the post-communist period 1989-1999. Its purpose was to 
identify the kind and the type of incentives and entry barriers for inward foreign direct 
investment that the foreign firms have considered in order to establish whether they should 
make an investment or not in Bulgaria. For the purpose of this empirical research, a data 
set was collected from a primary , source (using an own-design questionnaire and personal 
interviews were made in order to gain in-depth qualitative information).
The questionnaire used in the research study consisted of three parts. In the first part, the 
questions provided necessary background information on certain issues that were 
considered important in characterising the sample population. In the second part, one 
question included seven groups of sub-questions with related factors that were considered 
to be of major importance and allowed the managers of the enterprises to select the most 
appropriate for their case. These groups of sub-questions were initially selected based on 
Dunning’s theory, but necessary amendments were made during the research period of 
eighteen months (the research was started in January 1998, six months were needed for the 
construction of the questionnaire, studying the theories and deciding the way of contacting 
the companies and creating the sample. Twelve months were needed for the interviews and 
the statistical analysis of the results of the questionnaires). Similarly, part three contained 
only one question with a group of factors that describe the barriers discouraging the firms 
to invest in Bulgaria. More specifically, in the first part there are questions searching for 
some general characteristics of the company, such as the sector that the company belongs 
to, the year of investment, the amount of investment, the home country of an MNE, entry 
mode etc. In the second part there is the theoretical part of the questionnaire suiwey. In this 
second part, seven groups of hunters (seekers) have been created: Locational hunters 
(historical links, cultural closeness or distance, geographical proximity, stability, climate 
etc.), factor hunters or natural resource hunters (access to low cost of acquiring natural 
resources and raw materials - p. 13 “the eclectic paradigm of international production: a 
restatement and some possible extensions”, John H. Dunning, Journal of International 
Business Studies, Spring 1988), market hunters (size of the market, prospects for market
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growth, increasing market share), strategic market hunters (follow the competition, follow 
the clients, a way to survive, acquiring of assets, international pressures, globalisation etc.), 
efficiency hunters (economies of scale, of scope, risk diversification), exploiting the 
ownership advantages (brand name, know-how, past experience, existing business links 
etc.), hunter of financial aspects (favourable investment law framework, subsidies, tax 
exemptions). In the third part, there are twenty entry barriers (instability, bureaucracy, 
corruption, unstable legal system, etc.) The construction of the questionnaire was based on 
the Dunning’s theory [the eclectic theory (OLI -  eclectic paradigm of international 
production)]. According to Dunning we have; Locational (L) (natural resources availability 
and cost, investment incentives, characteristics of the country -  language, culture,..). 
Internalisation (I) (avoid costs, control supplies, avoid or exploit government intervention), 
and Ownership advantages (O) (intangible asset advantages, product innovations, know 
how, multinationality). Dunning has also define natural resource seeking (vertical 
integration, availability, cost), market seeking (market size and characteristics, investment 
incentives, p.82 Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, John, H. Dunning, 
1993, chapter 4), efficiency seeking (economies of scale and scope, risk reduction through 
product diversification -  p. 13 “The eclectic paradigm of international production; a 
restatement and some possible extensions”, John H. Dunning, Journal of International 
Business Studies, Spring 1988) and strategic asset seeking (gain new product lines or 
markets, economies of synergy, economies of common governance, improved competitive 
or strategic advantage, reduce or spread risks- p.82 Multinational Enterprises and the 
Global Economy, John, H. Dunning, 1993, chapter 4). At this point it is worth saying that 
the researcher spent a lot of time explaining to all the interviewers the questionnaire’s 
questions and the questionnaires were completed with the presence of the researcher.
IV. S ta tistica l analysis
The statistical analysis has employed the Descriptive Statistics methods, as well as the 
Inferential Statistics methods. More specifically, tabular and graphical methods were used 
to summarise the collected qualitative data and provided us the first insights about the 
research variables. Then, the chi-square test was used to investigate the statistical 
association between the variables. The author used the Chi-Square Test of Independence or 
test of association. The objective was to determine whether the variables are independent 
or not. The descriptive nature of the variables allowed such approach. For statistical 
validity, in order to be able to run the chi-square tests, there is a need to have at least five 
observations per cell. Thus, it was suggested to categorise the variable in the following
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way. For the implementation of the test the following was needed: Using specific 
descriptions, the population of the companies must be divided into classes. In other words, 
the 64 companies were classified according to their type/kind of business into three classes 
(taking under consideration from the theory the importance and the similarity of the 
different sectors):
1 : Productive, Textile and Industry 
2: Services and Banks 
3: Trade and Food
In more details, the group of sector: (POWER INDUSTRY, NON-FERROUS 
METALLURGY, METALWORKING INDUSTRY, ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY, NON- 
METALLIC MINERALS AND BUILDING MATERIAL, CHEMICAL AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, WOODWORKING INDUSTRY, GLASS 
INDUSTRY, CEMENT INDUSTRY, TEXTILE INDUSTRY, LEATHER AND 
FOOTWEAR (CLOTHING) INDUSTRY, PAPER PRODUCTION AND PROCESSING 
(Productive-Industrial companies -  thus HEAVY -  LIGHT INDUSTRY, productive 
Tindustiy + textiles).
The 2"  ^ group of sector: Banking -  Finance -  Telecommunications -  Hotels (Tourism) - 
Banks -  Transport (thus SERVICES).
The 3'^ group of sector: FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY, CATERING AND TRADE, 
consumer products- retail sector (thus FOOD + TRADE) (the categorisation is based on 
the statistical data used by Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency).
After collecting and examining the results for the questionnaire survey, it was decided to 
move one more step forward in his empirical research and to run a statistical analysis. His 
purpose was not only to determine the general incentives and barriers for the Bulgarian 
FDI inflows during the period in question, but also to determine IF the ranking of the 
incentives and barriers is different when dividing the 64 MNEs into 3 groups of sectors 
(considering 3 groups according to the sector that each MNE belongs to).
Another grouping was made which regarded the country of origin of the investor of 
interest. We examined if the specific ranking regarding the general determination of 
incentives and barriers for the case of Bulgarian FDI inflows, changes when considering 
only the neighbor origin MNEs, thus the Greek ones against the foreign MNEs (other than 
neighbour MNEs to the host country of Bulgaria). We have done this in order to conclude 
if there is a “Régionalisation” in the trend of FDI inflows in Bulgaria.
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1 : Neighbour countries such as GREECE (Greek origin of MNEs or MNEs with Greek 
interest)
2: MNEs from EUROPE and OTHER COUNTRIES
Contingency or cross tabulation tables were produced to allow a subjective impression of 
the data. Each one of the contingency table is a simple array used to present the results of a 
classification of a sample. In such a table the classes of the first part of variables are the 
row headings and those of the other variables are the column headings.
According to the test, in the null hypothesis (Ho) the variables are independent (there is no 
association between the variables) and in the alternative hypothesis (HI) the variables are 
dependent (there is association between the variables). The analysis is based on the p- 
value. If the p-value is less than 0.01 (strongly significant) and less than 0.05 and 0.1 
(significant), then there seems to be enough evidence against the null hypothesis of no 
association and it can be concluded that there is enough evidence to support the alternative 
hypothesis. If the p-value is more than 0.1, it cannot be rejected the null hypothesis of no 
association cannot be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis of a significant 
association between the variables of interest within the sample.
The statistical analysis establishes possible relations between the variables for the 64 
questioned companies. The nature of the relation between the variables, if any, was 
investigated with the chi-square statistic, which is regarded the most suitable for this kind 
of data. Instead of using a statistic method like correlation coefficients, which requires data 
collected in a continuous form, the chi-square test allows for making inferences to the 
population of interest, in this case foreign investors in Bulgaria, by making use of the 
categorical data. The results are valid in most of the cases at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance and the inferences about the population were based on the results of the p- 
value. There are reported to be some 110 foreign enterprises in Bulgaria, according to the 
official catalogue obtained from the Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency (BFIA) mid 
1998, which have invested over 1,000,000 US dollars. For the purpose of this 
questionnaire research, this author used an extended catalogue of 131 foreign investors in 
Bulgaria, which was comprised from the official BFIA catalogue mentioned above, and 
another 21 investors mainly of Greek origin, whose data was collected firom a one to one 
interview (5 companies, which were excluded from the old BFIA catalogue in mid 1998, 
have been included in the new BFIA catalogue, end 2000). These 21 other investors did
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not form part of the BFIA official published data of foreign investment in Bulgaria due to 
the expected inefficient data collection in such a hard task.
V. Chi -  Square M ethod
The Chi Square Method is a non-parametric test of statistical significance for bivariate 
tabular analysis (also known as crossbreaks). Any appropriately performed test of 
statistical significance informs you of the degree of confidence you can have in accepting 
or rejecting a hypothesis. Typically, the hypothesis tested with chi square is whether or not 
two different samples (of people, texts, whatever) are different enough in some 
characteristic so we can generalize from our samples that the populations from which our 
samples are drawn are also different in the behavior or characteristic.
A non-parametric test, like the Chi Square, is a rough estimate of confidence; it accepts 
weaker, less accurate data as input than parametric tests do (like t-tests and analysis of 
variance, for example) and therefore has less status in the pantheon of statistical tests. 
Nonetheless, its limitations are also its strengths because Chi Square is more 'forgiving' in 
the data it will accept. It can be used in a wide variety of research contexts.
When expected frequencies are large, there is no problem with the assumption of normal 
distribution, but the smaller the expected frequencies, the less valid are the results of the 
chi-square test. Therefore, if you have cells in your bivariate table which show very low 
raw observed frequencies (5 or below), your expected frequencies may also be too low for 
chi square to be appropriately used. In addition, because some of the mathematical 
formulas used in chi square use division, no cell in your table can have an observed raw 
frequency of 0.
The following minimum frequency thresholds should be obeyed:
• for a 1 X 2 or 2 X 2 Table, expected frequencies in each cell should be at least 5;
• for a 2 X 3 Table, expected frequencies should be at least 2;
• for a 2 X 4 or 3 X 3 or larger table, if all expected frequencies but one are at least 5
and if the one small cell is at least 1, chi-square is still a good approximation.
Then the test requires that the data be grouped. The actual number of observations in each 
group is compared to the expected number of observations and the test statistic is 
calculated as a function of this difference. The number of groups and how group 
membership is defined will affect the power of the test (i.e., how sensitive it is to detecting
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departures from the null hypothesis). Power will not only be affected by the number of 
groups and how they are defined, but also by the sample size and shape of the null and 
underlying (true) distributions'^.
VI. P rocedure -  D ifficu lties
The first step towards accomplishment of the empirical research was the selection of the 
appropriate set of companies that had already invested in Bulgaria. For this purpose, a 
statistical significant sample was selected. From an official list that had been collected 
from the Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency (BFIA), a list with 110 foreign companies 
was found (as of 30 June 1998). Tliis list contained the enterprises that according to the 
BFIA have invested over 1,000,000 million US dollars in Bulgaria until mid June 1998. 
The total invested capital from these enterprises amounted to around 70% of the total 
volume of foreign investments in Bulgaria at that time. Sixty-four foreign companies have 
participated, answered and been interviewed in this important research. The level of 
participation was very high, the sample statistically significant and according to the 
researcher’s belief there is no other work in the field with such a magnitude of sample for a 
country such as Bulgaria.
Prior to commencing this research, literature review of theories of FDI together with 
methodologies, techniques and previous empirical studies on determining factors 
influencing FDI decisions were studied and presented. Moreover, elements and 
conclusions from previous questionnaires’ analyses for Central and Eastern European 
countries also appear in this thesis. In addition, the results are compared with similar 
works.
Although it was a time consuming process, the researcher found it very useful and 
important to ask questions about the background of the participating companies in the 
questionnaire. Important information, such as the amount of investment, kind of business, 
direction of products, future expectations, etc. was gathered. Sometimes, the interview 
schedule was made up of some open questions, which allowed the interviewer to develop 
these questions in order to expand and explain the interviewee’s responses further. Notes 
were taken during the interviews so as to facilitate the analysis of the research process. The 
quality of data and information obtained was very reliable due to the fact that all the 
managers had been informed that their names and their companies’ names would not 
appear in the statistical analysis. It was primary data source and it was direct from the
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companies’ managers. The ultimate aim was to combine a theoretical thesis with real 
empirical research.
In conclusion, the whole research process was a completely new and valuable learning 
experience, within the researcher’s expectations. Initially, it was uncertain if financial 
sources to complete such a difficult research would be found. The research needed 
eighteen months to be completed. The researcher visited Bulgaria at least seven times, 
stayed there almost six months in total, took approximately 100 interviews from foreign 
companies that had invested in Bulgaria and spend a large sum of money and valuable time 
collecting the results (the whole research lasted 18 months).
Various unexpected problems were encountered and many new situations were 
experienced thought out the research and the results found were important. It is obvious 
that much of the research process should be allocated to the fieldwork. A specific example 
is the research timetable, which was created at the beginning. It was impossible to keep to 
the initial schedule, as the whole process took longer than expected and planned (the 
author notes that after the completion of the questionnaire analysis (end 1999), he was 
bedridden under medical treatment for a period of over a year due to health problems).
The researcher did not encounter any problems in finding sources of data about the 
transition to a market economy. There is ample literature on this topic, as well as about 
foreign direct investment theories. Moreover, as already mentioned, for the empirical part 
of the thesis a lot of similar work appears in journals, but not for Bulgaria. Furthermore, 
the extensive list of the people (see acknowledgements) that helped in this thesis provided 
the author with articles, publications and secondary data for all the Central and Eastern 
European Economies and thus prevented the encounter of any major obstacles in their 
collection. In addition, visits and interviews in Bulgaria, the already available published 
articles, and the data collected from the official Bulgarian agencies and organisations (all 
in the English language) have significantly increased the researcher’s knowledge about the 
Bulgarian economic environment throughout the years.
Finally, it should be mentioned that during the research, a diary was kept, proved useful in 
checking upon the progress made. The researcher was able to refer back to it to retrieve 
important information whenever necessary. Of course it was not the first time, this method 
was followed since it had been used by the researcher (in his dissertation of MPhil in
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International Finance at the University of Glasgow and in his two bachelor degrees BA in 
Business Administration and BA in Law both completed in Greece).
V II. D escrib ing the Survey
The survey lasted 18 months (time period January 98 -  June 99), but most of the 
questionnaires were completed in the period Jan '99-June ‘99, The total invested amount 
for the 110 foreign companies was 1,283,419,173 USDS and for the extra 21 companies 
(extended catalogue) was 47,6 million USDS. The statistical sample with 64 companies 
consisted of a total investment amount equal to 863 million USDS, which was 64.7% of 
the total investments of these 131 companies or 50.7% of the total Bulgarian FDI inflows 
(BFIA catalogue, Foreign Direct Investments over 1 million USDS (as of 30 June 1998)).
Only 9 out of the 64 participating countries in the questionnaire had made their first 
investment after January 1998 and the remaining 55 companies until the end of 1997. Most 
of the 64 companies had undertaken additional investment projects in Bulgaria throughout 
the previous years. The questionnaire survey was run before the benefits of the 
introduction of currency appeared in the Bulgarian macroeconomic environment. Thus it 
was expected that the macroeconomic instability, political instability, and low progress in 
the transition appeared were as significant barriers for the investors (from the questionnaire 
results).
During the completion of the questionnaire research, the problem of limited answers to the 
questionnaire arose. To overcome this problem, other ways rather than the post for 
distributing the questionnaires were selected. The combination of interviews, faxes, phone 
calls and visiting companies’ websites, was the most appropriate way for the successful 
completion of this research. More specifically, the usual way of replying questionnaires 
[Table A], the post way, in any research study, failed (i.e. only 4.7% of the companies 
replied in this way). Hence, it seems that the best replying rate came from one to one 
interviews (35,9% of the total response rate, followed by e-mail or www with 29.7%). The 
fax and telephone methods had success in about 30% cases together. Due to the above bad 
response rate by post and the possibility of a failure to collect the sufficient data, a multiple 
approach of the target group was decided by applying some pressure with various methods 
of contacting and getting their attention.
In the first six months, the author completed the questionnaire design and made decisions
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on the source of data, literature review, theory study, other published articles -  empirical 
studies, methodology (statistical analysis, target group, sample size, way of approaching 
the target group, financial sources for completing the study, scheduling timetable etc.)
Among the 64 companies 37 were of Greek origin. The reason that 37 companies seem to 
be of Greek origin is because firstly we have considered the offshore companies with 
approved Greek interest as Greek (i.e. Cyprus or Luxembourg based offshore companies). 
Secondly, we have also considered as Greek investments the joint ventures or consortiums 
with approved significant Greek participation (i.e. Alico/CEH that bought Postbank, the 
management and 43% of the total shares belong to the Greek Eurobank and the remaining 
shares to the American Insurance Group (AIG) and its subsidiary ALICO). Eight out of the 
37 above-mentioned companies were of this type.
The BFIA table helped the author to decide the minimum amount invested by each 
company in order to be considered in the analysis, having as a result a sufficient number of 
observations in the population for the purpose of this study.
However, it is possible that the author was not able to find all the investments over one 
million dollars, possibly due to the lack of formal government statistics. Thus, if the author 
has not included in this study a number of important investments (over one million 
dollars), this should be taken as a statistical error and should be added to the statistical 
error caused by the non-replied questionnaires. Thu sly, some misleading results are 
unavoidable.
Since the researcher of this questionnaire is of Greek origin, the high rate of responses and 
the high percentage of Greek answers in the final results were expected.
Figure A; Composition of Sector for Sixty-Four interviewed Multinationals
Kind of Business (64 Companies - Questionnaire 
Research)
14,10% 21.90%
28,10%
35,90% □  Industry 21,9%
B Services / Banks 28,1 %
□  Trade / Food 35,9%
□  Textiles 14,1%
Source: Author’s Questionnaire Research 
According to the existing literature, there has been no other statistically analysed research
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for Bulgaria with such a magnitude (64 companies have been interviewed and answered a 
questionnaire) and statistical significant sample, in order to identify the incentives and 
barriers for the FDI decisions in Bulgaria. Other surveys tried to determine incentives and 
barriers for more than one country simultaneously with less than 64 MNEs as a sample for 
one specific country.
The response size was 64 out of 131, and it formed the sample size. Literature has shown 
that this response rate in the subject area is extremely large and according to statistics a 
sample size (response rate) of 10% of the population of interest is regarded big enough to 
allow secure inferences about the population of interest. Our response rate was 48.9% of 
the updated catalogue. The sample is very representative since it comprises companies that 
have invested a very significant amount of US $ for the economic figures of Bulgaria. The 
invested volume of the 131 companies adds to around 70% of the total foreign invested 
capital in Bulgaria (Total FDI inflows in Bulgaria: 1.7 billion US$ in mid 1998).
The sample of the questionnaire analysis is also representative because the answers (see
Figures A and B). Moreover, in our sample the answers collected and analyzed, belonged
almost proportionally to the sectors of industry, services and trade. In our questionnaire
survey the services sector accounts 28% and the official FDI inflows in Bulgaria in the
same sector were 18% (Finance 11,4% + Tourism 5,1% + Telecommunications 1,8%
=18.3%). Trade in our questionnaire survey accounts 36% and the official FDI inflows in
Bulgaria in the same sector were 19,2%. Finally, the answers from the industrial sector
were 22% and textiles 14% (total 36%) and at the same time the official FDI inflows in
Bulgaria in the industrial sector were 55% of the total.
Figure B: Bulgarian FDI Inflows 1989-2000 {% sector)
Bulgarian FDI inflows 1989-2000 (% sector)
Industry 
Trade 
Finance 
Tourism 
Transport 
Telecom m unications 
Construction 
Agriculture 
Others
5^1 
i \ r
0,0% 10,0% 20,0% 30,0% 40,0% 50,0% 60,0%
Source; BFIA Catalogue
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Table A; Questionnaire Survey Prç^erties
Frequency Percent
Valid until end 
1997 55 85.9
1998 9 14.1
Total 64 100.0
Total 64 100.0
Way of Completing Frequency (No of companies) Percentage (%)
Fax 9 14.1
Telephone 10 15.6
By Post 3 4.7
E-mail, www 19 29.7
Interview 23 35.9
Total 64 100 which year MNEs have made the initial 
investment
Average of MNEs FDI inflows (from the questionnaire research) -  
AVERAGE=14.4I2
V alid
F re q u e n c y P e rc e n t
l e s s  th a n  m e a n  
v o lu m e  of In v e s tm e n t 51 79.7
g re a te r  th a n  m e a n  
v o lu m e  of I n v e s tm e n t 13 20.3
T otal 64 100,0
V a l i d  G R E E K
E U R O P E A N
O T H E R
Total
T o t a l
F r e q u e n c y
37
22
S
G4
84
57.8
34.4
7.8
100.0
100.0
Home location of MNEs (origin)
Vrblld I N D U S T R Y
S E R V IC E S /B A N K S
T R A D E /F O O D
TEXTILES
Total
F re q u e n c y
14
18
23
2 1 .8
28.1
36.8
14.1
100.0
V a l i d n o  a d d i t i o n a l  
I n v e s t m e n t  
a d d i t i o n a l  
i n v e s t m e n t  
T Ota I
F r e q u e n c y
14
50
64
P e r c e n t
21.9
78.1
100.0
Kind of Business -  the sector that an MNE belongs to additional investments in the future
Source: Author’s Questionnaire Research
VIII. S tatistica l problems
"'‘Even in established market economies standard statistical data provide only an 
incomplete description o f  economic reality, but in countries in transition data deficiencies 
and biases are much more serious”f
Under central planning, the output of state enterprises was often exaggerated, whereas 
during the transition, there are strong tax incentives for the output of the private sector to 
be underreported by large margins, conventional statistics fail to reflect the sharp 
improvement in the quality of goods and the satisfaction of the demand in the transition 
period, relative to the previous situation with enormous output and unsatisfied demand. 
Reported unemployment data and fiscal deficits during the communist period were 
problematic and cross-borders transactions are poorly reported. Regarding the foreign 
direct investment inflows comparisons have been made with three different sources of data 
have been considered (it is important to be noticed that the late 2000 data from all the 
resources more or less has been converged).
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One source of data is a database, which was retrieved from IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, UN, 
WIIW ETC., the second one is the Bulgarian balance of payments, which is used by all the 
international organisations and the third one is the Foreign Investment Agency in Bulgaria 
-  together with the Bulgarian NSI-, in which the data are derived from the companies’ 
information. Moreover, tables for comparing the inflows of FDI in different countries are 
presented in the whole thesis.
However, there is a problem in making comparisons using these data, due to the fact that 
four elements are included in FDI and thus, for example many countries exclude one of the 
components of FDI, usually the re-investments of the foreign companies. Besides, the 
comparisons are also inaccurate because each country follows a different method of 
calculating FDI. Thus, one country has followed the USA model, which defines as FDI the 
acquisition of at least 10% of the total shares of a company, whilst another country has 
followed the German model, which defines as FDI the acquisition of at least 25% of the 
total shares. Investments below these percentages are considered as portfolio investment.
On the other hand, as it was mentioned before, extensive help from several organisations 
has been received. They willingly provided statistical data for Central and East European 
countries and especially for Bulgaria. Therefore, the serious obstacle mentioned in other 
studies regarding the lack of available and necessary data has been overcome. The author 
was given the chance to compare statistical data from thirteen (13) different sources of data 
(OECD, EBRD, IMF, UN, UNCTAD, EIU, BNB, BNSI, BFIA, BP A, WB, Plan Econ. 
Reports, WIIW publications -  see abbreviations) and discuss all of them. There was 
scepticism about the reliability of Bulgarian statistics -  especially for the ex-transition 
years -  a situation shared by other Central and East European countries as well. The 
economic survey of Europe in 1989/1990 published by the United Nation Economic 
Commission for Europe argued that the initial estimates of Bulgaria’s growth in NMP for 
1988 were reduced by almost four percentage points in early 1990. Moreover, a deliberate 
distortion of the statistics has to be pointed out. Singh & Park (1985) have discussed and 
suggested that the overall growth in real Bulgarian NMP over the 1970s should be revised 
downwards to 5,4% per annum due to problems in the official treatment of the trade 
sector’s contribution to total NMP. They claimed that the estimates of growth rates in GDP 
are subject to even greater uncertainty, since there are few data on the performance of the 
non-material sectors of the economy.
Many times throughout the years of our research these statistical problems were 
experienced. Different editions of the same source of reference provide different figures
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for the same variable. However, the latest publications with updated data from different 
sources agree more or less to the estimates of all the economic data not only about the 
Bulgarian economy, but also for all Central Eastern European economies.
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CHAPTER ONE
1.1 In trod u ction
The legacy of the communist regime in Bulgaria created unfavourable conditions of the 
transition to a market economy. In 1989 Bulgaria was an industrialised country, which 
produced low quality products that were distributed to the CMEA countries and the USSR. 
The collapse of both of them also created a lack of foreign trade partners. Therefore, 
finding new partners as well as making changes in the composition and in the geographical 
distribution of the producing commodities was also necessary. Moreover, energy lacks due 
to the strong dependence on the Soviet Union imports and its energy crisis in 1990 and the 
segmentation of the USSR further aggravate the situation.
The transition to a market economy needs new policies to be applied. The whole package 
of the transition process includes stabilisation programme, structural reform and 
liberalisation of trade, prices and exchange rates. One of the worst initial economic 
conditions due to the legacy of the communist regime that existed in Bulgaria led the 
countiy lagging in economic development and thus, attracting limited FDI inflows.
The political instability and the inability or unwillingness for governmental decisions and 
changes during the post-communist period, led to a delay in structural reform, privatisation 
progress and restructuring of state-owned enterprises. The legacy of the communist 
regime in Bulgaria created unfavourable conditions for the transition to a market economy. 
In 1989, Bulgaria was an industrialised country, which produced low quality products, 
which were distributed to the CMEA countries and the USSR. The collapse of both, 
created a lack of foreign trade partners, therefore, finding new partners as well as making 
changes in the composition and the geographical distribution of the producing 
commodities, was necessary. The transition to a market economy was not easy. The 
unfavourable initial economic conditions, due to the legacy of the communist regime, led 
the country to a lag in economic development. A general transformation of the economic 
policies, laws and regulations of the country was needed. A transition process includes 
stabilisation programmes, structural reform and liberalisation of trade, prices and exchange 
rates, privatisation and restructuring of the state-owned enterprises. Because of the 
difficulties and the delay of the Bulgarian transition, FDI inflows were limited In the first 
years.
In this chapter we will try to outline the means and outcomes of transformation of centrally 
planned economies into market economies, the choice of stabilisation policy, modes of
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transition and the speed of economic reforms in general and specifically for Bulgaria. The 
process of transition contains elements of macro-economic stabilisation or adjustment, 
together with monetary, credit, fiscal and income policy, economic liberalisation of prices, 
trade, capital account, currency convertibility and exchange rates. The liberalisation 
provides competition opportunities and creates alternatives to the market and a more 
competitive environment for a successful integration into the world market, systemic 
reform of institutions, market and bankruptcy mechanism and competition. Furthermore, 
institutional reform of financial sector, legal, accounting, tax, pension system and system 
of unemployment compensation, ownership, social safety net, restructuring and 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The development of the banking sector 
and the financial reform, in general, contains elements from both the institutional reform 
and liberalisation policy. In addition, exchange rate policy also includes liberalisation of 
the rate, currency convertibility and also systemic reform of the foreign exchange market 
in Bulgaria. Therefore, the structural-systemic reform has been embodied in each of the 
following chapters in this thesis, whenever necessary.
This chapter, also analyses the macro-economic development for Bulgaria compared to 
other Central and East European countries, as well as, its initial conditions, causes and 
consequences of the three economic crises, the monetary policy, the income policy, the 
currency board, the monetary overhang, the re-allocation of capital and labour from 
industry toward services, and the economic obstacles and problems in choosing the road to 
the transition. It primarily, analyses the liberalisation of foreign trade, exchange rates and 
prices. Bulgarian foreign trade partners, imports, exports, tariffs and its trade balance have 
been studied. An important component of trade policy is the exchange rate, because a 
change in the level of the exchange rate immediately changes the competitiveness of 
exporters and importers and thus affects trade flows. There is also an extensive 
presentation and analysis of statistical data, tables and graphs about GDP, output, 
employment & unemployment rates, balance of payments, debt, current account, budget 
balance, wages, unit labour cost, etc.
1.2 B ulgarian  T ran sition  to a m arket econom y
Bulgaria is one of the smallest of Central and Eastern European countries. Its’ monetary 
unit is the lev\ The territory of the Republic of Bulgaria is divided into 278 municipalities 
and 9 regions.^ Bulgaria today has practically no illiteracy, the labour-force is highly 
qualified and educated and more than 50% of the employees have secondary and higher 
education. This was a result of the struggle for improving their lives and a strong tradition
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of cherishing education. In the decades of socialism, notable advances in education and 
health care were made. Bell (1997)^ mentioned that "'Bulgaria ranked among the most 
advanced nations in terms o f the proportion o f its eligible population that received 
secondary and higher education”. The country’s dependence on the USSR and the CMEA 
caused its heavy industrialization, and led the country’s industry to pay attention to 
quantity rather than quality of the products. Because of the country’s specialization on 
certain products its workers were highly skilled in certain sectors. This positive aspect is 
diminished in front of the negative aspects of the lack of variety and quality of goods, the 
lack of environmental concern, lack of management and good governance motivation, 
quantity rather than profit orientation, governmental subsidies that turned to bad loans, 
bureaucracy, low productivity, low motivation, and many other aspects, which are 
discussed throughout the thesis.
1.3 The tran sition  to Com m unism
The end of the 2"  ^ World War found Bulgaria in a difficult economic situation build 
through years of being in the wrong side of the wars. Bulgaria’s contact with the ex-Soviet 
Union at the end of the war strengthened the growing interest of Bulgarians in 
communism.
1.3.1 The first years o f the tr a n s it io n - the Soviet U nion influence
Close to the end of 2”  ^ World War (1944) Bulgaria found itself in an awkward political 
position. Bulgaria in the beginning of the war sided up with Germany, but at the end of the 
war, when the defeat of the Germans was close and the monstrosities of the Nazis started 
to show, Bulgaria wanted to join the forces of the opposing side. This attempt seemed 
really dangerous with the German troops all over Bulgarian ground. At the end, the Soviet 
Union cut the ‘Gordian Bond’ and declared war on Bulgaria on September 8, 1944. Not 
surprisingly, the Soviet troops were rather welcome from the Bulgarian people.
There were a lot of steps in order for Bulgaria to be a truly Communist state. Communism 
was growing in the Bulgarian people since 1943, when the Fatherland Frond (FF) was 
formed. FF was the mass organization of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), which 
had a long history in Bulgaria, and was formed by Communists, Socialists and other 
factionsf In September 1946, Bulgaria was declared a Republic by a referendum on the 
monarchy, which ended the dynasty that had twice taken the country to war along side with 
Germany. The transformation of the political system was completed in December 1947
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with the ‘Dimitrov constitution’ that declared Bulgaria as a ‘People’s Republic’. It was 
drafted in the ex-USSR and it was of a typical Soviet style; promising all freedoms to the 
people, accepting Marxism-Leninism as the ruling ideology for all parties, and stating the 
leading role of the communist party. The one-party system was imposed at the end of 
1947.
Until 1990, when free elections were held and the Communist party lost its constitutionally 
guaranteed exclusive power, the party controlled the government and all aspects of 
national life. The government controlled all functions of the economy, from the 
agricultural trade, which worked through co-operative farms, to the financial sector. The 
Bulgarian economy was a centrally planned and managed one, where the government 
determined the allocation of resources and output at all the levels of production. The 
nationalisation of the industry was quickly and easily accomplished, foreign trade was 
made a government monopoly and the state integrated into a system with alliances and 
agreements with Stalin’s Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. The FF 
resumed its former name, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) on December 1948. 
They created a socialist economy and social structure based on the Soviet model. In fact 
every “... aspect o f  national life seemed to be refashioned on the Soviet model: education, 
culture, economy, architecture and military. To keep the Bulgarians on the correct line 
there were ever more Soviet advisors attached to every arm o f government. ” [Crampton 
(1997, p. 194)]^ The intent to turn the economy from the agricultural to the heavy 
industrial sector was made obvious in 1949, when the first five-year plan came into 
operation. The plans from 1948 to 1960 followed the strategy of extensive growth by 
means of high accumulation and step-by-step the machine building and the chemical 
industry became the dominant industrial branches and dictated the industrial growth rate.
1.3.2 B ulgaria  under T odor Z hivkov -s tr o n g  dependence on the Soviet 
U nion (1954-1989)
During the Communist period, Bulgaria was under the influence of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), still, it made efforts to improve its relations with Greece, USA 
and Yugoslavia. Even after Stalin’s death, Bulgaria followed the revised Soviet attitude 
adopted by Stalin’s successors in the Kremlin. In March 1954, Todor Zhivkov®, became 
the new BCP leader and Bulgarian Prime Minister. He was the longest serving communist 
leader in Eastern Europe. Zhivkov ""always stressed fidelity to the Soviet Union, going as 
far as to ask the USSR to admit Bulgaria as the sixteenth Soviet Republic”. [Bell 1997, 
p.3 57]  ^ During most of the Communist period, under the leadership of Todor Zhivkov,
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Bulgaria was one of the most restrictive societies among the former Soviet satellites. 
Remarks like the one he made on September 1973 show his eagerness to be one with the 
Soviet Union: ""Bulgaria and the Soviet Union would act as single body, breathing with the 
same lungs and nourished by the same bloodstream”. [Crampton 1997, pi 99]®
In 1958, Bulgaria announced the completion of the collectivisation of agriculture. The end 
of this process was considered the end of the period of transition to the centrally planned 
economy, and marked the end of the economic revolution era. During these first years of 
the mass mobilisation of efforts and the political enthusiasm, Bulgaria experienced 
significant growth. At the end of the 1950s, the new economic system began to show signs 
of failure, a fact that was demonstrated by the increasing failure to meet with the five-year- 
plan targets. On 1964, the unsatisfactory economic performance led to the first of a series 
of reforms towards the improvement of the system. The reforms introduced management 
systems in some enterprises (consumer goods’ producers) and also a system where wages, 
premiums and enterprise funds were formed according to profits. The reforms extended in 
investments, shifting the responsibility from the state budget to bank credit, and to price 
regulations by introducing three types of prices - pegged, flexible and free. By 1967, this 
system was extended on the two-thirds of the industrial enterprises. The reforms continued 
in the 1970s, focusing especially on the further integration of the existing enterprises, with 
the purpose of reducing their number so as to make supervision over their activities easier. 
The result of these actions was the fact that the output concentration in Bulgarian 
enterprises was higher than that in Western Europe.
During the 1980s, the Bulgarian state made several efforts, through institutional reforms to 
reduce the state-owned industrial property, but still most of it, remained under state 
ownership. As Bulgaria reaches the end of the communist era (1986-1989), there were 
more efforts to put all management functions at a firm level and reduce the plan targets 
controlled by ministries. There was also an effort to improve product quality in order to 
meet with the CMEA export requirements.
During the communist period Bulgaria was a ""typical ~ Little- Stalin” communist country. 
Bulgarian economy was highly centralized and planned and was mainly based on heavy 
industry. From the social point of view the industrialization raised living standards, but it 
also resulted in internal immigration towards towns, and created pollution in many areas. 
Bulgaria was heavily depended economically on the Soviet Union, being a member of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA/COMECON)^ and the Warsaw Pact, and 
remained for a long time USSR's most dependable allies. In return, the USSR granted
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Bulgaria with substantial financial aid, during the 1970s, which was used for 
industrialisation and also energy imports, mainly oil, in low prices. Bulgaria produced low- 
quality manufactured goods and exported them to CMEA and high-quality agricultural 
products in Scandinavia, North America and the Far East and imported other goods, 
especially oil from Soviet Union at low prices. CMEA schemes and agreements had a 
beneficial effect on the Bulgarian economy. Bulgaria’s low-quality manufactured goods 
were exported to the CMEA countries and its high-quality agricultural products in 
Scandinavia, North America and the Far East. These trade actions brought a relative 
stability and gradual economic improvement during 1960s and 1970s, owing to the Eastern 
countries and especially to ex-Soviet Union.
1.3.3 The R eta lia tion  Period A gainst Turkish M inority; an obstacle for 
Turkish FDI outflow s in B ulgaria
Bulgaria, through the years, had varying relationship with its neighbouring countries, 
Turkey was a country, which was never in friendly terms with Bulgaria. Besides the 
obvious hostility developed by the 500 years of Turkish occupation, and the bad blood 
remaining from the Balkan Wars, there was another, more recent point of friction among 
the two countries; the Pomaks and the Muslims of Bulgaria. The fact that the Bulgarians 
with Turkish roots were not wanted in Bulgaria was plainly demonstrated by Prime 
Minister, Chervenkov, when in 1952, has encouraged the emigration of 250,000 Turks. 
This happened in a time, when Bulgaria was one of the most restrictive Eastern societies, 
and a little before, it was the year 1953, when a government decision stated that anyone 
who left the country illegally could be sentenced with the death penalty and their families 
might be taken to concentration camps. On that particular incident, Turkey^® agreed to take 
only 162,000 before they closed their borders.^'
The pressures on the Turkish population were intensified after the 1971 programme for the 
creation of a unified socialist nation. In the early 1970’s Pomaks were required to adopt 
Slav names, or be punished and by 1974-75, Turkish schools and Turkish language 
newspapers and journals were shut down.’^  Another 130,000 Turks left Bulgaria between 
1968-1978.'®
""There are no Turks in Bulgaria” Zhivkov stated in the mid-1980’s supporting the idea of 
a unified socialist nation. In 1984-85, there was another attempt to assimilate the 800,000 
Bulgarian ethnic Turks by obliging them to take Bulgarian or Slav names. However, the 
governmental attitude was not against Turks. Zhivkov based the governments’ persistence
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on the fact that ""the most o f the ethnic Turks were really Bulgarians who had been forcibly 
converted to Islam and a Turkish identity during the Ottoman period' [Bell (1997), p.359]. 
He was, in fact referring to Pomaks who had been Islamicised and Turkified under the 
Ottoman rule. Another reason was a demographic trend that appeared in the 1980s showing 
a bigger birth rate for Turks. That created the fear that the 10 per cent of Turkish 
population in Bulgaria would increase following the example of northern Cyprus. This 
precision led a part of the Turkish minority to go on hunger strike on the August of 1989 
and that forced Zhivkov to announce that ethnic Turks once again were free to leave from 
Bulgaria if ""they preferred capitalist Turkey to socialist Bulgaria”. After that 344,000' 
ethnic Turks left Bulgaria, until Turkish authorities closed their borders since this massive 
emigration created problems to Turkey. This event led to the international isolation of 
Zhivkov and gave the opportunity to Petur Mladenov, the minister for foreign affairs and 
the leader of a cabal, to act against Zhivkov, and become, with the acceptance of Russia, 
the new Prime Minister after the resignation of Zhivkov on 10 ,^ November 1989. Within 
four months about 42% of the people, which emigrated had returned to Bulgaria.’®
Thus, although the existence of Turkish minority in Bulgaria is an incentive for significant 
FDI inflows there, on the other hand the unfavourable bilateral relations in the past were a 
barrier, especially at the beginning of the Bulgarian transition. From table lb we can argue 
that Turkey appeared only in the 12  ^ place with limited invested volume. However, the 
existence of minority and the geographical proximity have been proved strong enough in 
order over 6300 Turkish companies to be registered in Bulgaria (table la). The significant 
number of Turkish companies and the limited amount of FDI flows can be explained from 
the fact that most of the Turkish registered companies are not active in the Bulgarian 
economic environment, together with the event that Turkish entrepreneurs use offshore 
enterprises in order to invest in Bulgaria and that most of those thousand of companies 
prefer to invest in Bulgaria for exploring the Turkish minority and thus to produce 
significant value added activities with insignificant FDI outflows.
X* COUNTRY OF 
INVESTOR
BOURGAS VARNA PLOVDIV SOFIA
CITY
STARA
ZAGORA
HASKOVO TOTAL BY 
COUNTRIES
1. TURKEY 400 205 1153 1203 152 586 6366
2. RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
350 743 302 1225 88 59 4004
3. GREECE 60 52 547 1575 43 96 3746
4. CHINA 4 12 51 2733 1 2 2878
5. SYRIA 43 136 216 1747 31 3 2399
6. ARMENIA 378 323 564 356 34 39 2254
7. ITALY 56 69 360 895 30 7 1867
8. FYROM 6 9 38 232 10 4 1606
9. UKRAINE 163 255 123 490 23 26 1578
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JVt COUNTRY
INVESTOR
OF BOURGAS VARNA PLOVDIV SOFIA
CITY
STARA
ZAGORA
HASKOVO TOTAL BY 
COUNTRIES
10. GERMANY 89 146 115 757 31 15 1554
Source: BFIA August 2002
Table 1b: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS IN BULGARIA BY EACH COUNTRY BY YEARS in USDS
Nr. C o u n try 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Jan-June
2002
Total by 
countries
1 GREECE 0.2 5.1 3 29.8 14.6 I6.I 3.3 14.9 241.1 213.6 78.2 619.9
2 GERMANY O.I 56.6 111 16.2 53.1 31.4 55.7 101 72.3 65.1 23.0 586.2
3 ITALY 0 0.2 5.2 2.3 1.2 0.4 2.1 23 339.7 77.3 13.9 465.3
4 BELGIUM 0 O.I 0.3 10 0.8 264 31.2 66.2 39.8 3.1 0.6 416.5
5 AUSTRIA 13 I 14.7 1.4 12.1 12.5 46.9 23.4 88.8 137.4 8.6 359.8
6 USA 0 10.5 16.2 16.1 20.7 46.6 38.6 49.8 37.1 41.4 8.4 285.4
7 CYPRUS 0.3 1.2 0.4 1.4 7.5 20.6 109 109 -11.3 29.1 6.1 273.3
8 RUSSIA 0.3 1.4 2.3 15.1 14.4 2 14.8 104 50.8 0.5 0.1 205.4
9 NETHERLANDS 0.1 0.5 37.9 0.9 46.3 10.8 41.3 28 17.4 21.6 -6.3 198.5
10 UK 6.2 5.6 2.4 13.7 7.3 15.8 58.9 48 22.6 15.5 -0.8 195.2
11 TURKEY 0 9.8 1.3 13.7 7.3 9.9 23.8 39.4 19.5 3.8 7.5 136.0
Source: Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency 2003,
1.4. Bulgaria in the Post-C om m unist Period
The Bulgarian communist regime did not collapse in a climate of violence and revolution, 
as in Yugoslavia or Romania. It was the so-called “disguised” transition to democracy 
brought from within the communist party as a response to the public feeling and the 
obvious fact that the virtues of communisms were becoming obsolete in the world order of 
the times. Petur Mladenov, then the minister of foreign affairs, and Dobri Dzhurov, 
minister of defence, forced the resignation of Zhivkov. It was the 10  ^of November 1989; 
one day after East Germany opened the Berlin Wall, that the BCP accepted Zhivkov’s 
resignation. After the fall of the communist regime Bulgaria faced great political 
instability, changing eight prime ministers in seven years (as shown in table Ic).
Table 1c: Bulgarian Governments (1990-2002)
1. ANDREI 
LOUKANOV
Bulgarian Prime Ministers 
19 December 1990 if
Bulgarian Presidents ! 
1. Mladenov (BCP) from j 
November 1989 until! 
7/7/1990 i
1 2. DIMITUR 
POPOV
20 December 1990 -  
7 November 1991
Independent, coalition 
jgovemment
1:
i1
3. FILIP 
DIMITROV
8 November I99I -  
29 December 1992
UDF 2. Zhelev (UDF) from j ; 
August 1990 -  May 1996 1
i 4. LYUBBN 
BEROV
30 December 1992 -  
17 October 1994 
(Professor of economic i 
history) j
BSP 1
|:
5. RENATA 
INDZHOVA
17 October 1994 -  
24 January 1995
Caretaker government i
6. ZHAN 
VIDENOV
25 January 1995 -  
11 February 1997
BSP 3. Stoyanov (agreed as aj 
president from all parties) ! 
from 1/6/1996 -  nowadays i
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7. STEFAN 
SOFIANSKI
12 February 1997 -  
20 May 1997
Caretaker government
8. IVAN 
KOSTOV
21 May 1997 -  June 2001 UDF
9. Simeon Saxe- 
Coburg-Gotha
PRIME MINISTER 
June, 17 2001 - ...,
National Movement | 
Simeon II -  42,73 per cent j
(Exiled King Simeon II) 4. Georgi Parvanov (BSP) 
53.3%, Nov. 2001 
[44-year old academic, who 
has the reputation of a 
conciliator and moderniser]
Source: Bitzenis* investigation -  various sou rces
Nevertheless, it is not only the changes in governments alone, which led to the delay in the 
stabilisation, liberalisation and structural reform, and consequently to the delay of the 
smooth transition to a market economy. Bulgaria lagged behind most of the rest of Central 
and Eastern Europe in economic reform due to several reasons such as the adverse initial 
conditions and the inability or unwillingness of the politicians to introduce adequate 
reforms.
Table 2: Direction of Bulgarian Trade (1945-1998)
¥VVVVVWyVVVV>rWVV«»VVVVVVVVVVW»VVVVVVDIRECTION/S
OURCE
YEARS
USSR
(OR
RUSSIA I 
AFTER j 
1990)
OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN ! 
COUNTRIES [Cuba's 
percentage is also added 
(1960-1983)]
TOTAL
EASTERN
EUROPEAN/
CMEA (OR
FORMER
CMEA)
WESTERN 1 
COUNTRIES/ 1 ; 
OTHER 1
i
EXPORTS !
1945 .95.............j .3........................................................ j 98 2 ] :I 1950 54 if 37 I 91 9
I I960 53.8 1 30.2 84.2 1Ÿ8 ^
1 1965 :S 2 .i i r B . i  ________ i 79.6__________________________j 20 .4___________ 1
i 1970 s i s  |2 Ÿ 5  i 79.7 I 20.3
i 1975 54.6 25.4 80 '^20 ...........1
i }1980_________
1 1983
49.9_____ i
58.5
23. 5_________________________I
20.6
70.8
76.4 I
29.2 ! 
23.6
1 1990 64 12.1 76.1 I (EU) if (other)
5.6 i| 18.4 J
17.4 il 27.6
: 1992 17.r i 5.1 i 22.2 I 31.5 146.3
: IMPORTS : ...................................................................
1 1945 93 1l l
i 1950 . -  1 Î 14
i I960 * 5 2 T ” ~ ir3 2 :7  ...............  i|84 | I 6
i 1965 1150 if 24.3  ^ i; 74.2 25.8
! 1970 : 52.2 if 24 1 76.1 .....................1 23.9 ................. ......
1 1975 15^7 Ip tU 72:5........................if 27.5 j
: 1980 57.3 if21.6 178.9 if 21.1
: 1983 I 58.5 [ 21.8_________________________ il 80.2____________ 1 19.8____________ j
111990 I 56.5 if 11.6 68.1 if (EU) il (other) 1
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w«vvvvvwvvvYWwww«w«vvvvvMrw«v<MVW
......... i 20.4
1991 43.2 i 3.2 45.4 126.4 i 27.2
1992 22.7 i  5.3 j 28 if35.5 i 36.4j Ï998 1 20.1 i  5.2 iJ l l ___________H 5.2  i 29,5
Sources: WIIW database, EIU various reports
Furthermore, Bulgaria’s grave economic dependence upon the USSR [see table 2], the 
collapse of the COMECON, which caused the most damage in Bulgaria comparing to other 
transition economies, the unification of Germany and many other reasons, led Bulgaria to 
face more obstacles in its economic development. On the other hand, though, the already 
existing industry set up by the USSR financial aid, along with Bulgaria’s highly skilled and 
relatively cheap industry workers, gives one strong incentive among the others for foreign 
investors.
1.5 The Transition  from Communism to Democracy
A successful transition process may be treated as a tool for the economic development of a 
country. However, transition "... in not only an intermediate goal contributing to economic 
development. It may also be regarded as an ultimate objective in itself. The market 
economy, in contrast to central planning, gives, in principle, the individual the right to 
basic choices over aspects o f  his or her life: occupation and place o f  work, where to live, 
what to consume, what risks to take or avoid, and so on. ” [EBRD (1994)'®]
There is a distinct difference between transition fi"om a planned to a market economy and 
transition from a communist regime to a democracy, which should be also considered. In 
other words, after the Central and East European countries faced the collapse of the 
communist regime and they moved to democracy, they adopted monetary, income, fiscal 
stabilisation policies and institutional reforms in order to establish in their economic 
environment all the elements of a functioning market economy. Thus, it is necessary to 
discuss shortly the transition to democracy and the need of having a “strict or severe 
government”, which would not sacrifice the successful implementation of its reform policy 
for the sake of popularity. The opposite was the case in Bulgaria, hence the long delay in 
adopting adequate structural reforms, successful and effective privatisation and 
stabilisation policies.
A very important factor in studying the transition process is the way the initial dismissal of 
the communist regime occurred. Regimes ‘fall’ in many different ways, for example ""the 
transition o f power was smooth and peaceful in Poland and Hungary, which had a 
tradition o f dialogue and negotiations; it was peaceful but painful in East Germany,
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Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria; and it was painful and violent in Romania which was on the 
verge o f  civil war by Christmas 1989”. [Berglund et al (1994) We can define six 
general models with regard to the way that the transition to democracy was achieved:
1) Violent reform: the old regime is overthrown by a violent uprising and is replaced by 
the forces of the opposition (e.g. Romania)
2) Quiet reform: the old regime is faced with a peaceful yet determined opposition and 
eventually hands over power to the latter (e.g. Czechoslovakia)
3) Compromise reform: the communist regime gives in to the demand for 
démocratisation by joining the democratic opposition. This can be either the result of 
pressure upon the former (e.g. Poland), or a conscious political decision for a gradual 
reform on the part of the old regime (e.g. Hungary)
4) Diplomacy reform; the transition is achieved through political intervention of an 
external power. This model refers exclusively to the GDR where the collapse of the old 
regime and the subsequent reunion with West Germany was demanded by the latter 
(e.g. GDR)
5) Mixed reform: the old regime, (Yugoslavian case), being the most liberal compared to 
other ex-communist countries during the pre-transition period, remained in power, 
promised transition reforms, but failed to change the situation. Only after 1999, many 
years after the totalitarian dictatorship of Milosevic, when the country suffered a lot 
from the NATO war and its embargo, a democratic regime finally has been established 
in the country, starting from the beginning the reforms and the actual transition to a 
market economy (e.g. Yugoslavia (FRY))
6) Disguised reform: the old regime anticipates the inevitable changes and in attempt to 
stay in power “disguises” itself as a democratic socialist party (e.g. Bulgaria).
Bulgaria’s regime was transformed, by a ‘disguised reform’. The ruling elite in Bulgaria 
lacked pressure from a strong opposition and they moved to the political opening only 
when the Soviet Union made a political intervention. Then the communist party renamed 
itself to Socialist party, scheduled and won the first elections.
1.6 The T ran sition  from Planned to M arket Econom y
The transition from a centralized economy to a market oriented economy is, in essence, 
the introduction of the private involvement in the productive sectors of the economy and 
the reduction of the state to the role of the legislator and facilitator of economic activity 
rather than the guiding force of the market. In centrally planned markets the decision­
making is the obligation and privilege of the state. Centralised markets are usually
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dominated by a social aspect of welfare, which allows the government to manipulate 
output, pricing, employment, etc. in ways that fit the socialistic profile of the market. Since 
the market forces do not guide the economic activities, they are biased and inaccurate in 
their valuation and estimation by market-oriented standards.
In socialist countries the income is distributed in a somewhat fair way, and the education 
and health levels are considerably high compared to countries with similar per capita 
income, due to the social safety net provided by the state. Still the economic results are 
usually artificial, since the state is not an entrepreneur so it is not profit-oriented, or 
efficiency oriented, thus the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more of a static 
mechanism of maintaining production rather than a dynamic economic force aiming at 
development and improvement.
The static nature of a direct government planning also affected the technological gap 
between the country and the developed world. When the decision for the transition is 
made, the whole structure of the country is proven inadequate to face free market, 
especially the citizens, which are not prepared to face the economic adversity and 
uncertainty that goes along with the free market structure, being protected for so long by 
the social safety net.
In the turning point of the transition the countries in question lack essential elements of 
facilitating a free market structure. There is no regulation, clearly, defining the 
individual property rights, which are essential in the development of a private sector. The 
institutional and legal infrastructure has been adjusted to the needs of a centralised market, 
so the country lacks commercial legislations and market oriented taxation systems, and 
sometimes there is no domestic price system in countries belonging to organizations like 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMBA). The Banking system is hardly 
market oriented; the financial markets non-exist, and there are no open labour markets.
The social aspect of the transition to a market economy is complicated and difficult to 
manage. The first issue is that citizens have trivial private property, since the vast majority 
of property belongs to the state. This trivial property together with the low per capita 
income, which was deteriorated by high inflation, resulted to the fact that people faced 
poverty, and thus restricted from access to certain goods, which safety net provided them 
with during the communist years (EBRD, 1997)'^. People with small savings cannot 
participate in any privatisation plan or in establishment of new private companies, until
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some restitution or mass privatisation plan is issued, so they are also negative to foreign 
investors in fear of unemployment and foreign control. The state, in this point, should not 
stall the changes or avoid decisions, which are “hard” on the people, in order to satisfy 
political purposes. Instead they should take rapid measures for restructuring of the whole 
country, and quick and fair re-distribution of state property to the people in order to avoid 
worst circumstances. Another social issue that arises is the power of the infamous 
nomenklatura, members of the former communist party, state officials and politicians, 
which maintain a degree of power and they are not willing to let it go. Nomenklatura, in 
the lack of efficient control of the changes, manage to create corruption, fraud and 
underline criminality in the state agencies and in all the transactions, aiming in benefiting 
of the whole procedure of privatisation and of other profit opportunities, exchanging their 
political power for economic prosperity. Those people affect the state and cause delays in 
the structural reform and inequality in any distribution of state wealth, increasing the 
wealth distances of the people. Another socio-structural problem is the increased 
interference of bureaucracy in the economic activity. This is not only a matter of structure 
or regulations, but also a matter of mentality of state officials, which needs to be changed.
The macroeconomic point of view is equally disappointing. The typical initial conditions 
of internal finances is the accumulation of bad loans to the state banks and the state itself 
from loss-making state companies, which had to remain operational, because of the 
socialistic policy (unemployment avoidance), but failed to become efficient due to many 
reasons. In turn, the external finances are also loaded with debts to international 
organizations and other countries. In order to finance the transition and restructuring of the 
state and firms, the state keeps increasing the external loans, and the companies the 
internal. The country faces high fiscal deficits, because authorities cannot balance the 
revenues and expenditures, due to several reasons such as the tax arrears, low productivity, 
increase of barter trade and increase of shadow economy.
The issue of the exchange rate regime is as significant as it is controversial in the first 
stages of the transition. The fact that countries, which used the exact opposite regimes, 
fixed exchange rate with the currency of a developed country or floating exchange rate, 
have reached success, implies that the choice of the regime is not as important as the 
efficient handling of the money supply and other important element by the state. The fixed 
exchange rate regime (pegging and other techniques) is safer, working as a ‘monetary 
anchor’ for the first steps. On contrary, if the country undertakes a flexible exchange rate 
regime may be denominated in no time, causing monetary crisis. Still it is essential for the
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country’s development and economic independence to be able to replace the fixed for a 
floating exchange rate regime (World Economic Outlook, 2000)'®.
1.7 The Steps needed for a successful transition process to a market 
economy
An efficient transition takes place in four steps (see table 3), each contributing, 
independently and inter-dependently, in transforming of the country in question.
Table 3; Four Steps for the Transition to Market Economy
MACROECONOMIC
STABILISATION
LIBERALISATION STRUCTURAL or 
Institutional REFORM
PRTVAT ISATIOn X ]  1 
RESTRUCTURING i ;
Monetary Policy
Decrease the monetary 
overhang, control of the 
! money supply__________
Prices, increase of the 
competition, increase of i 
the prices of products, 
stop the subsidies______ |
Legislation
Extensive introduction of 
new laws and rules for a 
new market environment
Clear (Well defined) | 
Property Rights, 
demonopolization |
1 Exchange Rate Policy
I Fixed Exchange rate as an 
i  anchor for stabilization
Commercialization of
state-owned enterprises
Restitution and 1 1
settlement of claims 11
Wage Policy 
Workers need new social 
safety net, unemployment 
benefits, increase of 
1 wages, increase of 
unemployment rate
Open Trade Rules 
New trade partners, new i 
trade agreements, stop 
subsidies, new 
competitive products, 
increase competition, 
differentiation of the 
products, increased 
quality of the products, 
no trade barriers, 
elimination of quotas 
and tariffs
New worker 
environment, giving 
power to the worker’s 
councils, new accounting 
rules, protection of 
consumers, steps for 
improvement of the 
infrastructure, protection 
of environment
Introduction of 
privatization and 11 
liquidation laws
I
III
1 Credit Policy, Interest 
Rate Policy, Low interest 
: rates to be competitive the 
! environment
Adoption of commercial 
code, privatization rules, 
competition rules
Stop Monopolies 11
Increase of the j 
competition |
Financial Policy 
Decrease foreign debt,
1 decrease all tlie deficits,
1 balance the state budget, 
1 revenues from 
1 privatization deals
Openness of the 
economy
Entry access for foreign I 
investors, worker 
mobility, establishment i 
of relations with foreign i 
organizations_________ i
Two-tier Banking 
system. Bankruptcy 
laws, clearing bad debts, 
stop subsidies, hard 
budget constraints, new 
banking rules
Small scale i 
privatization, j 
incentives for creation | 
of new firms, | 
increasing private | 
sector, increasing | 
services’ sector j
! Income Policy
i j Strict income policy as a
I nominal anchor for
II stabilization, decreases in 
j subsidies
Establishing of new 
companies. Liberal 
Market Rules, 
competitive 
environment
New market rules and 
introduction of FDl laws 
and incentives for 
foreign participation
Elimination of j 
governmental i 
intervention i 
Free movements for | 
1 the private sector, 1 
elimination of the | 
1 bureaucracy i
|i Taxation Policy
I Revenues from VAT,
1 ; taxation of revenues of 
j the profits of the new
I private sector or from the
II privatized state-owned__
Currency Convertibility 
Free move of the 
currency with foreign, 
easier foreign 
transaction, attract 
investments, capital ___
Introduction of rules for 
financial intermediaries 
and stock market 
exchange, creation of 
commercial banks, 
foreign branches, foreign
Introducing hard | 
budget constraints, 
corporate | 
governance, new 
i bankruptcy laws |
Aristidis Bitzenis, PhD 3 7
Foreign D irect Investment during the Transition from a Planned to M arket Economy: the case o f  B ulgaria 1989-2001
firms mobility if  banks
Fiscal Policy
Decrease governmental 
expenditures, increase 
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il  social security system
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loans 1
.............. _|
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Decrease the inflation 
rate, keep low inflation 
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The first step is the macro-economic stabilisation program, which should be adopted in 
order to reduce the inflation and money-overhang followed by severe efforts to decrease 
the huge debt burden. There are two determinants for the stabilization process, each of 
which including two different stabilisation strategies; the orthodox and heterodox approach 
combined with the money based and exchange rate based stabilisation strategy. The 
orthodox approach is based on elimination of the budget deficit with strict fiscal policy 
(fiscal anchor) and simultaneously a monetary policy (monetary anchor) is used. In 
heterodox stabilisation approach, income policy is used together with monetary and fiscal 
policy, as an extra tool for rapid and synchronized cut of inflation. Thus, there is direct 
intervention into wages and prices (income anchor). The "... heterodox approach argues 
that budget adjustments and tight monetary policy alone are insufficient to stop high 
inflation...in [the] ...contrary...wage and price controls may be superfluous...\Jho\... 
price controls may be difficult to enforce beyond a very small group o f  commodities... 
controls might be anticipated, controls may be addictive, giving policymakers the idea that 
inflation can be stopped without any other pain... [Those]... controls can introduce a great 
deal o f rigidity in the relative price structure o f  the economy ...controls may prove hard to 
phase out”. [Jeffrey Sachs, (1993)^°]. In money based stabilisation policy, the central 
bank chooses the money stock or the net domestic assets as its main policy target. In 
contrary, in exchange rate based stabilisation, the exchange rate serves as the main 
nominal anchor. Therefore, a country has to choose from Heterodox or Orthodox 
stabilisation policy setting the option of having the exchange rate as an extra nominal 
anchor or using the money based stabilisation program. However, if a country chooses the 
heterodox exchange rate based stabilisation program, but after a short or long time removes 
the wage and price measures, then the program becomes an orthodox exchange rate 
stabilisation program.
Bulgaria has chosen the heterodox money based stabilisation programme. Miguel A. 
Kiguel et al. (1991)^', have argued that ""The effectiveness o f alternative stabilisation 
strategies largely depends on a country's inflationary history ...hyperinflation cannot be
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Stopped always and everywhere in the same way. ” It should be pointed out ""that the money 
based stabilisations apply an inadequate therapy in the wrong way: monetary targeting is 
inadequate because o f  an unstable demand o f money, and it is applied in the wrong way, 
as it has been designed as a medium-term concept and not as a strategy fo r  short-term 
macro-economic fine-tuning”. [Peter Bofinger (1996)^^] Most of the Central and Eastern 
countries followed the heterodox stabilisation programme (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary). Only Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (according 
to Bofinger, 1996), followed the orthodox program. Bulgaria and Romania, having limited 
foreign reserves, have chosen a money-based approach, but all the others have selected the 
exchange rate based stabilisation program. The Bulgarian economy was suffering of 
economic and political instability from 1989-1997 when on July 1997 the introduction of 
the currency board, finally brought “peace”. The excuse of lack of currency reseiwes, the 
inability of each government to draw loans from the western countries or institutions, or 
the foreign countries’ or institutions’ unwillingness to help, brought on Bulgaria three 
major economic crises in eight years of the transition period. Those crises weakened 
economically the Bulgarian people resulting to the per capita consumption being so low, 
which discouraged any significant FDl inflows.
The second step of the transition is the liberalization of economic activity (prices, trade, 
currency convertibility etc.), which of course should be supported by institutional 
restructuring. This structural reform provides an efficient system of laws regulating the 
economic activity and redefining the role of the state. This also includes the restructuring 
and privatisation of the bulk of the state assets, which constitute a large percentage of the 
total assets of the country. The sudden exposure to market forces is due to cause instability 
in the economy, and complemented by the trivial experience of people and the mediocre 
economic legacy of the past, it may lead to severe economic crises. In order to avoid the 
crises the state needs to establish policies of macroeconomic stabilization. The typical 
symptoms of the ‘transition shock’ are the drastic increase of inflation, reduction of total 
output levels, increase in the unemployment rate, increase in prices, and of course a severe 
social impact and citizens’ negative reactions due to their bad economic condition.
The third step is the reduction of size of public sector by the quick privatisation and 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises, which is essential to be supported by the 
introduction of new corporate governance and property rights. Although privatisation, 
restructuring, imposition of hard budget constraints and elimination of subsidies will create 
large unemployment rates and decreasing the quality of living standards they are all
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necessaiy for the transition to a market economy.
In the fourth step, new laws must be issued in order to establish market institutions
(corporate law, accounting system, tax system, pension fund system etc.) and unlimited 
and unrestricted private ownership/property, must be legally established. New laws should 
be also issued regarding banking system structure, bank rehabilitation, privatisation of 
banks, foreign banks participation^^, payment system, and methods for dealing with bad 
loans as well as bankruptcy and liquidation laws must be enforced. New social policy is 
needed and social expenditures such as unemployment benefits, lessons for finding new 
jobs and increasing employee’s skills, must be introduced. Hard budget constraints must 
also be introduced, together with generous elimination of subsidies from the government to 
the state-owned enterprises in order for the governmental expenditures to be lowered. The 
tax system should be reformed in order to encourage individuals and companies. A 
financial reform is also necessary to support any other activity. The creation of a stock 
exchange market will facilitate the privatisation process, and it should be met by other 
currency reforms like the introduction of unlimited currency convertibility. Moreover, all 
the deficits must be balanced, the overvalued domestic currency must be devalued and 
generally there is a need for introduction of adequate institutional reforms.
A successful transition does not only come from within the country, since outside 
assistance is essential, either in the form of guidance or directly in the form of financial or 
other support. The countries in transition obtain assistance on technical aspects by the 
international institutions, mainly the IMF and the World Bank, which guide their way into 
the set up of a functional market economy. They get assistance in organizing legislation, 
in deciding on monetary policies and tools, in issuing new tax and treasury systems, in 
improving the management of administration and public expenditure. The help of 
international institutions also reflect in the financial sector, in restructuring of the banking 
system and creation of financial markets. Also with the help of the IMF, inaccurate 
statistical systems used in the past, are upgraded, so that dependability of the data can be 
trusted for evaluation of the country’s progress (World Economic Outlook, 2000).^'’
The international organizations also provide the country in transition with financial help 
in order for the country to meet certain stabilization goals, and to be able to repay the old 
and new debts. The steps, required by the IMF assistance plans, shared by transition 
countries are a large-scale liberalization of trade, prices and exchange rates regimes, de- 
monopolization of large state owned enterprises, rapid privatisation, development of the
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SMEs, social net provision in the budget, and adjustment of the taxation systems. Each 
plan provides additional steps, which are appropriate for separate countries. International 
organizations are willing to embrace reformed countries. Some of the countries, which 
undertook the way of the transition to a market economy, have already joined the OECD, 
WTO and NATO and a few Central and Eastern European countries have hopes of entering 
to the European Union (EBRD, 1997)^1
1,8 W hich is the optim al path for a successfu l econom ic reform
The sequence, path or pace of adaptation of each policy is very important in the transition 
process. The concepts of gradualism and gradual changes that in the long-term lead to a 
market economy, and the concept of shock-therapy or big-bang and the rapid changes, 
which are refined in time, are the two approaches that can be used, either pure, or mixed in 
different aspects of the transition. There is no optimal path for a successful economic 
reform. In the absence of an optimal model, each country must drawn the lessons about its 
policy approach in the beginning phase of the road to a market economy, by practical 
guidance rules and the history of transition experiences.
In a paper, the World Bank, 2002, pointed out that
“The relationship between the speed o f reform and economic growth has been the 
subject o f controversy. Some economists argued for advancing reforms in all areas 
as fa st as possible; others criticized such a strategy as imposing un-necessarily high 
cost. The most interesting part o f the debate focuses on the sequencing o f policies— 
on the relative speed o f different types o f  reform. Advocates o f  moving fast in areas 
amenable to rapid reform argue that the synergies among different components—for  
example, privatization together with liberalization o f prices and trade—may 
generate enough gains and winners to maintain the reform momentum. The need to 
take advantage o f  windows o f opportunity is also cited as important in that decision.
By contrast, advocates o f  slower reform point out that going ahead with reforms 
that can be implemented quickly— "‘stroke o f the pen ” reforms— without waiting fo r  
those that take more time, such as the creation o f institutions that support markets, 
significantly reduces the benefits o f these reforms. The loss could be so severe as to 
generate output losses and also lead to the creation o f interest groups opposing 
those reforms requiring more time^ .^ "[p. 16]
Technically is impossible to have at once all the changes of elements, which lead to a 
market economy. In order for the ‘big bang’ to be a successful policy, the country should 
already have the bases for the restructure (political stability, legal framework base and 
experience, competent government, eagerness and support from the citizens, sufficient per- 
capita income so that citizens may endure the changes). The changes must be induced in 
such sequence that will provide bases for the changes to come. For example how could a 
government liberalize the exchange rate regime, when the foreign currency reserves of the
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country were non-existent, or how can a government achieve a quick and successful 
privatisation process when the country lacked a sound banking system, financial 
intermediaries, and a stock exchange market? How can a country attract significant FDl 
inflows, when state monopolies in basic goods (gas, electricity etc.) are yet to be 
abandoned? So, in the cases that a reform in one matter is highly depended in the success 
of a reform in another, it should be treated gradually. However, this argument is very 
different from the policy of continuously postponing changes such as privatisation and 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises and introduction of new legal system.
The government must focus on what is important and not on what is urgent. For the 
government it is impossible to protect the entire population from the burden of the 
transition process and the imposition of strict measures. Dornbusch (1991)^’ in a paper 
argued that;
“Radical change is the only realistic option... gradualism opens the door to an 
unstructured free-for-all: consumers will go to the black market, firms will 
produce fo r the black market. Households will turn to D M  and dollars and 
thus provoke hyperinflation. Workers will privatise firm s spontaneously... 
Gradualism may seem a low risk strategy in that day-to-day events seem under 
control. But the realistic answer is immediate, radical reform, not the mirage 
o f a phased-in move to a market economy. Temporary collapse may be 
inevitable one way or the other, but in the context o f  radical reform it may at 
least be the seed fo r  reconstruction...[The]... transition needs to be 
accomplished extremely fa st because the ice is melting, the distance to go is 
far, and the task is overwhelming. The illusion that transition could be 
managed over many years is just that. The pace will he determined by the 
market, which is already operating on the backstage. Countries that move fast 
will draw resources from abroad and stand a better chance to retain scarce 
human capital and political reserves: countries that drag their feet risk falling 
into deep poverty, where even the unsatisfactory living standards o f  the past 
decade can no longer be maintained because the organisation o f the economy 
has vanished... A gradualist solution is appropriate when a market economy is 
in place and the issue is how to improve the use o f resources at the margin... 
[This]... is not the case o f  Central and Eastern economies, therefore, radical 
and rapid reform is the right medicine...the acceptance o f property is 
essential ...ifprivate property is not accepted the train cannot leave ”
The rapid changes are favoured by most countries, but have been sometimes criticized by 
theorists. Stanley Fischer et al. [2000, p.l] mentioned that “the faster is the speed o f 
reforms, the quicker is the recovery and the higher is growth” By observation of 
countries in transition, some concluded that the shock-therapy approach leads to drastic 
increases in the level of poverty and income inequality. Especially in the case of 
privatisation of state owned firms the rushed moves have often led to the disorganization of 
valuable operational enterprises, a fact assisting the drop of the output level. Others object,
42 U niversity  o f  G lasgow , O ctober 2002
Chapter 1: The Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy and the Legacy o f  the Communist Regime which may Affect FDl 
Inflows in a Host Country: the case o f  Bulgaria: 1989-2001
pointing to the fact that the output would drop any way and that the output was 
manipulated before the transition, therefore it was not so high. They also claim that the 
level of poverty and income inequality is higher in the countries following the gradualist 
method, which is a method that provides more space for the satisfaction of personal 
interests and corruption (World Economic Outlook, 2000)H Issues of speed and 
sequencing have also played an important role in debates on privatisation policies and 
restructuring. “The question that arises is whether a country should privatise before or 
after restructuring or should both proceed simultaneously. Another question is whether 
there is a need fo r sequencing in privatisation or not and i f  so what principles should 
underline i t” [Bitzenis, A. 2002, p.6],
Although early analysts have seen Bulgaria as a country, which undertook a ‘big bang’ 
transition, the eleven years of the Bulgarian transition studied by this author indicates 
otherwise. The instant price liberalization of more than 70% of the commodities in 1989 
was the only sign to point toward a ‘big bang’ strategy. On the other hand there was a 
delay in the liberalization of prices in remaining commodities, preservation of the big state 
monopolies, late introduction of bankruptcy laws and hard budget constraints as well as 
accumulation of bad loans and inability to stop the inflation before the introduction of the 
currency board, which them all resulted to the reinforcement of the nomenklatura, 
development of wild privatisation, and in overall a very slow progress of the privatisation 
and restructuring process. Bitzenis, A. 2002^" argued “The developments in Bulgarian 
privatisation are not only fa r  from a 'big bang’ path, but also arise doubts on whether it 
falls under gradualism. It can be argued that political constraints impose a gradual 
approach to restructuring, which has implications on the speed and sequencing o f  
privatisation ”.
1.9 The Road to a M arket Econom y: the case o f B u lgaria  1989-2001
Although all countries in transition have the same final goal, which is the creation of a 
market economy, the results of their efforts are different. This is because of different 
strategies, policies, and paths, which are followed, and different adverse initial economic 
conditions and many other external facts, which each country has faced or started with. 
Bulgaria lagged behind most of the other countries in the CEE region, mainly because of 
its adverse initial economic conditions, the geographical distance from the west, the legacy 
of the communist regime, and the external shocks and the political instability, which has 
been suffered from. A few inefficient actions of the regarding governments in Bulgaria 
were the introduction of a flexible exchange rate regime in the early years of transition or
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the late introduction of the currency board (only in July 1997), the very slow privatisation 
process (graph 1), etc. Besides the political aspect, the adverse behaviour of people 
regarding privatisation together with the inadequate legal framework with its constant 
changes, or even, the total absence of appropriate laws at the beginning of transition, them 
all, strengthened the nomenklatura, and thus bribery and corruption, and discouraged the 
inflow of significant amounts of FDl. The increase of nomenklatura’s power further 
delayed the privatisation process, created social problems, income inequality, caused 
discontent to the citizens and reduction of per capita income, decreases of governmental 
revenues, increase of illegal actions, and most important created an unstable economic 
environment, which also discouraged foreign investors. Moreover, the restitution problem 
and the unclear property rights in the beginning of the transition in Bulgaria, and the 
bureaucracy, are only some of many other reasons, which did not help the whole transition 
process. The Bulgarian economic policy until 1997 has intensified the problem and kept 
Bulgaria far away from development, which other countries in the region enjoy, countries 
such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech and the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. After the 
introduction of the currency board the newly elected government of 1997, with the 
assistance of IMF, managed in less than 4 years to achieve some stabilization of the 
economy, with one-digit inflation rate (tables 4a, 4b), drastic acceleration of the 
privatization process, (expected to be concluded by the end of 2003), improvement of 
investment environment, which made Bulgaria more attractive to foreign investors.
Table 4a: Bulgarian Inflation rate 1990-2000 _________________________________________________________________
..Bulga.rian J.nflation Rate a c c o r ^
YEARLY { [ [ % % ]
---- j
72,5 1996 2,3! 2,3 .......2i3jCZ2,3 2.3 : 4,1 3.5 ..lo il. ^ 4,l| 4,9 10,41
5,9} 8,4 7.51 3,^1 3,%.............4,Q474,1 iJ 1991:
6,2. 6.7 4,6.1.2 3.479,3X t u l i î î "  .........
63,96
5.5121,95
0,5j; 1.51 0.58 4,8! 2,S{ 2,611 2.633,04
Ml,4 ........j  1 ^ ........2,g ....... I g  1,7j.......2,W.1 2 , ......... ;% g23,g17,1jI18g......16,7_Qm;6,9i
12.3il -0,711  .5,7j[___ 0.8j| 3.7j| 5,5.| 3.6=j____0,51 0,5|i 1.6678.9
-0.3 -0.94 -0.7
1i 1.51
1.2: -0.2 1.40.11 0.5 i 3.61 2.42000
Source; BNB various annual reports
r  i i m m i  i f m m 4 m
Albania 35.5 193.1 85.0 21.5 8.0 12.7 33.1 20.3 -0.1 -
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 594.0 116.2 64 218.3 38 825.1 553.5 - 12.1 -21.2 11.8 4.9 -0 .6 1.7
Bulgaria 23.8 338.5 91.3 72.9 96.2 62.1 123.1 1 082.6 22.2 0.4 10.0
44 U niversity  o f  G lasgow , O ctober 2002
Chapter 1 : The Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy and the Legacy o f  the Communist Regime which may Affect FDl
Inflows in a Host Country: the case o f  Bulgaria: 1989-2001
Croatia “ 609.5 123.0 663.6 1 516.6 97.5 2.0 3.6 3.7 5.9 4.3 6.4
Czech Republic 9.9 56.7 11.1 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.9 8.4 10.6 2.1 3.9
Hungary 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.6 19.1 28.5 23.6 18.4 14.2 10.1 9.9
Poland 585.8 70.3 45.3 36.9 33.2 28.1 19.8 15.1 11.7 7.4 10.2
Romania 5.1 170.2 210.7 256.2 137.1 32.2 38.8 154.9 59.3 45.9 45.7
Slovakia 10.4 61.2 10.2 23.1 13.4 10.0 6.1 6.1 6.7 10.5 12.0
Slovenia 551.6 115.0 207.3 31.7 21.0 13.5 9.9 8.4 8.1 6.3 9.0
FYROM “ 608.4 114.9 1 505.5 353.1 121.0 16.9 4.1 3.8 1.1 -1 .4 10.1
Yugoslavia
580.0 122.0 8 926.0 2.2E+14 7.9E+10 71.8 90.5 23.2 30.4 44.1 77.9
Source: UN/ECE Common Database, derived from national statistics.
Note: From 1992 onwards indices derived from monthly data except for Armenia. Georgia, Hungary, Slovenia, Yugoslavia (from 1993); 
Turkmenistan (from 1995); Uzbekistan (from 1996). ® Retail prices.
Comment: From the above table, it is obvious that the achievement of the Bulgarian government to decrease 
inflation from over 1000% in 1997 in a one digit -  inflation rate at the end of 1999 is more than remarkable.
There is also political stability since the previous Bulgarian government has not changed 
from the beginning of 1997 up to the middle of 2001. Compared to previous years in the 
last five years, Bulgaria achieved significant grow for the economy in general and now 
Bulgaria may hope for the country’s admittance in the European Union when Bulgaria will 
satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. Bulgaria has already signed an association agreement with 
the EU, which constantly guides and supervises the country in its effort for full 
membership. In the latest report from the EU commission (November 2001), Bulgaria is 
close to being a functioning market economy. Provided it continues implementing reforms 
and intensifies the effort to remove persistent difficulties, it should be able to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term.
1.10 Bulgarian adverse in itia l conditions
Economists, governments and academic scholars during the transition period tried to 
explain the economic outcomes and the differences in magnitude of sequence of the 
transition policies. They also tried to explore the various characteristics of countries, which 
had at the beginning of transition, the external or internal shocks derived from the 
breakdown of the central planning system, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the wars 
and civil strives, and the variation of policies, which the countries of the CEE region 
adopted in order to succeed in the transition to a market economy. A question that has been 
derived from the above analysis is “if the initial conditions affect overall performance of 
those countries and the consequent success in order to become a functioning market 
economy”. Actually, there are several characteristics, which may affect country’s 
economic performance, not only at the start of the transition to a market economy but also 
at any stage of adaptation of a specific program or measure, which may also encourage or 
discourage the country’s transition policy to a market economy. For example, countries 
with little experience as independent nation states had more difficulties in creating efficient 
political institutions and on the other hand, the legacy of the communist regime and the
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external economic shocks delayed the economic recovery. Moreover, the various financial 
crises of the 1990s in Mexico, East Asia, and particularly in Russia, also contributed to 
delaying or interrupting the recovery of output. Furthermore, repressed inflation, high 
black market exchange rates, and the war and civil strife in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Tajikistan in 1992-94, in Georgia and Moldova in 1992, and in Croatia and FYROM in 
1991-94 which them all took a major toll on lives, infrastructure, and the state, 
undermining the political consensus on reforms needed for successful transition, etc. 
[World Bank 2002, pp. 11-15]
It is argued that the Bulgarian macro-economic development is behind compared to other 
countries in Central and Eastern European region, because (a) no other country in the 
region has faced severe exogenous shocks (collapse of the CMEA, UN’s embargo against 
Iraq and former Yugoslavia, Kosovo war) (b) no other state in the CMEA had developed a 
trade specialization that was so vulnerable to the collapse of the trading bloc, (c) Bulgaria 
started with one of the worst foreign debt/GDP ratios in the region (d) its adverse 
economic initial conditions were extremely unbearable and (d) because of geographical 
distance from the West.^‘ More specifically, Bulgaria reached the point of being between 
the least competent Central and East European countries in attracting foreign investment 
(table 5) and one of the slower in transition progress for a series of reasons.
Table 5: Inflows of foreign direct investment in Central & Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the CIS. 1990-2000, (Million dollars)
i m i m f m i m i m t m
Eastern Europe ^ 479 2 332 3124 4165 3 575 9 230 7 974 9 399 15 268 18615 21 502"
Albania ^ - - 20 58 53 70 90 48 45 41 100"
Bosnia and Herzegovina - - - - 100 90 117
Bulgaria ^ 4 56 42 40 105 90 109 505 537 819 975
Croatia - - 16 120 117 115 506 530 898 1 408 1 000"
Czech Republic 132 513 1 004 654 869 2 562 1428 1 300 ! 3 718" 6 324" 4 595
Hungary 311 1 459 1 471 2 339 1 146 4 453 2 275 2173 2 036 1970 1957
Poland (cash basis) ^ 10 117 284 580 542 1 132 2 768 3 077 5129 6 471 9 461
Romania - 40 77 94 341 419 263 1 215 2 031 1041 998
Slovakia 18 82 100 168 250 202 330 161 508 330 2 075
Slovenia 4 65 111 113 128 177 194 375 248 181 181
FYROM ^ - - - - 24 9 11 16 118 30 160"
Yugoslavia - 740 113 112 _»
Baltic states 119 238 460 454 685 1 142 1 863 1 139 1 148
Estonia 82 162 215 202 151 267 581 305 398
Latvia 29 45 214 180 382 521 357 347 400"
Lithuania 8 30 31 73 152 355 926 486 350*
CIS 1777 1 875 1 770 4 064 5 288 8 842 6 726 6 886" 5 363"
Armenia ^ - 1 8 25 18 52 221 122 140*
Azerbaijan ^ - 60 22 330 627 1 115 1023 510 -30"
Belarus 7 18 11 15 73 200 149 444 90
Georgia ^ - - 8 6 40 203 265 82 100"
Kazakhstan ^ 100 228 635 964 1 137 1321 1 144 1632 1 099"
Kyrgyzstan ^ - 10 38 96 47 83 109 36 20"
Republic of Moldova 25 17 14 12 67 24 75 81 34 120"
Russian Federation ^ - 100 1454 1211 690 2 065 2 579 4 865 2 762 3 309 3 000"
Tajikistan ^ 9 9 12 20 25 30 24 21" 24"
Turkmenistan ^ - - 11 79 103 233 108 108 64 80* 100"
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Ukraine 170 198 159 267 521 623 743 496 600*
Uzbekistan‘S . . . .  9 48 73 -24 90 167 140 121 100*
Total above* 5 020 6 278 5 806 13 748 13 947 19 383 23 857 26 640* 28013*
Source: National balance of payments slatisfics, IMF.
Note: ® Inflows into the reporting country., * Excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia., ^ Net of residents’ investments
abroad. Bulgaria, 1990-1994; Poland, 1990-1992., ^  The Czech data for 1998-1999 have recently been revised to incorporate inter­
company loans, increasing FDl inflows from $2,720 and $5,108 million, respectively. Both figures also reflect reinvested profits, which 
is not the case for the preceding years., ® Drawings less repayments.
The adverse initial conditions may be divided into the following four groups;
• Bulgarian adverse economic conditions, which were strong enough to underpin the 
delay in the whole transition process
• the legacy of the communist regime, which provided Bulgaria with elements that 
worsened the whole situation
• political instability together with political inability or unwillingness of various 
Bulgarian governments to adopt adequate policies, which may lead to a successful 
transition
• various external shocks, which also burden the way on becoming a marking 
economy
More specifically, adverse economic initial conditions were:
> Its foreign debt in the beginning of the transition (about 12 billion $ in 1992) most 
of which was denominated in US dollars. The Bulgarian ratio of external debt over 
GDP in 1991 was the worst in the region, with 157.4, when the following country, 
Hungary, had 67.8 ratio. The continuous depreciation of the domestic currency, at 
the early years of the transition, made the situation even worst, (table 6)
Ë ) ^ R n Æ  DEBT/ GDP %
COUNTRIES i| 1991 1992 1993,
CZECH REPUBLIC  ^ 26,4 ...........23,7
HUiSTGARY |  67,8 57,6 63,7
POLAND jf“  61,5 56,4
SLOVAK REPUBLIC j Y  ][" 28, l]
SLOVENIA I 14,7 | 13,9 1 14,&
BULGARIA 1 157,4 145,6 128,1
ROMANIA il 7,4 16,6 16,1
CROATIA ij 16,4 26,7 ........ .22,8
SOURCE; EBRD
> Bulgarian current account deficit in 1990 was the worst in the region after 
Romanian, with almost 1.7 billion dollars deficit. In 1991 the Bulgarian ratio of 
current account/GDP was still the worst in the region with a negative ratio of -  
5.4%. (table 7)
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CURRENT ACCOUNT in % of GDP
COUNTRIES 1991 1992! 1 9 ^
CZECH REPUBLIC j 1,2 [ . . . . . Z . . J : . . . . . . :...
HUNGARY 0,8 ....................................... -g
POLAND ^   ^ -2,6 u !
SLO ^NlX j 1 ................M ............... 1,5!
BULGARIA ..................7.5,4 : ....5 :3 -12,8!
RÔMÀMA I -4,1 .................4 . -4,5:
CROATIA ] -3,2 8! 5,5!
SOURCE; EBRD
Comment: Bulgaria begun its transition with the biggest external debt /GDP ratio compared to the rest of the 
CEE countries.
> Low foreign exchange reserves and large enough monetary overhang led Bulgaria 
to choose the heterodox stabilisation policy with nearly 70% liberalization of 
prices, but having a flexible exchange rate regime led to an unstable 
macroeconomic environment. After July 1997 the introduction of the currency 
board and the fixed exchange rate with the German DM, led Bulgaria to an 
economic development that proved that the decision, which was taken at the 
beginning of the transition, was “wrong” and the delay of the introduction of a 
fixed exchange rate regime.
However, the external shocks were more unbearable, and Bulgaria managed to
overcome most of their subsequent outcome only after 1999.
> The collapse of the CMEA on which Bulgaria heavily depended^^
> The unification of Germany and the loss of the GDR as a trade partner
> USSR’s energy crisis (after 1988”) and the termination of the USSR subsidies and 
exports of energy sources and commodities in preferential prices, together with the 
subsequent political fragmentation that followed the USSR’s collapse, had a 
devastating effect on Bulgarian economy since Bulgaria’s trade and energy 
supplies depended heavily upon the former super-power.
> The Gulf crisis cost approximately $2.5 billion US dollars; Iraq was one of 
Bulgaria’s largest debtor through trade relations (with 1.239 billion USD in 1989” 
and another 0.7 billion USD on 1990 from Iraq’s non-repayment of debt) and, 
thus, the agreement of repayment of the loan with the delivery of 600,000 tons of 
oil was devastatingly postponed due to the UN embargo (this cost Bulgaria $565 
million USD - the cost of replacing of Iraq contracted oil at higher prices)” . 
Bulgaria has also lost (except East Germany) another significant trade partner, 
Iraq.
> The embargo of Yugoslavia that cost in total approximately $8 billion (1,833 
million dollars from the impact on balance of payments and another $6,2 billion in
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the period July 1992-September 1994) and provoked real problems to the 
Bulgarian trade (tables 8 & 9) because of the loss of Yugoslavia as a trade partner. 
Moreover, the ex-Yugoslavian road, rail and river routes were the cheapest, nearest 
and maybe the only way to reach the West for exporting its products (a fall in the 
trade with neighboring countries, sharply increases in transaction costs).” The rail 
and road routes through the former Yugoslavia were indeed some of the leader 
arteries for Bulgarian trade and the alternatives, through Romania, Black Sea were 
slow and overcrowded.
Table 8: M erchandise exports of Central & Eastern Europe, 1980,1988-2000, (Billion dollars)_______________________
m 1 im  m # 0 r m
Eastern Europe 56.367 65.020 63.850 61.733 57.241 59.333 62.675 72.937 94.777 100.206 107.428 119.174 117 769 132 926*
Albania 0.320 0.230 0.302 0.231 0.101 0.072 0.123 0.139 0 202 0.213 0137 0 207 0 265 0239*
Bulgaria 7.160 7.554 6.651 5.232 3.433 3.992 3.769 3.935 5.345 4.890 4.940 4.194 4006 4 808
Czechoslovakia 10.475 12.381 11.988 10.728 11.319
Czech Republic 8.767 1 14.463 15.882 21.273 22.180 22.779 26 351 26 242 28 979
Slovakia 3 500 5458 6.714 8.585 8.822 1 9.640 10.775 10.277 11.905
Hungary 8.609 9.999 9.673 9.731 10.226 10.681 8.921 10.701 12.867 1 15.704 19100 23 005 25.015 28 092
Poland 13.071 14.573 14.665 18.291 14.912 13.187 14.202 17.240 22.887 24440 25.756 1 28 229 27.404 31651
Romania 9.217 8.971 8.076 4.570 4.266 4.363 4.892 6.151 7.910 8.085 8.431 8 302 8.504 10,367
Y ugoslavia (SFR) 7.514 11.311 12.496 12.950 12 984 14.772
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1.550 2.100 1.850 0.024 0.058 0.193 0.352 0,518 0 675
Croatia 2.300 2.600 4.020 3.310 4.353 3.709 4.260 4.633 4.512 4.171 4541 4.303 4 432
Slovenia 1.836 3278 3.408 4,118 3.874 6.681 6 083 6.828 8.316 8.310 8.369 9.050 8546 8 731
FYROM 0.654 1.113 1.095 1.199 1.055 1.086 1.204 1.147 1237 1.311 1.191 1.326*
Yugoslavia 4.298 4.461 4.651 4.704 2.539 1,531 1.846 2.677 2.858 1.498 1.723
Source: UN/ECE secretariat, based on national statistical publications and direct communications from national statistical offices.
Note: Trade flows reported include the "new trade" among members of the dissolved federal states, former Czechoslovakia (from 1993), the 
former SFR of Yugoslavia (from 1992). Data excluding the “new trade" were shown in earlier issues of this publication. Changes in the method of 
recording trade are reflected from 1993 in data for the Czech Republic (inclusion of OPT transactions, etc.), from 1996 in Hungary (inclusion of trade 
flows of free trade zones) and from 1997 in Slovakia (inclusion of OPT transactions, etc.).
Comment; In less than two years from the beginning of transition (1989-91) Bulgaria, Romania and Albania 
lost half of their exports. Although the others recovered in 2000, Bulgaria did not.
Table 9; M erchandise imports of Central & Eastern Europe, 1980,1988-2000, (Billion dollars)
1 im: im m t .............. ... m \ : mr.
Eastern Europe 65.443 60158 61.185 63.408 61.610 68 388 76.285 86.128 117026 135 887 146.195 159.491 155 434 172 589*
Albania 0.320 0.280 0.385 0.381 0.409 0.524 0.421 0.549 0.650 0.913 0.620 0.795 0.885 1 009*
Bulgaria 6.321 8.131 7.325 5584 2.700 4530 5.120 4.272 5 638 5.074 4932 4.957 5515 6.487
Czechoslovakia 10.619 12.180 11.772 11808 10 962
Czech Republic 10.368 1 14617 17.427 25.265 27.919 27 563 28.789 28073 32.244
Slovakia 3.889 6.332 6.634 8.777 11.112 1 11.622 13.006 11.265 12671
Hungary 9.188 9.372 8.863 8797 11.449 11.123 12.648 14.554 15.466 1 18.144 21.234 25.706 28.017 32 080
Poland 14.705 12.987 12.941 12.619 15.531 16.141 18.758 21566 29.043 37137 42314 1 47 054 45 901 48 940
Romania 11.061 5.361 5.834 6.889 5.793 6.260 6.522 7.109 10.278 11.435 11.280 11.838 10.394 13 055
Yugoslavia (SFR) 13.229 11.847 14.064 17.330 14.765
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1.300 1.850 1.750 0.524 1.204 1.555 2.120 2 431 2 290
Croatia 2.900 3.750 5.133 3.811 4.346 4.166 5.229 7.510 7788 9.104 8 383 7799 7 923
Slovenia 2.463 2.914 3,216 4.727 4.131 6.141 6.501 7.304 9.492 9.421 9.367 10.098 10.083 10,115
FYROM 0.934 1.531 1274 1.206 1.199 1.484 1.719 1627 1.779 1.915 1 776 2066*
Yugoslavia 4.915 5.383 6.701 5.548 3.859 2.665 4,113 4.826 4.830 3 296 3.711
Source: UN/ECE secretariat, based on national statistical publications and direct communications from national statistical offices 
Comment; In 1991,Bulgaria’s imports have deteriorated to 1/3 compared with the 1989 volume, while, at the 
same time, all other countries retained (more or less) constant their volume of imports. The decrease of 
imports was not indicative of an increase in the local production, but in loss of trade partners.
> Apart from the front-line states (Albania, FYROM and Yugoslavia), Bulgaria is 
probably the country most affected by the war in Kosovo. Before the war, some 
50% of Bulgarian exports were being transported through Yugoslavia. The
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magnitude of the damage in the Yugoslavian infrastructure indicates that the 
problem for Bulgaria will remain for long time (tables 6 & 7)
> The economic crises of Mexico, East Asia and the former USSR, which 
discouraged investors from investing in Eastern Emerging Markets.
The legacy of the communist regime provided the Bulgarian environment with 
negative characteristics, which need time, sacrifices and hard efforts in order their 
subsequent outcomes to be overcome (such as the negative attitude against 
consumption, labor, entrepreneurship, not profit oriented enterprises and the low level 
of productivity, not efficiency oriented behavior, absence of private sector, pursuing 
profitability and efficiency)
> lack of regulations, adequate legal framework, financial intermediaries, stock 
market exchange, which are essential elements that facilitating a free market 
structure
> macroeconomic instability due to the burden fiscal deficits, low productivity, 
external and internal loans (bad loans), increased shadow economy, heavily 
industrialized GDP, low quality of produced products together with the lack of 
finding new trade partners, inability to balance the state budgets, monetary 
overhang, and depressed inflation
> The very low per capita income and living standards (one of the lowest compared 
to many other Central and Eastern European countries) and the growing poverty, 
led the Bulgarian governments to be sceptical and a few times to postpone the 
tightened policies in the early years of transition.
> The insufficient quality and variety of products, which were unable to offset the 
lost trade partners with others from West and the limitation of natural resources.
> There were quite a large number of illegal actions during the transition process 
from illegal organizations (mafia and nomenklatura), which made the business 
environment unwelcoming.
> The magnitude of the restitution problem and the significant delay in re­
privatisation of the property, created a subsequent delay in the privatisation 
process.
Furthermore, politicians and governments have been proved unable to adopt adequate 
transition policies in order Bulgaria to become a fully functioning market economy 
before the end of 2002.
> The three economic crises, two in the same year, led the Bulgarian people to a 
significant loss of their money savings, and perhaps brought them to one of the 
lowest per capita consumption level. This was an entry barrier for most of the
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foreign companies that was in the procedure of examining and ranking the possible 
countries of the region as future host countries for establishing their investments.
> There was a significant delay in the liberalization of prices in products that 
remained Bulgarian monopolies in sectors such as energy, gas, petroleum, 
telecommunications, railways, television, etc.
> There is also a noticeably low progress in the development and increase of the 
private sector. In 1991 only 19% belonged to the private sector, one of the worse 
ratios in the region only larger from the Czech republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia. In 
1999, the Bulgarian ratio was lower than that of the counties which began with a 
worst initial ratio by almost 15%. The delay occurred not only because of the slow 
privatisation progress, but also due to the slow creation and establishment of new 
small enterprises, (table 10)
Ï993 ) Î994 1 j  . 1 9 ^ . i
Country j Private sector share (% of GDP) if
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech
Hungary
Poland
f W  i| 26 I
[60^^ 1 i
Romania 1 24 if 26 132 !!
Slovak ^ 1 5  ^^ 122 1^ 25 1144 | œ ___ iTTT llTS 1
Slovenia |  Ï6 120i p S  |  30 j 48 if45 j: 50 55 % 55 j
Source: EBRD various reports, EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit)IMF Staff Country Report no. 99/26 April 1999
> The ‘favourable introduction of the laws’ in the early years of the Bulgarian 
transition for the “nomenklatura” and the governmental support they received, 
created an unfavourable business environment with no significant economic 
development, low FDl inflows, soft budget constraints, slow and inadequate 
restructuring, inefficiency of the state-owned enterprises, accumulation of new 
debts and low privatisation process of the SOEs.
> In order to overcome the negative conditions at the beginning of the reform, 
Bulgaria borrowed in convertible currencies from private commercial banks.” This 
only worsened the situation, as the national currency was devaluated.
> The effort of Bulgaria to get the higher proceeds possible for the larger and more 
significant state companies, led the government to decide on restructuring before 
privatization and this led to a slower privatisation process, and to a lack of 
significant cases -  offers to foreign investors.
> The lack of transparency in the privatization progress, the inexperience in 
valuation of SOEs, the bureaucracy, the complex criteria of selecting the buyers.
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corruption, the late introduction of bankruptcy laws and hard budget constraints as 
well as the accumulation of bad loans and the large debt of most of the SOEs, 
which the Bulgarian state did not restructure rapidly and effectively.
> The inability to stop the inflation before the introduction of the currency board.
> The inadequate legal framework and it constant changes.
Internal shortcomings like the delay of reforming, slow process of privatisation, 
inadequate restructuring of public enterprises and a series of weak governments in the 
post-communist period did not help much Bulgaria’s economic development. The 
weaker Bulgarian geographic, historic and cultural links with Western Europe have 
been also proved “lethal” for its transition to a market economy. Moreover, incentives 
regarding Bulgaria” , such as the low labour cost, which support the transition and may 
lead to the attraction of significant FDl inflows have been lost. More specifically, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Russia are the countries with the lowest level of wages in the 
CEE region, but the Bulgarian competitiveness in terms of cheap skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled labour force may be threatened more in the near future, since the 
depreciation of the rouble in Russia (end of 1998), led wages below those in Bulgaria 
(table 11).
__________________________________Table 11: Average Gross Monthly W ages In Current Dollars________________________________
Feb Mar Oct if Nov
130 i 119 : 118114 if 119 116 :l 122
Bulsana 110 i 119 122 i *
130 i 130 N/A i N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A i120 : 123
572 i 580 590 i 588 558 i: 561Croatia
2001 II 627 il 579 ij 598 || 587 |j 619 || 585 || N/A i| N/A || N/A ij N/A !| N/A j| N/A i
357 f 345335 if 354 323 11 335 : 400Czech Republic* i 369 : N/A N/A i N/A ! N/A N/A !339 : 359 354 i 384
Hungary N/A i N/A
Poland 525 i 516 N/A il N/A i N/A507 if 529
Romania
Russia
i 2 0 0 0  123 I 122 i: 130 |  144 il 131 133 || 132 |  130 | 127 ij 127 if 133 |  155 i
N/A
il 1999 f 51.9 I  52.3 il 58.9 I 57.5 ij 60.1 66.4 66.5 if 65.3 66.9 if 66.7 j 67.9 85.1 |
2000 il 64 il 64 il 71 || 71 if 74 || 81 j| 83 if 82 if 85 ij 87 i| 90 jj 108 j
N/A N/A
240 246 2842000 262 248 270 279 270 i 257Slovakia* 270 272277 i 266 N/A :( N/A if N/A
870 846 807 i 868887 i 881Slovenia 852 823 Î N/A i N/A N/A N/A N/A883 i 877
Ukraine N/A i N/A N/A i N/A i N/AN/A ! N/A
Source: PlanEcon. Report *=Industry
Thus, as Bulgaria and Russia share a few common export goods such as metals and 
chemicals, and Russia has already attracted limited foreign investments in respect to its 
population, the competition will probably create problems not only on Bulgarian
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exports, but also in the inflows of FDL However, the signs of the time period 1997-
2000 arise much hope for the future.
1.11 The con d ition s o f the B anking System  in a C entralised  Econom y
Under central planning the financial systems were not involved in control and monitoring 
of state-owned enterprises. In the old system the commercial banks played the passive role 
of the administrator and controller of money. The government and its central plan, 
determined each time which enterprise should receive financing and which bank should 
ask for credit. This leads to a high degree of centralisation and a subsequent simplification 
of the banking activities. Actually, there was an abolishment of the main banking activities, 
and the banks learn to live without competition, pursuing profits and short or long run 
goals.
Under this regime, commercial banks used the passive role in their activities and 
performed the role of governmental agencies. They act in an environment where there was 
lack of competition, inadequate legal regulations, inefficient payment system and an 
absence in regulating and adopting bankruptcy and liquidation laws. It is not surprising the 
delay in the Bulgarian banking privatisation process, the low level of managerial skills, the 
weak corporate governance, and the bad loans burden of the state owned enterprises, which 
restrained the banking sector and the financial intermediaries from playing an important 
role in the privatisation process during the transition period and especially up to the end of 
1997. [Bitzenis A , 2003a].
The financial institutions in the Central and Eastern Europe have neither the experience nor 
the capability to perform well the intermediation functions of a market economy. It is 
obvious, that the establishment of a modern and efficient financial system is one of the 
main elements of the economic transformation. In the short run, it is an extra instniment 
for managing monetary policy, and thus controlling inflation or even hyperinflation 
phenomena. In the medium or in the long term, it is also a tool for improving the allocation 
of resources. In 1993, Thorne has pointed out that,'^° "'If banks behave efficiently, they will 
try to diversify their loan portfolio by lending to new good customers and limiting their 
lending to the old borrowers that have accumulated arrears with banks and account fo r  
most o f banks' non-performing loans”. All the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
economies had a choice of different strategies for reforming their financial systems. It is 
again the desirable and feasible pace of reforming the system; big bang or gradualism, and 
the additional problem of resolving the well-known issue of bad debts (non-performing
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debts). In 1996, Bristow has mentioned that"^  ^"It was not that bank managers were stupid, 
inefficient or venal, but that the planning system did not require loans to perform, provided 
no incentives fo r  enterprises to service their debt and provided no incentives fo r the banks 
to enforce debt-service by their customers. When the planning system is removed, the 
banks fin d  themselves standing naked in a gale. Their balance sheets contain a high 
volume o f loans which are not being serviced...
In centrally planned economies, state enterprises relied on relative price controls and direct 
and indirect subsidies. At the early years of transition, loss-making state-enterprises have 
managed to continue financing their losses from the banking system because stopping this 
behaviour was a hard governmental decision with social implications. The fear of an 
increase in the unemployment rate, the lack of bankruptcy and liquidation law, the slow 
process of restructuring and privatisation of the enterprises and banks, led to a postpone of 
dealing with the problem. In 1994, Dittus argued that"^  ^ "Such loans had been, in effect, a 
substitute fo r  fiscal subsidies. The termination o f this lending would push many enterprises 
into bankruptcy and perhaps liquidation, leading to job losses”. Fiscal policy is also a 
major concern for an effective transition process. Large government deficits and rapid 
inflation led the government to find ways of raising the revenues and reducing the 
expenditures. Thus, in order to eliminate these deficits through reducing expenditures 
governments moved to distortions of the subsidies to the state-owned enterprises.
In order to understand the difficulties of passing from the monopolised banking system 
into a banking system under market economy, the reader will be provided with a quick 
historical preview of the Bulgarian banking system. As mentioned above in order to attract 
foreign investors it is necessary to have a stable, liberal legal framework and banking 
system, which operates under the market economy’s mechanisms. Under the communist 
regime, the policy of generous subsidies to state-owned enterprises and the gathering of 
bad loans to the state banks, led Bulgarian banks to a one way situation, facing big 
problems in their development and together with the slow introduction of necessary laws, it 
brought a general delay in the creation of a sound banking system and the limited foreign 
participation until the introduction of the currency board (mid 1997). The currency board 
led Bulgaria to a relative economic development and significant FDl inflows. The political 
instability or inability (unwillingness) and the political cost of the introduction of strict 
measures (cut of subsidies and imposition of hard budget constraints) resulted to the delay 
in the privatisation of state-owned banks, entering of foreign banks and the creation of new 
private banks. Since economic stability and development, competitive environment,
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adequate legal framework and good banking system are significant incentives for FDl, and 
for the success of the transition from a planned to a market economy, the total delay had a 
much higher cost in the long run than the cost of a rapid restructuring, which would have a 
heavy social impact in the short run, but very good results in the long run.
1.12 The H istory of the Bulgarian Banking System
1.12.1 Banking A ctiv ities  in pre-com m unist period
Although Bulgaria was among the first countries to start the transition [table 12 by the 
EBRD] it ended up being among the last CEE countries to start organised western-style 
banking activities.
Table 12:Selected Characteristics of Transition Countries
Transition Country/ I j  Year the |  
Group' i j  Transition j ij began^ j
Starting Date of 
the Stabilization 
Program ^
1999 EBRD 
Average 
Transition 
Indicator *
’Exchange rate j 
regime adopted* i
’Exchange |  Price j 
regime end |  liberalization’ i 
1998* 1 i
j  EU accession |  f991 ] countries j (excluding |Baltics) if
Mar-91 3.3
Bulgaria_______=11991__j 2.9 __ F l x e d ^ i f  Instant 70% j
; Czech Republic I  1991 i Jan-91 3.4 Fixed Flexible Instant 85% !II Nov-91 95% I
; i  Hungaiy j |  1990 ] Mar-90 3.7 Fixed i Flexible |  Gradual i
ij Poland f  1990 j Jan-90 3.5 Fixed i r i n 5 t % %  i !
1 Romania 1991 j Oct-93' 2.8 Flexible Flexible |  GradualI 80%  (4 1II stages) 1
i Slovenia |  Î99Ô = Feb-92 3.3 Flexible Flexible ]f ... j
i  Other iP  1990 1 southeastern if 1 European |  j countries If
Jun-93 2.5
ii Albania ..... A u g T .92..... 2.5 Flexible j I  Flexible n r  •  •• H
I  j  Bosnia &  i| 
i  i  Herzegovina i|
1.8
i j  FYROM if 1990 j___Jan-94 2.8 j ^ F i x e d  j 1__Flexible______________ i
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Transition Report 1999; IMF staff estimates unless otherwise noted.
’ Data for country groups are simple averages of group member data, * From Fischer and Sahay, "The Transition Economies After Ten 
Years," IMF Working Paper 00/30 (Washington. International Monetary Fund, 2000). > Indicator of progress in structural reforms; see the Appendix.
* For Bosnia and Herzegovina, inflation over the period 1991-99 for the Federation is used for "Average Inflation 
1989-99" and 1999 GDP per capita in U.S. dollars is used for "PPP GDP per capita 1999."
5 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook, IMF staff estimates 
« Fixed regimes are those that have a currency board, pegged, (explicitly or implicitly) at a fixed rate or have a narrow crawling band.
Flexible regimes include those that are free or managed floating.
’’ The date of the first stabilization attempt. • Currency board in Bulgaria adapted in July 1997.
• survey 1991-1992 UN, chapter 3, “Eastern Europe", p.40
After the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire in 1879, the Bulgarian National 
Bank (BNB) was founded. The idea of establishing a National Bank was initially
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supported by the provisional Russian administration, which prepared the Statute of the 
Bank, which was approved by Prince DonDoukov on 25^, January 1879 (see table 13). 
The bank was actually established on 23"^ ,^ May 1879 after the replacement of the Russian 
administration by a Bulgarian one.'^  ^ The Banks of General Use that existed before the 
liberation were restored and renamed to Agrarian Banks. The BNB and the Agrarian 
Banks, the two state credit institutions, constituted the foundations of the Bulgarian 
banking system. The Bulgarian people yearned to fill the gap of a modem banking system, 
according to the standards of those times, resulting by the Ottoman rule, and that is self­
proven by the immediate establishment of BNB after the liberation.
At that time, the nature of the BNB in the first years of operations was purely of a 
commercial deposit bank, financing trade in the urban areas, since Bulgaria lacked banks 
to finance the emerging local industries and trade. Another function of the BNB was to use 
the temporary surplus in the budget for short-term loans, since it was also the free cashier 
of the state budget. The BNB kept time and demand deposits, and opened current accounts 
of some larger companies, but was not authorised to issue banknotes yet.'^ '*
Table 13; Establishment of Bulgarian Banks up to 1989
I 1896 IT 111906...................... fT92^281879 903 1905
BNB POST i BULGARIAN 
SAVINGS I AGRARIAN 
BANK I BANK
BALKAN,
GENERAL,
CREDIT
35 JOINT STOCK 
BANKS
129 JOINT
STOCK
BANKS
I 1934 1  1947 i 19641926-28 1969 1981
82 JOINT
STOCK
BANKS
34 JOINT
STOCK
BANKS
' BNB, Bulgarian 
Investment Bank 
until 1967 POST 
CREDIT until 
1 BANK(1951)
FOREIGN
TRADE
BANK
(BFTB)
Bulgarian Industrial | 
Bank,
AGRICULTURAL 
& TRADE BANK, 
SSB
MINERAL
BANK
7 sectoral 
banks commercial 
banks
Source: BNB various annual reports
One of the first restrictions of the BNB was not to lend any loans to the government for 
purposes of independent and efficient operation. Still, during the war years (1912-1918), 
the BNB was actually forced to finance the main bulk of the military spending at the 
expense of printing large amounts of new banknotes. Violating all principles of issuing 
operations, the government debt to the bank increased from 8 million levs (end of 1912), to 
881 million levs (end of 1918).
The autonomy of the BNB was substantially increased by the 1926-28 Law, which also 
widened the functions of the BNB as the regulating agent of currency circulation. The 
private banking also developed at a high speed. In 1929-1933, the first years of the Great
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Depression, the number of private banks grew up to 129, but after the crisis, it diminished 
to 82. Later, from the middle of 1934 up to the end of the Second World War, there were 
only 34 joint-stock banks in Bulgaria.
The World War II, (before the coup on 9^ '^  of September, 1944) had a heavy negative 
impact in the development of BNB, since it was placed under extreme conditions and was, 
once again, forced to finance the militaiy spending of the government through new 
banknote issue.
1.12.2  B anking A ctiv itie s  in com m unist period -  the U SSR  influence  
and m on op olisation
At the end of the World War II the Bulgarian banking system suffered a complete 
reorganization as the new social system was establishing. In 1947 all industrial enterprises, 
mines and private banks were nationalized. On December 27, 1947 Bulgaria entered a 
new era in the country’s banking system, as a result of the Banking Law presented on that 
day. According to that law the National Bank of Bulgaria (BNB) was the institution that 
would handle all government funds and nationalized enterprises and the Bulgarian 
Investment Bank would handle the long-term lending. The Post Credit Bank, although in 
retail banking (households services), was the only other banking institution preserved. This 
new legislation was based on a model imported from the USSR, serving the requirements 
of a centrally planned economy and was quite effective in nationalizing the Bulgarian 
banking system.
The banking system of Bulgaria in the years from 1948-1981 consisted of three separate 
institutions, each handling deferent sectors of the Bulgarian economy.
• The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) was responsible for monitoring the financial
aspects and payments of enterprises, as well as receiving their deposits. This 
institution was also responsible for extending credit in the domestic currency and 
financing government investments.
• The Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank (BFTB) was responsible for foreign
exchange operations.
• The State Saving Bank (SSB) was handling the needs of the Bulgarian citizens;
receiving saving deposits and financing the household sector.
Only the BNB and the SSB had a network of branch-offices around the country, while the 
remaining bank exercised its functions and serviced its clients through the branch-offices
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of the BNB.
From 1981 until 1989, certain changes in the system made a way for the reformations that 
occurred in 1989. The first one, was the introduction of the Mineral Bank, in 1981, an 
institution created to allocate credit resources to new small and medium size enterprises. 
The second change, in 1987, was the formation of seven “sectoral” banks that provided 
loans in any currency.
Table 14; Main activities of the Bulgarian banks during the communist era
YEAR i  BANKS FUNCfiONS !
1951 i f  The Post Credit bank was closed Its functions passed to the State Savings Bank
: 1964 i f  The Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank was i| founded Serviced all foreign currency operations and financial relations with the rest of the world
I 1967 The Bulgarian Investment Bank was closed Its functions were transferred to the Bulgarian National Bank and the State and Savings Bank
! 1969 iFEstiblishrnent of specialised banks; the 1 Bulgarian Industrial Bank, the Bulgarian 
i f  Agricultural and Trade Bank.
They existed only until the end of the following year. |
1 1981 in^vknei^^ founded, transformed the I next year into the Bank for Economical 
j| Projects
"Mineralbank" operated on the basis of semi- market principles.
i 1987 îrErtâblîshîn^^ of seven new commercial 1 banks; Economic Bank, Biochim Bank,1 Balkan Bank, Construction Bank, Elektronika 1 Bank, Agrocooperative Bank, and Transport 
i  Bank operating in the same field as the Bank 
i f  for Economical Projects "Mineralbank"
The purpose of the reform was to decentralise the ! banking activities. Functioning as investment j banks, each bank was specialised in servicing a concrete industrial branch they had no branch- offices in the country and were servised by the branch-offices of the Bulgarian National Bank on | commission basis.
Sources: BNB various reports
1.12.3 Banking A ctiv ities  in the early years of the post-com m unist  
period
After four decades of central planning, the need for updating the banking system was 
intense for the Bulgarian economy, since the years that the main target of the system was 
the movement of credit from the state budget towards depended public enterprises, resulted 
in crucial delays in the system. This reflected on the functions and operations of the banks 
especially those that dealt with the foreign transactions, by restraining any initiatives they 
might develop, to compete in the international banking market, which was continuously 
renewed.
In that difficult economic environment, the Bulgarian banking system attempted a radical 
transformation in 1989; in order to avoid inefficiencies created by an obsolete system and 
to support their initial tries to create a market economy. The years before the collapse of 
the communist regime created a lot of drawbacks in the Bulgarian banking system that a 
significant delay in the transformation was partially expected, but the delay in taking 
governmental decisions, introducing a legal framework, and facilitating the quick
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privatisation and restructuring of state banks was more than could be justified.
The banking system model of government monopoly was effective in a centrally planned 
economy, but was absolutely inapplicable for a market economy. The adoption of Decree 
No.56 in 1989 on Economic Activity, allowing the establishment of private businesses, 
was the first step for the whole private sector, including private banks. The other 
important step was the introduction of the “Rules for the Banks” by Ordinance 19, which 
distinguished the functions of the BNB as a central bank and the activities of the 
commercial banks, already in existence in Bulgaria. The introduction of those laws led to 
the establishment of 59 new commercial banks in 1989^' initially being owned by the 
BNB, (they were BNB branches transformed to commercial banks), having 100% state 
capital and being allowed to function as universal banks. In 1989, the institutions 
composing the Bulgarian banking system were the BNB, the BFTB, the SSB, the 
Mineralbank, the seven sectoral banks, and the 59 commercial banks. The effectiveness of 
the structure formed after the last reorganisation was questioned since it was too scattered, 
the number of banks was too high (69 banks in 1991), and their capital too small (more 
50% had ownership capital up to USD 500,000 and an average volume of credit 
investments for the year up to USD 12 million). Their size restricted their capability to fully 
participate in the financing of large-scale projects. Since there was no clear concept of the 
optimum size and capacity of a commercial bank under the 1991 conditions, and the future 
banking structure was far from final, the BNB Board, in order to prevent the establishment 
of other inefficient banks, suspended the issuing of new licenses for banking activities. The 
only licences issued were for opening new banks with substantial foreign capital interest, 
or with a capacity to play a key role in the restructuring of the economy.
Table 15: Macroeconomic indicators, non performing loans and fiscal costs
!.............................  _  ........................—
HUNGARY T po l a n d  ’ CZECHO­SLOVAKIA I T b u l g a r ia  I ROMANIA n
: Ratio of enterprises’: bank credit to GDP %
i In end of 1990 j 25.8 1115:6 60.5 ifT O  I 386 U
! In June 1991 24 62.4 ______j 44.6 :
! Real Interest Rates J C Z Z Z Z Iir 4 : -96 8 :
i In 3 quarter of 1991 8.1 T î I È ---------- 2.3 i| -71.9 -31.7 |i
I Annual Rate of i inflation % 1 1 I
: In end of 1990 Î6.6_________: 150.Ï.... ji
In June 1991 36 71.3 224.9 •;
Estimated ratio of : nonperforming to total : loans in 1991 % 50 |4 0
55
r "  1
36.6 il
........................................................j
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Estimated fiscal cost of ------ -----removing all bank 5.4 6.5 5.6 17.7 I 22.9: nonperforming loans(in % of GDP) .........................il........................ i
Source: Thome (1993), p. 977, Countries’ official statistics and Thome’s estimates. For Czechoslovakia the 
real interest rate if for the first quarter of 1992. For the fiscal cost of removing the nonperforming loans 
Thorne has used the nominal lending rate as a proxy for swapping governmental bonds for nonperforming 
loans or providing a govemmental guarantee on these loans. The total enterprises’ loans, as a share of GDP, 
were less than 20% in Hungary and Poland and about 50% in Bulgaria and Romania.
In an article, Thome^  ^ has presented a table [table 15], which among other things presents 
the number of private banks in CEE countries in 1989. At that time, Poland had 9 private 
banks, Hungary 4, Czechoslovakia 2, Bulgaria 59 and Romania 4. Many authors have 
argued that the extremely high number of Bulgarian banks seemed enormous compared to 
the Bulgarian population. However, these banks were small in size and scope of activity, 
created from the conversion of 59 branches of the BNB. There was also a sale of the 
remaining branches of the BNB to commercial banks.”  In 1993, in Bulgaria there were 
approximately 4,000 branches, this means one branch per 2,100 of the population. 
Furthermore, Thome’s table (1992/'^ shows that in 1990, the SSB accounted for 46% of 
the total deposits in Bulgarian banks, when the 59 commercial banks accounted for 17%, 
the 8 “sectoral” banks for 11%, BNB for 16% and BFTB for 10%. The most impressing 
result, which supports the argument that the 59 commercial banks were small in size, is 
that the deposits of the five largest (of the 59 banks) accounted for 44% of the deposits of 
the 59 banks while their total assets accounted for the 56% of the assets of the 59 banks. At 
the same time the total assets of all the 59 commercial banks accounted for 25% of the 
Bulgarian Bank assets (see also table 15).
In 1991, a totally new Bulgarian banking system, which was based on a two-tier system 
having a central bank on one end and commercial banks on the other, was introduced. 
Around the same time, several other Central & Eastern European countries, like Poland, 
Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia, initiated reforms in their banking systems, which 
also based on the two-tier system. According to Thorne (1993), the reformation at that 
time was completed only in Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, because they 
consolidated the change by a completely new central banking law, according to western 
standards. On the other hand, Poland and Romania backed up the reformation with 
amendments to their existing banking law. Another difference pointed out by Thome is 
the model each country selected as a guideline for their reformation. From all five 
countries, only Hungary separated between commercial and investment banking functions, 
following the Anglo-Saxon model. The other four countries, including Bulgaria, chose to 
follow the German-Japanese model of universal banking. Thorne argues that since the
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latter model is suitable for banks in mature markets and industrial economies, such as 
Germany and Japan, the rules imposed on the banks would cause structural problems as 
well as problems in the application of the system. Overall, Thorne concludes, that the 
legislation of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, was the most liberal, and did not constrain 
banks in the investments of their capital and reserves. Another point on the liberal status 
of Bulgarian legislation of 1989 was the lack of any constraints in foreign ownership or 
participation in local banks.
1 .12.4 C om m ercial B anking Sector
Commercial banks play an important role in determining the money supply, which is a key 
variable of the macroeconomic policy. The activities of commercial banks are a very 
important issue, because they are the main mechanism for flow of the money capital from 
individuals, in the form of savings, to investors, through the commercial banking system.
During most of the communist years the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), absorbed all 
existing commercial banks and undertook all banking functions. Bristow (1996)^  ^ has 
mentioned that “... structural changes came in 1989 when 59 new commercial banks were 
created from branches o f  the BNB, financed by the transfer o f  deposits, balanced by 
further transfer o f loans to enterprises'\sQQ also table 13].
The Law on the Bulgarian National Bank initiated the redefinition of roles and 
responsibilities in the new two-tier banking system that significantly changed the roles, 
objectives and firnctions of Bulgaria's central and commercial banks. Minkov (1993)” , has 
mentioned that ''at the beginning o f banking reform in Bulgaria there were a number o f 
banks considered commercial, although the parameters and the results o f their activities 
were fa r from commercial banking. The development o f a two-tiered banking system was 
incomplete, and this was why the banking sector had not yet turned into an effective 
vehicle fo r  financial capitaF.
The Law on Banks and Credit Activity constitutes the regulatory framework for the 
activities of banking institutions and provides even state-owned banks with significant 
autonomy. Further, reinforced the operation of the banking sector driven by market forces. 
The entry of new banks and the development of non-bank financial institutions gave rise to 
healthy competition among commercial banks.
$
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By the end of 1995 there were already 28 private Bulgarian banks. At the same time, the 
number of large banks was increasing, and the number of commercial banks decreasing. 
The number of new private banks was constantly growing and the 59 banks established 
from the commercialisation of the 59 branches of the BNB were consolidated by the 
BCC’s plan, which was to merge all the small banks into 4-6 big banks ready for 
privatisation mainly by foreign investors.
Table 16; The development of Bulgarian banks during the transition period
r NUMBER OF PRIVATE BANKS IN BULGARIA
1991 1992 1993 1994 j 1995
;.............. U.............. j 28 i
LARGE BANKS (with assets of 30 billion Lev or more)
NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
1989 I 1995 1 1996 g 1997 _____ 8 1998 {
1.............. ^ ............... I 46 34 i 36 j1............35........... i
Source: BNB
Commercial banks generate funds either by borrowing from other commercial banks and 
financial institutions (through the interbank money market) or by borrowing from the 
BNB. The "refinancing” of commercial banks by the BNB was presented in forms of 
loans from the BNB to the banks. The BNB was obliged to carefully control the loans to 
commercial banks since this activity allows the money supply to expand thus negatively 
affects the inflation rate. Refinancing includes several facilities^* like the Lombard 
Loans^ ,^ the Credit Ceilings^®, the Discount Operations^\ the Overdraft Facility^ ,^ the 
Open Market Operations'^, the Minimum Reserve Requirements, and the Short-term 
Deposit Auctions'^ '*.
1.13 Short In trod u ction  to the foreign trade organ isation; the CMEA 
System  of Trade
A quick review of the economic development during the 20* century and prior to 1989 
presents, among others, the legacy of the communist regime, the strong dependence on the 
CMEA and the Soviet Union trade and some other specific factors which led Bulgaria to 
having one of the worst initial economic conditions in the region, making the road for the 
transition to a market economy a “hard task”. Bulgaria’s dependence on the CMEA and 
the ex-USSR trade^  ^ and the collapse of CMEA trade with figures are also presented. This 
chapter also analyses the political instability in Bulgaria that created significant delay in 
the privatisation process, in the establishment and application of the new legal status and in 
the avoidance of the expansion of the nomenklatura, Mafia and other illegal actions. This
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part will present the reasons, which led to the collapse of the CMEA trade and the 
subsequence collapse of the industrial production at the beginning o f the transition period 
of each Central and Eastern European (CEE) country.
Before any further analysis it is important to understand the function of the institution that 
prevailed all maters of foreign trade for the six “people’s democracies” (Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, GDR) and the Soviet Union together with all 
the other members and associate members and co-operators country-members.^*’
From 1948, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania, started 
building the foreign trade monopoly, patterned on the Soviet Union administrative system. 
They procedure of erecting a foreign trade monopoly included the following elements:
1. the separation of foreign trade from, domestic production and trade, by forming foreign 
trade corporations, which were employed exclusively in international transactions. 
Each of those corporations had a monopoly of trade in its own sector.
2. the inclusion of foreign trade in the central plan and the imposition of quantity ceilings 
on all imports and quantity floors on all exports.
3. the fixing of domestic prices in order to avoid the currency being overvalued owing to 
domestic inflation.
4. the integration of the Soviet enterprises and joint enterprises into the national system.
The Central Eastern European countries and the USSR traded heavily with each other and 
these actions became the framework for the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA). In January 1949, the CMEA was established in Moscow. It was an 
intergovernmental body initially established as a payments’ system for the trade of the 
socialist countries but it also assisted and co-ordinated the economic development of its 
members.
1.13.1 The C M EA ’s organ ization al structure
The .political principle o f  the CMEA was '‘equality, sovereignty and interest" ...CMEA 
did not have an executive or legislative mandate... [nor did it] ... create a common market, 
but it did create a distinct economic region by fostering preferential relationships codified 
in bilateral ti'eaties between governments...]Th.Q\ ... CMEA system o f bilateral clearing 
did not involve international payments through transfer o f currency to or fi^om accounts in 
another country. The TR (transferable rubbles) lacked two major properties o f money: it 
was neither a means o f payment, nor was it a store o f value. The total volume ofTRs in the 
CMEA system was merely a measure o f the volume o f the outstanding bilateral surplus or 
deficit in national clearing accounts held by the countries with the IBEC”. The 
transferable ruble, however, was not truly transferable, let alone convertible. [Schrenk
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(1992)^®]. For example if  Poland built up a credit balance with IBEC by running a  
trade surplus with Hungary, it could not use the credit to finance a deficit with Bulgaria. 
For this and other reasons, each CMEA country sought to balance its trade bilaterally 
with each CMEA partner”. [Kenen 1991]®® Trade was, in principle to be balanced.
The CMEA organization consisted of the following members;
Table 17: CMEA country-members
Bulgaria Original member
1 ......................... ......... ..........1
Soviet Union Original member | :
Czechoslovakia Original member j East Germany i 
(GDR)
Joined in 1950 ^
Hungary r^ ^ ^ ir igh ^ ^ Mongolia Members |
Poland 1 OriginM member Vietnam [ Members j
Romania 1 Original member | Cuba Members I
Albania 1 Ceased participation in the ! 
I CMEA in 1961 !...............................................1
Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Finland, Iraq, Mexico, i 
: Nicaragua, Syria and Democratic of Yemen and some | 
other developing countries were co-operators and 
observers
Yugoslavia j Became an associate | 
member in 1964. It never | 
assumed full membership |
incorporating, at the same time, with the following institutions:
1. The Council Session: It was the highest level of the CMEA, consisting of the
regular annual meeting of heads of the governments.
2. The Executive Committee: It was the CMEA’s permanent board, which consisted 
of government representatives.
3. The CMEA Secretariat: It was the core organisation.
4. The International Bank for Economic Co-operation (IBEC): It was a financial
institution, which managed the complex clearing between the accounts of the 
members. These accounts were held bilaterally in transferable rubbles (TR) by 
crediting and debiting IBEC accounts. TR was the currency for the CMEA trade 
until 1991.
5. The International Investment Bank (IIB): A financial institution, which was 
mainly concerned with borrowing in convertible currencies and financing joint 
projects or financed investments projects in the non European CMEA developing 
countries’ members.
The CMEA was perceived, by some, as a continuation of the Soviet autarchic growth
64 U niversity o f  G lasgow , O ctober 2002
Chapter 1 : The Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy and the Legacy o f  the Communist Regime which may Affect FDI
Inflows in a Host Country: the case o f  Bulgaria: 1989-2001
Strategy due to its Soviet type structure and the fact that the USSR dominated, in 
percentage the total trade amount. This was certainly the case of Bulgarian foreign trade; 
from the second half of the 1950s about 50-55 percent of the total Bulgaria's foreign trade 
turnover was with the Soviet Union and about 30-35 percent with the other CMEA 
countries (especially the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia). 
According to Bruno (1992) "the CMEA collapse in 1989, caused the most damage in 
Bulgaria, the bulk o f  whose exports had gone to the CMEA
The CMEA had a positive effect on the East European trade. During the period 1956-60 
the East European Trade had a larger growth rate than the total world exports and even the 
trade of Western industrialised countries. The growth rate decelerated from 1961 to 1965, 
to a rate below the Western one, only slightly above the world total.
During the 1960s Bulgaria had the fastest rate of growth of foreign trade, with exports 
growing considerably faster than imports. By 1972, Bulgaria had the larger amount of 
foreign trade among the CMEA countries, followed by Romania, Poland, Hungary, the 
USSR, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Still Bulgarian economy was heavily dependent on 
foreign trade, as it lacked in raw materials.
Most of the trade among the CMEA countries was conducted on a government-to- 
government basis. It was based on five-year agreements, supplemented by annual protocols 
which were fixing the quantities and prices of the products to be traded. The commodity 
composition of CMEA trade and the international trade of the country was planned from 
the government. That was one of the problems of a centrally planed international trade. 
"Central planning tends to be biased against foreign trade. Planners crave certainty, and 
foreign trade, even between planned economies, involves uncertainty. It is hard to plan 
production, harder still to plan consumption, and very hard to plan the differences between 
them. To plan trade between two countries, moreover, the planners have to match the two 
countries' differences, imparting more uncertainty to each country's plan. ” [Kenen 1991]^  ^
The prices of primary commodities according to the Bucharest formula, adopted in 1975, 
were based on a five-year moving average of world prices but tended to lag behind them.
1.13.2 The CM EA trade and Trade R elations betw een CM EA members; 
The E conom ic D evelopm ent prior to 1989
Approximately 60-70% of the intra-CMEA trade, of the Central and East European 
countries, was with the USSR. Hungary was at one extreme, with the USSR’s share in total
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the introduction of world markets prices in trade among the CMEA countries
Prior to the above, was the Sofia CMEA session in January 1990. The Soviet Union 
has proposed the change of the currency for the CMEA trade. This proposal was a 
result from the Soviet need to improve its terms of trade, increasing its earnings and
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foreign trade falling below 20% by 1990, and Bulgaria at the other extreme, had almost 
totally Soviet-oriented development policies and trade.
The transition brought about a dramatic rearrangement o f the geographical distribution in 
the CEECs’ foreign trade. The share of the CEECs dropped radically and that of European 
Union increased significantly. The CEECs’ relations with the Soviet Union and then with 
Russia stopped to play a dominant role in the region.
Probably no other country employed so much assistance from the combined effects of 
generous Soviet supplies of energy and raw materials, together with an equal Soviet 
willingness to accept Bulgarian manufactured goods in return and resulting in extremely 
generous barter terms of trade. Russian long-term plans are to build new transit oil 
pipelines carrying oil from central Asia through Bulgaria and Greece to the Aegean Sea. In 
the West, Italy and Germany are the main trade partners. Trade with the U.S. is negligible. 
The chief exports were machinery, food products, tobacco, non-ferrous metals, cast iron, 
leather products, and textiles. The principal imports are petroleum, natural gas, machineiy, 
transportation equipment, steel, cellulose, and timber. On the other hand, though, the 
already existing industry set up by USSR financial aid, along with Bulgaria’s highly skilled 
and relatively cheap industry workers, gives one strong incentive among the others for 
foreign investors.
1.13.3. The most im portant factors behind the collapse of CMEA Trade
There are several reasons that led to the collapse of the CMEA system. The finally decision 
concerning the dissolution of the CMEA trade was made in June 1991, when the idea of a 
new organisation was also rem oved.T he following points explain the above;
y
The unification of Germany in June of 1990 and the disappearance of GDR as a trade 
partner for the remaining CMEA members. The trade to GDR amounted to 15% of the 
total trade among CMEA countries.
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improving its balance of payments.
• Another Sofia CMEA session was held in June 1990. The committee decided to 
transform of CMEA system into a new organisation like OECD. This new organisation 
was responsible for analysis of the economic development of member countries and for 
co-operation in fields such as statistics, energy, environment, etc. Many analysts have 
argued that this session in fact, had announced the abolition of the CMEA system and 
as it has mentioned before, after a year there was an abandonment of the idea of 
creating a new organisation.
• Moreover, this change to dollar payments was necessary, because most of the Central 
and Eastern Economies has already chosen the road for the transition to market 
economy and the remaining countries were close to adopting such as policies. It was 
necessary to abolish the CMEA trade, because the transition is based on economic 
liberalisation, reorientation of economic relations and outward oriented trade policies.
• As it was mentioned earlier the CMEA trade system was based on central planning 
system. Therefore, the abolition of central planning, foreign trade monopoly and the 
liberalisation, privatisation and structural and institutional reform have destroyed the 
foundations of the CMEA system.
• The war of Iraq and the consequences of international oil crisis in the summer of 1990, 
which gave a dramatic character to the cost of energy. Until the end of 1990, the 
CMEA countries imported energy from Russia at lower prices than the world market 
prices. After the introduction of dollar payments and the significant increase of the oil 
prices due to the Gulf war, the five CMEA countries (except GDR), faced problems in 
paying the cost (approximately 15 billion US$) without external financial assistance. 
This led to a significant increase in the foreign debt in all the CMEA members. Koves 
(1992)’^'* has pointed out that "the smaller European CMEA countries did, in fact, enjoy 
more favourable terms o f trade in their transferable-ruhle trade with the Soviet Union 
than in their dollar-accounted trade with other countries. They were net exporters o f 
relatively overpriced manufactures, as compared with the energy and raw materials o f 
which they were importers. This meant that in any given period o f time, Central and 
East Europeans had price benefits when exporting to and importing from the Soviet 
Union. ”
• Moreover, there was an economic and political crisis in USSR in 1991. This Soviet
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Union inability to pay for imports and the subsequent unwillingness to export led to a 
significant decrease in the trade flows among the CMEA countries (we have already 
mentioned that 60-70% of the intra-CMEA trade of the Central and East European 
countries was with the USSR). Koves (1992)^^ has argued that "the single most 
important factor behind the collapse in trade was the Soviet economic and political 
crisis, eventually leading to a crash and disintegration
Furthermore, the USSR from 1988 onwards has faced several problems, which led to a 
political fragmentation after the Moscow coup of August 1991. In September 1991, the 
CIS was created and on 26* of December 1991, there was the formal dissolution of the 
USSR. In addition, similar problems appeared in the associate member of the CMEA 
system, named Yugoslavia. In June, 1991, a civil war began and followed by the 
recognition of the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. 
In June 1992, was also the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republic. This political 
disintegration has influenced the relations between the members and has resulted to a 
decrease in the trade flows between the members.
• Although, in this thesis it has been argued that the abolition of the CMEA trade was a 
result of the above reasons, it has also to be mentioned that there was a significant 
decline in the trade flows during the 1980s among the CMEA countries. Furthermore, 
the economic crisis of the member countries and the considerable decrease in output 
and the overall decline was another reason for the collapse of the CMEA trade.
1.13.4  W hy the CM EA trade did not collapse earlier
During the years 1990-1991, the five European country-members of the CMEA trade 
system continue seeking Soviet Union guaranteed for their exports and stable Soviet 
deliveries of energy and raw materials. This happened because of their competitive 
weakness on international markets and the difficulties that they were facing in the 
reorientation of their trade.
Countries-members of the CMEA system even in 1991 continued to ensure as many Soviet 
oil deliveries for themselves, as possible. This has happened due to the lack of the 
necessary infrastructure (pipelines) for importing significant quantities of oil from other 
countries. Moreover, although there was a payment in dollars, on the other hand, oil 
deliveries from USSR were indeed, in lower prices than the world market prices. 
Furthermore, there was a lower transportation cost, and a significant knowledge of the
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Soviet oil trade and a subsequent lack of experience of the international oil trade.
In addition, the CMEA countries have continued to ask for Soviet oil deliveries for another 
reason. They wanted to maintain the same level in their exports. The only chance, at least 
at the beginning of their transition, was to exchange their exports of manufactured goods 
with imports of the Soviet oil.
On the other the USSR had reasons to continue the trade with the CMEA countries during 
the years of transition. Although, the CMEA countries’ products were at a lower level of a 
quality comparing to the western products, a large proportion of them had already 
generated a favourable image in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, these products were of 
much higher quality of the domestic products. In addition, Central and Eastern Europe 
economies, from their previous experience, also had a relatively good knowledge of the 
USSR market, traditions, practices, language, and had already established a strong enough 
repair and service network. Koves (1992)’® has argued that "for a number o f economic, 
technological, and human reasons, not only did the "five ” depend to a large extent on the 
Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union depended on the "five ”, ”
1.13.5 B ulgaria  as a country case study; B u lg a r ia ’s dependence on the  
C M E A .
Bulgaria was one of the least industrialised countries of Eastern Europe depending mainly 
on agriculture. After the rise of the communist regime in 1949 Bulgaria developed a 
strong dependence on the Soviet Union, a country that was the cornerstone of Bulgaria’s 
industrial development, providing the new communist country with capital and energy 
resources; the two things Bulgaria lacked the most. The country experienced some growth 
during the communist period but it failed to set solid bases for an independent and 
prosperous economy. This was due to the controlled economy that prevented competition 
and gave no incentives for quality and efficiency. By the early 1980s Bulgaria had become 
an industrialised country with a more or less stable economy and a reported per capita 
income roughly similar to other European countries such as Poland, Hungary, Portugal and 
Yugoslavia.”  However, the stable economy was a product of the protective environment of 
the CMEA. The data provided in the table below show that the bigger percentage of 
Bulgarian Foreign Trade was contacted with CMEA country members. Those trade 
partners had little concern about the quality of the products and where not looking for a 
better deal elsewhere.
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Bulgaria’s dependence on the CMEA as well as the USSR is self-proven by the data on 
foreign trade during the communist years. After the collapse of both’®, Bulgaria was left 
without its main trade partners, and with production that would not stand a chance, in 
terms of competitiveness, in a non-controlled market. In general all " ...CEE [Central and 
Eastern European] countries ... needed to restructure in numerous ways, notably from  
heavy to light industry, from industry and agriculture to finance and services, and from  
CMEA to world trade. ... Within existing firms, new products lines and production 
methods had to be developed, while simultaneously reducing input waste, notably in terms 
o f energy, labour and the environment.” [Estrin et al 1997, p9]’® The"... CMEA collapse in 
1989, caused the most damage in Bulgaria, the bulk o f whose exports had gone to the 
CMEA”. [Bruno 1992, p.80]. The unification of East Germany, who was also a major 
trade partner during communist years, with West Germany was another strike to Bulgaria’s 
weak economy.
The changes in Bulgaria’s familiar trade environment were, most probably, the strongest 
obstacles for its economic reform. The ex-USSR impact on the Bulgarian economy during 
the energy crisis was also devastating due to the strong dependence of Bulgaria in oil 
imports from the USSR. The energy crisis in the USSR resulted in severe energy shortage 
in Bulgaria , In addition to the above, the UN sanctions on Iraq as a result of the Gulf 
crisis cost Bulgaria $2,5 billion.*^ Iraq was Bulgaria’s largest debtor through trade relations 
and, thus, the agreement of repayment of the loan with the delivery of 600,000 tons of oil 
was devastatingly postponed due to the UN embargo. Another crucial reason for the delay 
of the economic transition was the large amount of Bulgarian foreign debt; one of the 
larger debt/GDP ratio among the East European countries. Only one country, Romania, 
started its transition with debt, less than 1 billion US$. Although the Soviet Union and 
Poland started their transition with more dept than Bulgaria they had 8,5 and 4,5 billion US 
$ foreign reserves respectively, while Bulgaria and Romania, veiy soon after the transition, 
run out of foreign currency reserves. The already - made loans in hard currency together 
with the devaluation of the national currency increased the adverse initial conditions.
Summarising, the Persian Gulf crisis, which caused higher oil prices, the interruption of the 
trade between Iraq and Bulgaria as well as the collapse of trade relations with Russia, East 
Germany, and CMEA members, brought Bulgaria close to disaster in times when the 
country was most vulnerable. As a result, Bulgaria started the transition to an open market 
having one of the worst initial economic conditions of ex-communist countries.
.
j !
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1.13 .6  W hat are the reasons behind the output co llapse in CEE 
countries?
The similar large falls in output in the economies of central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union during their transition period is a very controversial and complicated issue. Despite 
wide differences in reform policies, the cumulative falls in industrial output, at 40-60 per 
cent, large and similar between countries. Some of the considerations associated with the 
subject present different views of the problem.
• The opponents of the shock therapy like Stiglitz J. (1999)®^  argued that the 
speed of the transition greatly affects the output collapse since it might generate 
inflation as a result of rapid price and trade liberalization, as well as sharp increases 
in interest rates, and the external shock might take local enterprises by surprise. 
This argument is proven wrong by the statistical data. Poland, which followed a big 
bang policy in 1989, did have the largest output drop in 1990, but the effects were 
short term since it made the better recovery from all other countries even from 
those that followed a more gradual approach.
• In situation when the rapid speed is essential for the success of the transition 
(economic, institutional and political), according to Gomulka, S. (1998)“'* there are
four classes of specific causes of output falls: "J) massive and rapid changes in 
relative prices in conditions o f limited resource mobility; 2) the elimination o f 
excessive real aggregate demand to establish buyers' markets; 3) the collapse o f 
captive markets within the former CMEA area; and 4) the collapse o f the arms 
industry and o f state financed investments in housing, energy, agriculture and the 
infrastructure. ”
• The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the CMEA, and the USSR, the larger 
facilitators of trade in the region, deprived the CEE countries of their most 
important trade partners®®
• Other authors such as Kornai has argued that the output collapse is due to the 
change of the economic system rather than to the transition policies
• The lack of competitive products with significant quality and the lack of 
marketing skills, lead to an inadequate promotion and this lack of trade partners 
also lead to output decreases
• The statistical exaggeration (price distortions) of the output in the communist 
years led the economists to argue that the collapse during the transition years was
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not so significant as the figures show 86
• The price liberalisation lead to sharp price increases of the products and thus 
these markets has lost their comparative advantage of the low price and thus led to 
output decreases
• Most of the state-owned enterprises were in debt, thus during the transition most 
of the governments decided to privatised them, to liquidate or even bankrupt them. 
Thus, the output has declined
• During the transition there was a trend of large amount of production keeping 
the commodities in large storehouses, without focusing in the quality, and 
exchange these products with other products from other CMEA countries where the 
products were in scarcity. After the collapse of this trade there was no need to 
continue such as behaviour.
• Shortage of raw materials, energy and semi-finished goods, which in the 
communist era were imported from Russia is another reason for output collapse for 
countries such as Bulgaria, which was heavily depended on importing such as 
things from Russia®’
• The tight financial disciplines and the hard budget constraints imposed by the 
governments to the enterprises made companies to be more careful, more efficient 
and to become profit seekers and not quantity or turnover seekers. Moreover, they 
did not sell to clients of other state-owned enterprises that raised doubts about their 
ability or intention to pay (become risk averse). Lastly, banks on which the 
government had also imposed strict policies did not continue to support financially 
the enterprises thus, there were not accumulating large amounts of stock of 
commodities or increasing their production output (lack of working capital or 
capital for expansion, lack of orders, loss of markets etc.)
• The low per capita consumption after economic crises or even before that. A lot 
of products in the planned economy were subsidized by the government, especially 
in the food sector, thus after the abolishment of these subsidies and the low 
purchasing power of the citizens, they did not afford to buy the same quantities of 
products. There was increased poverty with significantly increased number of 
unemployment rate.®®
• The increases in the unemployment rate resulted to a percentage to the decline of 
output.
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1.14 CO NCLUSIO N
The legacy of the communist regime in Bulgaria created unfavorable conditions for the 
transition to a market economy. In 1989, Bulgaria was an industrialized country, which 
produced low quality products, which were distributed to the CMEA countries and the 
USSR. The collapse of the CMEA trade created a lack of foreign trade partners. Therefore, 
finding new partners as well as making changes in the composition and in the geographical 
distribution of the producing commodities was also necessary. However, the distance, 
both geographic and economical, from the West for almost four decades and the low 
quality of the products led to the difficulty of finding new trade partners and thus to the 
collapse of the industrial output.
At the beginning of transition, the general view among the policy makers in all the 
transition economies was that the information tools were inadequate to help them in taking 
significant decisions and using the analysis of the past trends as an indicator to improve 
policy design.
When studying the statistical data, especially in the communist period, it is necessary to be 
careful. "Even in established market economies standard statistical data provide only an 
incomplete description o f economic reality, hut in countries in transition data deficiencies 
and biases are much more serious” Under central planning, the output of state 
enterprises was often exaggerated, whereas during the transition, there are strong tax 
incentives in order to the output of the private sector to be underreported by large margins. 
Conventional statistics fail to reflect the sharp improvement in the quality of goods and the 
satisfaction of the demand during the transition period, relative to the previous situation 
with enormous output and unsatisfied demand. Reported unemployment data and fiscal 
deficits during the communist period were problematic and cross-border transactions were 
poorly reported.
The statistical offices of the planned economies were adequate to keep under control the 
statistical information regarding state-owned enterprises with strong governmental control 
of the bookkeeping system. In the post-communist era, the introduction of a significant 
number of private firms, created problems to those statistical agencies, which did not 
expect and were not ready to prepare and measure economic facts of a market economy 
with quickly increasing private sector. Under the planned- economy there was a continuous 
attitude for an increase in output. This was apparent in the figures, but at the same time it
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does not signify economic growth. There was an exaggeration of the data. Balcerowicz®° 
has argued that "even in the established market economies statistical indicators do not 
provide a fu lly adequate description o f the economic reality, because fo r  example, o f well 
know problems o f  statistical representation o f changes in produce quality, or the 
inadequacy o f comparing data on unemployment in various countries. Even in these 
countries there are many instances o f  the poor interpretation o f statistics”. The newly 
emerging output in Eastern Economies is more closely geared to the consumers’ welfare 
than the planned economy’s output. Martha de Melo et al. have pointed out that®' "Under 
central planning the output o f state enterprises was often exaggerated, whereas during the 
transition, output o f the private sector has tended to be underreported, sometimes by large 
margins. ” There are strong tax incentives for the output to be underreported by the private 
entrepreneurs. Lipton et al. (1990) have argued that®^  "Real growth has been routinely 
overstated and inflation routinely understated in the data o f  Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union ”.
The statistical data show that countries from the Balkan region such as Bulgaria, Romania, 
Albania, FYROM, Bosnia and Yugoslavia lag behind not only from the Western advanced 
economies, but also from the other countries of the CEE region. Furthermore, the Balkan 
countries are unable to reach the statistical data (such as industrial output, unemployment 
rate and trade) they had in 1989. On the other hand, countries like Hungary and Poland 
have managed to overcome (more than 30%) the levels of industrial output they had in 
1989^\
A few basic reasons, which led the Balkan countries to a significant delay in economic 
growth, are:
• the geographical distance from the Western market
• the strong dependence on the ex USSR and the CMEA trade organization
• the different initial adverse economic conditions (the worst in the whole region) 
together with the severe exogenous shocks (wars on Yugoslavia and Kossovo and 
the subsequent embargo and the dissolution of Yugoslavia)
• the political instability and the continuous hostilities in the Balkan region
• The insufficient quality and variety of products, which were unable to offset the 
lost trade partners with others from the West and the limitation of natural resources.
Countries such as Albania, Bulgaria and Romania had in 1991 a decrease of approximately 
50% of the figures of 1989 in trade exports and nowadays (2000) do not manage to reach
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the levels of 1989 (with the exemption of Romania). On the other hand, countries such as 
Hungary and Poland (regions close to the western markets) did not have large decreases in 
their exports in the period 1989-1991 and in the year 2000 have managed to double or even 
to triple their exports (their main export destinations being the West). Actually, it is 
obvious, that the most advanced economies from the whole CEE region (Slovenia, Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, together with the Baltic states), which have better 
opportunities of becoming future members of the EU, have also managed to increase 
significantly (double or triple) their exports in 2000 compared to the figures of 1989. 
However, it can be pointed out that most, if not all, of the CEE countries had a positive 
trade balance (or very close to zero balance) in 1989, but on the other hand, they have a 
negative trade balance in 2000.
Finally, there are a lot of chances for a few countries from Central and East European 
region to become future members of the European Union (under the European Union 
Enlargement Policy). Nowadays, the economic situation of CEE countries is far away from 
that of the EU and the macroeconomic data of CEE economies (especially that of the 
Balkan countries) did not satisfy the Copenhagen economic criteria. However, most of the 
CEE countries have strong hopes to join the EU and to proceed in an economic (nominal) 
convergence with the Copenhagen criteria until the end of this decade®f
Although early analysts have seen Bulgaria as a country, which undertook a ‘big bang’ 
transition path, the eleven years of Bulgarian transition studied by the author indicate 
otherwise. The instant price liberalization of more than 70% of the commodities in 1989 
was the only sign to point toward a ‘big bang’ strategy, when even the prices of the 
remaining commodities have not been liberalized after those years and the big state 
monopolies are still under state control. Although a few countries from the CEE region 
have chosen the shock therapy model of transition in early years (such as Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Russia, Albania, Estonia, Latvia), most of them shift to 
gradualism (Russia, Romania, Ukraine) or “failed” due to the postponing of reforms as a 
result of inadequate governmental abilities, fragile coalition governments, political cost of 
reforms, political concerns for re-election etc. or some other countries started from the 
beginning as gradualists (such as Hungaiy, Lithuania), but never shift to shock therapy 
models®®.
All the signs of Bulgarian economic life were negative until mid-1997. The governmental 
failed to increase the private sector and to create adequate financial intermediaries having 
at the same time one of the weakest stock markets in the region even in the present day.
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The development in Bulgarian privatisation is not only far away from a ‘big bang’ path, 
but also raise doubts on whether it falls under gradualism. An explanation may be that 
Bulgarian governments in the sense of thinking political cost impose a gradual approach, 
first to restructure and then to privatize.
However, after the mid-1997, things have changed and only positive signs in the Bulgarian 
economy can be seen. There is acceleration in privatisation and restructuring (Bitzenis, A , 
2003 forthcoming®®), an increased private sector (near to 65% in 1999), one-digit inflation 
rate, low interest rates, macroeconomic stability, increased FDI inflows, significant 
participation of foreign banks, starting the abolishment of the remaining monopolies, 
imposing hard budget constraints and adaptation of an adequate legal framework.
Although the signs for economic growth (after July 1997 and especially in 1999-2000) are 
obvious positive, Bulgaria is behind most of the other CEE countries since it has not yet 
recovered economically, neither in GDP (table 18) and industrial output (table 19) nor in 
trade balances, so increases in the growth of the low level of stock market performance, 
real GDP, exports and imports and industrial output are needed. Moreover, the Bulgarian 
government should try to decrease the high unemployment rate (table 20), to balance the 
current account deficit and to proceed to the finalization of the remaining privatisation 
deals together with the abolishment of the remaining monopolies.
Table 18: Real GDP/NMP in Central & Eastern Europe. 1980,1987-2000, (Indices, 1989=100)m »  w
Eastern Europe 88.7 99.4 100.8 100.0 93.2 82.9 79.3 79.0 82.1 86.9 90.3 92.1 93.8 95.0 98.7
Albania 
Bosnia and
79.4 92.4 91.0 100.0 90.0 64.8 60.1 65.9 71.4 80.9 88.2 82.0 88.6 95.0 102.6
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 76.2 99.3 101.9 100.0 90.9 83.3 77.2 76.1 77.5 79.7 71.6 66.6 68.9 70.6 74.1
Croatia 99.0 102.5 101.6 100.0 92.9 73.3 64.7 59.5 63.0 67.3 71.3 76.2 78.1 77.8 80.7
Czech Republic 93.7 95.7 100.0 98.8 87.3 86.9 86.9 88.8 94.1 98.7 97.7 95.5 94.8 97.7
Hungary 86.3 99.4 99.3 100.0 96.5 85.0 82.4 81.9 84.4 85.6 86.8 90.7 95.1 99.3 104.5
Poland 91.1 95.9 99.8 100.0 88.4 82.2 84.4 87.6 92.1 98.6 104.5 111.7 117.1 121.8 126.8
Romania 88.5 106.7 106.2 100.0 94.4 82.2 75.0 76.2 79.2 84.8 88.2 82.8 78.3 75.8 77.0
Slovakia 97.1 99.0 100.0 97.5 83.3 77.9 75.1 78.7 84.0 89.2 94.8 98.6 100.5 102.7
Slovenia 98.9 103.5 100.5 100.0 91.9 83.7 79.1 81.4 85.7 89.3 92.4 96.6 100.3 105.5 110.6
FYROM 93.3 101.4 98.1 100.0 89.8 84.3 78.7 72.8 71.6 70.8 71.6 72.6 74.8 76.8 80.7
Yugoslavia 95.7 100.2 98.8 100.0 92.1 81.4 58.7 40.6 41.7 44.2 46.8 50.3 51.5 41.6 45.7
Source: UN/ECE Common Database, derived from national and CIS statistics.
Note: Data for the east European countries are based on a GDP measure, except where otherwise mentioned. For the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, NMP data for 1980-1990 were chain-linked to GDP data from 1990. Country indices were aggregated with previous year PPP-ljased 
weights obtained from the European Comparison Programme for 1996. « Gross material product (1980-1989 for Croatia).
Comment: In all the CEE countries, there was a similar reduction in real GDP, with the negative exceptions 
of Albania and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria did not recover in 1999 like the rest of the other CEE countries.
Table 19: Real gross industnal output in Central & Eastern Europe, 1980,1987-2000, (Indices, 1989=100)
Eastern Europe 82.8 98.5 100.6 100.0 85.9 70.2 63.0 61.5 65.5 70.3 73.9 77.5 78.6 78.5 85.0
Albania 77.0 93.3 95.2 100.0 86.7 50.4 35.2 31.7 25.8 23.9 18.1 18.6 22.7 26.3 29.4
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 106.0 101.1 98.1 100.0 101.8 76.9 25.5 2.0 1.7 2.8 5.2 7.0 8.7 9.6 10.5
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Bulgaria 71.3 98.0 101.1 100.0 83.2 66.4 54.2 48.8 54.0 56.4 59.3 53.4 49.1 43.1 44.1
Croatia 88.7 102.0 100.6 100.0 88.7 63.4 54.2 51.0 49.6 49.7 51.3 54.8 56.8 56.0 57.0
Czech Republic 81.5 96.5 98.5 100.0 96.6 75.7 69.8 66.1 67.4 73.3 |74.8 78.1 79.4 76.9 80.9
Hungary 92.9 106.4 105.3 100.0 90.7 74.0 66.8 69.5 76.2 79.7 82.4 91.5 103.0 113.7 134.5
Poland 86.3 95.5 100.5 100.0 75.8 69.7 71.7 76.3 85.5 93.8 101.6 113.3 117.3 122.9 131.6
Romania 76.9 99.2 101.9 100.0 81.9 63.3 49.4 50.1 51.7 56.6 |60.1 55.8 48.1 44.3 47.9
Slovakia 76.7 98.6 100.8 100.0 94.0 75.9 68.6 66.1 69.3 75.1 76.9 77.9 80.9 78.0 85.1
Slovenia 90.3 101.6 98.9 100.0 89.5 78.4 68.1 66.1 70.4 71.8 72.5 73.2 75.9 75.6 80.2
FYROM 72.1 97.3 95.6 100.0 89.4 74.0 62.3 53.7 48.0 42.9 44.3 45.0 47.0 45.8 47.4
Yugoslavia 80.0 97.6 98.4 100.0 88.0 72.5 57.0 35.7 36.2 37.6 40.4 44.2 45.8 35.2 391
Source: UN/ECE Common Database, derived from national and CIS statistics.
Note: Data for former Czechoslovakia and the former SFR of Yugoslavia for 1980 until the breakup obtained as sum of individual country data for 
former members. For the countries of the former Soviet Union, data for 1980-1990 were chain-linked to national or CIS data from 1990. Country 
indices were aggregated with previous year PPP-based weights on the basis of data obtained from the European Comparison Programme for 1996.
Comment: In 1990, all CEE countries had a similar reduction of approximately 50% in industrial output, with 
the negative exception of Albania and the positive exceptions of Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic 
and Hungary. Bulgaria did not recover in 1999.
Table 20; Registered unemployment in Central & Eastern Europe, 1990-2000, (Per cent of labour force, end-of-period)
m 4
Eastern Europe 9.6 12.4 14.0 13.6 12.5 11.7 11.9 12.6 14.6 15.1
Albania 9.5 9.2 27.0 22.0 18.0 12.9 12.3 14.9 17.6 18.2 16.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 39.0 38.7 39.0 39.4
Bulgaria 1.8 11.1 15.3 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5 13.7 12.2 16.0 17.9
Croatia ° 14.1 17.8 16.6 17.3 17.6 1 15.9 17.6 18.6 20.8 22.6
Czech Republic 0.7 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 7.5 9.4 8.8
Hungary 1.7 7.4 12.3 12.1 10.9 10.4 10.5 10.4 9.1 9.6 8.9
Poland 6.5 12.2 14.3 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.2 10.3 10.4 13.1 15.0
Romania 1.3 3.0 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.6 8.8 10.3 11.5 10.5
Slovakia 1.6 11.8 10.4 14.4 14.8 13.1 12.8 12.5 15.6 19.2 17.9
Slovenia 10.1 13.3 15.5 14.2 14.5 14.4 14.8 14.6 13.0 12.0
FYROM " 24.5 26.2 27.7 30.0 36.6 38.8 41.7 41.4 43.8 44.9
Yugoslavia “ ^ 21.0 24.6 24.0 23.9 24.7 26.1 25.6 27.2 27.4 26.6
Source: National statistics and direct communications from national statistical offices to UN/ECE secretariat.
® The data reported on employment cover only the social sector in agriculture, hence unemployment rates are biased upwards.
^ Since 1999, excluding Kosovo and Metohia.
Comment: Bulgaria’s unemployment rate increases every year (with an exception for the period from April 
2000 to June 2001).
On the other hand, the Bulgarian government may consider all the above as the most 
important tasks to achieve or to overcome, while simultaneously keeping at the same level 
or increasing the growth rate of the macroeconomic performance within the period of the 
following years (up to 2010) will give Bulgaria the chances for becoming one of the next 
members of the EU. This is mainly based on the level of the “black economy”, which 
occurs in the CEE countries and especially in Balkan countries, which is around 40%-50% 
of the GDP level of each country (the EU countries have around 10%-15% level of 
“underground economy”, and Greece is the only country among the EU, which has the 
biggest level of “hidden economy” - around 30%-35% of GDP). Considering firstly that 
the GDP per capita of Greece (a member of the EU), Cyprus and Malta (which both are 
countries that satisfy the Copenhagen criteria for an accession to the EU) is around 13,000 
US$ (for each of them) and secondly the GDP growth for most of the CEE countries is 
around 5%-7% per year, then we conclude to the following: with such a growth rate, if we 
assume the level of black economy in 50% of the real GDP, then we also conclude that the 
GDP per capita of one country, such as Bulgaria, will reach the level of 13,000 US$ in a
Aristidis Bitzenis, PhD 77
___________Foreign D irect Investment during the Transition from a  Planned to  M arket Economy: the case o f  B ulgaria 1989-2001
period of 7 - 10 years. However, estimations and other researches from organizations and 
institutions are more optimistic and they are talking for earlier EU accession (e.g. for 
Bulgaria in 2005-2006).
The transition theories are exaggerated models of the economic development and operation 
of every country since the variables considered are the same in all macroeconomic 
analyses. The extreme effects observed in countries that are faced with the disability of all 
sectors of the economy, reveal the roots of the lesser effects of the policies regarding the 
same variables in less troubled economies. Theorists through close observation of the 
experiences of many countries have set up the guidelines for the transition economies. The 
results are valuable not only for countries in transition, but also for other countries, 
developed or not, in the application of any reform strategies.®’ Despite "... the similarity o f 
ultimate objectives and basic direction o f changes required, countries ' actual transition 
experience has differed enormously, with respect to both policies implemented and results 
achieved to date. The reasons fo r the differences include the country’s initial conditions, 
the external environment (notably external shocks), and the specific policies pursued 
during the transition.” ®®
1.15 ENDNOTES
' After the denomination, the new  banknotes in  circulation on the 5th July, 1999 are: 1 lev, 2 levs, 5 levs, 10 
levs, 20 levs, 50 levs and the coins: 1 stotinka, 2 stotinkas, 5 stotinkas, 10 stotinkas, 20 stotinkas, 50 
stotinkas. The old banknotes and coins w ill remain in circulation until 31 Decem ber 1999.
 ^W Y Z A N  L. M IC H A E L , “Bulgaria: A  Country Study” in  East-Central European Economies in Transition, 
edited by John P.Hardt and R.Kaufman, N ew  York, 1995, pp.531-551.
® B E L L , D . JO H N , “ ‘Postcom m unist’ Bulgaria”, m Politics, power and the struggle for democracy in South- 
East Europe, edited by Karen D aw isha and Bruce Parrott, 1997, Cambridge U niversity Press, UK, Chapter 9, 
p . 3 5 5 .
Membership in  the Front was about 4 .4 m illion in  the late 1980s; the Communist party at that time had 
som e 930,000 members. The other political party that ftmctioned in  Bulgaria during com m unist rule was the 
Bulgarian National Agrarian U nion (BA NU ). The Fatherland Front (FF) had first formed in 1941, but had 
made little progress because few  parties were w illin g  to co-operate w ith the comm unists. In the summer o f  
1942, a second FF emerged, consisting again o f comm unists and the left agrarians under N ikola Petkov.
® C R A M PT O N , R. J ,, 1997, A  Concise History of Bulgaria, Cambridge University Press, p. 194, UK.
® Todor Zhivkov, Bulgarian Communist leader, born in  Pravets. Trained as a printer, he joined the Y oung  
Communist League in 1928 and the Bulgarian Communist party in 1932. Zhivkov fought in the Resistance 
against the N azis during W orld War II and was afterwards elected to the N ational Assembly. A  loyal 
Stalinist, he became a full member o f the party's Central Committee in  1948, a member o f its Politburo in  
1951, and its first secretary in 1954. In 1962 Zhivkov assumed the Prime M inister's office, and by 1971 he 
was the titular head o f  state, thus holding the highest positions in both the state and the party. Re-elected  
party ch ief in  1981 and again in  1986, Zhivkov was ousted in a coup in  Novem ber 1989 and expelled from  
the party a m onth later. Convicted in September 1992 o f  corruption in office, he drew a seven-year prison 
sentence.
’ B E L L , D. JO H N , 1997, “‘Postcom m unist’ Bulgaria”, Chapter 9, Karen D aw isha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), 
Politics, power and the struggle for democracy in South-East Europe, Cambridge U niversity Press, UK, 
p.357.
® C R A M PT O N , R. J., 1997, A  Concise History o f Bulgaria, Cambridge University Press, p. 199, UK.
® Council for M utual Econom ic A ssistance (COMECON or CM EA), former intergovernmental body 
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CHAPTER TWO  
2 L iteratu re  review  on the EDI T heories
The dynamics of the world economy and global competition patterns are encouraging 
multinational enterprises to expand into emerging economies. Due to the political and 
economic changes in the Central and Eastern Europe, the unexplored and undeveloped 
markets opened up for western companies. Many MNE’s felt the need to move quickly and 
grasp the potential opportunities there. The addition of approximately 430 million people to 
the countries operating under Western economy principles, following the political upheaval in 
the region in 1989, has been an important factor in this development. All these countries are 
being in stage of transition from centrally -  planned economies to market -  driven economies. 
For this reason, and especially in the Balkan region there is lack of economic and political 
stability. Taking into consideration the economic and political environment of the Central and 
Eastern Europe, the important question arises for many potential entrants to the new emerging 
markets: What are the major reasons to enter and which is the most convenient entry mode for 
the western investors into CEE? (for more discussion see endnotes)’
Firstly, consumers in CEE had no access to many consumer goods that have been readily 
available in countries at similar levels of per capita income elsewhere. This created a catch-up 
demand that unleashed immediately after trade liberalization. Dominated firms may see the 
new markets as an opportunity to gain competitive advantages, while global leaders wish to 
prevent such challenges and the emergence of new competitors from within the region. 
Multinational enterprises established in both Western and Eastern Europe may have superior 
opportunities to exploit price discrimination, product differentiation or vertical integration. 
Moreover, for many companies the presence in the region may be necessary for global 
competitiveness.
The key issue to address is how to prepare successful international strategy in such an 
environment that is characterized for countries in transition. The environment of Eastern 
European countries is characterized as an unstable, uncertain and risky. Consequently it is 
impossible to prepare accurate business forecasts in the fast changing and uncertain economic, 
political and legal environment. The common problems that the investing company has to 
cope with are the overall state of economy, unclear government priorities, lack of necessary 
legislation, inexperienced bureaucracies, different culture and business practices, 
underdeveloped court systems, inexperienced agents in business negotiations, bribery and 
corruption. The level of technical skills is not matched by managerial skills, nor
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entrepreneurial culture and willingness to take business risks. Further costs arise from weak 
infrastructures, outdated capital stock, social costs, and the regulatory environment. Although 
rapid improvements are being reported for these criteria, it may still be difficult to find a local 
partner with the necessary business skills.
Investors who seek to enter these markets find necessary to engage in some a priory 
marketing research, but the problem is to find reliable data to base a decision on. Moreover, 
the institutional framework does not provide the efficient protection of intellectual property 
rights. Consequently, to do a business in an environment that does not provide legal 
protection of any kind of property represents enormous difficulties and potential risks. Even 
though, there are plenty of obstacles that can make entry to the Central and Eastern Europe 
difficult, for many western companies it still represents a great opportunity to establish an FDI 
project.
The choice of market entry strategy is the crucial part of international business strategy. 
Companies have special modes to cope with international markets that differ in the control 
that the entrant attains over the local operations and the resources that are required for the 
entry. Firms entering a foreign market can choose among an array of possible organizational 
modes, including exports, contractual modes of coordination and equity investment as joint- 
or wholly-owned venture (FDI, privatisation, merger & acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint 
ventures etc.).
This thesis examines foreign direct investment practices and determination on FDI in the 
Bulgarian transition economy; thus, an overlook on the theories on FDI provides several key 
elements, which are considered when studying FDI.
• The relationship between the firm size and the market size: the comparison clarifies 
the velocity and direction of small and medium size firms.
• The internal and external constraints that influence growth patterns: the internal 
constraints (within the company) may be shortages of capital, managerial skill, 
information etc. and the external may be government constraints, market constraints 
etc.
• The internal and external opportunities, which provide reasons or incentives for FDI.
• The internal and external disadvantages that may be corrected with FDI.
• The role of risk and uncertainty
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2.1 In tern a liza tio n  T heorists: G eneral Theory or another specific  theory
Dunning (1973^, 198 P) was the first to provide a more comprehensive analysis based on 
ownership, location, and the advantages of internalization. Dunning's eclectic theory provides 
some answers about the geographic distribution of FDI by analyzing location factors. His 
taxonomy of location factors emphasizes possession of raw materials, labor costs, government 
incentives, and servicing of local markets. Dunning's model has been criticized for being 
tautological: it provides taxonomy for a wide variety of variables that may be important. But 
the taxonomy does not provide theoretical justification of why certain location factors are 
important.
2.1.1 The E clectic  A pproach (O LI 1976)
The OLI theory aims in explaining the multinational operations of firms, their level of success 
and the pattern through which they emerge. FDI is determined by the special regional 
characteristics of the home and the host country, the range and type of the products of the 
activity or the industry that the firm belongs and the strategy of the management, organization 
and structure the firm wishes to achieve with the investment. According to Dunning 
(1981,1988,1991), the level of FDI of a firm is governed by three sets of factors, namely 
ownership (firm-specific) advantages (O), location (country-specific) advantages (L) and 
internalisation advantages (I). The advantages discussed are different in separate countries, 
industries, and firms and in different time periods. The optimal use of these advantages may 
lead a firm to FDI.
Dunning's main contribution to the theories of FDI is that he draws on several important 
approaches to set up his own "general" paradigm. This is the major reason why his theory is 
called eclectic.
According to the normal meaning of the terms, while such factors as know-how, management 
and marketing skills and national product fimctions are advantages owned by a firm or a 
country (ownership and location advantages), the advantage of internalisation in itself is not. 
This is because internalisation of a market refers to the replacement of an arm's-length 
contractual relationship (i.e. the external market) with unified ownership (i.e. the internal 
market); it is a firm's strategic choice: whether to export its goods which embody the 
ownership-specific advantages, to set up foreign subsidiaries, or to license the use of such 
intangible assets. Though internalisation can bring advantages, it is hard to say that these are 
advantages intrinsic to the nature of the firm.
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2 .1 .2  The In vestm en t D evelopm ent Path (ID P) (1979)
The IDP refers to a specific country in relation to the others, in regard to the elements 
presented in the OLI model. The country incorporates its locational advantages, the firm 
specific advantages of the local firms, and the extent to which local and foreign firms chose to 
exploit the L advantages in relation to their O advantages through internalization of different 
markets. The level and specifications of all the factors are observed through time and in 
relation with the factors of the other countries. The main point of the IDP is that the level of 
inward and outward FDI may be determined by the level of the above factors. The country 
passes through different stages depending on the level of all the factors so in each stage there 
is a predicted level of inward and outward FDI.
The IDP is a dynamic model describing the amount of inward and outward FDI in a countiy, 
considering the development of its OLI configurations in relation with the spillovers of FDI 
and analyzing their effects on additional investment activity.'’
2.1 .3  RUGM AN
Rugman has developed a general theory that studies the FDI activities of the MNEs regarding 
the concept of internalization as the link between the various theories explaining the motives 
for FDP. Based on the market imperfections theory by Coase, and several early theories 
about internalization by Coase (1937), Hymer (1976), Buckley-Casson (1976), Dunning 
(1977) and others, Rugman incorporated many FDI theories in one general theory of 
internalization. The first step towards accepting the absence of free trade was realizing the 
imperfections in all markets (good and factor markets, capital markets etc.), which made 
arm’s length transactions a utopia. Some market imperfections are the different trade 
barriers, the asymmetry of information and technology, the transactions costs (real and 
nominal), and other factors that emerge in the market by the fact that trade activities do not 
only aim in smooth and efficient trade but also in making profits for governments and 
individuals. Those market imperfections suggest that there is not really free trade; instead the 
transactions are effected by external factors as well as the maximum benefit of the parties 
involved. What Rugman, and previous writers, suggest is that companies turn to 
internalization in order to bypass these imperfections and achieve maximum efficiency and 
profits in their operations. When internalization is conducted out of the national borders then 
an MNE is created.
The general theory of internalization suggests that MNEs internalize in order to either avoid
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or exploit the different international market imperfections by developing an internal market. 
The internal market is dominated by the benefit of the company itself, it distributes the firm- 
specific assets such as knowledge in a way that maximizes efficiency, and it reduces the 
market imperfections and the cost that would arise if the same transaction took place in an 
external market.
According to Rugman if "... the world were characterized by a model o f free trade, there 
would be no need fo r  the [Rugman 1980, p366f The theory of FDI up to 1980 (the
time of the Rugman theory) suggested that MNEs arise from imperfections in goods and 
factor markets and turn the county-specific advantages (that lead to trade) to firm-specific 
(that lead to FDI). Internalization is dictated by the recognition of market imperfections and 
the fact that they prevent the efficient operation of international trade. Rugman has 
mentioned that ''internalisation is a refinement o f  the market imperfections approach and that 
it explains why the MNE has a firm specific rather than a country specific advantage
2 .1 .4  Parry (1985)
Rugman has received criticism by Parry (1985)^ for not establishing the internalization theoiy 
as ‘general’ since it cannot explain all aspects of FDI by MNEs. Parry suggests that 
internalization theory may explain only some kinds of FDI, namely vertical integration, 
transfer pricing and quality control of inputs. Vertical integration is generated by the need to 
control the raw material production and/or the final good distribution, terminating long-term, 
not profitable and not efficient contracts. Transfer pricing responds to tax regulations or other 
related imperfections and can reduce the global taxation of the firm, and since it can only take 
place among subsidiaries of the same firm it leads to FDI. The MNE may also answer to the 
lack of reliable providers of input or distributors of the final products, and in order to control 
quality in foreign countries it undertakes FDI. Parry argues that these are the only ways that 
the benefits of internalization can help avoid market imperfections.
Rugman responds to the criticism by stressing the fact that his theory does not actually reject 
the conclusions of Parry, but in comparing and combining various explanations of FDI the 
theory comes to the conclusion that all motives or incentives for FDI are rooted in various 
market imperfections and the firm overcomes or exploits them by using internal markets 
economy, thus efficiently allocating the firm specific advantages. The locational advantages 
are second in consideration and are determined in relation to the firm specific advantages.
There have been many elements of the market that have been considered imperfections, all of
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which are used as incentives for FDI in other theories and the suggested ‘cures’ exploit the 
benefits of internalization. “The process of internalization explains most (and probably all) of 
the reasons for FDI. Previous writers in the literature on the motives for FDI have tented to 
identify one or more of the imperfections in factor or product markets, or have noticed a 
response by the MNE to government induced types of market imperfections such as tariffs, 
taxes, and capital controls^. All of these types of market imperfections serve to stimulate one 
short of MNE or another. The MNE is in the business of internalizing externalities. It is now 
time to recognize that internalization is a general theory of FDI and a unifying paradigm for 
the theory of the MNE.””’
2 .1 .5  B uck ley-C asson
Buckley and Casson have discussed the internalization process as a response to market 
imperfections, but in a somewhat smaller scale than Rugman. According to them “the MNE 
... [is] . . . a  special case o f  a multiplant firm, bringing under common ownership and conti'ol 
several interdependent activities linked by flows o f intermediate products. ”[1991, p36]” The 
answer to why the firms chose to internalize independent activities lay in the market 
imperfection, because there is no reason in replacing a perfect market with a centrally planed 
market. The MNEs create a ‘perfect’ internal market in order to avoid the market 
imperfections. The authors give five kinds of imperfections (without rejecting the possibility 
of the existence of others). They explain the reasons for internalization and the growing (at 
that time) trend of MNEs by listing the benefits in internalization.
1. Increased control and planning of production, because of better coordination of flows of 
crucial inputs.
2. Generation of market power by discriminatory pricing.
3. Decreasing effect of other firm’s market power.
4. Secure transfer of valuable knowledge and/or technology.
5. Reduction of governmental intervention (through for example transfer pricing).’^
In later articles (mainly 1988-1996) the two theorists added several other variables in the 
internalization theory.
• The management decision making, has a significant influence in all company
actions. The same external environment may lead managers of different mentalities of 
different firms to different decisions.
• The cultural influence in management decisions is acknowledged and the parameters
are examined both by economic concepts and anthropological or organizational
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behavior theories. The “ ... development o f an entrepreneurial culture and
geographical factors which confer entrep o t potential as an initial locational 
endowment may go some way to explaining the pattern o f differential growth an 
ownership in the world economy
• The cultural differences and the physical distance between the home country and 
the host country(s), which are of course interrelated may cause difficulties in terms of 
language or mentality of doing business (cultural shock), if it is a first time experience. 
Cultural differences may be observed in different regions of the same nation, but on 
international they are usually more sever. A different view is presented by Morosini, 
Shane and Singh (1998). They argue that cultural distance may prove beneficial for 
the performance of the investing company, since it provides an insight of different 
methods that may be useful to the company, and draws the attention of the locals to 
the different culture they present’f  Anyway the cultural differences can be overcome 
by an organized MNE but they may greatly affect a new company.
• Multinationality is a great asset for a company, since MNEs have easier and cheaper 
access to information and technology and they can distribute them to the subsidiaries 
in minimum cost.
• Innovation and arbitrage (Casson 1985 p. 175) are two special cases of 
entrepreneurial activity. The entrepreneur "must take important decisions that are
■ difficult to make'' [p. 171-172]. The entrepreneur may be the owner of a firm or a 
manager hired by the owners. Any wrong decision, any mistake will be very costly for 
the firm. Successful entrepreneurship requires to synthesize different kinds of 
information from different sources. Innovation must be useful in order to synthesize 
the technology, the inputs, the demand price and the law and institutions governing 
transactions in the markets. An arbitrager must combine information about 
technology, price differentials and laws and institutions governing transactions in the 
markets. "Arbitrage consists o f buying 'cheap ' in one segment o f a market and selling 
'dear ’ in another. Arbitrage is the fundamental economic mechanism by which price 
uniformity is achieved. The arbitrager sets up transactions in an attempt to 
appropriate the discrepancy between the lowest selling price and the highest buying 
price [p. 177 Casson 1985]... Innovation and arbitrage are, to some extent, merely 
different facets o f the same phenomenon: spill-overs from innovation by one 
entrepreneur change the environment o f other entrepreneurs and thereby create 
arbitrage opportunities fo r  them.'' [p. 176 Casson 1985]
Those elements’^  cannot be measured, but they give a more complete view of the decision 
making process.
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Buckley (1995) gave great significance to the role of the manager in the firm, justifiably so, 
since managers are the actual participants in decision-making. The manager coordinates all 
operations of the company, from communications to the operation of the different production 
lines, inputs and products, and from transaction costs to separation of functions such as 
financing in order to achieve the best result for the firm. An effective management may 
achieve economies of scale and economies of scope, which are primary goals of a MNE. The 
management role is also vital in reducing the transaction costs arising from multi-plant 
enterprises. The quality of management is far more important in a multinational company than 
in a local firm still, management " ...decision taking /w...[the context of limited information]... 
is perforce plagued with errors ... and unintended consequences." [Buckley, p. 49]’^
2.1 .6  Casson (1985)^'^
Casson has added the entrepreneurship element in the internalisation theory. "A manager is 
responsible fo r  deciding upon and implementing the production plan, that is, fo r  choosing 
technique, setting the scale o f  output and ensuring that each input is available in the right 
quantity at the right time and p/ace... [Manager] is also responsible fo r  choosing institutional 
arrangements and thereby determining the boundaries o f  the firm. The essence o f the 
manager’s role is not ownership but negotiation and control, [p. 173].
Casson (1990) has suggested that the theory of FDI is à "logical intersection" of three distinct 
theories: the theory of international capital markets, which explains the financing and risk- 
sharing arrangements; the theory of the firm, which describes the location of headquarters, 
management, and input utilization; and trade theory, which describes location of production 
and destination of sales. Although each theory provides some insight about the complexity of 
FDI flows, an integrated theory that combines these elements in an analytically persuasive 
way has not been developed.
2.2 STRATEG IC TH EO RISTS
2.2.1 M ichael Porter^^^ , P orter’s Determ inants^’’
Porter’s theory has analyzed the reasons for the international competitive advantage of a 
country’s products in exports. This theory is highly related with the capability of a country to 
attract FDI inflow. Porter has set four country specific determinants that are related mainly to 
a country’s non-transferable advantages, and to the prevailing market environment (Factor
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Conditions, Demand Conditions, Related and Supporting industries, and Firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry). Porter introduced two more determinants that are not directly related 
to the business environment, but have significant effects in its development (Chance and 
Government). The competitive advantage is determined by the interaction of all six 
determinants that, inevitably, affect one another. Porter has described the evolution of a non­
competitive country to a competitive one, through the development of the four country 
specific determinants. Porter’s research has assisted to the comprehension of behavioral 
patterns of MNE’s regarding their choices in terms of location (country) of investment and 
specific sectors in these countries "...that have been able to attract the participation o f  
foreign-ownedfirms in some value-added activities but not in others. ” [Dunning pl37]^°
2 .2 .2  Bruce K ogut: seq u en tia l investm ent
Bruce Kogut separates the process of becoming an MNE, into the initial investment that is the 
company’s first step into a foreign market, and the sequential investment that any other 
expansions through FDI in the same or other host market is. In general Kogut treats FDI as a 
sequential process that leads to the creation of MNEs. Kogut has successfully argued that 
although theories that explain the behavioral patterns of the expansion of MNEs may apply in 
some level in the decision process still multinational companies should be studied under the 
hypothesis that the advantages gained by being an MNE often become more important than 
the original reasons for FDI.^’ The learning and experience of managing diversified activities 
in different locations and the spreading of environmental risk gives the company a significant 
edge when competing in either local or international markets. By effectively running 
subsidiaries in dispersed locations the company manages to improve the managerial structure 
increasing efficiency in intra-firm trade, but also with in every subsidiary. By spreading the 
environmental risk the company overcomes its dependence on one country gaining leverage 
in negotiations with governments and economic agents, either in the countries it operates in or 
in countries that it plans to invest. Also the international operations may facilitate the 
exploitation of financial and factor markets and provide opportunities to arbitrage cross- 
border information. In the case of multinationals Kogut has raised another issue. To what 
extent do MNEs take advantage of the international market imperfections? "These 
imperfections, which are carefully considered in the studies on the political dilemmas posed  
by multinationals and on multinational planning and control, are curiously understated in the 
mainstream economic literature” [Kogut 1983, p65]^ .^ Consequently the power derived from 
multinational operations, the expertise and flexibility gained by operating in different markets, 
constitutes another reason for FDI when it is undertaken by a already international company,
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thus when the FDI is seq u en tia lK ogu t’s theory is applicable for capital-intensive primary 
products and high technology industries and a firm gain from common governance of 
geographical dispersed activities.
2.2 .3  The corporate decision  m aking approach (A h aron i’s approach)24
Aharoni presented the FDI decisions, in small first- time-investor, companies as a managerial 
process that depend, among other things, on the discretion of the managers and on the pursue 
of their personal goals. The other parameters he presented are the "cost o f  information, the 
limited decision horizon o f the managers, conflicts within the firm  and uncertainty". He 
presented the five-stage of a common FDI decision process. (1) The company needs a ‘strong 
initiating force’ in order to consider FDI. A single opportunity is not enough, but it, usually, 
should be followed by either specific interest from within the company, or by a strong 
statement of support or recommendation by an influential party like a client, a supplier or a 
government agency. (2) The ‘investigation process’ is a sequential, biased process and if at 
any point the results are negative the project is abandoned. Since it is not an overlook of the 
opportunity and does not examines the environment as a hole, the sequence of the search is 
important: (a) establish the degree of risk by examining general indicators (b) on the spot 
indicators (c) presentation of the report. This process is followed by the building of 
commitments within the firm among managers. (3) The ‘decision to invest’ is finally taken. 
(4) This is the stage of the ‘reviews and negotiations’ where there are attempts to reduce 
uncertainty, and the powerful groups within the firm impose their wishes. (5) The last stage is 
the ‘changes through repetition’. In this stage the firm tries to improve control over the 
subsidiary by an international division. This time, the risk and the uncertainty seems less 
frightening to the managers and they are intrigued to develop the company into an 
international one.
2.3 FD I as a Transfer o f T echnology
2.3.1 Transfer o f technology-know ledge as a m on opolistic  asset
Apart of the money-capital, the foreign investor also transfers in the host country knowledge 
and technology. The most significant ‘holder’ of intangible assets such as knowledge, 
technology, and managerial and marketing skills are the MNEs. The fact that MNEs can 
utilize R&D outcomes in more than one market (so the expense is justified) and that they hold 
technological knowledge and assets, leads to the development of new products and processes. 
MNEs again through their access to technology, have the ability to differentiate their products
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either in order to stand out from similar products or to fit specific regional needs. The ability 
to detect the need for differentiation, and the kind of changes needed reflects the general 
marketing skill of the MNEs that also provides the company with sophisticated advertisement 
and promotion activities that secure the customers loyalty. Behind all functions of an MNE 
lays the managerial skills and techniques developed through experience as well as the need 
for efficient coordination and control. All these qualities are more important than the money- 
capital transferred, because, in a long-term perspective, they can be absorbed and utilized by 
the domestic firms. They are also one of the reasons MNEs prefer to invest themselves rather 
than rent their know-how through licensing^ .^
2 .3 .2  H. J . Jo h n so n
H. J. Johnson indicates that MNEs treat knowledge and technology as a ‘public good’ the 
public being the subsidiaries. This means that the cost of the R&D process is undertaken 
entirely by the domestic/central firm while all subsidiaries enjoy the results (new products, 
efficient production, new managerial techniques etc.). The “...marginal cost o f exploiting 
[the knowledge and technology derived from R&D]... abroad through direct investment is 
practically nil fo r  the firm  that owns [it]. ” [Ragazzi 1973, p484]^^ The knowledge should be 
easily transferred among the subsidiaries but should no be easily copied by the competition. 
Johnson also suggested that the output of the knowledge (like differentiation) is not easily 
separated from other qualities of the firm (like marketing skills). The MNE promote direct 
investment over licensing when there are no potential buyers or when the return from FDI is 
higher than from licensing.^’
In the same subject Kindleberger argued that a significant part of the decision to undertake 
FDI is based on the advantage of knowledge and high economies of scale, that enable the 
MNE to operate the subsidiary more efficiently and with less cost that any local firm. The 
company before undertaking FDI is analyzing all the alternatives (exports, licensing, FDI) and 
decides on the optimal solutiofr^.
2 .3 .3  D. J . Teece
Teece was concerned with the cost and the effects of the transfer of technology in the host 
country and in the growth of world economy in general; his conclusions will be examined in 
terms of MNEs and FDI. The cost of the transfer depends on the nature of the company and 
the technology it uses, the level of technological advancement of the host country 
(particularly the labor and the infrastructure). The cost of the initial transfer is much higher
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than any activities to renew the technology; still in industries with high rate of technological 
growth it is difficult to maintain the technology level up to date if the location is separated 
from the source of the developments. The cost of the transfer is higher when the technology 
is transferred to centrally planned economies, possibly due to high documentation 
requirements, or differences in language and managerial skills. Nevertheless the smooth flow 
of information and knowledge is very important to the growth of disadvantaged countries, and 
the world economy in general.
2.4 IND U STR IA L O RG ANIZATIO N APPROACH; m arket im perfections  
approach
2.4.1 D efin ition  o f M arket im perfections
The root of market imperfections is in the various theories of free trade, and the assumptions 
that theorists (like H /0  or Ricardo) have taken in order to develop them. The “free trade” is a 
frictionless model of the real market environment assuming equal and immediate distribution 
of information, technology and knowledge, no costs other than production cost (no 
transportation costs, no tariffs, no legal costs etc.), equal tastes of all consumers, equal 
production functions, no government intervention, no equity differences, no time-lags in the 
transactions, trust and honesty among the transacting parties, strict cost-based pricing of the 
products and other utopist rules for trade. Latter theorists like Coase, MacManus, Hymer and 
others studied the imperfections of the ‘free trade’ model, realizing that those imperfections of 
the market is actually the essence of the market and should no be left out of the study of the 
market. Of course, not all variables can be incorporated in econometric models but the 
empirical study of statistics can plainly explain their effects in different theories.
According to the reversion of the ‘free trade model’ any market factor that gives advantage to 
‘carriers’ of trade, differentiating them in any way is based on a market imperfection. So by 
reversing the assumptions of ‘free trade’ one may develop the following kinds of market 
imperfections.
• Imperfections related to the biased distribution of information, technology, and 
knowledge (managerial superiority, knowledge of the nature or value of the product)
• Transaction costs (transportation costs, legal costs)
• Time lags in transactions
• Trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, quality specifications)
• Imperfections related to consumer preferences (cultural and social differences,
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marketing effects)
• Production function imperfections (differences in nominal supply scarcities, elasticity 
of demand, overpricing)
• Governmental interventions (associated with trade barriers, subsidies, political gains)
Basically, most of the market transactions are biased, and fall under some imperfections. The 
key to exploiting or ‘curing’ these imperfections for the benefit of a company is to properly 
evaluate and compare the importance of the imperfections affecting it in different situations.
2.4 .2  H ym er’s theory on FDI
One of the basic contributions on FDI theory was that of Stephen H. Hymer. In his Ph.D. 
thesis written in 1960, and also in an article written in 1968 he outlined a newly appeared 
perception of FDI, based on ideas of Joe Bain (1956) and Ronald H. Coase (1937). His 
arguments have been discussed extensively through the years, and although they were 
doubted, they were the incentive for several economists to expand the theory of FDI, a fact 
the led to the creation of a new field of international business studies.
According to Dunning [1993, p69] ” ... H y m e r w o r k  is best known fo r  its application o f
an industrial organizational approach to the theory o f foreign production. ” In order for a 
firm to undertake an FDI project, it relies on certain advantages, which may be called 
monopolistic, exclusive or ownership advantages, such as monopoly control of raw materials, 
financial or marketing advantages, managerial and research skills etc. He argued that FDI 
involvement was merely a geographic expansion that exploited the power coming from the 
use of the above advantages. He also mentioned, in his article in 1968^\ that [Casson, 1990 
pi 7]^  ^ “ the expansion o f a business is more difficult beyond national boundaries than inside 
one country. The firm  has to enter a new environment where information is scarce and 
communication is difficult. ” [Dunning 1993, p.69.]^ '" "The emphasis placed by Hymer on the 
organization o f  economic activity by MNEs as a means o f advancing monopoly power, rather 
than o f reducing costs, improving product quality or fostering innovations, also led him to 
consider the alternatives between FDI and other forms o f international involvement in 
normative terms, rather than by a reasoned analysis o f  the costs and benefits o f these 
options. ”
Hymer mentioned that there is a significant difference in the portfolio theory for the capital 
transfer (indirect portfolio investment) and FDI (direct investment). He based his argument
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on the following reasons:
1- Neoclassical portfolio theory referred to the financial capital market, which it 
considered a perfect competition market with no transaction costs. Based on the 
arbitrage theory the moves of capital are caused by the changes of interest rates in 
order to generate profit.
Hymer pointed out that the MNE is a creature of market imperfections, overemphasized the 
market power advantages of a MNE and mentioned that a MNE transferred its assets abroad 
in order to minimize risks and to achieve monopolistic power. The whole work (1960) of 
Hymer is based upon structural market imperfections (knowledge of the market, distribution 
networks, product diversification etc), which are Bain-type advantages, but he failed to 
mention the transaction cost market imperfections that are Coase/Williamson-type 
advantages. In the present time it is accepted that market imperfections should be taken into 
account even for portfolio investment. Lack of information for an acquisition of shares from a 
company that participates in the host stock market exchange or a depreciation of the local 
currency, has as a result the return of the investment to be lower than expected. Thus, the risk 
is more or less the same either for portfolio investment or for FDI taking into account the 
above market imperfections. Still Hymer was the first to separate portfolio from FDI. 
[Dunning 1985, p228]^^ “ ... capital is assumed to he transacted between indented buyers and 
sellers, that is, no role fo r  the MNE.... The pioneering conceptual insight o f Hymer was to 
brake out o f the arid mold o f international trade and. investment theory and focus attention 
upon the MNE per se.... The unique feature o f  FDI is a mechanism by which the MNE  
maintains control over productive activities outside its national boundaries, that is, FDI 
means international production.... Hymer’s great insight was in focusing attention upon the 
MNE as the institution fo r  international production, rather than international exchange. ”
According to Rugman [1982, pl3]^® "the first application o f the market imperfections 
approach in an international context was by Hymer in his 1960 dissertation...
2- While portfolio investment concerns movements of financial capital alone, FDI 
involves transferring of other resources as well such as technology, managerial skills. 
[Dunning, 1993, p69]^ ® "Firms are motivated to produce abroad by the expectation o f  
earning an economical rent on the totality o f  their recourses, .. .”
5- [Dunning, 1993, p69]^  ^ "... FDI ... involved no change in the ownership o f resources 
or rights transferred, whereas indirect investment, which was transacted through the 
market, did necessitate a transfer in ownership. ”
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As it has been mentioned, the widely accepted definition of FDI is the following: FDI "...is 
defined as investment in equity to ... have a significant degree o f influence ... or have a 
lasting interest... or influence management operations o f an enterprise in a countiy other than 
the investor’s home country The definition of FDI is refereed continuously to control and 
influence the management of a firm, and this is actually the fundamental difference between 
FDI and portfolio investment. In portfolio investment the investor has no intent to gain any 
control over the company, while in FDI control and influence are the main targets.
Although (according to Hymer) portfolio investment is caused by interest rates differentials 
these may also affect an FDI project because the investment might be financed from the host 
country. Moreover, exchange rate fluctuations, lack of information and other market 
imperfections affect both types of investment (direct and indirect). In other words, market 
imperfections should be taken into account even for portfolio investment. Lack of information 
for an acquisition of shares from a company that participates in the host stock market 
exchange or a depreciation of the local currency, has as a result the return of the investment to 
be lower than expected. Thus, the risk is more or less the same either for portfolio investment 
or for FDI taking into account the above market imperfections.
As for Hymer’s third argument, it is not considered valid in today’s market since any 
investment on a foreign company that exceeds 25% or even 10% of it, is considered FDI. 
Thus, a foreign involvement without having the majority of the shares of a company, or even 
with a percentage between 11% and 49% is considered FDI and simultaneously has a transfer 
in ownership. There is a requirement the investment to have a lasting interest in participation 
in the control of the firm. Nowadays, it is also accepted that there are new kinds of ownership, 
too complex. Thus, a company that has a great spread of shares and the major shareholder 
own a percentage of less than 50% having or not the management of the firm, it is considered 
to be the owner of the firm, without having a transfer of ownership. On the other hand, it is 
possible a shareholder to posses a significant percentage, even more than 50% of the total 
shares of a company and it is impossible to manage the firm as an owner and thus, their 
investment have a transfer of ownership.
According to Casson [1990, chi, p. 2]'” "Hymer places much more weight that have 
subsequent writers on capital imperfections. According to Hymer, these imperfections 
explain why shareholders prefer to diversify risks through holding shares in diversified 
forms. ” His contribution focused greatly on market imperfections such as volatile exchange
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rates, risk and uncertainty and cost of acquiring information and making transactions. This 
analysis was an extension of Joe Bain’s classic theory of 1956.
John Cantwell [1991, p20]'*^  argued that in Hymer’s approach "... economically advanced 
counP'ies, owing to their relative abundance o f capital but scarcity o f labor, have low rates o f  
profit or interest but high wage rates prior to international transactions. They, therefore, 
tend to export goods requiring capital-intensive production methods to less advanced labor- 
abundant countries; or, as a partial substitute for this, to export capital direct through FDI in 
developing countries. Capital thereby flows from countries in which the interest rate is low 
(owing to the abundance o f capital) to those in which it is high (owing to capital scarcity). ”
In his 1968 article, Hymer extended his ideas regarding FDI theoiy but he [Dunning 1993, 
p70j43 u very heavily on the ideas o f  Coase (1937), whose wfork he did not
acknowledge in his thesis. ” [Casson 1990, p.l]"*"^  "Thispaper (1968) is important because it 
shows that Hymer developed a Coasian theory o f the MNE. ... His theory embraces both 
horizontal and vertical integration... ”
Hymer supported in his theory that instead of separating internalization and market structure, 
as other writers such as Cantwell suggested, one should consider the interaction between 
them. The entrance of a new firm in an industry through internalization it is bound to affect 
the concentration of the market and hence the market structure. On the other hand the market 
structure affects the internalization process by displaying the business opportunities. The 
concentration of the market determines if the firm will profit by expanding horizontally, or if 
it should seek solutions in expanding through activity diversification. If the market structure, 
in an industry concerning a stage of production in a multi-stage production process, is a form 
of imperfect competition, it implies price distortions and can be exploited by moving 
vertically rather than horizontally in an internalization process. [Hymer, 1968, p i8]'*’^ "If 
markets were perfect and the firm  could buy everything at a fixed  price determined by 
competition, then the incentive fo r  direct investment would be very weak. ” Other market 
imperfections may also be exploited through vertical integration.
In Hymer’s 1968 article there was also a presentation of several other reasons for FDI.
• Eliminate international transport costs
• Protection of the firm from a foreign producer
• Avoiding tariffs on imports
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These factors were roughly discussed and not supported with arguments. He also presented a 
comparison between the two forms of foreign involvement, FDI and licensing, supporting 
FDI. He based his support on the fact that it is very difficult to predict the future profits of the 
investment and estimate the income generated by the foreign subsidiary, so it is safer to 
internalize than license the advantage of your company. Again the arguments are veiy few 
and one-sided, not taking in mind many other factors like for example the risk of failure 
(deficit) or the cooperation with local partners (joint venture).
Hymer argued in his thesis that the tariff may be considered as an instrument inducing FDI 
instead of exporting. However, he did not mention either the geographical and location 
advantages in the decision of undertaking and FDI project, or the costs and benefits of FDI or 
technology transfer and the impact of MNEs in the host countries. Furthermore, Hymer was 
the first to indirectly correlate the idea of international diversification with the participation of 
individual investors in MNEs. He mentioned that the profits may differ between countries, 
and that there is greater stability in individual profits if a portfolio diversification exists. 
Dunning et al [1985, p. 231]47 has argued that Hymer’s contribution at this point is important 
because he was the first to present a role for MNEs that appeared later in the modern theory of 
finance. Dunning has also pointed out that Hymer considered more or less a MNE as an 
indirect vehicle of the individual investment, in the sense that through international 
diversification with the help of an MNE, individuals avoid transaction costs which they would 
have to face if they will undertake such diversification alone.
Hymer has also mentioned in his article in 1968 elements that it can be found most of them in 
Coase (1937) work such as management costs and techniques, transaction costs, transport 
costs, financial costs, coordination costs, organization costs and entrepreneurship, adopting 
new technology and innovation, scale of economies, horizontal and vertical integration, 
uncertainty, lack of information, price determination, control of quality, financial market 
imperfections, risk diversification through vertical integration, geographical proximity, 
taxation, tariffs, licensing vs. FDI and differentiation of the product as a reason for horizontal 
integration.
2.4 .3  R ichard Caves
Caves also examined in his 1983 article the behavior of MNEs towards the transfer of 
technology. He concluded that the MNEs prefer research-intensive sectors, and consciously 
allocate the R&D results to the subsidiaries while keeping the R&D base close to the mother
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company for matters of control, and scale economies/^
After an extensive literature review in 1996, Caves agreed with the following theories
• The theory of international movements is relevant to FDI because direct investment
involves some net transfers of capital
• If the demand curve faces a downward-sloping curve in both markets and the firm can
achieve economies of scale then the production is concentrated in one location and
exports are encouraged unless there are trade barriers that forbid exports. It may 
concentrate production in one sizable national market although production is more 
cost-efficient in a smaller market.
• MNEs make value-maximizing decisions on the location of the investment based on 
demand-side factors such as production and transportation costs, production 
differentiation, scale economies etc.
• Tariffs provide incentives for MNEs to invest rather than export
• When exchange rates are expected to be long-lived they affect FDI
• Capital flows can substitute trade where trade is restricted, so trade and FDI are 
alternatives for both the firm and the economy
• Sector-specific mobile factors tent to locate in the most cost-minimizing country 
creating this way an absolute rather than a comparative advantage in determining 
patterns of commodity trade.
• Despite the common tendency foreign direct investments have to flow from capital- 
rich countries to capital-poor countries, two-way FDI and the significance of the 
human resources of a country in attracting FDI reduces the predictive accuracy of the 
standard trade model.
• Countries with similar per capita income need more or less the same specifications in 
differentiated goods. Also the cultural closeness a common language make MNEs 
transaction costs fewer.
• The pure cost-efficiency factors prevails the FDI decisions only when the investment 
targets export-processing facilities'”’.
Caves in a previous article (1974) with statistical analysis has found^° that the intangible-asset 
variables (industry’s advertising and research intensity) are significant determinants for 
Canadian and UK industries. Moreover, the “Multiplan economies factor {...the organization 
o f multiplant firm s becomes a rational technique fo r  minimizing costs [p.280]” works well 
only for Canada due to geographical proximity of FDI outflows from USA. Finally, the 
statistical results are poor to support empirically the “entrepreneurial resources hypothesis”
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(... the MNC expands abroad in order to give fu ll employment to the coordinating abilities o f  
its fixed  stock o f entrepreneurial talent. This hypothesis seems to give content to the popular 
suggestion that the success o f  American multinational firm s rests on the quality o f American 
entrepreneurial talent... entrepreneurial resources are firm-specific... ”)  [p. 280].
2.4 .4  K in d leb erger
Kindleberger believed that FDI is a product of market imperfections because for FDI "to 
thrive there must be some imperfections in the markets fo r  goods or factors including among 
the latter technology, or some interference in competition by government or by firms, which 
separates markets." [Hood 1979, pp47-48^^] These imperfections either create problems to 
the firm (such as transaction costs or coordination problems with suppliers) leading to 
internalization of the firm’s functions (vertical integration) or present profit generating 
opportunities that a company is tempted to exploit (exchange rate differentials, governmental 
decisions). Market imperfections are also the reason a company preserves its ownership 
advantage. In a perfect market, information and technology would be common, and so would 
be capital markets, consequently no firm would hold any ownership advantage.
2.5 TR AN SA CTIO N  COST THEO RISTS
2.5.1  W illiam son , H ennart and T ransaction  Cost Theory
Williamson (1973) suggested that there are reasons of market failure that favor the 
internalization of a firm’s operations in the place of market operation. It can be argued that 
these are also reasons for FDI The same reasons stand for the transformation of a firm’s 
internal structure from independent departments to a hierarchical structure. He creates a 
framework that leads to the advantages of the hierarchical organization instead of markets.
He mentioned two groups of factors such as the human factors that may affect transactions 
(bounded rationality, opportunism and atmosphere). The other category is the 
transactional or environmental factors (uncertainty, small numbers of firms). These two 
groups of factor interact and produce information impactedness. The fact that information 
level is not equal among the agents of a market, thus there is information impactedness (one 
of the agents to a contract has deeper knowledge than does the other), may lead to the 
opportunistic use of information by one party that will cost the other party. Although, these 
factors are not transaction costs, Williamson mentioned a third group of factors, namely, the 
contractual costs, which may be considered as transaction costs. These are: information costs
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(the cost of informing traders), bargaining costs (the costs of reducing -  bargaining) and 
enforcement (the costs of enforcing the terms of trade) costs.
“Transaction costs would be zero i f  humans were honest and possessed unbounded 
intelligence. Thus, Williamson’ types of limitations exists in reality as transaction costs. 
Bounded rationality occurs since individuals are unable to absorb all available information in 
order to facilitate the decision-making. Thus, there is a cost in the acquisition and absorption 
of information. Moreover, opportunism is the incentive for individuals to act by self-interest 
in order to take opportunities to cheat if it is necessary and profitable for them. Thus, there is 
a problem when managers act for their self-interest with guile. Finally, he also mentioned in 
his book (1975)^^ the asset specificity, which refers to the fixed costs of an asset and the 
difficulty of arranging liquidation and recontracting. Thus, internalisation provides the 
opportunity of recontracting under the most favorable long-run circumstances.^'*
The above factors are the reasons why, according to Williamson, a company may internalize, 
through vertical integration and this may happen through FDI. [Williamson 1973]^  ^
Williamson’s contribution to FDI theory was also the introduction of the importance of 
managerial skills in the operation of a firm and the importance of internal organizational 
structure in the efficiency of a firm. In a later article Williamson (1992) examined, based on 
earlier studies by Coase, the value of transaction costs in the cost-efficient operation of a firm 
and how they work as incentives for internalization. This study, although of a microeconomic 
nature, constituted the base for many contemporary theories of PDF'*.
Little discussion of conglomerate integration has been made by the transaction-cost theorists, 
though Hennart analysed the existence of free-standing firms (Hennart, 1991) which have 
basic characteristics of conglomerates.
By definition, free-standing firms set up a head office in major capital exporting countries, but 
all their productive assets are located abroad. According to Hennart, these firms "arose to 
bypass international capital markets when loan transactions would have been subject to high 
transaction costs" (Hennart, 1991, p.94). However, capital is a very common and 
homogeneous intermediate good. Information on its value is readily available, and transaction 
costs of capital are not high. On the other hand, substitution of internal organisation for the 
capital market may be subject to distortions in capital allocation and diminishing returns in 
conglomerate firms. It seems that internalisation of the market for capital is not necessarily a 
better choice than market transactions.
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2.5.2 Ronald H. Coase (1937)
The theory of R. Coase is discussing the cost of some types of market transactions and how 
internal organization of a firm may help in avoiding them. There are four types of costs that a 
management team may want to avoid if high enough
1. “the brokerage cost of finding a correct price”
2. “the cost of defining the obligations of parties in a contract”
3. “the risk of scheduling and related input costs”
4. “the taxes paid on exchange transactions in a market”
[Rugman, 1980, p369]^^
The minimization of those costs is an incentive for the firm to try an approach of vertical 
integration, so as to control the intermediate products. Vertical integration is efficient only if 
the costs mentioned above are very high, or if there is no market for the intermediate product, 
the firm needs for the final one.
Coase in the development process of this theory shared several of the thoughts, that became 
the base of his theory, with one of his collogues. He was investigating the fact “...that 
economic integration is the result o f the limitations o f small-scale production -  in essence it is 
the joining up o f small-scale producers in different industries in order to get the advantages 
o f large-scale production. ” Coase considered integration as "... ‘the bringing together under 
one control o f different functions. In this statement he does not distinguish between 
horizontal and vertical expansion. In particular he argued that “the distinction between 
vertical and horizontal integration was without value. ‘What is important is that different 
functions are in fac t brought together under one control, what stage they are in being o f little 
account. [Coase 1937, p40]^ ®
According to Rugmaffi^ this theory is “readily applicable to the MNE”. The costs and 
inefficiencies of a transaction in the international market are certainly more than that of the 
domestic. The export costs (tariffs), transportation costs and others resulting from the 
distance between the producer and the final consumer are added. The multinational 
organizations are motivated to internalize in order to minimize those costs, only if a thorough 
examination of the facts indicates that the costs and risks of operating abroad are covered by 
the gain the firm has by eliminating the other costs.
Coase, through this analysis, was the first to recognize that the market is imperfect although 
he did not put it in these words. There are some points in his work that are based on market 
imperfections and refer to the benefits of creating a firm instead of an individual business.
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These points may be seen as benefits of integration
• the cost of market transactions is reduced (the cost of using the price mechanism as 
one spreads the information cost, and the costs of negotiating and contractual cost are 
reduced as the firm incorporates more functions)
"the main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost 
o f using the price mechanism” [p.21J. It is quite difficult to have arm’s length transaction, thus 
each partner that participates in a transaction is also burden of the extra cost of information 
(collecting information, choosing the fair price etc.).
"the costs o f negotiating and concluding a separate contract fo r  each exchange transaction 
which takes place on a market must also be taken into account”[p21]. It is preferable to sign 
long-term contacts in order to avoid time and additional costs for preparing a new contract or 
renewal the old one.
"It seems improbable that a firm  would emerge without the existence o f uncertainty ...[p22]. 
In a firm it is difficult profits and sales to be predicted.
“... the exchange transactions on a market and the same transactions organized within a firm  
are often treated differently by Governments or other bodies with regulatory powers ” [p22]  ( 
sales tax, tax on market transactions etc.)
"It was suggested that the introduction o f the firm  was due primarily to the existence o f  
marketing costs”[p23], which marketing costs have been characterized by Coase as "...the 
costs o f using the price mechanism ”[p29]
" ...as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, 
the costs o f organizing additional transactions within the firm  may n'.ye”[p23]. Thus, it is 
needed good management and improvement of management techniques [p25], which will lead 
according to Coase in minimizing of these costs. He also mentioned the importance of the 
technology [p25] and the "...changes like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to 
reduce the cost o f organizing spatially will tend to increase the size o f the //>7w”[p.25] He 
added that "all changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size o f  
the firm ”. He also pointed out the existence of organizational and management errors. Thus 
there are costs of making mistakes and [p. 24] “ ...the less likely the entrepreneur is to make
IO6  U niversity  o f  G lasgow , O ctober 2002
C H APTER  2: F o r e ig n  D ir e c t  In v e s tm e n t a s  a n  en try  m o d e
mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the transactions 
organized” [p. 24]
2,5.3 John C. McM anus (1972)
MacManus has studied the parameters on FDI by collecting data on the connection of FDI to 
the tariff barriers, in Canada. He examined the effect of high tariffs in industries that provide 
the host country with intermediate products or raw material. He came to the conclusion that 
the increase in the tariffs (1) do not cause and increase in the bid for raw material for either 
foreign owned or locally owned firms, (2) do not increase the actual transaction cost between 
foreign and local firms, (3) do not necessarily increase the cost of transferring rights. It does 
affect, though, the way they will exchange commodity rights. It also makes it easier for 
companies that are subsidiaries of foreign suppliers to manipulate the transfer prices in order 
to avoid the extra tariff cost since they have common benefits. It is more difficult for to 
independent companies to do so because a situation like that implies a lot of trust between the 
two parties. In that way alone does the specific kind of industry a competitive advantage 
against the local firms. Nevertheless the statistical data from Canada do not support the 
assumption that this is a common occurrence.^” Moreover, he mentioned the importance of 
availability of capital, technology, product differentiation, management, training and 
experience [p.37]. He also argued about the price mechanism and the costs of transacting 
[p.40], the costs of transferring a property right [p.41], the costs of transacting which are "the 
costs that are incurred hy the parties to a market exchange to enforce their exclusive rights to 
the assets or services being traded” [p.41], the costs of establishing and enforcing the terms 
of an agreement [p.42, 43], and the costs of setting relative prices in order to maximize profits 
[p.42]. McManus [p.54] also mentioned for transfer pricing method in order to be possible for 
a MNE to manipulate the prices between parent and subsidiary for their mutual advantage.
McManus (1972) was the first that has acknowledged the term of internalisation of a firm, 
"the establishment o f a firm  can always "internalize” an "external” effect or reduce a 
particular marginal inequality but only at the cost o f reducing non~discretionary constraints 
on behaviour and replacing them with management control”\gA6f^
2,6 Risk Diversif ication and Foreign Exchange Theorists
2,6,1 HARRY M ARK OW ITZ (1952) theory of portfolio'*'
The theory of portfolio considers that the investor (individual or MNE) is risk-averse and thus
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is prepared to pay less than its expected value for the outcome of a risky project (investors 
prefer high expected return and low standard deviation (standard deviation is the proper 
measure of the security’s risk)). The investor if he is a rational one, chooses an efficient 
portfolio, which offers the highest expected return for a given standard deviation of that 
return, or the lowest standard deviation for a given expected return. By diversification the 
investors succeeded in eliminating the risk, and hoping for the expected return. Although, 
there are significant differences in FDI and portfolio diversification, some considerations and 
theories in FDI has included a function of a MNE with which MNE is assumed to diversify its 
functions abroad in order to minimize its risk and increase the profits for their share-investors.
2.6.2 Rugman (1976, 1977): Risk Divers ification Hypothesis
Rugman (1976, 1977)^” argued that the MNE has the advantage to exploit the information 
through an internal market. Having the market imperfections the MNE is a vehicle for 
individual international diversification. The MNE in order to overcome the market 
imperfections creates an internal market and becomes "an indirect vehicle for international 
diversification when individual investors are confronted with financial market imperfections 
M>hich make it impossible fo r  them to build up efficient world portfolio themselves.
2.6.3 Agmon and Lessard (1977)^^
According to diversification strategy FDI exist when MNEs diversify their activities into 
related industries in order to explore their ownership advantages and overcome some of the 
market imperfections. Moreover, a MNE can diversify its activities into unrelated industries, 
through a diversification of a product. In both cases there is a hope for increasing sales, profit 
and market share. From this MNE’s strategy arising the issue of diversification strategy 
between an investor and a MNE.
"In the presence o f barriers to portfolio capital flows, multinational firm s (MNCs) have an 
advantage relative to single-country firms because o f their ability to diversify 
internationally.... I f  there is no baniers to international capital flows, and i f  capital markets 
were uniformly well developed, investors would diversify their portfolio holdings 
internationally and required rates o f return on securities (projects) would reflect only their 
contributions to the risk o f a fully diversified world portfolio” [p. 1049]. In order to verify the 
existence of the diversification motive for multinational expansion, Agmon et al. observed 
two conditions: first if the barriers of portfolio flows are more stringent than the foreign direct
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investment flows. They concluded that MNEs might diversify internationally at a lower cost, 
more probable and easier than portfolio investors. Even if the barriers are the same for 
investors and MNEs, then it is possible for the multinational to find a way to move investment 
flows in the host country. A MNE can transfer money-capital, managerial or technology skills 
that are not restricted as the direct money flows. Secondly, Agmon et al. wonder if the 
investors recognize the fact that a MNE provides a diversification opportunity, which is 
superior or otherwise unavailable. Under an econometric analysis they found that the US 
investors recognize the international composition of the activities of US-based corporations.
Financial market imperfections that give MNEs a financial advantage provide another 
incentive for FDI, being complement to the real good and factor market advantages. The 
imperfect correspondence of "company earnings and/or asset values in various countries” is 
not sufficient to establish relevance of international diversification to the corporate level. The 
barriers or costs of portfolio capital flow should be higher than those of investment flows in 
the purpose of FDI, and the opportunity for diversification provided by the MNEs should be 
viewed as unique by the investors. If the financial markets were perfect ones uniformly well 
developed then the investors would prefer a worldwide diversified portfolio rather than 
diversification in the firm level. When “...coupledwith the observation thatMNCs often can 
diversify internationally at a lower cost than portfolio investors, it suggests that the 
diversification motive should he given more serious consideration than has been the case to 
date.'' [1055]
2.6.4 Donald J. Lecraw (1991, 1984)
Lecraw’s^® contribution to FDI theory was the assumption that all locational advantages are 
subject to change when referring to developing countries. He argued that “inflows o f FDI 
were related to changes in the country's locational advantages, the labour force and domestic 
capital, and to changes in barriers that might impede TNCs from investing in the host 
country, such as government restrictions on FD I.” [Lecraw, p i70] After the regression 
analysis of data collected in developing countries, several patterns emerged.
Lecraw came to the following conclusions regarding the relationship between FDI inflow and 
the country specific characteristics of a developing country. FDI inflow is influenced, firstly 
by the country specific factors that are not influenced by the government (like natural 
resource base, rate of growth of the labor force etc.), secondly factors that are partially 
influenced by the government (like the rate of growth of the consumption, the perceived risk 
of the country, the real exchange rate etc.) and thirdly by the factors directly controlled by the
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government (like the tariff rate, the investment incentives system etc.). In general, FDI 
inflows are influenced by the general conditions of the country.
In a previous article (1984)®® Lecraw concluded that according to his regression analysis’ 
results for 200 largest manufacturing firms in Canada “the foreign-owned firms [have a] 
diversification strategy [that] was influenced both by the parent firm 's strategy and by 
characteristics o f the subsidiary and the base industry in which it operated\^.196}. 
Moreover, he has pointed out that "... industry structural variables influence the 
diversification strategy and the profitability o f  the firms within the industry... on the other 
hand, it allows fo r  the possibility that different firms in the same industry may follow different 
diversification strategies based on management ’5 formulation o f the firm 's goals and 
assessment o f its strength and weakness, ... and that the success (profitability) o f a firm may 
depend on the strategy it chooses, the appropriateness o f  this strategy, and the extent to which 
it follows this strategy, as well as the profitability o f  the industries in which it is 
operatingF{p.l%Ql\. For that Caves (1980)® has also argued that “the structures o f markets 
have been affected by the organizational options open to firms. The productivity with which 
resources are used depends on whether or not firms make the best choices o f strategy and 
business organization, given the market and technological environments in which they 
operate. ”[p. 88].
2.6.5 FROOT (1991)™
The markets are subject to informational imperfections. These imperfections cause external 
financing needs, which may be more expensive than internal financing due to the fluctuations 
of the foreign exchange between home and host country. Moreover, a depreciation of the 
currency of the host country may lead to acquisitions of foreign assets from the MNE to the 
host country. Froot, with the results of his model has concluded that the exchange rates has a 
systematic effect on FDI more than with the other forms of foreign involvement, “the 
correlation o f FDI with the exchange rate is very different from that observed for other forms 
o f capital inflows, including passive portfolio investments... a depreciated currency can give 
foreigners an edge in buying control o f  productive corporate assets. ” [p. 1215],
2.6 .5 .1Crit ic ism
From the definition of FDI, MNE through direct investments seeking profits and controlling 
interest, thus this point is in the contrast with the definition of portfolio diversification. 
Therefore, the theory of FDI regarding diversification of risk it can be seen in a different way
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than that of portfolio diversification although MNE can easier diversify in different countries, 
overcoming the barriers. However, investors can easily invest in many MNEs simultaneously 
and thus diversifying their risk better than each individual MNE. On the other hand, MNEs 
with the existence of market imperfections they can acquire information easier and most 
probable than the individual investors and thus MNEs are in the unique position to predict the 
future returns of an investment. However, the manager of a MNE is more risk averse than the 
shareholders, because manager is seeking for his salary, while shareholders are seeking for 
their dividends. As a preferable conclusion, MNEs should diversify in activities of a related 
market in many countries in order to achieve except all other goals, a diversification of a risk, 
having from its experience the correct and appropriate information
2.6.6 ROBERT ALIBER (1970, 1983)
Capital arbitrage theory assumes that there is a moving of equity capital from countries where 
returns are low to countries where they are higher, so that profit is generated from the 
difference (arbitrage) among returns. Aliber has update this theory and mentioned that 
“...there are substantial differences among countries in nominal and real interest rates. 
Because nominal interest rate differentials are poor forecasts o f future changes in exchange 
rates, a wedge is introduced between returns on similar securities denominated in different 
currencies. [David J. Teece, 1985, p.233]’’”
In essence, Aliber treats exchange rates as an incentive for MNEs if favorable and as a barrier 
if unfavorable in regard to the MNE’s home and host country. [Dunning 1973, p316]’  ^“Since 
the value o f  any one currency fluctuates over time it immediately follows that in addition to 
the variables which influence the worthwhileness o f an investment in the local currency, its 
value in relation to other currencies has to be considered. A rate o f  return o f 10 per cent with 
a currency that devalues by 5 per cent is worth 5 per cent less the depreciated value o f the 
assets in other currencies.”
[Grosse et al 1992]™ “Robert Aliber (1970) showed that a plausible explanation for at least 
part o f  United States-based overseas expansion was the low real cost o f borrowing in dollars 
during the 1950s and 1960s relative to other currencies. That explanation may also explain 
the increase in direct investments in the United States, from Japan and the Federal Republic 
o f Germany during the 1980s, as real borrowing costs fe ll in those countries.” One of the 
things Aliber has failed to explain is why there is a simultaneously cross investment between 
two countries with different currency and exchange rates, in the same sector of the economy, 
since, according to Aliber, the firms aim to arbitrage the exchange rates differentials.
Aristidis Bitzenis, PhD \ \ \
Foreign D irect Investm ent during the Transition from  a Planned to  M arket Economy: tlie case o f  Bulgaria 1989-2001
Moreover, his theory failed to mention why investments between countries from the same 
currency area exist. Aliber also pointed out that MNEs from strong currency area can 
profitable borrow cheaply than the domestic firms, in a way of importing low-cost money- 
capital flows. Moreover, Aliber argued that portfolio investors are ‘myopic’, because they 
believe that the foreign investment and operations of a MNE are in the same currency area as 
the parent firm and the investor does not take into account the foreign exchange risk involved 
in the repatriation o f the profits to the parent firm.
This theory is applicable but one sided since it fails to take into consideration a variety of 
other factors influencing FDI decisions. In any case it must be combined with other kinds of 
analysis. Nevertheless [Dunning, 1993, p282]™ “it is likely to he used in explaining MNE  
investment in capital- intensive sectors..,”
Aliber also made some interesting observations about the sequel usually followed by a firm in 
order to exploit a foreign market; export-licensing-FDI. He based his analysis on comparing 
the variable costs of exporting a product (tariffs, transportation costs etc.) and the product cost 
in the home country, to the fixed costs of producing in the host country. After a certain time 
during which the product is being exported by the firm, the foreign market may grow 
substantially. At this point the size of the market implies that it is more efficient to produce 
within the foreign market than exporting to it, but still it does not justify a direct investment. 
That leads the firm to license the product to local producers. When the local market expands 
further then the licensing is not profitable for either side, so the firm chooses the way of 
establishing an FDI project.’®
2.7 Trade Theorists -  Market Seeking -  Locational Advantages
2.7.1 H/O and Ricardian models
The “...theory o f FDI is the converse o f  the pure theory o f international trade. I f  the world 
were characterized by a model o f free tirade there would be no need fo r  the M NE' F  Some of 
the trade theories though are useful in FDI, if we use them in an extension mode. One of the 
most discussed trade theories is the factor endowment theory of Heckscher and Ohlin (H/O 
theory or model). The theory states that a country would produce and export products that 
depend mostly on the production factors (particularly capital and labor) that are abundant in 
the country and import the product that depends mostly on production factors that are rare in 
the country. H/O theory assumes that the production factors are completely mobile 
domestically and capital and labor are completely immobile internationally. Moreover, H/O
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assumes that production functions are the same and technology freely and instantly available 
in all countries. Although the H/O theory is not absolute it reflects the locational specific 
advantages of a country that an MNE takes into consideration before directly investing in it.
77
David Ricardo created a model in which trade was based on comparative advantages such as 
international differences in labor productivity. These differences resulted fiom differences in 
production functions and the use of technology. Differences in productivity functions are 
exogenously or derived from differences in national characteristics such as climate and the 
quality of natural resources. These differences it can be said that are based to country -  
specific advantages according to FDI theory. This model also assumes complete international 
immobility of factors of production. The model considers technological differences, which 
result to productivity differences. It can be said that there is a link with trade and FDI using 
Ricardian model if we expand it with factor endowments mobility and keeping in mind the 
international differences in technology and production functions as a firm -  specific 
advantage and country-specific advantage.™
Neither H/O nor Ricardian models can explain FDI. However, extensions of these models 
such as the H/O extension model (neo-factor trade theories), which introduce additional 
factors such as human capital and natural resources and the Ricardian extension model (neo­
technology theories) which introduce economies of scale, product differentiation etc. can be 
both used as a basis for significant number of FDI theories.
Dunning (1995)™ suggested that “what is wrong with trade theory is its failure to address 
techno-economic micro-organizational and macro-organizational issues and, particularly, 
the effect on trade o f coordinating resources and transacting across exchanges by alternative 
modalities". In the world economy there are new elements that have made changes such as 
the increasing mobility of assets, the declining significance of arm’s length transactions, the 
increasing role of governments and their intervention via imposition of barriers or providing 
FDI incentives.
2.7.2 Vernon Raymond, (1966, 1979)
Vernon with his well-known theory of international product cycle tried to explain the patterns 
of international trade and FDI in the manufacturing sector. He developed his theory arguing 
exclusively about the USA as the most fertile country for innovation in product development. 
Vernon overcame the classical assumption that factors of production and the products
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themselves were immobile, and suggested that it is the decision of the firm to continue 
producing and trading locally, to export or to directly invest in production facilities abroad. 
[Grosse 1992, p i 14] is a theory o f shifting production location but it does not 
incorporate the role o f Governments in influencing cross-border locations. I t is, therefore, a 
theory o f location in the absence o f national boundaries. ” [Dunning 1993, p70]®’ “In a 
classic article published in 1966, Vernon used, a micro-economic concept -  the product cycle 
-  to help explain a macro economic phenomenon, viz. the foreign activities o f US MNEs in 
the post- war period. ”
Vernon was the first to focus on the so-called country-specific/ locational advantages. Given 
that there is cross-national trade and all natural and human resources are immobile, Vernon 
has pointed out that trade also depended upon the technological capability of the firms to 
upgrade those inputs and/or to create -  innovate new ones. The ability to renew ones 
resources may be considered as an ownership/competitive advantage, At first the firm is 
willing to export its products to foreign markets with similar demand patterns and supply 
capabilities. When the product matures, and the demand becomes more price elastic the 
attraction of establishing foreign direct investment activities in a foreign location increase. 
The final decision of choosing the host country depends on various factors such as the 
conditions in the host country. The distance between home and host countiy is also an 
important factor as the MNE may intent to make the products manufactured in the host 
country, available for re-exportation to the home country. (Geographical proximity) One of 
the basic assumptions of Vernon is [Vernon, 1993, p4] "... that the enterprises in any one o f
the advanced countries o f the world are not distinguishably different from those in any other 
advanced country, in terms o f their access to scientific knowledge and their capacity to 
comprehend scientific principles. ...It is a mistake to assume, however that equal access to 
scientific principles in all the advanced countries means equal probability o f  the application 
o f these principles in the generation o f new products. There is ordinarily a large gap 
between the knowledge o f a scientific principle and the embodiment o f  the principle in a 
marketable product. An entrepreneur usually has to intervene to accept the risks involved in 
testing whether the gap can be bridged. " The risk in undertaking a project of developing a 
new product, focusing on high-income consumers, is financial since research and 
development is very costly for the firm.
On the other hand, Vernon considers knowledge as a variable, still very important for the 
decision-making, but depended on communication levels, which are influenced by distance. 
On those bases Vernon abandons [Vernon, 1993, p4]™ “the powerful simplifying notion that
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knowledge is a universal free good, and introduce[s] it as an independent variable in the 
decision to trade or to invest ” The knowledge that the entrepreneur holds leads him to the 
production of an innovative product. The production of the new product takes place in a 
highly developed country such as the USA, because the willingness and the ability to spent on 
a new product is positively related with the per capita income. Especially when the product is 
highly differentiated, or the firm enjoys a monopolistic advantage, the price elasticity of 
demand is very low, so the firm is able to make a profit even if the production costs are high. 
Thirteen years after his original approach, Vernon summed up his conclusions.
H "According to the product cycle hypothesis, firms that set up foreign producing facilities 
characteristically do so in reliance on some real or imagined monopolistic advantage.”
[Vernon, 1979, p255]
rt “The home market in fact plays a dual role in the hypothesis. Not only is it the source of 
stimulus for the innovating firm; it is also the preferred location for the actual development of 
the innovation.”
[Vernon, 1979, p256]
n "Once the innovator has set up its first production unit in the home market, any demand 
that may develop in a foreign market would ordinarily be served from the existing production 
unit.”
[Vernon, 1979, p257]
rt “Eventually, however, the firm may consider other alternatives, such as that of licensing a 
foreign producer or setting up its own producing subsidiary abroad. ... If licensing is not the 
preferred choice, then the firm makes the usual familiar comparison between the delivered 
costs of exports and the cost of overseas production. That is, the marginal costs of producing 
for export in the home unit plus international transport costs and duties are compared with the 
full cost of producing the required amount in a foreign subsidiary.”
[Vernon, 1979, p257]
rt “ ...the original innovator... [was intimidated by] ... the thread... of the difficulty of 
deciding what is at stake in failing to find the least-cost location, what alternative sites need to 
be investigated, and what the costs of investigation are likely to be. [this being the reason for 
not investigating lower-costs cites, outside the home market, from the beginning]”
[Vernon, 1979, p257-258]
rt “These conditions change, however, as the threat begins to crystallize. Eventually, it may 
be clear that the innovator is threatened with the loss of its business in a given foreign market. 
At that point, the areas to be investigated as possible production sites have been narrowed
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while the size of the risk has been more explicitly defined.”
[Vernon, 1979, p257]
In the same article he revised some of his thoughts under the light of new developments, 
explaining why they could not be applied at the time of the article.
rt ...the leading MNCs have now developed global networks of subsidiaries
rt ...the US market is no longer unique among national markets either in size or factor cost
configuration.
rt ... the improved position of European and Japanese firms as innovators.
[Vernon, 1979, p265]
There are, though, some occasions where this theory may be fully applied (at the time when 
the article was written).
rt in cases of smaller firms that are in the first stages of internalization
Hin the cases of certain European and Japanese industries that have an advantage of 
innovation but only temporarily
n  in less developed countries where many innovations are yet to be absorbed 
Kin the case of companies operating in developing countries, that develop an innovative 
product, suited to fit the needs of specific markets, and introduce it to other developing 
countries with less industrialization.
[Vernon, 1979, p265-266]
Vernon’s conclusion was that “the product cycle concept continues to explain and predict a 
certain category o f  foreign direct investments. Although it no longer can be relied on to 
provide as powerful an explanation o f the behavior o f US firms as in decades past, it is likely 
to continue to provide a guide to the motivations and response o f  some enterprises in all 
countries o f  the world” [Vernon, 1979, p267]
2.7.3 Kojima
Kojima’s theory on FDI direction and sector is a trade-oriented theory that is based upon the 
comparative advantage pattern. It is a macroeconomic approach that is focused on the 
benefits a country derives from capital and technology inflow provided by FDI, rather than 
the benefits an MNE derives from FDI. The concept is simple: if a product is produced in 
country I in a lower cost than in country II, and country II has a comparative advantage that 
can assist in producing the product even more cost-efficiently in country I then country II 
should undertake an FDI project in country I and export back to country II. In other words, 
inward FDI should target the country-specific advantages that can be assisted by the input of
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the investor company (such as managerial skills or technology) in industries hat the home 
country is disadvantaged, in order to exploit the opportunity of exporting to the home country 
and other countries and assist the development and expansion of the specific industry in the 
host country. Kojima disagrees with the concept of shifting the production of a good 
efficiently produced in the home country to the host country in order to substitute trade. In 
this theorem Kojima tries to integrate trade with FDI, supporting a kind of FDI that is 
complement rather than substitute to international trade. It is called the ‘Japanese FDI’ theory 
and it is considered opposite to the ‘American FDI’ theory because the first perceives FDI as 
an activity that should assist trade relationships while the second perceives FDI as a substitute 
to trade.
Kojima’s theorem is very much based on the H/O assumption. The H/O assumption suggests 
that the bulk of a country’s exports are products that mostly utilize each country’s strong 
comparative advantages. If the comparative advantage is mobile (capital, technology, 
managerial skills) it can be utilized in another country complimenting the host country’s 
specific advantages.
Kojima suggest two ‘prescriptions’ based on the ‘Japanese FDI’ theory.
(1) Oversees resource requirements should not be satisfied by FDI but by long-term trade 
agreements
(2) The developing countries should take deep consideration about the industries toward 
which they receive FDI. They should start with industries in which they have a potential 
comparative advantage, and they should try to slowly and steadily assimilate technology. 
Another ‘tip’ for developing countries is that they should use FDI as a “tutor” and derive the 
superior technology, skills, the training of labor etc. in order to assimilate the technology and 
not just facilitate it. The positive spillover effects fade-out if there is a massive ‘invasion’ of 
many firms that reinforces the negative effects of FDI by putting the local firms in an inferior 
position. The foreign investor should slowly depart after the conclusion of the transfer of any 
intangible assets and invest in another country that waits for a ‘tutor’.
Kojima has received a lot of negative criticism about (a) ignoring the transaction and 
transportation costs and (b) ignoring the market imperfections. These criticisms, though, do 
not take into consideration the fact that Kojima sets as a goal of FDI the reinforcement of a 
foreign industry for the good of the home country and, if one takes it further, the 
macroeconomic prosperity of a country, and not the profit margins of an individual MNE.
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Certainly this approach may be characterized as a utopia, still given its goals it is very much 
valid.
2.7.4 Hirsch Seev®®
Hirsch tried to determine the optimal point for exports to be substituted by FDI through a 
capital-budgeting formulation. Hirsch’s model also shows that foreign production may lead to 
the improvement of the competitiveness of intermediate products. What the Hirsch model 
lacks, according to Kogut is a variable to represent the cost savings from having more than 
one subsidiary®®.
2.7 .5  Horst Thomas
Horst in his 1970 paper, explored the strategy a monopolistic firm operating in two national 
markets simultaneously should follow in order to maximize profit. The strategy concerned 
the decisions of the distribution of production in each country, the export level from one 
country to the other and the size of the intra-firm transfer prices and was examined in terms of 
marginal production costs in relation with the level of production, and the level of tariffs in 
imports in relation to the changes they bring in the production and export policies.
His model was purely theoretical and was mainly based on the assumption that the firm was 
only selling in two countries exporting from country 1 to country2 and that the demand was 
depended solely on the price. Nevertheless the model adequately explained the relationships 
in question and came to some interesting conclusions. From the side of the government 
imposing the tariffs the main concern is to favorably affect policy goals like the balance of 
payments, the employment level, the performance of local firms, the price level for local 
consumers etc. and are usually hoping in replacing imports with local production of the 
imported goods (FDI). Although the prices will most probably rise, reducing the demand and 
consequently the imports, the decision of the foreign firm to undertake FDI is not assured.
When the firm’s production allows economies of scale it is less possible to split production in 
order to avoid price increases from tariffs since the gained percentage will be offset by the 
cost increases resulting by not achieving economies of scales.®’ The model is more or less 
valid when small enterprises are concerned or for territorial moves of MNEs but it cannot 
sufficiently explain or predict moves of MNEs worldwide.
Horst®® in an article in early 1970s has pointed out the issues that a MNE must consider such
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as how much to produce, to sell, to export, what transfer price to put on intra-firm exports, 
which is the correct price to sell, the importance of tariffs and taxes. Horst tests a model using 
a monopolistic firm with a profit-maximization strategy, which sell in two countries 
simultaneously. He concluded that “high tariffs are often imposed with the hope o f getting 
firms to replace imports with domestically produced goods [FDI substitute of trade]... a 
country might encourage local production, not only fo r  domestic consumption, but fo r export 
as well [export base].../ax policy might be used to both reduce prices and expand domestic 
production and employment [tax incentives]... [and there is a willingness] o f investor countries 
to refrain from  double taxation” [Horst, p. 188, Chapter 10].
2.7.6 Graham, M. Edward: ‘exchange of threats’ hypothesis®^
According to the product-cycle analysis, as firms grow and their product matures the 
production becomes more capital-intensive, the fixed cost rise in relation to total costs and the 
product’s demand becomes more price-elastic. In that stage achieving economies of scale 
becomes very important to the company, and any price-cutting strategies by rivals may prove 
disastrous for the company. Still oligopolistic firms give up their potential for very efficient 
economies of scale and create foreign subsidiaries, thus splitting the production. According to 
Graham the reason for this is the threat of other companies invading in your market reducing 
the company’s market share and by acting this way companies exchange profitability with 
security. This results to an increase of oligopolistic interaction among foreign firms.
“Graham hypothesized that an MNE which found its home territory invaded by a foreign 
MNE would retaliate by penetrating the invader's home tu r f” [...72] A firm may even 
predict the invasion by a significant competitor and take the first step itself. The "... leading 
firms in each industry would have to aim to have similar geographical distribution o f sales or 
production as one another... [at the point collusive agreements to ensure security
would reach a peak”. This action makes collusive agreements and cartels less possible but 
still maintains competition. This can also occur involving smaller companies in neighboring 
countries.
2.7.7 Follow the leader or reaction to competitor’s investments™ 
(Knickerbocker)^’
Knickerbocker argues that in oligopolistic industries, which characterized by high seller 
concentration one reason for FDI is the tendency of firms to "match their rivals move to 
move”. The firm that takes the first step in a new market exploiting any business opportunity
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draws the attention of similar firms that can exploit the same opportunities. If the ‘leader’ 
company faces difficulties then the companies that follow learn from its previous mistakes. 
If  on the other hand, the quality of the opportunity was misused then the competitors, again 
taking advantage of the ‘leader’s’ expertise, may diversify meeting the opportunity in a better 
way. Even if the ‘followers’ have no real gain in investing in the new market they tend to do it 
anyway in order to prevent the ‘leader’ from dominating the new market making it very 
difficult for the ‘followers’ to enter in later times. Firms try to maximize their profits in a 
world where information about market conditions is unequally distributed. Soon or later will 
decide to exploit the opportunity of investment, thus all the firms monitored the market and 
especially the market intelligence system’s firm, This theory and the “exchange of threat 
hypothesis’ are valid for industries such as car rental, life insurance, banking, advertising, 
consultant etc.
2.7.8 Caves 1982
Caves (1982) developed the rationale for horizontal integration (specialized intangible assets 
with low marginal costs of expansion) and vertical integration (reduction of uncertainty and 
building of barriers to entry).
2.8 NEW Trade Theorists  / Vertical  Integration
Brainard (1997) has argued that the explanation of the new trade theorists about MNE’s 
expansion can be termed as “factor-proportions hypothesis, [which] holds that firms integi'ate 
production vertically across borders to take advantage o f factor price differences associated 
with different relative factor supplies”^ ^
2.8.1 The technologica l accumulat ion approach (Cantwel l)
Technology, as a firm-specific asset, is developed within a company through R&D in 
response to the market needs and the competition. The technological advancement and 
innovation, as well as the assimilation of the new technology in the company, is a cumulative 
process depending on the company’s previous technological status. The more complex the 
technology used, or developed within a firm, the greater the need for internalization. The 
competition is also a strong incentive for a company to intensify the efforts for technological 
advancement, and competition is very intense among international companies. '^* Deriving 
from those assumption one may conclude that internationalization may intensify the 
technological competition among MNEs and that high accumulation of technology within a
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firm calls for even more tight internalization, which again, supports further 
internationalization.™
2.8.2 M ult inat ional Firms and the New Trade Theory (Markusen and 
Venables)
This theory discuses a model in which multinational production may be triggered by local 
(national) competition, and MNEs are in equilibrium when pant-scale economies cost less 
than firm-scale economies plus transport and tariff. The main considerations are the country 
size, the factor endowments and the technology of the country. The general conclusion is 
that, as countries grow similar in size, relative endowments and technologies, the 
multinational production becomes more important than trade. In order to determine the 
‘national ownership’ of the firm the model differentiates between the relative factor advantage 
and the country-size advantage. In the first case the firm ownership may reside entirely in the 
advantaged country, unless transport costs are minimum. In the second case there are more 
than one parameter to determine the equilibrium. The effect of multinational activity in the 
two countries depends on the size of the investment. If the initial investment (from the most 
advanced to the less advanced country, in terms of size, endowments and technology) is 
medium and the transport costs high, then both countries are benefited. If, on the other hand, 
the relative advantage of the countries is large, and the transport costs medium then the more 
advanced country may lose from multinational activity whereas the less advanced country 
gains significantly96
2.8.3 Krugman-FDI and Geographical Concentration
Krugman suggests that firms of certain industries tent to concentrate in regions that have 
already a high sectoral activity. This happens, according to Krugman for sector-specific 
rather than location-specific reasons. The industries that usually agglomerate in a specific 
location share the following characteristics™:
• Low transportation cost of the products
• Increased ability for economies of scales
• High value of technological knowledge and breakthroughs
• Increased need for skilled labor
• Dependence on suppliers of input (raw materials or intermediate products)
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When many firms of the same sector are concentrated in the same location, it consequently, 
concentrates skilled labor, technology and suppliers. Therefore the location attracts other 
firms, given that they can overcome the transportation cost and trade barriers of exports. The 
firm may establish a subsidiary in the certain location in order to be close to the technological 
information flow, supporting in the same time the production stage that is not complicated by 
exploiting location specific advantages (like cheap unskilled labor) in another location. A 
typical example of agglomeration is the Silicon Valley in the USA, which is the center of 
R&D activity concerning computers. The choice o f location is initially based on the location- 
specific advantages like demand, or (immobile) labor force but the concentration of the firms 
lead to the further development of those advantages in favor of the specific sector, for 
example the individuals in the labor force are consciously trained on the subject and the 
government adjusts the laws. The pattern may change when the region is saturated then the 
same procedure is initiated in another region, and may eventually, create a new center for the 
sector.
This theory may explain certain paradoxes in FDI, like the reason why certain firms ignore 
locations that provide them with very cheap labor, or other advantages. The theory is 
reinforced by FDI activity of suppliers of input or service firms following their customers. 
Consequently another reason for FDI is the ‘tradition’ a location carries in certain sectors™.
2,8.4 Ignatius J. Horstmann and James R. Markusen99
Horstman and Markusen developed an econometric model in order to prove the widely held 
notion that the existence of MNEs is based on the knowledge-based firm-specific advantages 
they hold such as technology, expertise and know-how. This kind of assets can be transferred 
to other production facilities in minimum marginal cost (public good property). The public 
good property creates economies of scale in a multi-plan firm and gives the firm cost 
advantage against many independent factories. MNEs develop through this advantage and 
they perform international transactions servicing the foreign subsidiaries with the firm 
specific assets (management, engineering, marketing, financial services). MNEs may develop 
considerable market powers, from the use of the firm-specific assets, since the host country 
enjoys the benefits without making local investments, so the MNE gains significant monopoly 
rent. The outflow of FDI has been shown to be in favor of the home country too. Although 
many production jobs are lost there is welfare maximization (that is a social objective) given 
the assumption about domestic and foreign cost structure.
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2.8.5 Helpman
Helpman in his 1984 article’ examined the equilibrium circumstances that make it profitable 
for a company to become a multinational, to choose the foreign location of its activities and to 
predict its pattern of foreign trade. The equilibrium depends on the cost minimizer factors 
and the location choice. Helpman has argued in favor of vertical and horizontal integration 
and firms making profits when they choose cost-minimising locational-choices for their 
production lines. The study came to the following conclusions:
• MNEs posses firm specific assets (marketing, management, R & D )  that treated as 
inputs that can serve product lines in many locations.
• It is assumed the existence of product differentiation, economies of scale and 
monopolistic competition
• MNEs play an active role in the international trade
• There is a simultaneous existence of intersectoral trade, intra-industry trade, and intra- 
firm trade
• Horizontal and vertical integration lead to cost-efficiency
• Relevant factor endowments determine the location of cost-minimizing single 
production line of a MNE
• Possible locational determinants such as transport costs, tax advantages and tariffs are 
assumed away, so that the production facilities are not established in order to save 
transport costs or avoid trade barriers
• The larger the relevant factor endowments differences in home and host country the 
larger the volume of trade or FDI
• The larger the country (host) size in terms of GNP the larger the volume of trade or 
FDI
• For given relative country size (host), the larger the relevant factor endowments 
differences in home and host country the larger the share of the intra-firm trade
Helpman (1984) in his conclusions mentioned that “the current theory can also explain cross­
country penetration o f multinational corporations as a result o f  impediments to trade (such as 
transport costs or tariffs)... the theory explains the simultaneous existence o f intersectoral 
trade, intra-industry trade, and intra-firm trade... \m  extension of this theory for horizontal 
and vertical integrations for MNEs appeared in Helpman (1983) in which he argued that]... 
integrated multinational corporations end up having production facilities in parent as well as 
in host countries and the existence o f vertical integi'ation brings about intrafirm trade both in
Aristidis Bitzenis, PhD 12 3
Foreign D irect Investment during the Transition from  a Planned to  M arket Economy: tire case o f B ulgaria 1989-2001
J7 [H is a general purpose input] services and in intermediate inputs
2.9 Conclusion
What derives from the literature review from 1937 up to 2000 is the comprehension of the 
relativity of each theory; there is no theory that dominates the decision making process of 
FDI. The opportunities a country has to offer change through time, and the different ways in 
which MNEs evaluate the opportunities. Each theory applies in a limited number of sectors, 
and that a given firm may be served by different theories in different time periods.
After the consideration of the FDI theories the author made an attempt to present, in the 
simplest possible way, the incentives, motives, reasons, possibilities, opportunities, 
externalities, imperfections that an MNE considers before the decision of FDI. A company, 
when considering FDI, it tries to exploit or overcome any factor that has stimulated or 
motivated its management to proceed in investing in a foreign country. Moreover, the 
barriers, which discourage an FDI decision, are in fact, the other side of the same coin, 
meaning that the negative side of an incentive constitutes a barrier.
Some of the theories presented may be viewed as static, while others may be considered 
dynamic. The static theories studied only the factors that lead to the decision of FDI, while 
the dynamic theories also consider the evolution of the foreign company and its interaction 
with the host industry and the host country. The dynamic models led the author to the 
presentation of the direct and indirect effects of FDI on the host country, on the transition 
process to a market economy and on the MNE.
One must consider that the market conditions are always changing and the changing character 
of the boundaries, the globalization, the European Union etc. will definitely create new 
challenges and opportunities for a company to seek value-adding activities internationally in 
ways different from the ones studied up to now. This model may be expanded with every 
new theory developed that derives from the above changes. As the authors of the above 
theories concluded on reasons on why a company may undertake FDI by examining certain 
subjects (countries, incentives, barriers) in certain time periods, the author of this thesis, 
studying all those FDI & new trade theories, creating a questionnaire and studying nearly 100 
foreign companies operating in Bulgaria in the time period 1989-1999, ended up with two 
conclusions: the first is that no theory can be general and the second is that in the case of 
Bulgaria some specific incentives and certain FDI theories are appropriate for application (see
124 U niversity  o f  G lasgow , O ctober 2002
C H APTER  2: F o r e ig n  D ir e c t  In v e s tm e n t as an  en try  m o d e
chapter 3).
The changes observed in the last decades certainly have a significant growth rate, much larger 
than that of the past. Respective changes are likely to occur in much larger growth rate in the 
years to come. These changes will cause many static theories on FDI, and on other economic 
aspects, to become obsolete. For example consider how the theory of Aliber on FDI as a way 
of exploiting the differences in exchange rates, will apply after the monetary unification of the 
countries of the European Union.
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CHAPTER 3
Before any discussion regarding the determination of foreign direct investment (FDI) [for a 
discussion of statistical problems, inaccuracies and problems regarding the definition of FDI 
see appendices of this chapter], we must outline the literature review of other questionnaire 
surveys. In doing so we can conclude that the findings of econometric studies tend to support 
questionnaire survey results.
3.1 Literature Review of other questionnaire surveys regarding the
determinat ion of FDI
The following discussion attempts to be a literature review of the most relevant and important 
articles on our subject. Their main effort focuses on determining the most significant 
incentives and barriers of FDI, based on questionnaire analysis.
Benacek V., et al., 2000 concluded’ that “the findings o f econometric studies tend to 
support survey results. This suggests that market size and growth potential have been 
the driving force behind FDI, with factor cost advantages playing a lesser but still 
significant role. Macroeconomic and political stability are also taken into account. 
Market seeking was the primary motive for FDI, however, the role played by the 
absence o f trade barriers and membership in free trade areas suggests that export 
oriented investments are also present. Inflows o f FDI have improved the overall growth 
potential o f the economies, but primarily through productivity improvements within the 
foreign firms, rather than through linkages with the domestic firm s or spillovers into 
them [abstract]..., Investment incentives have not, in general, had a decisive influence 
on the investment decision, but the privatization process has had an important influence 
on the timing o f FDI, Evidence on the attraction o f the skilled labour force in Central 
Europe has been more variable. ... There is some indication that foreign investment has 
had a negative impact overall on the trade balance in Central Europe, which supports 
the evidence that foreign investors have been primarily market rather than export 
oriented, at least in the analyzed period. ... Incentives are less important in attracting 
FDI. However, once an investor decides to invest in the region, incentives may 
influence the choice o f location among similar locations inside the region...The 
privatisation process should also be taken into account. It acts as a strong signal o f the 
commitment o f the government to private ownership. The one-off opportunities offered 
by the transfer o f  state monopolies into the private sector give a strong incentive fo r  
strategic investments. First-mover advantages are intrinsic in the privatisation o f a 
monopoly, as the new owner is likely to gain a degree o f market power even i f  the 
monopoly is divided.... The Visegrad economies appear to be converging on a level o f  
about 75 per cent, close to the levels o f the market economies in Western Europe.... The 
privatisation process played a key role in determining the level o f  direct investment in 
the early years o f  transition. The earliest countries to embark upon significant 
privatisation programmes were those in Central Europe. These economies have also
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attracted the highest shares o f inward investment [conclusions, Benacek V., et al., 
2000].
Benacek et al. also claimed that:
Certain factors will affect which countries (i) receive higher levels o f  investment, while 
other will affect which sectors (j) receive higher levels o f  investment For example, 
political stability may influence the distribution o f investment across countries, while 
specific incentives may direct investment towards certain sectors, [conclusions, 
Benacek V., et al, 2000].
On this basis, we drew the conclusion that it was necessary to run the chi-square statistical test 
in the specific questionnaire survey for each sector of the Bulgarian economy in order to 
determine the incentives and barriers for FDI inflows.
Benacek V., et al, 2000 also concluded that “Taken individually, a single survey may 
suggest misleading conclusions. For example, a study that excludes Hungary and the 
Czech Republic may conclude that political and economic stability is not very 
important to investors. But a study that does include them will indicate that their 
relative stability can help explain why such a large share o f  investment in the transition 
economies has gone to these two countries ”
We have run a questionnaire survey in a specific country trying to avoid the above-mentioned 
misleading results when the determination of the incentives and barriers in Bulgaria was based 
in the consideration of each sector of the Bulgarian economy and each origin of MNEs.
In general, survey respondents who already had an investment in a country rated its 
risk substantially lower than those that did not (Lankes and Venables, 1997).
According to the literature review, in a survey^ by Klaus E. Meyer (1995) a questionnaire 
was sent to 677 German and British companies in the winter of 1994/95. The companies^ 
were selected randomly from a database (AMADEUS). Stratified sampling was followed and 
each stratum was defined by firm size. 269 (39%) companies responded that they share 
business relationships with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia from 
which only 212 companies were included in the study as the rest questionnaires received had 
uncompleted/misleading observations. 38% of the investing projects were acquisitions or joint 
ventures and 19% of the 38% (7% of the total) were through privatisation programs. The local 
market was the dominant attraction and factor cost orientation came almost exclusively in 
combination with market-oriented investment. Those aiming towards low factor cost preferred 
the Czech Republic (38%), Poland (31%), Hungary (29%), Russia (26%) and Romania (21%). 
The most important conclusion drawn from the survey is that labour costs play a secondary
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role in the investment motivation of western investors in the CEE region. Local markets were 
the main attraction with only 9% considering factor costs as the primary attraction of the 
region. Only a combination of low factor costs and an attractive local market motivates the 
potential investors to implement their plans. Meyer has also found that Germany prefers 
neighbor countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland.
Meyer (1996)'* reported that the purchasing power of consumers is important to the 
investment decision for market oriented investors. The most significant factor for market 
oriented investors is the size of the market in terms of population. Factor price oriented 
investments also find access to local markets to be important, although to a somewhat lesser 
extent, as would be expected. Meyer went on to say that a qualified labour force is one of the 
most decisive determinants of foreign investment in Hungary, especially for assemblers and 
domestic supply based exporters. Labour quality is of lesser importance to non-exporters. 
Furthermore, market oriented investors in Hungary regard political and economic stability as a 
crucial factor in the location decision. Factor-price oriented investors are less concerned with 
stability. Finally, Meyer concluded that market oriented investors in Hungary are influenced 
by the lack of competitors in a given market.
Arthur Andersen (OECD, 1994)^ in an OECD survey^ found that the main barriers or 
constraints regarding FDI and according to their importance were the following: bureaucratic 
or administrative issues, legislative issues, economic climate, business infrastructure, political 
volatility and cultural considerations. Access to a large domestic market, market share, market 
potential, low cost production, the source of raw materials, geographical location and 
following the clients theory, were the primary motives for an investment decision. Moreover, 
Andersen mentioned that the Austrian firms gave priority, when deciding to invest, to both 
geographic proximity and the strong historical links with Hungaiy and Czechoslovakia and to 
a lesser extent with Poland.
In another survey by Hans-Peter Lankes and A.J. Venables (1997)^ a total of 11.000 
worldwide firms were contacted in January 1995. Of these 11.000, only 1.435 responded, of 
which 628 that indicated they were willing to be interviewed at senior executive level. Finally, 
executives from 117 of these firms with 145 investments in Central & Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union were interviewed between June and November 1995. The results were:
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•  The investor motivation was the local market size for Poland and the Commonwealth 
Independent States (CIS) countries and political stability for the Czech Republic and 
Hungary
• The 2"  ^ investor motivation was political stability for Poland, natural resources for the CIS 
and stability of macroeconomic policy for Hungary and the Czech Republic.
• The 3"^"^ investor motivation was the stability of macroeconomic policy for Poland while the 
regulatory environment was for the Czech Republic and Hungary and access to other 
markets was for the CIS countries.
• The 4**^ investor motivation was the geographical proximity and access to other markets for 
Poland as well as the skilled labour costs for CIS countries and geographical proximity for 
the Czech Republic and Hungary
• The 5* investor motivation was the unskilled labour costs for the CIS, although the skilled 
labour cost was for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Lankes and Venables (1997)®, also found that market size is the most crucial determinant for 
market oriented investors, except in Hungary and the Czech Republic, where political and 
economic stability dominated. The importance of factor costs seems to depend, not 
surprisingly, on the purpose of the investment. They found that export oriented firms place 
much greater importance on production costs and cheap skilled labour, as would be intuitively 
expected. Transport costs were found to be relevant for heavy industry, which is also 
expected. The attraction of a skilled labour force was of significant importance only in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. According to Lake and Venables, trade barriers are not 
considered as an impediment to investment in Hungary and the Czech Republic, although 
import tariffs from the EU are thought to deter investment in Poland and other Central 
European countries. Geographical proximity to the EU was considered important, especially to 
market oriented investors. However, survey respondents indicated that investment was not 
primarily motivated to gain access to EU markets, suggesting that proximity was important 
mainly to enable intra-firm trade. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia are thought to be considerably less risky than other transitional economies. The 
Czech Republic and Hungary are popular partly owing to the low inflation throughout much 
of their transition period. Surveys of investors in Poland show that economic growth trends are 
among the factors influencing the decision to invest. Lankes and Venables (1997) found that 
tax incentives for foreign investment do not play a key role to the location decision in CEECs,
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.although individual agreements between the investor and the govermnent are significant for a 
small group of investors. This is especially the case in Hungary. First-mover advantage 
appears to have played a strong role in the investment decision, especially for market-oriented 
investors. The aggregate data indicates that acquisitions of formerly state-owned firms by 
foreign investors outnumber greenfield investments in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. However, even in the early years Hungary received significant levels of greenfield 
investment, while bureaucratic barriers curtailed greenfield investment in the Czech Republic.
Lankes and Venables (1997) also found that almost half of the investors are positively ,1
influenced by similar investments by competitors in the same country (following the 
competitors' theory).
The survey^ by Simona lammarino and Christos Pitelis (2000)***, focused on the Greek 
outward FDI in Bulgaria and Romania whereas our survey focused on worldwide inward FDI 
flows in Bulgaria. However, both surveys yielded similar and comparable results. According 
to Pitelis et al. their response rate was high, due to the use of 80 research assistants and to the 
fact that the coordinator, was at the time, engaged in a related project at the Greek Ministry of 
Development, which facilitated access considerably. Pitelis et al. reported the type of FDI by 
motivations was perceived as the most important in determining the choice to invest; thus 
according to their importance we the following ranking: expected economic growth, 
geographical location, incentives, labor costs, increases in market shares. Moreover, the 
constraints and risks faced by investors in undertaking production activities were: bureaucracy 
and administrative constraints, general uncertainties of rules, business infrastructure, and 
legislative and economic climate constraints. Furthermore, custom tariffs, technological 
backwardness, foreign indebtedness and local currency strength seem not to be so influential.
Finally, half of the investments in their sample were joint ventures, followed by wholly owned 
(usually greenfield rather than based on acquisitions) and then came FDI using 
licensing/franchising modes of entry. In the case of both Bulgaria and Romania, the form of 
participation in the investment preferred by Greek parents was the establishment of an entirely 
new firm through a joint venture, with the foreign investor having the majority stake of the 
total company’s shares.
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The empirical analysis is based on the results o f a survey carried out in 1995-96 as part o f 
an ACE Project supported by the European Commission on the economic integration 
through FDI in the less favoured CEECs and the impact on the LFRs o f the European 
Union. A questionnaire was sent to Greek companies that had undertaken foreign direct 
investment projects in Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic: the responding firms 
were 96 and the total number o f investments in the three countries was 104. In this paper 
we focus on Greek outward FDI in Bulgaria and Romania, using part o f  the database in 
trying to draw some implications fo r  the home country, with a sample o f 76 Greek parents 
and 85 direct investments in the two CEECs [Pitelis et al, 2000].
The overall number of FDI is 85 and, as already explained, it does not coincide with the 
number of investors, i.e. 76 parent companies, because some of them have invested in both 
countries. First of all, the survey was mainly addressed to large firms, operating in both 
manufacturing and service sectors. Thus, the FDI considered here is mostly attributable to 
rather old and experienced firms, exhibiting a relatively high propensity to invest abroad - the 
actual Greek multinational corporations, such as, Rolco-Vianil (detergents and soaps), 
Intracom (telecommunication equipment, information systems and related services), Hellenic 
Bottling Company (soft drinks) and Delta (dairy products, frozen food). While many of them 
are long-term operating firms, for which the internationalisation process had started long 
before the collapse of the centrally planned economies (the European Union partners being 
their main locational target), only a tiny proportion of Greek parents declared to have been in 
operation in the CEECs for more than one or two years (as stated the survey was carried out in 
1995-96).
Table [A] reports the type of FDI by motivations which was perceived as most important in 
determining the choice to invest. The number of possible motivations was set up equal to a 
maximum of eight answers. Several issues can be raised from that table. Expected economic 
growth scores highest, as a general expectation from the opportunities created by investing 
abroad, followed by geographical location, incentives, labour costs and, with a slightly lower 
frequency, increase in market shares (both domestic and regional), which attached 
approximately the same importance to all three type categories (exporters, local suppliers and 
distributors). Unsurprisingly, both geographical location and proximity to the EU market are - 
in relative terms - more significant for exporters than for local suppliers, whilst for the latter 
relatively higher scores are attached to factors strictly linked to the local social environment, 
such as cultural similarities and historical links. As expected, the source of raw materials is 
relatively more relevant to exporters than to the other two categories, while, rather 
surprisingly, labour skills seem to be relevant in none of the cases (Pitelis et a l, p. 11).
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T a b l e  A. T y p e  of FDI b y  m o t i v a t i o n
MOTIVATIONS TYPE
Exporters Local suppliers Distributors Total
Expected economic growth 9 41 3 53
Geographical location 9 20 2 31
Investment incentives 8 22 I 31
Labour costs 7 22 2 31
Increase in domestic market share 4 23 2 29
Increase in regional market share 4 23 I 28
Proximity to the EU market 8 8 3 19
Source of raw materials 6 9 0 15
Cultural similarities 4 10 0 14
Transport costs 3 6 1 10
Political and economic climate 2 4 2 8
Country's chance to join the EU 2 3 2 7
Historical links 1 5 1 7
Energy costs I I 1 3
Labour skills 2 1 0 3
Source: Pitelis et al., 2000
The constraints and risks faced by investors in undertaking production activities in Bulgaria 
and Romania, always grouped by type of FDI are listed in Table [B] (maximum number of 
possible answers set up equals to eight) (Pitelis et al., p. 12.)
Table B. Type of FDI by constraint
CONSTRAINTS TYPE
Exporters Local suppliers Distributors Total
Bureaucracy/administrative constraint 14 40 9 63
Business infrastructure constraint 9 32 4 45
Legislative constraint 11 25 4 40
General economic climate constraint 11 26 2 39
Incoherent and unstable legal system 8 22 3 33
High investment risk 8 20 5 33
Slow pace transition 7 22 3 32
Uncertain or imprecise property rights 9 18 4 31
Undervalued local currency 8 18 2 28
Political uncertainty 8 17 2 27
Custom tariffs and policy constraint 2 16 6 24
Cultural considerations constraint 2 16 5 23
Technological backwardness 2 9 2 13
High foreign indebtedness 2 6 2 10
Overvalued local currency 2 5 0 7
Source: Pitelis et al., 2000
Bureaucracy and administrative constraints are at the top fo r a ll three categories. On 
the whole, it emerges that general uncertainties o f  rules are perceived as the most 
discouraging factors, as shown by the high scores attached to business infrastructure, 
legislative and economic climate constraints in all three categories. Cultural 
considerations are again perceived as relatively more important fo r  local suppliers and 
distributors, as well as custom tariffs, while technological backwardness, foreign 
indebtedness and local currency strength seem not to be so influential (p. 12).
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Finally, Table 5* [in Pitelis et al, 2000] presents the three categories o f control mode o f  
Greek FDI, associated with the type o f investment, the host country and the industry in 
which the MNE operates. As emerges from the table, half o f  the investments in our 
sample are join t ventures, followed by wholly owned (usually greenfield rather than 
based on acquisitions) and then FDI in licensing-franchising. In the case o f both 
Bulgaria and Romania, the form o f participation in the investment preferred by Greek 
parents was the establishment o f an entirely new firm  through jo in t venture, the share o f 
foreign investor, although not always specified, being usually o f  majority stake (p. 13).
[*Table 5: w holly owned= 12 in  Romania and 14 in  Bulgaria. Joint ventures^ 25 in  Romania and 17 in  
Bulgaria. L icensing/franchising= 9 in Romania and 8 in  Bulgaria].
In another questionnaire survey, Pye (1998)** considered a sample survey of investment from 
the major European and North American countries into the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia between 1989 and 1996 (334 firms). The results showed that the 
primary motive in 34 per cent of the sample was the size of the market, together with the 
growth potential and maintaining market share. Strategic motives, which include serving 
regional and EU markets, were listed second. Pye (1998) also found that financial efficiency 
factors account for 10 per cent of the secondaiy motives of investors. In the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, labour cost advantages were considered the most important factors, along with 
overall stability, profitability and local market access. Elsewhere, labour cost advantage was 
viewed as less important than market access. The attraction of a skilled labour force was found 
to be of significant value only in Slovakia. Pye (1998) confirmed earlier findings that export 
oriented firms are in the minority of firms surveyed. Those that did exist were geared towards 
supplying neighboring CEECs. Pye (1998) also discovered that overall stability of the host 
country for investment is thought to be somewhat important, especially in the Czech Republic. 
He found that strategic advantages are particularly valuable in Romania and Poland and that 
acquisitions have dominated greenfield investment in Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic*^. However, the share of greenfield investment has increased significantly in 
Hungary, now that the privatisation process is complete. This strongly suggests that the 
privatisation process has played a decisive role in the majority of foreign investments, even if 
it is considered insignificant by certain managers interviewed in the surveys. If the firms 
surveyed were actually dominated by greenfield investments, this indicates that the sample 
was not representative of the real population of foreign investors.
Altzinger (1999)*^, in a survey of 150 Austrian firms investing in CEECs, found that market 
potential was the primary motive for investors. It is especially important for investors in 
finance and insurance, construction and food and beverages. He also discovered that Austrian
A . B it z e n is ,  O cto b er  2 0 0 2
investors, with the exception of the engineering sector, view low wage costs as significant, but 
to a lesser degree than market potential. Labour costs were of particularly low importance to 
investors in finance and insurance. The creation of an export base was significant to Austrian 
investors in Central Europe, especially in the food and beverages sector. Nonetheless, 83 per 
cent of output in this sector was sold locally in 1995.Altzinger concluded that proximity to 
Austria is important to Austrian investors, especially in the finance and insurance sector, 
partly due to historical and cultural ties.
A survey conducted by Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)*'* in 1998, 
revealed that Greek companies show a preference for Bulgaria, Romania and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, because of their geographical and cultural proximity, their 
common religious beliefs, existing trade relations and lack of other significant western 
investment interest. At the same time they consider these three countries and the Balkans in 
general, as an initial investment opening with a view to later expansion via these nations into 
Russia and the Black Sea states. Moreover, the most significant disincentive to development in 
all the countries under examination proved to be political and economic instability.
The basic conclusions, which can be drawn from SECI survey, are summarized below; 
o All disincentives are rated on a scale from less restrictive to most restrictive, 
o The most significant disincentive to development in all the countries under 
examination was found to be political and economic instability. More specifically:
Table C: The most important disincentives according to SECI research
Disincentive Average rating \ Country
ji 1. Political and economic instability 8.03 i Albania, Moldova, Yugoslavia, Romania, Russia
jj 2. Crime - lack of transparency - corruption 7,14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary
ij 3. Deficient infrastructure 6,93 1 Croatia, Slovenia
ii 4. Insufficient legal and administrative framework 6,89 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ii 5. Inadequate policy towards foreign investments ii (Bureaucracy, difficulties in land ownership)
ii 6. Negative business environment (non-existent ii financial and banking systems, the Black market)
6.37 I 
5,19 1
Source: SECI, 1999
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Lastly, in April 1998, KPM G International (a consultant company)*^ initiated a survey of the 
foreign investors in Bulgaria in order to identify key factors such as major incentives and 
barriers to foreign investment, present business opportunities and further investment 
considerations. The skilled labour force has been one of the driving considerations for more 
than a third (36%), followed by low labour cost (34%), former business contacts (34%), 
strategic geographic location (31%), good local market 29%, proximity to home operations 
9% and tax incentives with only 2%. Moreover, 37% of the surveyed companies indicated that 
green-field investment was the most common form of foreign investment. 23% of the 
investors have chosen to use local expertise and know -  how in the form of joint ventures. 
Another 23% have participated in the government’s privatisation program and another 17% 
have acquired private businesses. Nearly half of the investors (47%) have pointed to the 
customer base in the region. The majority of foreign investors (84%) have pointed out that the 
incoherent and unstable legal system was one of the most serious problems for their 
operations, followed by bureaucracy with 80%, limited purchasing power with 71%. Next 
came excessive taxation 57%, lack of infrastructure 55%, high investment risk with 32% and 
crime and corruption with 8%.
In general, the conclusion from the above literature review is that all these surveys are 
considering a questionnaire (sample) survey in more than one country (except the KPMG 
research) having interviewed sample of answers ranged from 334 MNEs in 5 countries, 212 
MNEs in 5 countries, 162 MNEs in 4 countries, 150 MNEs in the most Central European 
Countries, 117 MNEs in 4 countries, 92 in 10 countries, 76 MNEs in 2 countries, up to less 
than 70 MNEs in Bulgaria. All these surveys have a sample size bigger than ours, however all 
those except one conducted in more than two countries each one. Our sample size consisted of 
64 MNEs which were in the top 120 ranking places according to the Bulgarian Foreign 
Investment Agency (BFIA) due to their significant investment volume in US$. Moreover, 
from the above studies only one survey was considered specifically Bulgaria as a country case 
study and another two were partially considered Bulgaria. Moreover, when a survey was 
conducted in more than one country simultaneously, you have the limitations mentioned above 
by Benacek et al. Nonetheless, from the presentation of these surveys useful conclusions can 
be drawn especially from the comparison of the outcomes of those surveys with the results of 
our survey.
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According to the literature review (table la), paying attention to similar works, having a 
sample country, Bulgaria, we can conclude to the following: we can argue that the well-known 
international consultant company, KPMG ran a survey with an answered sample of around 70 
MNEs (same sample size with our research). This sample was not significant due to the 
following limitations: around 50% of the total sample had invested less than 1 million USDS 
(non important investments according to the official BFIA catalogue), and only 50 companies 
out of the 200 asked (population), were also from the official BFIA catalogue. The proportion 
of the sectors that those companies belong to, was biased and did not capture the introduction 
of the currency board and the consequent Bulgarian political and macroeconomic stability.
Moreover, SECI conducted a survey in many Balkan countries in search only for investing 
barriers. The survey, though had an unclear sample (the selection of companies criteria was 
also unclear). Bulgaria was only one country out of ten surveyed countries and only 92 
companies participated in the whole research. However, one of the surveys conclusions 
regarding corruption, crime and mafia which rank high as an investing obstacle for the case of 
Bulgaria, is also in accordance with our survey results but in contrast with KPMG research 
results in which corruption has not been considered as an important one (only 8%).
Finally, Pitelis et al.’s survey has considered 39 FDI projects, which have been undertaken in 
Bulgaria. At the same time 85 Greek FDI projects had been undertaken in both Romania and 
Bulgaria (85 FDI projects from 76 MNEs). Although the sample, the selection of the sample 
and the proportion of MNEs participating in the Bulgarian economy are unclear and maybe 
biased, on the other hand we can say that most of the results are in accordance with our 
results. Moreover, Pitelis et. al. took into account only the Greek FDI outflows in Bulgaria and 
thus the incentives for Greek entrepreneurs only were determined. In the present research, we 
have considered and pinpointed the incentives and barriers for 64 large MNEs from several 
countries which have invested in Bulgaria.
Table 1a: Determination of FDI inflows according to the literature review; Survey based  approachÏNCÉNTÎ#SSUftVÉYS BARRIERS
Benacek V., et al., (2000)
«... The findings of econometric studies tend to support survey results »
"eiNERÀTFINÜINeS--------------------• market size• growth potential• factor cost advantages• Macroeconomic and political stability
THIS I6  A LitËRATURE REVIEW
CzechRepublic,Hungary,Poland,Romania,Russia
• The local market (the size)• factor cost orientation (low cost)• geographical proximity• purchasing power of consumer• qualified labour force• political and economic stability
Klaus E. Meyer (1995, 96)
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• lack of local competitors3 Arthur Andersen (OECD, 1994) Poland,CIS,Hungary,
Republic
• access to large domestic market,• market share,• market potential,• low cost production,• source or raw materials,• geographic proximity• strong historical links• geographical location• following the clients theory
• bureaucratic or administrating issues,• legislative issues,• economic climate,• business infrastructure,• political volatility• cultural considerations
4 Hans-Peter Lankes and A.J. Venables (1997)
Poland,Slovakia,Slovenia,Hungary,CzechRepublic
• the local market size• politicai stability• natural resources• stability of macroeconomic policy• the regulatory environment• the access to other markets• geographical closeness (proximity)• skilled labour costs• unskilled labour costs• Geographical closeness to the EUb Simona lammarino and Christos Pitelis (2000)
Romania,Bulgaria • Expected economic growth• Geographical location• Investment incentives• Labour costs• Increase In domestic market share• Increase in regional market share• Proximity to the EU market• Source of raw materials• Cultural similarities
• Bureaucracy/administrat ive constraint• Business infrastructure constraint• Legislative constraint• General economic climate constraint• Incoherent and unstable legal system• High investment risk• Slow pace transition• Uncertain or imprecise property rights• Undervalued local currency• Political uncertainty6 Pye (1998) Poland,Slovakia,Hungary,
Republic,Romania
• the size of the market,• the growth potential,• maintaining market share,• labour cost advantages• overall stability.• profitability and local market access• serving regional and EU markets,• skilled labour force• supplying neighboring CEECs• Privatisation process7 Altzinger (1999) CentralEurope • market potential• wage costs• Creation of an export base• Geographical proximity• historical and cultural tiesd kPMG International (1998) Bulgaria • skilled labour force• low labour cost• former business contacts strategic geographic location good local market• proximity to home operations• tax Incentives
• incoherent and unstable legal system,• bureaucracy,• limited purchasing power• excessive taxation,• lack of infrastructure• high investment risk,• crime and corruption9 Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) (1998)
BalkanRegion • Political and economic instability• Crime - lack of transparency -  corruption• Deficient infrastructure• Insufficient legal and administrative framework• Inadequate policy towards foreign investments (Bureaucracy,Difficulties in land ownership)• Negative business environment (Inexistent financial and banking systems, Black market)10 Bitzenis, A. (1999) Bulgaria • market size,• low labor cost of unskilled workers,• geographical proximity,• international pressures from competition,• prospects for market growth,• link to other neighboring countries,• lack of local competition
• unstable legal system,• bureaucracy,• corruption, crime and mafia• high investment risk• limited purchase power• lack of infrastructure• macroeconomic
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instability
Source: Bitzenis, A, 2003
3.2 D escrip tion  o f how survey was designed  to test im p ortance of these
incentives
3.2 .1  C hoosing the sam ple and con stru ctin g  the qu estion naire
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, a questionnaire was designed to extract 
valuable information regarding the determinants of FDI in Bulgaria during the post­
communist period 1989-1999. Its purpose was to identify the type of incentives and entry 
barriers for inward foreign direct investment considered by foreign MNEs in order to establish 
whether they should make an investment or not in Bulgaria. From an official document that 
had been collected from the BFIA, a list with 110 foreign companies was found. This list 
contains the enterprises that according to the BFIA, had invested over one million US$ dollars 
(each MNE) in Bulgaria until the middle of June 1998 (Those 64 companies are still in the top 
120 biggest foreign investors according to the BFIA catalogue, Jan 2003). The total invested 
capital from these enterprises amounted to around 50% of the total volume of foreign 
investments in Bulgaria at that time (more than 65%, end 2002).
According to the existing literature, there has been no other statistically analysed research for 
Bulgaria with such a magnitude (64 companies have been interviewed and answered a 
questionnaire) and statistical significant sample, in order to identify the incentives and barriers 
for the FDI decisions in Bulgaria. Other surveys tried to determine incentives and barriers for 
more than one country simultaneously with less than 64 MNEs as a sample for one specific 
country.
The sample is very representative since it is comprised of companies which invested a very 
significant amount of US $ for the economic magnitude of the Bulgarian Economy and as a 
percentage of the total Bulgarian FDI inflows. Moreover, the sample is also representative 
because the answers*^, collected and analyzed, belonged almost proportionally to the sectors 
of industry, services and trade [see endnotes for more details *^ ].
Among the 64 companies 37 were of Greek origin. The reason that 37 companies seem to be 
of Greek origin is because firstly we have considered the offshore companies with approved
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Greek interest as Greek (i.e. Cyprus or Luxembourg based offshore companies). Secondly, we 
have also considered as Greek investments the joint ventures or consortiums with approved 
significant Greek participation (i.e. Alico/CEH that bought Postbank, the management and 
43% of the total shares belong to the Greek Eurobank and the remaining shares to the 
American Insurance Group (AIG) and its subsidiary ALICO). Eight out of the 37 above- 
mentioned companies were of this type*®.
The managers of MNEs, who were interviewed, were asked to mention any number of 
incentives, which they thought to be crucial to their company in their decision for undertaking 
an FDI project in Bulgaria. Therefore, the sum of the percentages of the results, found in 
Figures 1-4 is not equal to 100%.
3 .2 .2  R esearch M ethodology of the S ta tistica l analysis o f the question naire  
survey
The statistical analysis establishes possible relations between the variables for the 64 
questioned companies. The nature of the relation between the variables, if any, was 
investigated with the chi-square statistic, which is regarded the most suitable for this kind of 
data. Instead of using a statistic method like correlation coefficients, which requires data 
collected in a continuous form, the chi-square test allows to make inferences for the 
population of interest, in this case foreign investors in Bulgaria, by making use of the 
categorical data. The results are valid in most of the cases at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance and the inferences about the population were based on the results of the p-value.
As mentioned in the general introduction of this thesis the author decided after collecting and 
examining the results for the questionnaire survey to move one more step in his empirical 
research and to run a statistical analysis. His purpose was not only to determine the general 
incentives and barriers for the Bulgarian FDI inflows during the period in question, but also to 
determine IF the ranking of the incentives and barriers is different when dividing the 64 MNEs 
into 3 groups of sector. Finally, the author tried to explore and determine IF the ranking of the 
incentives and barriers is different when dividing the 64 MNEs into 2 groups according to 
their origin (for more see introductory chapter of this thesis). The results from this statistical 
analysis underpin the author’s expectations and in other words the ranking was different when 
considering all the 64 MNEs and then dividing them according to the origin and according to
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the sector that each one belongs to. To statistically testify all the above, the author used the 
well-known CHI-SQUARE test, which is an appropriate method for testing associations 
between variables such as incentives and origin of MNE, groups of sector and incentives, 
barriers and origin of MNE and barriers and groups of sector of MNEs.
3.2 .3  C onclusions derived from the d escrip tive  q u estion n aire analysis
• The survey lasted 18 months (time period January 98 -  June 99), but most of the 
questionnaires were completed in the period Jan ’99-June ‘99. The total invested 
amount for the 110 foreign companies was 1,283,419,173 USDS and for the 21 was 
47,6 million USDS. The statistical sample with 64 companies consists of a total 
investment amount equals to 863 million USDS, which is the 64.7% of the total 
investments of these 131 companies or the 50.7% of the total Bulgarian FDI inflows. 
(BFIA catalogue, Foreign Direct Investments over 1 million USDS (as of 30 June 
1998))
• Only 9 companies out of 64 participated in the questionnaire have invested for the first 
time, after the end of 1997, and the questionnaires were completed only one year after 
the introduction of the currency board.
• The usual way of replying questionnaires [table 2a], the post way, in any research 
study, failed (i.e. only 4.7% of the companies replied with this way). So, it seems that 
the best replying rate came from one to one interviews (35,9% of the total response 
rate following by e-mail or www with 29.7%). The fax and telephone methods had 
success in about 30% together. Due to the above bad response rate by post (despite the 
fact that the questionnaire was sent to all the companies) and the possibility of failing 
collecting the sufficient data, it was decided a multiple approach of the target group by 
putting some pressure with various methods of contacting and getting their attention.
• In the first 6 months the author completed questionnaire design, and has taken 
decisions on the source of data, literature review, theory study, other published articles 
-  empirical studies, methodology (statistical analysis, target group, sample size, way of 
approaching the target group, financial sources for completing the study, scheduling 
timetable etc.)
• The reason that 37 companies seem to be of Greek origin is because as Greek have 
been also considered those that appear as offshore companies (i.e. Cyprus or
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Luxembourg based) but with approved Greek interest, and those that appear as joint- 
ventures or consortiums (i.e. Alico/CEH that bought Postbank, the management and 
43% of the shares belongs to the Greek Eurobank) - 8 of 37 companies were of this 
type.
• The BFIA table helped the author to decide the minimum amount invested by each 
company in order to be considered in the analysis, having as a result a sufficient 
number of observations in the population for the purpose of this study.
• However, it is possible that the author was not able to find all the investments over 1 
million (or because of the lack of formal government statistics). Thus, if the author has 
not included in this study a number of important investments (over 1 million), this 
should be the statistical error and should be added to the statistical error caused by the 
non-replied questionnaires and this might cause some misleading results.
• Whilst the researcher of this questionnaire is of Greek origin the high rate of responses 
and the high percentage of Greek answers in the final results were expected.
Table 2a; Author’s questionnaire research 's properties
AUTHOR’S QUESTIONNAIRE RESEARCH’S PROPERTIES
1 Mid 1998 (sample) 1 1998 (Populatiop) l| End 2000 (sample) End 2000 (Population) j
1.283.419.173 080$  [BFIA catalogue ->110 companies (75% of the 
total FDI inflows in Bulgaria)]
TOTAL FDI INFLOWS in jf USDS 3280,2 mllon (bFIA j BULGARIA i| catalogue-> 150 USDS 1.7 billion |  companies (82% of the
i total FDI inflows in i 1 i[ Bulgaria)
l^TALIFbilfriffoWBULGARIA USDS 4 billion
110 companies -> BFIA catalogue 1150 companies ^  BFÎA j 1 1 catalogue 1
110 + 21 =131 companies -> Extended catalogue 1 21 were excluded from Ihe if 150+16 = 166 companies BFIA catalogue In the year if -> Extended catalogue 
1998 i 1
5 companies, whicTt were ] 
excluded in the BFIA catalogue 
in mid 1998, were included in i 
the BFIA catalogue in the year I
131 companies -> 1,333 
billion USDS (75% of the TOTAL FDI)
1 131 companies -> 2.320 j 
i billion USDS (an 
[________________  1 increase of 74%) J
1 Ti66 companie  ^ !
j billion USDS (83% of the 1 1 TOTAL FDI)
2000 __ I
^ 1 :
RESULTS FROM THE AUTHOR’S QUESTIONNAIRE RESEARCH 1
64 companies of the 
questionnaire -> mid 1998 863 million USDS have been invested by those 64 
companies -> mid 1998 j
1 64 companies -> 1,896 billion i USDS (an increase of 120%) -> 
if end 2000
AVERAGE amount of 
investment = USDS 14 million (13 companies above the average)
AVERAGE amount of iP  j 
investment = USDS 29.6 if i million (15 companies is above the average) if
Response rate 1
863/1333 = 64.7% of the POPULATION (extended 
BFIA catalogue)
863/1 700 = 50.7% of the TOTAL FDI INFLOWS 1896 / 3330 = 56.9% of the I POPULATION (extended 
BFIA catalogue)
1896 / 4000 = 47.4% of the 
TOTAL FDI INFLOWS |
1 The first 30 companies in1 the BFIA catalogue (mid 1998) have invested 981 1 million USDS, 74% of the
The first 30 companies in 
the BFIA catalogue (end 2000) have invested 2,517 
billion USDS, 76% of the 1:
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total (BFIA catalogue) "totaUBFIA^
The first 60 companies in
1 the BFIA catalogue (mid 1998) have invested 1131 million USDS, 88% of the 
total (BFIA catalogue)
27/50 companies (54%), which participated in the questionnaire analysis were among the top 50 in 
invested volume of the j 
BFIA catalogue -> In mid 1998
The first 50 companies in
the BFIA catalogue (end i 2000) have invested 2,852 billion USDS, 87% of the i 
total (BFIA catalogue)
30/50 companies (60%) participated in the questionnaire analysis were among the top 50 in invested 
volume of the BFIA catalogue -> In the end of 2000
{Significant investments of Greek interest
The volume of Investments of Greek interest (that participated in the questionnaire analysis -> [37/64 = 57%]) was 265 million USD$ according to the extended 
BFIA catalogue -> mid 1998 (20% of the SAMPLE (265/1330)) and 265/863 = 30% of the 64 interviewed 
companies.
The volume of Investments of Greek interest (that participated : in the questionnaire analysis -> [37/64 = 57%]) was 534 : million USDS according to the extended BFIA catalogue ->
1 end 2000 (16% of the SAMPLE (534/3330)) and 534/1896 =: 28% of the 64 interviewed companies.L____________ __ ________I
Source: Author’s Questionnaire research
* In this table there are som e elem ents o f  the questionnaire analysis and a few reasons that led the author to the 
conclusion that the analysis was based on a representative sample and on a high response rate.
Kind of Business (64 Companies - Questionnaire 
Research)
28,10%
0  Industry 21,9%
■  Services /  Banks 28.1%
□  Trade /  Food 35,9%
□  Textiles 14,1%
FIGURE 1a: Questionnaire Survey -  64 MNEs by Sector 
Source: Author's Questionnaire Research
The sample of the questionnaire analysis is also representative, because the answers (see 
figures la and lb), which have been collected and analyzed, belonged almost proportionally to 
the sectors of industry, services, trade. Moreover, from the survey the services sector accounts 
28% and the FDI inflows in Bulgaria in the same sector were 18%(Finance 11,4% + Tourism 
5,1% + Telecommunications 1,8% =18.3%). Trade in the survey accounts 36% and the FDI 
inflows in Bulgaria in the same sector were 19,2%. Finally, the answers from the industrial 
sector were 22% and textiles 14% (total 36%) and at the same time the FDI inflows in 
Bulgaria in the industrial sector were 55% of the total.
FIGURE 1b: Bulgarian FDI inflows (by each  sector)
B u I g a r l a n  FDI  i n f l o w s  1 9 8 9 - 2 0 0 0  (% s e c t o r )
I n d u s t r y
Trade 
F i n a n c e  
T o u r i s m  
T r a n s p o r t  
T e l e c o m  m u n l c a t l o n s  
C o n s t r u c t i o n  
Ag r i c u l t u r e  
O t h e r s mmm
0,0%  10,0%  20,0%  30,0 40,0%  50,0%  60,0%
Source: BFIA Catalogue
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3,2.4 C onstruction  of the qu estion naire
The questionnaire used in the research study consisted of three parts. In the first part, the 
questions provided necessary background information on certain issues that were considered 
important in characterising the sample population. In the second part, one question included 
seven groups of sub-questions with related factors that were considered to be of major 
importance and allowed the managers of the enterprises to select the most appropriate for their 
case. These groups of sub-questions were initially selected based on Dunning’s theory, but 
necessary amendments were made during the research period of eighteen months (the research 
was started in January 1998, six months were needed for the construction of the questionnaire, 
studying the theories and deciding the way of contacting the companies and creating the 
sample. Twelve months were needed for the interviews and the statistical analysis of the 
results of the questionnaires). Similarly, part three contained only one question with a group of 
factors that describe the barriers discouraging the firms to invest in Bulgaria. More 
specifically, in the first part there are questions searching for some general characteristics of 
the company, such as the sector that the company belongs to, the year of investment, the 
amount of investment, the home country of an MNE, entry mode etc. In the second part there 
is the theoretical part of the questionnaire survey. In this second part, seven groups of hunters 
(seekers) have been created: Locational hunters (historical links, cultural closeness or distance, 
geographical proximity, stability, climate etc.), factor hunters or natural resource hunters 
(access to low cost of acquiring natural resources and raw materials - p. 13 “the eclectic 
paradigm of international production: a restatement and some possible extensions”, John H. 
Dunning, Journal of International Business Studies, Spring 1988), market hunters (size of the 
market, prospects for market growth, increasing market share), strategic market hunters 
(follow the competition, follow the clients, a way to survive, acquiring of assets, international 
pressures, globalisation etc.), efficiency hunters (economies of scale, of scope, risk 
diversification), exploiting the ownership advantages (brand name, know-how, past 
experience, existing business links etc.), hunter of financial aspects (favourable investment 
law framework, subsidies, tax exemptions). In the third part, there are twenty entry barriers 
(instability, bureaucracy, corruption, unstable legal system, etc.) The construction of the 
questionnaire was based on the Dunning’s theory [the eclectic theory (OLI -  eclectic paradigm 
of international production)]. According to Dunning we have: Locational (L) (natural 
resources availability and cost, investment incentives, characteristics of the country -
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language, culture...), Internalisation (I) (avoid costs, control supplies, avoid or exploit 
government intervention), and Ownership advantages (O) (intangible asset advantages, 
product innovations, know how, multinationality). Dunning has also define natural resource 
seeking (vertical integration, availability, cost), market seeking (market size and 
characteristics, investment incentives, p.82 Multinational Enterprises and the Global 
Economy, John, H. Dunning, 1993, chapter 4), efficiency seeking (economies of scale and 
scope, risk reduction through product diversification -  p. 13 “The eclectic paradigm of 
international production: a restatement and some possible extensions”, John H. Dunning, 
Journal of International Business Studies, Spring 1988) and strategic asset seeking (gain new 
product lines or markets, economies of synergy, economies of common governance, improved 
competitive or strategic advantage, reduce or spread risks- p.82 Multinational Enterprises and 
the Global Economy, John, H. Dunning, 1993, chapter 4). At this point it is worth saying that 
the researcher spent a lot of time explaining to all the interviewers the questionnaire’s 
questions and the questionnaires were completed with the presence of the researcher.
3.3 Potential incentives and barriers for FDI in Bulgaria
3.3.1 Overview of aggregate data on FDI in Bulgaria
3.3.1.1 FDI Progress in Bulgaria
The cumulative value of all foreign direct investment flows in Bulgaria reached 4.8 billion 
USD at the end of 2002. About 80% of them have been generated during the period 1997- 
2001. The FDIs through green-field, joint ventures (JVs), reinvestments and additional 
investments in acquired enterprises exceed the FDIs through privatization, which had been the 
main source in 1997. Bulgaria ‘lost its chance’ in the period 1992-1996, when the developed 
countries extensively invested in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
(BFIA, 2002)(see Table 3a).
TABLE 3A; FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS IN BULGARIA BY YEARS
YEAR
VOLUME IN SUSD million
NUMBERPrivatization Non-privatization Total by years
1992 34.4 34.4 1715
1993 22 80.4 102.4 3052
1994 134.2 76.7 210.9 4269
1995 26 136.6 162.6 5646
1996 76.4 180 256.4 6168
1997 421.4 214.8 636.2 5503
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1998 155.8 464.2 620.0 6226
1999 226.7 592.1 818.8 4845
2000 366 635.5 1001.5 5153
2001 19.2 675.0 694.2 9089
Jan-Sept 2002 62.7 251.0 313.7
Total 1510.4 3306.3 4816.7 51666
Source: BFIA 2003, “Non-privatization" - Greenfield investment + Additional investment in companies with foreign participation + Reinvestment + Joint ventures
The top investor in Bulgaria is Greece followed by Germany, Italy and Belgium. Other major 
investors include the USA, Austria, Cyprus, Russia, the Netherlands and the UK (see Table 
4a).
Table 4a: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS IN BULGARIA BY EACH COUNTRY BY YEARS In USDS
Nr. Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Jan-June
2002
Total by 
countries
1 GREECE 0.2 5.1 3 29.8 14.6 16.1 3.3 14.9 241.1 213.6 78.2 619.9
2 GERMANY 0.1 56.6 111 16.2 53.1 31.4 55.7 101 72.3 65.1 23.0 586.2
3 ITALY 0 0.2 5.2 2.3 1.2 0.4 2.1 23 339.7 77.3 13.9 465.3
4 BELGIUM 0 0.1 0.3 10 0.8 264 31.2 66.2 39.8 3.1 0.6 416.5
5 AUSTRIA 13 1 14.7 1.4 12.1 12.5 46.9 23.4 88.8 137.4 8.6 359.8
6 USA 0 10.5 16.2 16.1 20.7 46.6 38.6 49.8 37.1 41.4 8.4 285.4
7 CYPRUS 0.3 1.2 0.4 1.4 7.5 20.6 109 109 -11.3 29.1 6.1 273.3
8 RUSSIA 0.3 1.4 2.3 15.1 14.4 2 14.8 104 50.8 0.5 0.1 205.4
9 NETHERLANDS 0.1 0.5 37.9 0.9 46.3 10.8 41.3 28 17.4 21.6 -6.3 198.5
10 UK 6.2 5.6 2.4 13.7 7.3 15.8 58.9 48 22.6 15.5 -0.8 195.2
11 TURKEY 0 9.8 1.3 13.7 7.3 9.9 23.8 39.4 19.5 3.8 7.5 136.0
12 SPAIN 0 0.1 0 0 0 49.6 56.8 3.2 0.7 19.4 -0.5 129.3
13 SWITZERLAND 0.4 6.7 0.2 7.9 23.1 31.4 6.6 13.1 15 1.5 16.8 122.7
14 FRANCE 0 0.2 4.2 5 6.5 0.8 3.4 62.7 28.9 12 -1.6 122.1
15 CZECH REP 0 0 0.1 2.3 2.3 4.7 0.6 0.1 0 0.4 50.2 60.7
16 LUXEMBURG 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 11.8 22.7 3.8 0 17.1 0.7 58.3
17 SWEDEN 0 0 0 0 1.4 2.4 0.9 1.6 0.3 3.7 15.6 25.9
18 IRELAND 0 0 0 17.4 0.2 5.2 1 3.7 1 -5.5 2.3 25.3
19 HUNGARY 12.3 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0.7 1.7 2 1.9 1.5 20.3
20 ISRAEL 0 0 0.9 0 1.5 0 0 13.8 1.9 -0.6 1.1 18.6
21 KOREA 0 0 0.3 0.2 22.3 22.9 1.8 2.8 6.6 2.9 -41.5 18.3
22 LIECHTENSTEIN 0 1.1 0.1 0 0 2.5 0.8 1.3 3 3.2 1.5 13.5
23 JAPAN 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.9 1.9 0 1.3 2.8 4.0 13.1
24 MALTA 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 8.9 0 0.5 1.5 0.3 11.5
25 DENMARK 0 0 1.1 0 0 1.1 1.6 0.3 1.3 0.4 0.2 6.0
Source: Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency, 2003
The European Union is the major source of FDIs for Bulgaria with over 60% of the total FDI 
distribution by sectors shows the major role of industry (around 50% of the total), followed by 
finance (20%), trade (over 15%), tourism (around 5%), infrastructure and construction (5%) 
(see FIGURE 1C).
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Figure 1c: Bulgarian Foreign direct investment stock by sectors in USD m (1992-2001)
Agriculture 
Electricity, Gas 
Mining 
Construction 
Transport 
Hotels, Restaurants 
Communication 
Sales, Repair 
Finance 
Manufacturing » » ) •
Source: Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency, 2002
By the end of the year 2002, around 60% of the long-term assets of the state owned enterprises 
were transferred into private hands (BFIA), 2001). Privatization in the banking sector is close 
to its completion with only two state-banks still operating on the market. About 99% of the 
agricultural lands have been restituted to their former owners.
In the years 1998-2001, the amount of FDI inflows was more than 3000 million US$ while in 
the first six transition years it was less than 1400 million US$. 32% of the total FDI inflows 
(1510/4816) were derived from the privatisation deals when at the same time less than 5% of 
the total FDI inflows were acquisitions of shares through the stock market. 55% of the total 
FDI inflows were conducted in the industrial sector, followed by the trade sector with 19.2% 
and the financial sector with 11.4% (see Tables 3a, 4a and Figure Ic).
In Table 4a, although Greece appears in the position, this accumulated data does not 
include the Greek investments and the Greek entrepreneurs which used offshore companies 
from Cyprus and Luxembourg in order to invest in Bulgaria.
From Table 3a (last column), we can argue that there was a continuous yearly increase in the 
number of MNEs that entered the Bulgarian market (FDI projects) during the transition years 
with an exemption of the year 1999. The peak number was in 2001 with 9000 FDI projects 
when at the same time in 1992 it had been only 1700.
Finally, from Table 5a we can conclude that the majority of FDI inflows in Bulgaria have been 
accumulated in the capital of Bulgaria, Sofia. From the total 4531.7 million USD an amount of
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$2166.83 has been invested (around 48% of the total) in Sofia, followed by Varna with only 
418.35 millions USD.
DIRECT INFLOWS BIGGEST DESTINATIONS IN USDS (IN BULGARIAN REGIONS YEARLY)
N ii Region 1 1992 . . . . . . . . - - TT'" "T - - - - - - - f1993 1994 ; 1995 1996 1997
1. 1 Sofia j  26.96 j 81.54 1 183.07 1 59.08 |  101.98 ] 130.37 i
2. II Varna || 0.16 | 2.39 1  1.51 ij 0.72 if 8.58 j 214.12 i
1998 II 1999 1  2000 | [  2001 | Total
1. ii Sofia I  i
2. ij Varna |  j| 57.12 |  46.85 ij 75.80 |  11.09 [ 418.35
Source: Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency 2002
3.3.2 General Results from a questionnaire survey for foreign MNEs
In order to determine the incentives and barriers of inward FDI in Bulgaria and to divide them 
into several groups according to the FDI theory (Dunning Eclectic Theory), a research was run 
using a questionnaire and the results were analyzed and studied with the help of statistics.
3,13%
Figure 1. Groups of incentives (hunters)
□ efficiency hunters 3,13%
□ financial aspects hunters 
17,19%
□ exploiting ownership 
advantages 20,31%
□ market for strategic 
reasons hunters 32,81%
E3 location hunters 50%
E factor hunters 62,5%
B market hunters 79,69%
Source: Author’s Questionnaire Research
According to the above figure, foreign investors have proved to be market hunters with a 
percentage of 80%, followed by factor hunters with 62%, locational hunters with 50% and 
strategic market hunters with 33%. At the same time 20% have invested in Bulgaria in order to 
exploit their ownership advantages and 18% to exploit financial advantages. Only 3% of the 
investors were efficiency hunters. Thus, one can infer that in a country such as Bulgaria 
having a customer base of eight million people with many unsatisfied needs, foreign investors 
focus primarily on the characteristics of the market.
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Figure 2. Ways (entry m odes) that have been used by MNEs in order to invest in Bulgaria
18,80% 0% A70% 35,90%
54,70% V 23,40%
^privatisation 35,9% 
HPhare, EU 0%
□From Trade to FDI 23,4% 
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■acquisition 7,8% 
■Greenfield FDI 54,7% 
■joint venture 18,8% 
□portfolio 0%
■brancties 4,7%
7,80%
Source: Author’s Questionnaire Research
Regarding the entry mode of MNEs in the Bulgarian market, the author’s research has 
revealed that 55% of the sixty-four foreign investors have chosen as a best or preferable way 
for their FDI projects the green-field way, followed by 36% of the investors, which took 
advantage of the opportunities that the Bulgarian privatisation programs offered and 18,8% of 
MNEs, which created joint ventures (Figure 2). Although it is well -  known that joint ventures 
was the most preferable way of foreign entry in the ex-communist countries in the early years 
of their transition, this low percentage of joint ventures can be explained from the fact that the 
survey took place in the time period 1998-1999. At that time, most of the joint ventures which 
had been created in the early years of transition, had collapsed either due to insufficient 
cooperation of the local partners with foreigners or due to the acquisition o f the remaining 
shares by foreign investors. Later establishments of FDI projects in the Bulgarian market 
followed other forms of foreign entry such as the greenfield FDI or acquisitions through 
privatisation programs, either because there was not the same lack of knowledge regarding the 
sluggish Bulgarian economic environment as it had existed at the beginning of the transition 
or due to the registered failure of many joint ventures.
15*.
Chapter 3: The Determinants o f  Foreign Direct Investment inflows in Bulgaria: 1989-2001
Figure 3. The Most Important Incentives for FDI in Bulgaria (Research from 64 MNEs)
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Source: Author’s Questionnaire Research
From Figure 3, it can be pointed out that the main incentives (as expected) were: market size 
(94%), low labor cost of unskilled workers (67%), geographical proximity (58%), 
international pressures from competition (45%), prospects for market growth (44%), link to 
other neighboring countries (42%), and lack of local competition (40%).
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Figure 4. The m ost important barriers, obstacles or disincentives for Bulgarian FDI inflows (Research from 64 MNEs)
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Source: Author’s Questionnaire Research
The primary barriers that the investors had to deal with, in the Bulgarian market, are shown in 
Figure 4. The biggest obstacle was the unstable legal system in Bulgaria (74%), followed by 
bureaucracy (58%), corruption, crime and mafia (53%) and the high investment risk with 
52%,.
3.3.3 The most im portant incentives and barriers: an analysis
The main incentive for FDI inflows in Bulgaria was the market size with a high percentage of 
94%. Although Bulgaria is not a big market such as France, Germany, etc, on the other hand, 
this high percentage was not a surprise for the author due to the following: firstly, 37 out of 64 
interviewed companies were Greek, which in turn considered Bulgaria as an important market 
with a population of over 8,300,000 people (which is “another Greece” for them). Secondly, 
for companies such as Coca Cola, Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonalds every country and
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every market is significant and their policy is to participate in almost every country (market 
hunters -  global companies) in the world (even in Bulgaria). Thirdly, it is significant for a 
large MNE from a western market to gain a large percentage of 50% - 80% of the Bulgarian 
market share when the same company owns a percentage of 10%-15% of the German market 
share. Fourthly, the majority of the 27 foreign (western) MNEs that participated in the 
questionnaire research have also considered Bulgaria as a link to other neighbor countries and 
especially to CIS countries (considering Bulgaria as a "bridge" for a future expansion into CIS 
countries or creating an export base to feed with products the neighbor markets). One can infer 
that in a country such as Bulgaria having a customer base of more than eight million people 
with many unsatisfied needs, foreign investors focus primarily on the characteristics of the 
market, taking into consideration simultaneously the prospects for growth of the Bulgarian 
market and the possibility of Bulgaria joining the EU during this decade. Lastly, foreign 
MNEs believe that there are extremely high similarities in the economic environment of the 
Balkan markets and when they choose one country from this region as a destination for an FDI 
outflow, then they proceed to the establishment of FDI projects in the most of the remaining 
Balkan countries. This has happened due to the similar characteristics, similar risks, incentives 
and barriers that exist in those markets. Thus, an MNE which has invested in a few Balkan 
countries, views an additional FDI project in Bulgaria as a subsequent investment and part of 
the general MNE’s global strategic plan.
Table 23; P rospec ts  for M arket Growth a s  an incentive for FDi inflows
Oriqin for MNEs
TotalGreece
Europe & 
Other
CX22 No Count 26 10 36
% 72.2% 27,8% 100,0%
% 70,3% 37,0% 56,3%
Yes Count 11 17 28
% 39,3% 60,7% 100,0%
% 29,7% 63,0% 43,8%
Total Count 37 27 64
% 57,8% 42,2% 100,0%
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
From Table 23, we can argue that only 11/37 Greek MNEs (29,7%) invested in Bulgaria due 
to its prospects for market growth. On the other hand, 17/27 (63%) of other foreign MNEs 
investing in Bulgaria believed that one of the most important incentives were the Bulgarian 
prospects for market growth (CX22). Thus, it is obvious that the origin of MNEs played a 
significant role in the consideration of the prospects for Bulgarian market growth as an 
incentive for FDI. From a statistical point of view, we underpin the same, when the continuity 
correction (2X2 Table) was 0,017 and thus at a 5% level of significance we conclude that 
there is an association between the origin of MNEs and those prospects.
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Table 25: As a Link to  o ther neighbor countries as an Incentive for FDI 
Inflows
Origin of MNEs
TotalGreece
Europe & 
Other
AX7 No Count 
%
%
17
45.9%
45,9%
20
54,1%
74,1%
37
100,0%
57,8%
Yes Count 
%
%
20
74,1%
54,1%
7
25,9%
25,9%
27
100,0%
42,2%
Total Count 
%
%
37
57,8%
100,0%
27
42,2%
100.0%
64
100,0%
100.0%
From Table 25, we conclude that only 7/27 (25,9%) foreign MNEs (other than Greek) have 
considered as an incentive that Bulgaria is a link (bridge) for its neighbor countries (AX7). 
In contrast, 20/37 (54.1%) Greek MNEs, investing in Bulgaria mentioned that Bulgaria was a 
market with opportunities, and can be used as a first step of investment in order in a later time 
point to invest in other neighbor markets. Furthermore, Greek MNEs claim that they used 
Bulgaria as an investment base due to its strategic position, geographical proximity or even to 
exploit favorable trade agreements with neighbor countries. This is actually true when most of 
the significant Greek MNEs (3E/HBC, Intracom, Panafon, OTE/Cosmote, National Bank of 
Greece, Delta, Titan), participating in the Bulgarian market, have also invested in other 
neighbor countries such as FYROM, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania and Moldavia, using 
Bulgaria as a first step in their foreign expansion strategy. Again, the origin of the MNEs 
played a decisive role and thus the Greek MNEs focused not only in Bulgaria as an investment 
destination, but also in the whole SE region. From a statistical point of view, we support our 
findings when the continuity correction (2X2 Table) was 0,046 and thus at a 5% level of 
significance we conclude that there is an association between the origin of MNEs and the 
incentive of using Bulgaria as a link with neighbor countries.
Table 17: Low co st of unskilled labour a s  an Incentive for FDI Inflows
Origin of MNEs
TotalGreece
Europe & 
Other
BX16 No Count 6 15 21
% 28,6% 71,4% 100,0%
% 16,2% 55,6% 32,8%
Yes Count 31 12 43
% 72,1% 27,9% 100,0%
% 83,8% 44,4% 67,2%
Total Count 37 27 64
% 57,8% 42,2% 100,0%
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Looking at Table 17, we see that Greek MNEs significantly acknowledge that one of the most 
important incentives (31/37=83.8%) in their decision making of an FDI project in Bulgaria 
was the low labour cost of unskilled workers (BX16). At the same time, 12/27 (44.4%) of
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Other foreign MNEs took into account the above incentive as important. The extremely high 
percentage of the Greek MNEs can be explained from the fact that they were smaller in 
economic magnitude if we compare them with the remaining foreign MNEs. A few of them 
belong to the textiles sector which is labour intensive industry. Moreover, most of the Greek 
enterprises used Bulgaria as an export base (geographical proximity) either to re-export their 
products back to Greece or to export them to other neighbor countries (minimization of the 
production cost due to low labour cost and low transportation cost). From a statistical point of 
view, we can assume the same when the continuity correction (2X2 Table) was 0,002 and thus 
at a 1% level of significance we can conclude that there is a strong association between the 
origin of the MNEs and the incentive of low unskilled labour cost.
The existence of geographical proximity in the S'""* place (58%) in the ranking of incentives 
for Bulgarian FDI inflows was an expected outcome due to the fact that 37/64 interviewed 
companies were of Greek origin and thus geographical proximity together with the lack of 
western investment interest (40%) were strong enough reasons for expanding their activities 
in Bulgaria. Finally, the new global economic environment supports incentives such as 
international pressures from competition and physical presence in many countries 
(global strategy) (45%) and acquiring assets of other companies under globalization 
pressures (37%), which have been proved significant for the case of Bulgaria.
3 .3 .3 .1  B ulgarian  Legal Fram ew ork regarding Foreign D irect Investm ent
Having chosen the road of economic reforms and through the introduction of the market 
principles in the past several years, Bulgaria has taken a number of steps to introduce a liberal 
economy and attract foreign investment which are the prerequisites to a modern economy with 
a developed infrastructure. This is particularly true for the legislative initiatives where many 
new acts have been adopted or old ones have been amended. Currently, there is an acting legal 
framework for doing business by modem standards which favours the inward investment. The 
conditions for doing business in Bulgaria are quite liberal and there are no restrictions for 
foreign investors to settle in the country.
According to the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investments Act (1996)^  ^ ''(1) 
Any foreign person shall have the right to make investments in Bulgaria and to acquire shares 
or participating interests in commercial pm'tnerships according to the procedure provided for  
Bulgarian persons, being equal in rights thereto, save as otherwise provided by statute. (2)
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Save as otherwise provided hereby, partnerships wherein foreign persons hold an interest 
shall have the same rights as partnerships wherein foreign persons hold no interest (3) The 
percentage o f a foreign participating interest in newly form ed or existing partnerships shall be 
unrestricted'.
However, during the transition period there was an unstable legal system in Bulgaria. A fact 
which has been mentioned in the questionnaire research as a barrier for foreign investors. The 
changes in the content of the Bulgarian laws have been so numerous that they have caused a 
sense of insecurity to local investors and especially to foreign ones. The radical changes in 
these laws are reflected by the many names the laws have changed through the years. The 
first Law on the Business Activity of Foreign Persons and on the Protection of Foreign 
Investments (1991-1992) was adopted by the Parliament of Bulgaria in 1991 and was 
promulgated in the State Gazette, Issue No. 47 of 1991. In 1992, it was revoked and the 
Bulgarian Parliament adopted the Law on Promotion and Protection of Foreign 
Investments (1992-1997) or the Encouragement and Protection on Foreign Investment 
Act, promulgated in the State Gazette, Issue No. 8 of 1992. From 16-24 October 1997, the 
Parliament of Bulgaria adopted a new Law on Foreign Investments. All the laws brought the 
legal framework on foreign investment in full compliance with the accepted international 
standards and provided for an even more attractive investment regime.
The prerequisites for an investment to be considered direct (thus FDI) go through a lot of 
differences and changes existed in each country. The Bulgarian laws concerning foreign 
involvement and especially FDI have also changed many times. According to the Law on the 
Business Activity of Foreign Persons and on the Protection of Foreign Investments, 1992, 
Article^^ 9, foreign investment "'shall mean any investment made by any foreign person 
acting, inter alia, in a single merchant capacity or through a branch, or by a partnership 
wherein a foreign person holds an interest exceeding 50 per cent".
In keeping with the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investments Act [published in 
the Official Gazette issue No. 109 of December 27th, 1996] Article 9. (1) (Amended, Official 
Gazette issue No 109 of 1996) ...foreign investment means any investment to the value o f not 
less than USD 50,000 or the equivalent thereof in Bulgarian lev or in any other foreign 
currency translated along the central rate o f  the Bulgarian National Bank as applicable on 
the date o f  investment, made by any foreign person, any subsidiary wholly owned by a foreign
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person, any sole-irader foreign natural person, or any partnership wherein a foreign person 
holds an interest up to the extent o f the said interest..."
The latest Law on Foreign Investments, 1999, Article^^ 12 mentions that, "a foreign 
investment shall be any investment by a foreign person or its branch in: I. shares and stakes 
in commercial companies, 2. ownership title over buildings and limited ownership title over 
property 3. ownership title and limited ownership title over movable property where 
considered long-term tangible assets, 4. ownership title over an enterprise, or detached parts 
thereof, within the stipulations o f  the Law on Restructuring and Privatisation o f State-Owned 
and Municipal Enterprises, 5. securities, including debentures and Treasury bonds, as well as 
their derivative instruments issued by the State, by the municipalities or by other Bulgarian 
legal persons, with a remaining term until maturity not shorter than 6 months, 6. loans, also in 
the form o f financial leasing, fo r  a term not shorter than 12 months, 7. intellectual property 
title - articles o f copyright and kindred rights, patentable inventions, utility models, trade 
marks, service marks and industrial designs, 8. rights stemming from concession contracts 
and contracts fo r  the assigning o f management."
In keeping with the Methodology for Compilation of the Direct Investment in Bulgaria 
followed by the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB)^^ "...the presence o f  a lasting interest 
presupposes a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment 
enterprise and a considerable degree o f influence on the part o f  the investor in the 
management o f the direct investment enterprises. ... in the Balance o f  Payments Manual is 
adopted the principle that the acquisition o f 10% or more o f the voting power in the 
management o f the investment enterprise is considered an establishment o f a direct investment 
relationship."^^
The Foreign Exchange Law '^ ,^ 1999, Article 1, par. 8, states that a direct investment is: "a) the 
establishment or acquisition o f a business enterprise, b) the acquisition o f unlimited liability 
partnership rights or a stake in a business which entitles the investor to more than 20 percent 
o f the votes in the General Assembly o f the business, c) the extension o f  a loan the maturity o f  
which exceeds five years with the purpose o f making a direct investment in compliance with 
letters "a” and "b” above, or in connection with an agreement fo r  participating in the 
distribution o f profit, d) additional investments to those already made as per letters “a) " or 
"b) ” above."
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As the author has mentioned, the statistical data for FDI in general are not very accurate for 
comparisons because of the different ways each county uses to define and calculate them. The 
problem is even worse in Bulgaria, since the prerequisites for F D f  ^  have changed five times 
in the last eleven years. Perhaps this fact explains the differences in the data available from 
official sources for the same years.
3 .3 .3 .2  L iteratu re review  regarding corruption
A comparative survey was conducted in Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM in January 2000. It 
was based on the public opinion regarding corruption and conducted with the cooperation of 
Vitosha Research, Center for the Study of Democracy, Albanian Center for Economic 
Research, Albania, and Forum -  Center for Strategic Research and Documentation, FYROM. 
The survey was based on a Corruption Monitoring System of Coalition 2000 which was 
created by Vitosha Research and was an initial step towards implementation of a Regional 
Corruption Monitoring System.
Vitosha Research was extensively engaged in conducting the surveys of the Corruption 
Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000. The CMS included a comprehensive set of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques aiming at different target groups (general public, 
businessmen, public officials, professionals, etc.). In 2000, a total of 5 quantitative surveys of 
population and business elite were conducted.
The results o f  the CMS (Corruption Monitoring System) showed that in terms o f values and 
principles, public opinion essentially remained negative to corruption but at the year end o f  
2000, a certain public desensitization to the manifestations o f  corruption were detected 
Public opinion perceives corruption as a widespread phenomenon in Bulgarian society and 
fairly consistently qualifies the sectors o f customs, police, ministries, the tax administration, 
the court system (including judges, lawyers, court officials, prosecutors) as corrupt. The 
stability o f corrupt behavior suggests that the capacity o f Bulgarian society to cope with the 
problem o f corruption depends not only on a change in mass attitudes to this phenomenon, but 
also on the emergence o f new social practices. There is a need fo r  essentially new regulatory 
mechanisms that should be both morally acceptable and practically effective [p. 3 8 Vitosha 
Research].
Table i: Spread o f Corruption Practices^^
(Do you think that there is a lot of corruption Involved in;...) Yes No
Obtaining business license and permits 75,0% 14,8%
Clearing goods with customs 72,1% 4,8%
Sanitary regulations 62,0% 24,8%
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Procurement of goods and services from government 57,9% 8,2%Authorizations from municipalities and district councils 57,4% 24,7%
Obtaining a vehicle fitness certificate 51,8% 26,7%
Procurement of goods and services for private companies 43,2% 28,8%
State investments 38,9% 20,8%
Public procurements 37,9% 26,2%
Arbitration/litigation 24,1% 32,9%
Environmental regulations and compliance 20,5% 44,3%
Work safety regulations 20,4% 53,7%
Residence and work permits 14,0% 50,2%
Sample size N = 520  
Source: International Crime Victimization Survey o f Businessmen
The above survey (Table i) among business-persons showed that crime and corruption pose a 
real threat to the economy in general and to smaller businesses in particular.
The citizens of the countries of Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria evaluate in different ways the 
main problems of their societies, as well as the public significance of the problem 
“corruption”. According to public opinion in Albania, corruption is the most important public 
problem at present. In Bulgaria, corruption is among the four most important problems and in 
FYROM corruption is ranked at seventh place. In Bulgaria, as well as in FYROM, 
unemployment is ranked as the most important social problem (see Table ii).
Table ii: Main problems faced by country
Albania -Bulgaria -FYROM
% Rank % Rank % Rank
Political instability 40,3 4 13,1 8 35,7 4
Ethnic problems 5,2 9 1.4 11 28,9 6
Corruption 68,4 1 37,5 4 28,5 7
Low incomes 26,3 5 50,6 2 38,1 2
Crime 54,5 2 27,9 5 32,1 5
Unemployment 44,7 3 65,3 1 69.0 1
Environment pollution 6,4 8 4.3 9 3.8 11
Health Care 22,7 6 18,9 6 10,2 8
High prices 4,9 10 2,9 10 4,2 10
Education 3,7 11 14,6 7 6.2 9
Poverty 20,5 7 41.2 3 38,0 3
Respondents gave up to three answers and the sum total o f  percentages therefore exceeds 100.
Source: Vitosha Research
According to public opinion in Albania, doctors are the ones who exert the strongest 
corruption pressure on citizens. More than two thirds of all the respondents have declared that 
such pressure was exerted on them. Municipality, tax, and police officers also exert substantial 
corruption pressure on Albanian citizens. In Bulgaria, police and customs officers, doctors, 
and administrative staff in the judicial system are shown as occupations that most often exert 
corruption pressure. In FYROM, the ranking of the different professional groups according to
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the corruption pressure they exert is led by doctors, municipality, police, tax, and customs 
officers, as well as administrative staff from the judicial system (see Table in).
Table ill: “If in the course of the past year you have been asked for something in exchange in 
order to have a problem of yours solved, you were asked by:"
Albania*'* 
%* Rank
Bulgaria 
%* Rank
FYROM 
%* Rank
Doctor 71,0 1 20,0 2 36,1 1
Teacher 3,8 13 4,9 14 10,1 11
University professor or official 4,2 9 10,1 7 11,3 10
Official at a ministry 2,9 15 3,2 15 12,1 9
Municipal official 
Administrative official in the
20,5 2 11,3 6 25,5 2
judicial system 4,7 7 18,5 4 17,7 5
Judge 8,5 5 6,9 10 13,4 8
Public prosecutor 4,1 10 5,9 13 4,5 14-15
Investigating officer 4,4 8 6,1 12 4,5 14-15
Police officer 12,6 4 23,4 1 18,0 3
Customs officer 7,9 6 19,8 3 17,8 4
Tax official 15,6 3 8,4 8 16,2 6
Member of parliament 0,9 16 1,9 16 4,0 16
Municipal councilor 4,0 11-12 6,7 11 7,9 12
Businessman 3,4 14 13,7 5 15,0 7
Banker 4,0 11-12 8,1 9 4.7 13
* Relative share o f  those who have had such contacts, who have been asked for money, gifts, or services.
** The Albanian data concern not only the direct corruption pressure but also report on the respondents' perceptions o f the indirect 
corruption pressure.
Source: Vitosha Research
According to the public opinion in Albania, corruption is most widespread among customs 
and tax officers, as well as among all representatives of the judicial system -  judges, lawyers, 
investigators, and prosecutors. In Bulgaria the leading positions in the ranking are occupied by 
customs officers (who are far ahead of the other occupational groups), lawyers, tax and police 
officers, businessmen. In FYROM customs officers are also assigned first place in the ranking 
based on the spread of corruption. They are followed by doctors, ministers, members of 
parliament, and ministry administration (see Table iv).
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Table iv: "In your opinion, how widespread is corruption among the following groups?"
"Nearly all’ and most’ are involved in corruption (%)‘
Albania 
% Rank
Bulgaria 
% Rank
FYROM 
% Rank
Journalists 9,4 21 10,6 21 17,8 22
Teachers 9,0 22 9,5 22 25,6 19
University professors and officials 27,8 18 29,4 18 52,2 7
Officials at ministries 50,2 12 47,9 7 52,7 6
Municipal officials 56,1 9 45,0 10-11 43,6 15
Admin, officials in the judicial system 63,7 7 42,0 13 46,4 11
Judges 85,4 2 48,5 5-6 50,7 8
Public prosecutors 72,5 6 46,3 8 39,8 16
Investigating officers 74,3 5 41,0 14 37,9 17
Lawyers 77,2 4 54,8 2 45,0 14
Police officers 51,4 11 51,9 4 45,8 12-13
Customs officers 95,2 1 77,0 1 66,3 1
Tax officials 79,5 3 53,9 3 50,2 9
Members of parliament 37,7 15 45,0 10-11 52,8 5
Ministers 47,6 14 45,3 9 53,1 4
Municipal councilors 36,3 17 32,5 16 33,2 18
Business people 54,8 10 48,5 5-6 58,2 3
Doctors 58,9 8 42,5 12 62,4 2
Political party and coalition leaders 37,4 16 35,7 15 48,0 10
Local political leaders 49,1 13 31,7 17 45,8 12-13
Representatives of NGO’s 21,7 20 16,2 20 22,3 20
Bankers 23,8 19 20,9 19 20,9 21
Source: Vitosha Research
The data show that the institutional spread of corruption in the three countries largely 
reproduces public assumptions about common corrupt practices among different occupational 
groups. Among the first five institutions determined by the respondents as “centers” of huge 
corruption in Albania, Bulgaria, and FYROM are customs, tax offices, and the judicial system. 
According to public opinion, in the three countries the Army, National Institute of Statistics 
and Presidency are institutions where corruption is the least widespread (see Table v).
Table v: "In your opinion, how widespread is corruption in the following institutions? "
Albania Bulgaria FYROM
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank
Presidency 3,86 16 4,28 20 4,58 13
Parliament 5,74 12 6,96 10 6,22 9
Government 7,24 6-7 6,94 11 6,52 8
Industry line ministries “  - 7,24 6 6,84 4
Municipal government 7,24 6-7 7,02 8 -  -
Municipal administration 7,34 5 6,82 12 -  -
Army 5,22 14 5,06 18 4,50 14
Customs 9,72 1 9,02 1 8,14 1
Tax offices 8,86 2 7,68 3-4 7,20 2
Judiciary 8,78 3 7,68 3-4 7,02 3
Police 7,06 11 7,30 5 6,72 6
Committee on Posts and
T elecommunications 7,18 8-9 6,32 13 -  -
Committee on Energy 7,10 10 7,00 9
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Privatization Agency 8,66 4 7,96 2 6,82 5Agency for Foreign Investment 7,20 7 6,60 7
Commission for the Protection of
Competition “  - 6,18 15 -  -
Securities and Stock Exchanges
Commission 7,18 8-9 6,22 14 — —
Audit Office -  - 5,54 16 5,74 11
Bulgarian National Bank 5,54 13 5,34 17 5,82 10
National Institute of Statistics 4,28 15 5,00 19 4,64 12
♦ In this table are listed some o f  the Bulgarian organizations and institutions. The Albanian and FYROM’s data refer to the relevant 
institutions in these countries.
Source: Vitosha Research
In the Global Corruption Report 2003 which was conducted by the Transparency
International, Dejan Jovic examined Southeast European countries^  ^and concluded that...
The countries o f  Southeast Europe witnessed high levels o f corruption in the past 12 months, 
much o f  it attributable to ineffectual state institutions and the weak implementation o f  
legislation. Nevertheless, many countries in the region are consolidating state institutions as 
they proceed with the transition to liberal democracy. The transition is being accelerated by 
international pressure, which continues to be a major force behind anti-corruption efforts. Yet 
corruption continues to be widespread in Southeast Europe: old networks o f  influence and 
‘parallel systems ’ offer a semi-legal or illegal way o f gaining access to services or products, 
(p. 190)... In Bulgaria, Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha -  the former king Simeon 
II -  won the July 2001 elections on an anti-corruption ticket that exploited public 
di.senchantment with the conservative government o f Ivan Rostov. In January 2002 Bulgarian 
newspapers published a list o f  former ministers in R ostov’s cabinet against whom the 
prosecutor-general had filed  charges. One month later, the government established an 
interministerial anti-corruption commission, called the White Commission, chaired by the 
minister o f  justice, with support from the World Bank. Though it has no power to investigate, 
the commission researches cases o f  corruption by examining written evidence and witness 
statements. Members also make proposals fo r  legislative changes. Bulgaria has also targeted 
the problem o f the trafficking o f women. Corrupt police officers, court officials, border guards 
and government officials -  including employees o f international organisations -  allegedly 
facilitate the trade by taking bribes and cooperating with traffickers. ‘Police in Bulgaria ... 
have reportedly extorted bribes from those who have tried to report cases o f trafficked women 
and to ask fo r  appropriate investigations, ’ observed the Vienna-based NGO International 
Helsinki Federation fo r  Human Rights in February 2002. ‘Police are often in collusion with 
criminal traffickers, fo r example in forcing women back to brothels from which they have 
escaped, or receiving sexual favours and bribes in return fo r  such cooperation with 
traffickers. ’ Proposed amendments to the criminal code include the creation o f  a new unit to 
combat the traffic in human beings and a national commission on trafficking at the Council o f  
Ministers. Financial transparency was improved by Bulgaria's Financial Intelligence Bureau, 
which investigates money laundering cases, and amendments to the law fo r  the National Audit 
Office (NAG) in June 2002. Staff at the NAG, which serves as an independent external auditor 
of projects funded by international donors, are being trained with assistance from the EU  and 
USAID, which also aims to enhance access to the financial declarations o f officials on the 
public registry website. Anticorruption measures adopted through legal reforms include the 
criminalisation o f  trading in influence, tougher sentences fo r bribery, wider definitions o f  
bribery and the confiscation o f  assets gained as a result o f corruption (p. 193-194).
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Considering the literature review presented previously in this chapter, a few well-known 
surveys which considered Bulgaria as a case study, examining at the same time the barriers 
that discourage FDI inflows in Bulgaria were as follows;
As mentioned above, in a survey conducted by the Southeast European Cooperative 
Initiative (SECI)^  ^in 1998, the following barriers occurred in South East European countries 
(SEECs) can be viewed.
Disincentive Average rating i Country
1. Political and economic instability 8,03 Albania, Moldova, ii Yugoslavia, Romania, ij Russia ij
2. Crime - lack of transparency - corruption 7.14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, |j Bulgaria, Hungary ij
3. Deficient infrastructure 6,93 j Croatia, Slovenia ii
i 4. Insufficient legal and administrative framework 6,89 The former Yugoslav ij Republic of Macedonia ij
i 5. Inadequate policy towards foreign investments i ; (Bureaucracy, difficuities in land ownership) 6.37
: 6. Negative business environment (non-existent j financial and banking systems, the Black market) 5,19
Source: SECI, 1999
From the above Table vi we can argue that political instability, corruption, insufficient legal 
framework and bureaucracy were the most important barriers for all the countries examined by 
the SECI.
A survey^  ^ by Simona lammarino and Christos Pitelis (2000) 
constraints:
31 found the following
Table vii. Type of FDI by constraint
CONSTRAINTS TYPE
Exporters Local suppliers Distributors Total
Bureaucracy/administrative constraint 14 40 9 63
Business infrastructure constraint 9 32 4 45
Legislative constraint 11 25 4 40
General economic climate constraint 11 26 2 39
Incoherent and unstable legal system 8 22 3 33
High investment risk 8 20 5 33
Slow pace transition 7 22 3 32
Uncertain or imprecise property rights 9 18 4 31
Undervalued local currency 8 18 2 28
Political uncertainty 8 17 2 27
Custom tariffs and policy constraint 2 16 6 24
Cultural considerations constraint 2 16 5 23
Technological backwardness 2 9 2 13
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H igh foreign indebtedness 2 6 2 10
Overvalued local currency 2 5 0 7
Source: Pitelis et al., 2000
"Bureaucracy and administrative constraints are at the top fo r all three categories [Table vii]. 
On the whole, it emerges that general uncertainties o f rules are perceived as the most 
discouraging factors, as shown hy the high scores attached to business infrastructure, 
legislative and economic climate constraints in all three categories” (p. 12).
KPMG^^ International (a consultant company), in April 1998, in its survey concluded that the 
majority of foreign investors (84%) have pointed out that the incoherent and unstable legal 
system was one of the most serious problems for their operations, followed by bureaucracy 
with 80%, limited purchasing power with 71%. Next came excessive taxation 57%, lack of 
infrastructure 55%, high investment risk with 32% and crime and corruption with 8%.
3 .3 .3 .3  C onsidering legal fram ew ork as a barrier
In order to determine the incentives and barriers of inward FDI in Bulgaria and to divide them 
into several groups according to the FDI theory, a research was run using a questionnaire and 
the results were analyzed and studied with the help of statistics. The biggest obstacle that the 
investors had to deal with in the Bulgarian market was the unstable legal system (74%), 
followed by bureaucracy (58%) and corruption, crime and mafia (53%).
From the following Table 1, it can argue that the Bulgarian unstable legal fi-amework which 
was profound from the above theoretical analysis, was also another important barrier for 
establishing an FDI project in Bulgaria. 47/64 MNEs (73.4%) informed the author that this 
barrier was also the most significant barrier (see Figure 4). Moreover, another significant 
finding of this thesis is that foreign MNEs, other than Greek MNEs, mentioned the above 
barrier with an extremely high percentage of 92.6% (25/27). At the same time, only 22/37 
(59.5%) Greek MNEs investing in Bulgaria, have also made reference to this as a barrier. The 
reason behind this is that the western foreign investors are not familiar with constant changes 
in the legal framework. At the same time, Greek MNEs are used to living in such an 
environment with constant changes in the legal framework, inadequate enforcement of the 
laws which leave space for corruption, bribery and bureaucracy. Greek MNEs did not reject 
the above barrier, but referred to it at a significant lower percentage. From the statistical point 
of view, the p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 Table) is 0,007 and thus <0.01. Therefore, we 
accept the Ha hypothesis, implying that there is strong association between the two variables
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(it is worth noticing the origin of MNEs if they consider the Bulgarian unstable legal 
environment as a significant barrier or not) at 1% level of significance.
Table 1 : U nstable Legal System  as  a barrier for FDI and the  origin of 
MNEs
Origin of MNEs
TotalGreece
Europe & 
Other
Y62 No Count 15 2 17
% 88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
% 40,5% 7.4% 26,6%
Yes Count 22 25 47
% 46,8% 53,2% 100,0%
% 59,5% 92,6% 73,4%
Total Count 37 27 64
% 57,8% 42,2% 100,0%
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
From the following Table 2 we can argue that MNEs which belong to the services sector or 
were banks were fully affected by the unstable legal environment (18/18, 100%). Moreover, 
MNEs belonging to the trade or food sector also mentioned (16/23, 69.6%) the above barrier 
as a significant one. The percentage was lower (13/23, 56.5%) in industrial and textile sectors 
compared to other sectors. It can be said that the unstable legal framework affects mostly 
MNEs which belong to the services sector. From the statistical point of view, according to the 
Pearson chi-square test, the p-value is 0.007 and thus <0.01. Therefore, we accept the Ha 
hypothesis, and so, there is strong association between the two variables (there is association 
between the sector that an MNE belongs to and the unstable legal environment) at 1% level of 
significance.
Table 2: Unstable Legal S ystem  a s  a barrier for FDI and the  sec to r tha t an MNE belongs to
Kind of business
Total
Productive/lndustry+
Textiles Services/Banks Trade/Food
Y62 No Count 10 7 17
% 58,8% 41,2% 100,0%
% 43,5% 30,4% 26,6%
Yes Count 13 18 16 47
% 27,7% 38,3% 34,0% 100,0%
% 56,5% 100,0% 69,6% 73,4%
Total Count 23 18 23 64
% 35,9% 28,1% 35,9% 100,0%
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Finally, it was not only the unstable legal environment in Bulgaria that created problems to 
foreign investors together with the constant changes in this legal framework, but also the 
inadequate enforcement of the laws which left space for corruption, bribery and bureaucracy 
(see Figure 3 and Table 5b).
A . B itz e n is ,  O cto b er  2 0 0 2 169
3.4 Considering bureaucracy  as a barrier
The high percentage of 37/64 (57,8%) of the interviewed companies which mentioned 
bureaucracy (Y72) as an important barrier for their FDI in Bulgaria was expected (Table 32).
Table 32: Bureaucracy as a barrier and the Origin of MNEs
Orlain of MNEs
TotalGreece
Europe & 
OtherY72 No Count 
%
%
16
59,3%
43,2%
11
40,7%
40,7%
27
100,0%
42,2%
Yes Count 
%
%
21
56,8%
56,8%
16
43,2%
59,3%
37
100,0%
57,8%
Total Count 
%
%
37
57,8%
100,0%
27
42,2%
100,0%
64
100,0%
100,0%
On the other hand, the high percentage of Greek MNEs (21/37 56,8%) that gave mention to 
bureaucracy as a decisive barrier for them was unanticipated. This outcome can be 
characterized as a surprise due to the fact that Greek entrepreneurs were familiar with Greek 
bureaucracy and many managers from other western MNEs have acknowledged the 
experience and the ability of Greek entrepreneurs to cope with great success in economic 
environments with a high percentage of bureaucracy. An explanation of the outcome may be 
that bureaucracy in Bulgaria is at higher levels than in Greece and that bureaucracy is an 
obstacle and a difficult task to cope with, even for experienced entrepreneurs. Finally, the 
origin of MNEs did not play any role at all in the consideration of bureaucracy as a barrier. 
From a statistical point of view, we can point out the same when the continuity correction 
(2X2 Table) was 1. Thus we concluded that there is no association between the origin of 
MNEs and the barrier of bureaucracy.
Although from Table 32 it was apparent that the origin of MNEs did not play any role in the 
consideration of bureaucracy as a barrier, on the other hand from Table 31 we can argue that 
the sector in which MNEs belong to, played a significant role.
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T ab le  31: B u re a u c ra c y  a s  a  b a rr ie r  a n d  th e  s e c to r  th a t  a n  MNE b e lo n g s  to
Kind of business
TotalProductive/lndustry+Textiles Services/Banks Trade/Food
Y72 No Count 6 5 16 27
% 22,2% 18,5% 59.3% 100,0%
% 26.1% 27,8% 69,6% 42.2%
Yes Count 17 13 7 37
% 45,9% 35.1% 18,9% 100,0%
% 73,9% 72,2% 30,4% 57,8%
Total Count 23 18 23 64
% 35,9% 28.1% 35,9% 100,0%
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
In Other words, over 70% of MNEs which belong to industrial / textile or services sector 
considered bureaucracy as an important barrier, when at the same time only 30% (7/23) of 
MNEs which belong to the trade/food sector mentioned the above as a crucial barrier. From a 
statistical point of view, we assume the same, when the Pearson Chi-Square was 0,004 and 
thus at 1% level of significance we concluded that there is a strong association between the 
sector that an MNE belongs to and bureaucracy as a barrier.
3.5 Considering corruption as a barrier
All sources generally apply a definition of corruption such as the misuse of public power for 
private benefits, e.g., bribing of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, or 
embezzlement of public funds. Each of the sources also assesses the “extent” of corruption 
among public officials and politicians in the countries in question. Corruption is, to an extent, 
an inevitable phenomenon during transition, but one that threatens to undermine market and 
democratic institutions before they have become self-sustainable. The international 
organisations lack a shared definition of corruption and a common understanding of why 
corruption is problematic. In particular, political corruption is often confused with organised 
crime. While there might be an overlap between the two, political corruption is more usefully 
defined as acts undertaken by public officials to further their personal rather than the public 
interest; a fact which may or may not be illegal. Organised crime, on the other hand, refers to 
illegal activities such as smuggling, trafficking and money laundering. The latter might, but 
does not necessarily rely on corrupting or bribing public officials in order to facilitate 
operations.
In a survey in 2001, the World Bank found that the most important means of corruption were: 
Stealing of Public Assets, Corrupt Privatization, Corruption in Procurement, Budget Leakages, 
Patronage and Nepotism, Bureaucratic/ administrative corruption. Elite bribes to shape laws /
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policies and Corrupt Leadership.
Corruption is not outlined as the biggest obstacle to the foreign investors in Bulgaria^^. 
According to independent foreign surveys, frequent changes to the statutory basis, the state 
administration's lack of flexibility, low purchasing power and the underdeveloped 
infrastructure present much greater problems to the investors. Corruption is a social 
phenomenon perceived by executives in state-owned and private entities as a problem 
currently existent in Bulgaria with far-reaching consequences.
In order to overcome corruption, there is a need for a Anti-corruption efforts which broadly 
fall into two categories: One approach is to put pressure on countries to introduce certain anti­
corruption laws, such as OECD and Council of Europe conventions on bribery and corruption. 
In addition, state activities can be more tightly regulated and the policing of these regulations 
more effectively monitored. An alternative approach seeks to build integrity among public 
servants so as to engender better standards of public service, a will to perform in a non­
corrupt manner and a capacity for self-limitation.
On the same line, the author’s questionnaire analysis and its subsequent statistical analysis 
proved that with the help of Table 19, we can argue that 34/64 thus 53,1% of the total foreign 
MNEs mentioned corruption, bribery or other illegal actions from mafia as important obstacles 
for the operation of their FDI projects in Bulgaria. At this point, a surprise was the fact that 
barrier corruption, crime, bribery, mafia and illegal actions (Y67), had also been mentioned 
from 29/37 (78.4%) of the Greek companies (Table 19).
Table 19. Origin o f  MNEs and crime-corruption-bribery-illegal actions
Y 67
TotalNO Y E S
RID G re e c e  C ount 
%  RID 
%  Y67
8
2 1 ,6%
2 6 ,7%
29
78 ,4 %
85 ,3 %
3 7
100 ,0%
5 7 ,8%
E urope  & C ount 
O the r %  RID 
%  Y67
2 2
8 1 ,5%
7 3 ,3%
5
18 ,5%
14,7%
2 7
100 ,0%
4 2 ,2%
Total C ount 
% RID 
%  Y67
30
4 6 ,9%
100 ,0%
3 4
5 3 ,1%
100,0%
6 4
100 ,0%
100,0%
'(RID) Origin of MNEs (in two groups) - Corruption, Bribery, Crime, Illegal actions, cost of protection from "mafia" (Y67)
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The basis for this surprise is very profound when studying Table 20 where we can argue that 
the Greek corruption rate in 2002 was very similar with that of Bulgaria. This happened 
throughout the years (1998-2002) when Bulgaria improved its corruption rate from 2.9 to 4 
and on the other hand, Greece deteriorated its corruption rate” from 4.9 to 4.2.
Table 5b; The Transparency Internationa) Corrupbon Perceptions Index: 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)
Rank :COUpby%::::: : CPI 2002 score Surveysuseo1 ,, Finland; k ;:: 9.7 8
2 IDcmxtàik “ 93  ■ 8Nèw&mifmd ■ 9:5— “ 8 "2729 — 98
31 Italy 5.2 i i
33 4.9 l i
44 4.2 84T - ■ xz&W:!.: 4 0 10: : ... Btdaiurftt'::::-'. 4 0 7
4.0 1151 3.8 452 ■ ■ Czech Republic - -377 - .  ...Latvia 577 4gtdvAReowWk 3.7 8
81 .... T 3 ..... . . . ~r~101 1.6 6102 TlaiSadesh 1.2 5
CountryRank Country 2001 CPI Score Surveys Used
I Finland 9.9 7
2 Denmark 9.5 7
29 Italy 5.5 9
42 Greece 4.2 8
47 Bulgaria 3.9 6
Croatia 3.9 3
Czech Republic 3.9 10
90 Nigeria I.O 4
91 Bangladesh 0.4 3
Country Rank Country 2000 CPI Surveys Used Country Rank Country 1999 CPI Score
I Finland lO.O 8 I Denmark 10.0
2 Denmark 9.8 9 2 Finland 9.8
35 Greece 4.9 8 3 New Zealand 9.4
39 Italy 4.6 8 Sweden 9.4
52 Argentina 3.5 8 36 Greece 4.9
Bulgaria 3.5 6 38 Italy 4.7
Ghana 3.5 4 63 Bulgaria 3.3
Senegal 3.5 3 Egypt 3.3
Slovak 3.5 7 Ghana 3.3
Republic FYROM 3.3
89 Yugoslavia 1.3 3 Romania 3.3
90 Nigeria 1.2 4 98 Nigeria 1.699 Cameroon 1.5
Country
Rank
Country 1998 CPI 
Score1
2 
336
39
66
84
85
DenmarkFinlandSweden
GreeceItalyBulgaria
EgyptIndiaParaguay
Cameroon
10.0 9.6
9.54.94.62.9
2.9
2.9 1.5 
1.4
Source: Transparency Index (T l)
The above-mentioned result (Table 19), that Greek MNEs considered corruption and mafia as 
an important barrier even more than the other foreign MNEs, can be partially explained from 
the fact that Greek companies were smaller in economic magnitude compared to the other 
foreign MNEs and thus it was easier for mafia to approach them. Furthermore, Bulgarians 
respected foreign MNEs (and especially large ones) that came from advanced western 
countries and this may be explained by their famous brand name and the Bulgarian tense to 
mimic western civilization. Moreover, as mentioned earlier as regards to bureaucracy, it is one 
thing to be familiar with corruption and another to consider corruption as a “necessary tool” in
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every day economic and business transactions. However, it was not so much the origin of 
MNEs that played a significant role in the consideration of corruption, as the sector that an 
MNE belongs to (see following Table 2).
Table 2: C orruption and the  secto r th a t an MNE belongs to
Y67
TotalNo YesKind of Productive/Industry Count business +Textiles %
%
10
43,5%
33,3%
13
56,5%
38,2%
23
100,0%
35,9%
Services/Banks Count 
%
%
15
83,3%
50,0%
3
16,7%
8,8%
18
100,0%
28,1%
Trade/Food Count 
%
%
5
21,7%
16,7%
18
78,3%
52,9%
23
100,0%
35,9%
Total Count 
%
%
30
46,9%
100,0%
34
53,1%
100,0%
64
100,0%
100.0%
It is apparent from the above Table 2 that foreign banks and other companies which belong to 
the services’ sector, were the less affected MNEs (3/18 =16,7%) by this barrier. On the other 
hand, foreign MNEs from the trade/food sector with a percentage of 78,3% (18/23) and MNEs 
from the industrial/textile sector with a percentage of 13/23 (56,5%) mentioned the above as a 
strong barrier.
Using the same questionnaire survey, it can be emphasized that corruption affected mostly 
financial aspect hunters 9/11(81,8%), factor hunters with 29/40 (72,5%) and locational hunters 
22/32 (68,8%). We can also conclude that MNEs which invested in Bulgaria using their 
ownership advantages (2/13, 15,4%) or for other strategic reasons (5/21, 23,8%) did not 
mention corruption as a significant barrier.
Table 10: C orruption  and  P rivatisa tion  a s  a foreign  Involvem ent en try  w ay
Y67
TotalNo Yes
Privatisation No Count 
%
%
15
36,6%
50,0%
26
63,4%
76,5%
41
100,0%
64,1%
Yes Count 
%
%
15
65,2%
50,0%
8
34,8%
23,5%
23
100,0%
35,9%
Total Count 
%
%
30
46,9%
100,0%
34
53,1%
100,0%
64
100,0%
100,0%
From the above Table 10, we can point out that only 8/23 (34,8%) MNEs, which invested in 
Bulgaria using a privatisation program, informed the author that corruption was a barrier. This 
result may be explained by the fact that although corruption is still a fact in Bulgaria, MNEs, 
which became higher bidders in privatisation deals and finally acquired the state-owned 
companies, did not consider corruption as a barrier perhaps due to the “happy end” of the
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privatisation deal. However, the majority of other MNEs (26/41, 63.4%) mentioned corruption 
as a significant barrier possibly due to their failure to acquire a state-owned enterprise (SOE), 
through a privatisation program because of corruption, or due to their choice of other ways of 
foreign involvement, such as joint ventures or greenfield FDI, where corruption is strongly 
associated with other factors (corruption and green-held FDI 24/35 (68.6%), corruption and 
joint ventures 7/12 (58.3%)).
The high percentages of corruption in the above mentioned entry modes in Bulgaria such as 
green-field FDI and joint ventures can be explained by the fact that a foreign investor in order 
to acquire land, buildings or to construct a building, needed to co-operate with governmental 
agencies, to unclear property rights and to issue licenses. All those activities are quite enough 
to leave room for corruption.
Moreover, from the theoretical point of view, most of the joint ventures which exist in the SE 
European countries, had been established at the beginning of the transition period owing to the 
fact that their environment was not familiar and foreign MNEs needed (especially at the 
beginning) local partners in order to cope with bureaucracy and corruption.
Table 13: Corruption and Jo in t Ventures a s  a foreign Involvement entry way
Y67
TotalNo Yes
Joint No Count 
Ventures %
%
25
48,1%
83,3%
27
51,9%
79,4%
52
100,0%
81,3%
Yes Count 
%
%
5
41,7%
16,7%
7
58,3%
20,6%
12
100,0%
18,8%
Total Count 
%
%
30
46,9%
100,0%
34
53,1%
100.0%
64
100,0%
100,0%
Thus, the high percentage of 58.3% of foreign MNEs (Table 13) that have established joint 
ventures was unexpected, especially since they have also mentioned corruption (Y67) as a 
decisive barrier.
However, with the help of Table 12, it can be said that (7/12, 58.3%) MNEs, which followed 
joint ventures as a way of foreign entry, belong to the trade or food sector.
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Table 12: Joint Ventures and the kind of Business that an MNE belongs to
Joint Ventures
TotalNo YesKind of Productive/! nd ustry+ Count 22 1 23business Textiles % 95,7% 4,3% 100,0%
% 42,3% 8,3% 35,9%
Services/Banks Count 14 4 18
% 77,8% 22,2% 100,0%
% 26,9% 33,3% 28,1%
Trade/Food Count 16 7 23
% 69,6% 30,4% 100,0%
% 30,8% 58,3% 35,9%
Total Count 52 12 64
% 81,3% 18,8% 100,0%
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Therefore, as we mentioned above, that sector was mostly influenced by corruption (18/23, 
78% - Table 2). Thus, we concluded that the high percentage of corruption (7/12, 58.3% - 
Table 13) is connected with joint ventures, is due to the fact that more than 50% of those joint 
ventures belong to the sector most affected by corruption, the trade/food sector.
3.6 Critical discussion of  the survey results; Are the FDI inflows in the 
CEE countries and especially in Bulgaria a myth?
The changes observed in the last decades certainly have a significant growth rate, much larger 
than that of the past. Respective changes are likely to occur in much larger growth rate in the 
years to come. These changes will cause many static theories on FDI, and on other economic 
aspects, to become obsolete. For example consider how the theory of Aliber on FDI as a way 
of exploiting the differences in exchange rates, will apply after the monetary unification of the 
countries of the European Union.
This potential of the global market along with the consideration that each theory applies in a 
limited number of sectors, and that a given firm may be served by different theories in 
different time periods, the author proceeded in connecting the main aspects of the dominant 
theories in one Universal Model. This model hardly contains any new considerations, just 
another point of view of the existing theories. All the operations have one main purpose and 
that is profit. Profit can be either long term or short term, direct or indirect and may be 
achieved through many channels, but still remains the higher purpose behind the actions of all 
enterprises. Based on this notion all theories that analyze why companies undertake FDI or 
under what circumstances they should undertake FDI, have deep consideration of profit This 
model connects all the FDI theories under the consideration of the way they assure profit for 
the company.^^
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As mentioned above, there is no theory that dominates the decision making process of 
FDI. After the consideration of the FDI theories the author made an attempt to present, in the 
simplest possible way, the incentives, motives, reasons, possibilities, opportunities, 
externalities, imperfections that an MNE considers before the decision of FDI. A company, 
when considering FDI, it tries to exploit or overcome any factor that has stimulated or 
motivated its management to proceed in investing in a foreign country. Moreover, the 
barriers, which discourage an FDI decision, are in fact, the other side of the same coin, 
meaning that the negative side o f an incentive constitutes a barrier.
Some of the theories presented in chapter 2 may be viewed as static, while others may be 
considered dynamic. The static theories studied only the factors that lead to the decision of 
FDI, while the dynamic theories also consider the evolution of the foreign company and its 
interaction with the host industry and the host country. The dynamic models led the author to 
the presentation of the direct and indirect effects of FDI on the host country, on the transition 
process to a market economy and on the MNE. One must consider that the market conditions 
are always changing and the changing character of the boundaries, the globalization, the 
European Union etc. will definitely create new challenges and opportunities for a company to 
seek value-adding activities internationally in ways different from the ones studied up to now.
These considerations led to an additional conclusion. Since every country offers different 
motives and incentives for investment and has different obstacles and barriers that are all 
submitted to considerable changes through time, the MNEs choose the country that maximizes 
the possibility of success for their investment plan. Even when two countries hold the same 
properties, an MNE bases its investment decision on evaluation of all factors in relation with 
the corporate priorities and needs. The author succeeded in determining the most applicable 
theory for Bulgaria in the time period 1989-1999 by the statistical analysis of the results of the 
questionnaire answers and the interviews of almost a hundred foreign companies operating in 
Bulgaria.
The multinationals are interested in searching markets that fulfil their investment plans. They 
carry out extensive market research, before they reach a decision and focus their interest on 
the profitability of their decision. They are working towards finding countries, which fulfill 
their goals. A great deal of multinationals’ decisions in making FDI depends on their 
willingness to participate in countries that exist in different geographical and strategic
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positions. It is not possible that all countries around the world offer the same opportunities, 
the same conditions for a multinational to act, at the same time. Consequently, the interest of 
multinationals is not concentrated in one part of the world constantly, but follows 
opportunities in different places (Latin America, the UK and Ireland, Spain and Greece, 
Eastern Europe, CIS, SE Asia etc.) at different periods of time according to the circumstances. 
Each country offers its comparative, locational advantages, and its incentives for FDI. The 
multinationals evaluate these incentives and selects the most appropriate country for their 
investment. Derived from the worldwide statistical information there may be found countries 
with near to zero FDI inflows and simultaneously others that hold a great percentage of the 
total amount of FDI inflows. Since the 80% of the worldwide volume of FDI belongs to the 
multinationals their attitude towards it may reflect the nature of the world FDI.
Especially, for the case of Bulgaria and the CEE region, a simple analysis of the official data 
and of the results of the author’s statistical analysis provided the author with certain 
conclusions, indicative for the FDI inflows in the region.
The western investment interest in the Central and Eastern Europe is very low considering that 
only a percentage between 2%-5% of the worldwide FDI outflows goes to CEE countries. 
This is apparent in the following tables, which show the low volume of FDI inflows that the 
whole Central and Eastern European region received compared to the global FDI inflows that 
other countries have received at the same time period (tables 6a, 6b, 6c).
Table 6a: FDI inflows, by host region, million US$, 1995-1999
Region !jl995 ]|.1996 ||l997 :jl998 Î1999
Developed countries 11205,693 11219,789 ||275,229 !|4807638....11636,449 1
Western Europe J iig /o iF 114(940 |l3 8 ,9 8 6  125^97924 1315,123"" i
North America if68,029 ....194,091...... 1117,249.... 11208,02.1.... j[3qq,5?4. J
other developed countries _____J l i P E Æ Z . m
Developing countries j |l l l ,8 8 4  ||145(030 j|l78,789 I[l79,481 ||207(619 i
Africa 114,699 l5 ,522  116,896 1|7,519 Il8,949 1
fLatin America and the Caribbean i|32,816 1|45,890 i}69,172 i|73,767 ||90,485
jDeveloping Europe .........114.8.3........ .....II.LP.26........111,020........ ill,.459.........12 ,315....... j
|A s ia ____________________ ___  1173,324 " i |9 2 ^ ^  lfl01 ,575  "1196,504 ||To5,621 ;
[The pacific :|583 11.158 11126 j{231 |248
ICentral and Eastern Europe 1114,267 [12,697 19,034 i(l9,963 [121,420
Source: World Investment Report 2000, UN
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FDI i >w<^^^>vvvvwvwwvv<^yyvw»wirvvyvyvvvwvvw>»^>wvwvvvvwv<>vvwvvvvvvvyfn>v^ >^wvvvwvv<^/<ww»v<»>nrça<vvvvvvvvwvInflows % 11 if 11 Outflows % 1[
“ 9 9 4 n f l W j l .............................. t ..... Î994...... jfl997l
Western Europe
Japan
Asia 25 il 21.7:1 11 12.9 il l  4.4!
.......................... CEE.......................... J ..... .2:4..... jI..M ..il............................... #........ Pd........
Latin America & Caribbean 11.8 ii 9.6 il ii 1.8 ii 2.1 1
other ......9 ^ ...... 11E 9.JI.............................. JI.........6 .........il..3=4i
TOTAL 100 il 100 il il 100 il 10b i
Source: U NC TA D, World Investment Report, 1998, Table 1.8
the CIS, 1990-2000 (Million dollars)
Eastern Europe ^ 479 2 332 3124 4165 3 575 9 230 7 974 9 399 15 268 18615 21 502’
Baltic States .. .. 119 238 460 454 685 1 142 1 863 1 139 1 148
GIS 1 777 1 875 1 770 4 064 5 288 8 842 6 726 6 886* 5 363’
Total above ^ .. 5 020 6 278 5 806 13 748 13 947 19 383 23 857 26 640* 28 013'
Source: National balance of payments statistics; IMF. ^ Excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia.
145502
The data also shows that even the leading countries in foreign direct investment outflows, 
have a low interest in the CEE countries (and especially in Bulgaria) considering their total 
FDI outflows each year compared with their outflows directed to the CEE (tables 7 & 8).
Table 7: FDI INFLOWS IN THE BALKAN REGION
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Albania - - 20 58 53 70 90 48 45 41 100* 425
Bulgaria 4 56 42 40 105 90 109 505 537 819 975 3282
Romania - 40 77 94 341 419 263 1 215 2 031 1041 998 6519
FYROM - - - - 24 9 11 16 118 30 160* 208
Yugoslavia (FRY) - 740 113 112 _• 965
TOTAL FDI INFLOWS IN THE ABOVE nV E  COUNTRIES OF THE BALKAN REGION 1 1 3 9 9
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina .. 1 100 90 117 307
Croatia - 16 120 117 115 506 530 898 1 408 1 000* 4710
Slovenia 4 65 1 111 113 128 177 194 375 248 181 181 1777
T O T A L  F D I  I N F L O W S I N T H E A B O V E E E I G H T  C O U N T R I B S  O F  T H E  B A L K A N  R E G I O N 1 8 1 9 3
Source: N ational balance o f  payments statistics; IMF. 
Table 8: Outflows of FDI in 1993- 1996(billions of US dollars)________
if 54^5 il USA ji gsis i r USA
1996
FRANCE 11304
' JAPAN "
Source: Balance o f  payments, International Financial Statistics, IMF, U N C TA D  (1 9 9 8 ) , World Investment
Report, 1998, p .l 1
The FDI outflows from one country to another, is usually not an issue of national interest or a 
specific interest from one country to another. Derived from the worldwide statistical 
information there may be found countries with significant FDI inflows and simultaneously
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these inflows to be from very few MNEs. This “isolated” interest of the multinationals is also 
clear from the example of the two Belgian multinationals, which have invested in Bulgaria. 
These two companies for strategic reasons (acquiring an existing Bulgarian firm producing 
similar products, having access to other neighboring countries, increasing their world-wide 
market-share) proceeded to FDI decisions in Bulgaria. Belgium was in the second place in 
FDI inflows to Bulgaria and 95% of these inflows belong to the above two companies (tables 
9&  10).
N o i n v e s t o r  1 
............................................. 1 C O U N T R Y 1 S E C T O R If BULGARIAN"  j C O M PA N Y 1  y e a r  1 VOLUM E ! IN U S D  i m illion j  |1 fU N IC R E D lT O ITALY n n ^ a n c e J1 BULBANK 112000 if 307.0 11
2 j NATIONAL BANK 1 
O F  G R E E C E
G R E E C E "H i f in a n c e n  UNITED  
I BULGARIAN  
1 BANK
1 1 2 0 0 0  III ! 270.03 fË B R D  if In ternational ; j r z ~ J L  — Z Z — Jg4_gg" ! 261.2
i mmm I i i ü l ü  i | so d i CÆVNYA II97M H i
'I | MINIERE 1 BELGIUM |l # # # # # :  |  l Ü  1
!................................. il.................................. .........................1..................................1...................i l É i.......Source: BFIA Catalogue
Table 10; FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BULGARIA BY COUNTRIES AND BY YEARS in millions of USD 1992-2001 (Jan-June
r Countiv Tf T992 if 1993 i{ 1994%  19% f  1996 |  1997"! 1998 "[ 1999 r 2000* if 2001 |  Total by 1 1  if it countries1 if it preliminary i
1 pERMANY {6.1 ij56.6 ill 11.4 #6.2 |{53.1 *31.4 |5 5 .f' t o ....t e .....~]3ô:e— ê m — ....1
..... pREECE | 6 . 2  ijs'.i ib.O :}M.8 #4.6  16.1 1(3.3 14.9 jp41.1 |Ï42.6 ij470.7 |
3 ITALY Ip.O i|0.2 15.2 j[2.3 |l .2  |j0.4 |2.1 {23.6 ||339.7 i{42.9 p ?  |
I p E # #  I I # '  p *  |f l3  i p #  i ( #  p m  p i f m  ] p l  i f i i  i j i i a  i
5 e * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e  . M  ':6
7 ....f i . . . . . . i t ! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I Ë 1 . . . . . . . Ë “ : l .... |io8.9 i  .3  . . . . .  i
Source: BFIA Catalogue
Thus, the author argues that there is an interest from MNEs to invest in a host country and not 
from specific home countries to give incentives or even provoke their home firms to invest in 
a specific host country. The interest is more company centered and that is evident in Central 
Eastern Europe by the fact that the bulk of the CEE FDI inflows come from approximately 40 
multinationals from 5 advanced countries. Table II demonstrates that less than 40 large 
MNEs coming from the most advanced countries (the USA, the UK, Italy, France, 
Netherlands, Japan) have invested 43% of the total volume of foreign investment in Hungary, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland.
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Table 11: Forty (40) MNEs have invested over 25000 million USDS in 4 countries
MNE (Invested capital in million USD$) FDI 1ORIGIN HOST COUNTRY
1 Daewoo 1552.3 Korea POLAND
2 Flat 1545.9 Italy POLAND
3 RAO Gazprom 1246.9 Russia POLAND
4 Vivendi 1204.2 :|France^^ POLAND j
5 United Pan-Europe Communications 1200.0 i| Netherlands POLAND
7
(ivwywwwwvwvwwvvwv'^
8 Citibank
9 Allied Irish Bank Pic 746.7 Ireland POLAND
10 EBRD 703.4 i[international POLAND
11 Shell 618.0 Great Britain POLAND
12 Eureko B.V 601.4 international POLAND
13 Metro AG 598.0 ijGerman^ POLAND
14
15 Enterprise Investors ^  550.0 i j u S A POLAND
16
17
ING Group NV 520.0
465.0
Netherlands POLAND
IPC USA POLAND
18 Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH
19 Saint-Gobain 440.0 France POLAND
20 Coca-Cola Beverages Pic 400.0 IjGr^ Britain POLAND
21 Ameritech (USA) and Deutsche Bundespost Telecom $1.725 billion j(Germany, telecommunications) HUNGARY
22 VW/Audi US $420 m i (Germany, auto) HUNGARY
23 US West International US $330 m 1(USA, cellular phones) i| HUNGARY
24 General Electric 550 $ m USA lighting |  HUNGARY
25 General Motors US $500 m i (USA, automotive maker) || HUNGARY
26 SuzuwT^otor^Co US $250 m |(Japan, auto) |  HUNGARY
28 RtT NETHERLANDS, TELECOM DENMARK. & OTHER SCANDINAVIAN OPERATIONS 250 M $ USD ^TELECOMMUNICATIONS |  HUNGARY
27 Allianz US $220 m I Invested (Germany, insurance company) HUNGARY
28 million + Germany i[i| REPUBLIC
29 T MobilDeutsche Telekom Mobil^  STET USD183million Germany, Italy if CZECH \ [ i| REPUBLIC
30 Siemens AG USD 170 [Germany || CZECH
31 Ccmhiïentaî AG
wmnrmmmmfwwmmmfwwwvwwv*: USD 150 million Germany REPUBLIC |
32 iÎ0C"^ ^^ Agî^  DuPont-Conoco, Royal Dutch SbtSi " "ÜSD629""'" million n he Netherlands USA, Italy ^f^REPUBLIC
33 Phillip Morris USD 420 million [usa •! CZECH r  1 REPUBLIC
34 : National Energy Corporation El Paso Energy, NRG Energy i  USD 400 millon ijSA I  CZECHI REPUBLIC
35 i  Pepsi-Cola International i " USD 200“"'" million ii REPUBLIC 1
36 Ford Motor Company USD 115m ij CZECH j  ii REPUBLIC 1
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38
37 p ü i i i ü — ^MVWXWS/V»
[NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE
307.0 ijlTALY
wwSjsMâMâflMMCWwWwÇ GREECE
BULGARIA
BULGARIA
39 261.2 ijlnternatlonal BULGARIA
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
206 BULGARIA
190.3 BELGIUM BULGARIA
LUCOIL PETROL 101.0 RUSSIA
pMERICAN STANDARD 100.0 USA
[SH & ülQ V ERSEÀS'l^^
BULGARIA
BULGARIA
92.9 UK BULGARIA
HEIDELBERGER ZEMENT
mG
7 0 .2
Wo^
GERMANY
GERMANY
BULGARIA
BULGARIA
124 GREECE BULGARIA
25647.6 Million USD$
Four countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech [Republic, Bulgaria) 19822 $m I Hungary,20402 $m i Poland.
16546 $m ijCzech Republic,
,.?7?.Q.$n?......ib.M.*si§*.n3
I OTAL 59548 $m 43% of the total from 40 MNEs with an origin mainly from  the USA, Japan^  Germany,
Source: Author's Research, various sources
The official data also demonstrates that although there are major investors (in FDI outflows), 
from the USA, the UK and Japan, in most CEE countries, they show no interest in Bulgaria 
(tables 10, 12 & 13). In Poland, the USA, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and the 
Great Britain, each one, has invested more than the total FDI inflows in Bulgaria. However, 
the lack of investment interest of the USA, France, Netherlands and the UK in investing in 
Bulgaria is not a surprise or it can be explained by the geographical distance, the strong 
Bulgarian dependence on the ex USSR and the ex CMEA trade organisation.
Table 12: Foreign Direct Investment in Poland -  (at the first half of 2000)y»»»»v»w»vvvwiyvri»vw»»w»vw*v»v»wwvwvv»wvvyvvww»v>çNO. 1 Country of origin i Capital invest^ (millions oflT™ Planned investment |  Number of investors USD) II (millions of USD) |
1 p S A  1 6396,5 I! ^ 6 4 8 ,1  | [ 128
2 i^rm any 6234,4 ................. .11........................................1 ............... 1893 jjprance 4091,1 ................. r ........ :... '614 ............... 1............. 70
"'4npetherlands i 3714,7 ^  ........... 58
5 Iptaly I 3273,8 1 607,0 II 67
6 jjGreat Britain 2646,1 — T  .....r ......... " 6 ------M
16 p apah 361,6 I 1 3 7  8 12
Source: the Research Department ofPAlZ, September 2000
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Table 13; Central and Eastern Europe: geographical sources of inward FDI stock a s  a percentage, 1999
Central and Eastern Europe: geographical 
sources of inward FDI stock, 1999 (Percentage) 1
Germany 18
United States 16
Netherlands 12
Austria
Other European Union 7
France 6
United Kingdom 6
Other Western Europe 6
Italy 4
Cyprus 4
Central and Eastern Europe 3 ]
Other and not specified 11
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC d a ta b ase , 3 October 2000, by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Germany (or German MNEs) is in the first place in FDI inflows in Bulgaria, but having 
invested a small amount (half billion USDS) though is first in all the Central and Eastern 
Europe (tables 10 & 13). Furthermore, only three German MNEs in the Czech Republic have 
invested together over 1.3 billion according to Czechlnvest, PBJ - March, 1999 (Volkwagen 
900 million USD, Siemens AG 170 million and Continental AG 150 million USD) and even 
in Romania (a country that lags in transition, together with Bulgaria, behind the other CEE 
countries), German MNEs have invested 0.633 billion USDS according to the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Romania (October 2000). German MNEs have also invested 6.480 
billion USD in Russia according to Russia's Goskomstat data as of July 1, 1999. Moreover, 
three German companies in Hungary have invested altogether 734SUSD million (420 SUSD 
VW/Audi, Allianz 220 SUSD, Siemens 94 SUSD), an amount that exceeds the total German 
FDI inflows in Bulgaria (Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency, HCSO, mid 
1999). Finally, German MNEs have invested 6.234 billion of USD in Poland according to 
Research Department of PAIZ (Sep. 2000)
The choice of the companies on the direction of FDI is very much affected by any group of 
countries or a whole region, which may initiate a transition to a market economy, through 
privatization programs and their offers, or may go though other stages, which create 
opportunities for FDI. One may say that each time has its trends on developing economies 
that provide opportunities (Central America, South America, SE Asia, CEE region). One may 
also argue that the fact that the economy needs financial and technical support for the 
transition to a market economy is what generates the opportunities and interest for FDI
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inflows.
The fact that strong Western economies are not in the first positions in the FDI lists of inflows 
in the CEE region is not surprising as much as the fact that Greek investments dominate the 
Bulgarian market (see table 10). However, this is happened mainly due to the geographical 
proximity, cultural closeness (at least closer compared to other EU or Western countries) and 
the lack of foreign investment interest. Greek domination in Bulgaria is not a unique case. 
The case of Greek FDI outflows in Bulgaria is similar with the cases of Austria and Nordic 
countries in Slovakia, Slovenia and Baltic countries respectively. Bulgaria has provided the 
opportunity for the Greek enterprises to become MNEs and use Bulgaria as an export base, 
since Greece is the most advanced country in the region of South East Europe and especially 
in the Balkans (being a member of the EU and NATO). Another advantage for Greek 
investors in the CEE region is that their knowledge of the market raise their possibilities to 
work with the difficulties o f an “underground” or “grey” market, cope with the bureaucracy 
and overcome corruption, bribery etc.
3.7 C O N C L U S IO N S
This survey tried to specify the main incentives and barriers for a specific country case study, 
namely Bulgaria during its post communist period. More specifically, in our survey the 
findings regarding the significance of geographical proximity were in accordance with Pye 
(1998), Pitelis et al. (2000), OECD (1994), Meyer (1995-6) and SECT (1998)) and the low 
labor cost were in accordance with with Pitelis et al (2000), OECD (1994) Altzinger (1999).
On the other hand, the finding regarding the importance of low labour cost is against with 
Meyer’s findings, who considered that for British and Germans MNEs were interested in low 
labour cost as a secondary incentive. Our survey in which Greek, Turkish and Russian MNEs 
prefer to invest in the neighbor Balkan region and in particular in Bulgaria, exploring low 
labour cost especially for labour intensive industries and export oriented industries. 
Geographical proximity and the importance of low labour cost for export- oriented companies 
were also in accordance with Lanks and Venables (1997) and Pitelis et al. (2000).
We agree with Lanks and Venables (1997) who argued that
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The importance o f factor costs seems to depend, not surprisingly, on the purpose o f the 
investment. They found that export oriented firm s place much greater importance on 
production costs and cheap skilled labour.
Our findings regarding the importance of cultural closeness together with the importance of 
strong historical links and strong cultural ties was in accordance with Andersen (OECD), 
SECI and Altzinger.
The absence of political stability as a major incentive for the case of Bulgaria can be 
explained by the fact that Bulgaria faced political instability from the start of its transition 
period and up to the year of 1997 (8 governments in 8 years). So, it was not evident the 
Bulgarian political stability at the time period when this survey was conducted.
Meyer (1995-96) found that the qualified labour force was an important reason for 
investment in Hungary together with its political and economic stability. Also Pye (1998) 
mentioned the importance of skilled labour force in Slovakia. However, sometimes the 
absence in consideration of the low labour cost as an significant incentive and the searching of 
the availability of qualified labour force is the key difference for foreign investors who prefer 
to invest in the Central European countries such as Hungary and Poland instead of investing in 
the Balkan region. This also clarifies the lack of western investment interest in the SEE region 
and the preference of British and German MNEs to invest in Hungary or Poland and not in the 
Balkan region or even more not in Bulgaria^^. The Central European countries are neighbor 
countries to the advanced economies of Germany, the UK etc. and they provide more stable 
environment and they are more advanced economies with qualified labour force compared to 
the Balkan ones. On the other hand, the MNEs from advanced economies are less considering 
the low labour cost as the Greeks, Turkish and Russians are considering this.
We can also conclude in this chapter that there is a specific finding in the KPMG research 
which we believe that it is a biased one and not in accordance with our findings. This is 
regarding the above-mentioned incentive of skilled labour force which has been highly 
considered by the KPMG. In other words, the skilled labour force has been one of the driving 
considerations for more than a third (36%) in KPMG research. This author argues that this 
high percentage is biased and it depends on the sample. So, we can conclude that there was a 
participation of a large enough number of companies (in KPMG sample), which belong to a
A . B it z e n is ,  O cto b er  2 0 0 2
sector which prefers/needs skilled labour force and not that the skilled labour force is a so 
significant factor for foreign MNEs which prefer to invest in Bulgaria.
We disagree with Lankes and Venables (1997) who found that almost half of the investors are 
positively influenced by similar investments by competitors in the same country (following 
the competitors’ theory). The explanation behind our disagreement is the fact that our survey 
mentioned that only 12.5% mentioned the theory of following the competition theory because 
for the case of advanced economies such as German or British there are a lot of strong MNEs 
so the first movers are not the only MNEs interesting in investing in Central Europe. This is 
not the case of Greeks or Russian or Turkish MNEs which have only limited number of MNEs 
which prefer to invest in the Balkan region. Thus, it is difficult to have a lot of strong Greek or 
Turkish MNEs in order to follow each other in their investment paths.
The low importance of financial incentives is also in accordance with Buss^^, Brewer et al.^  ^
and OECD. We are against the finding of Pitelis et al, who find in a very high ranking place 
the investment incentives.
The finding of market size and its prospects for growth are in accordance with Lankes and 
Venables, Meyer, OECD. However, another unique finding of this survey was the high 
consideration of Bulgaria as a link to other neighbor and prospective countries. We agree with 
SECI regarding the finding that the investors are considering Bulgaria as an investment link 
to other neighbour countries.
The finding of KPMG regarding limited purchasing power which was scored with 71% we 
can argue that this high percentage it was an expected outcome for the KPMG research 
because of the chosen time period (April 1998) that the survey was conducted. In other words, 
we have to consider that in February 1997, Bulgaria experienced its third economic crisis in a 
row, after the 1994 and 1996 crises. In our survey we have also found a significant percentage 
of 50% and this difference in the importance from 71% to 50% can be partially explained by 
the later time period that our survey was conducted and the positive outcomes for the 
Bulgarian environment due to the introduction of the currency board.
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Lack of competition was also a significant incentive and it was in accordance with Meyer’s 
survey. At the same time, the importance of following the clients’ theory as an incentive was 
also in accordance with OECD.
Furthermore, our finding regarding corruption and its consideration as an important barrier 
was in accordance with only the SECI survey and it was not followed by OECD and Pitelis et 
al. The finding of corruption ranking in such a high place of importance for an MNE project 
was a significant and unique outcome of this survey and it was revealed as an incentive from 
Greek entrepreneurs. However, our finding was in contrast with the KPMG research in which 
corruption ranked at the end with a very low percentage of only 8%.
The outcomes regarding the unstable legal system and bureaucracy in high levels in the 
ranking were a surprise. They were in accordance with OECD, Pitelis et al. and KPMG.
Moreover, political and macroeconomic stability were of minor importance for the MNEs 
because of the successful establishment of the currency board in mid 1997 and the political 
stability that has existed in Bulgaria from early 1997.
Finally, the fact that only half of the interviewed MNEs considered the Bulgarian environment 
as a risky one and not by all the MNEs (if you considered that the whole region is associated 
with the high risk consideration) is in accordance with all the surveys presented in the 
literature review with similar percentages and similar ranking places.
The significant sample used in this questionnaire survey consisted of sixty-four MNEs. These 
MNEs made a significant volume of investment, over one million $US dollar each one. 
According to the literature the present survey is a significant contribution to the field because 
was conducted for an ex-communist and isolated country from the western investment interest 
in the specific chosen time period, having a large enough sample, high response rate and a 
proportional distribution of the participants in all the sectors of the Bulgarian economy^^.
A problem arises when making comparisons using FDI data, owing to the various elements 
included in FDI and thus, for example many countries exclude one of the components of FDI, 
usually the re-investments of the foreign companies. Furthermore, comparisons are also 
inaccurate because each country follows a different method of calculating FDI. One country
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followed the US model defining as FDI the acquisition of at least 10% of the total shares of a 
company, whilst another country followed the German model, which defines as FDI the 
acquisition of at least 25% of the total shares. Investments below those percentages are 
considered as portfolio investment.
This chapter also concludes that unstable legal framework, lack of adequate and efficient laws, 
constant changes in the legal framework, insufficient enforcement of laws and bureaucracy 
left space for corruption and briberies and thus discourages foreign investors in participating 
in such an environment.
Our results are in accordance with various surveys and reports presented in this chapter but 
they are in contrast with the KPMG’s research in which corruption was of limited 
consideration and with Pitelis et al.’s survey where corruption was not taken into account.
3.8 APPENDICES  
D ifficu lties in d efin in g  Foreign D irect Investm ent
Foreign direct investment (FDI) came from needs and opportunities presented in an imperfect 
market. There is a lot of literature, which analyzes the reasons that a firm or individual 
entrepreneur finds when directly investing in a foreign country. There is also a lot of literature 
about how to predict the outcome of such an investment and choose the best alternative. The 
generally accepted characteristics of FDI however coincide in the following definitions taken 
from several sources.
A definition of Foreign Direct Investment is:
“ ...FDI is defined in the IMF Balance o f Payments Manual (5^  ^edition) as ‘investment 
that involves a long-term relationship reflecting a lasting interest o f  a resident entity in 
one economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in an economy other than that o f the 
investor. The direct investor’s purpose is to exert a significant degree o f  influence on the 
management o f  the enterprise resident in the other economy* (1993)” [Dunning, 1993, 
p5]'°
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"DFI is defined as investment in equity to influence management operations in the partner 
company” [Meyer, 1998, pl25]^^^
The IMF’s definition emphasizes in ‘‘lasting interest”, “a significant degree o f  influence” of 
the investor over the company outside the home country [Brewer, 1994, pi 17]^ ^^
“There are many different operational definitions o f FDI, but all aim to encompass the desire 
o f a home country firm  to obtain and manage an asset in a host country” [Barrell et al., 1997, 
p64]"'
“A Direct Foreign Investment is the amount invested by residents o f a country in a foreign 
enterprise over which they have effective control ” [Ragazzi, 1973, p471]'i44
The main points are investing / acquiring / obtaining a foreign firm or asset and influencing / 
controlling the management operations. The essence of FDI is clearly displayed in the 
‘objection’ of MacManus"^^ about the name of FDI:
“Foreign Direct Investment is a rather inappropriate name fo r  the process by which 
productive activities in different countries come under the control o f  a single firm. The 
essence o f  this phenomenon is not foreign investment, which is an international transfer o f  
capital, but the international extension o f  managerial control over certain activities. ” 
[MacManus 1972, p66]
The issue of control and influence is very important in defining FDI, but does need some 
clarifications. The fact is that, depending on the host country, when an entrepreneur or a 
company acquires more than 10% or 20% or even 25% of a foreign company, it is considered 
FDI. But does such a small percentage ensure control for the investor? The ownership rights 
issue over a company is a very complicated subject nowadays. The person, which has control 
over the decisions affecting the company is determined by the elaborate enactment of each 
company that varies greatly; enough to forbid assumptions and generalizations. Sometimes a 
person can have management control owning 10% of the company (if for example the given 
company’s shares are divided among many shareholders through the stock market) or have no 
management control even if s/he owns more than 50% of the company or have both 
management control and over 50% share and not be able to take important decisions (if the
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agreement of all parties dictates that in order for a decision to be valid the 2/3 of the owners 
must agree). So, one must keep in mind that not all investments over 10% or 25% aim and 
lead to control.
Some definitions use “lasting interest” and “significant amount o f influence”. This is more 
accurate in explaining the current status of several FDIs, but still it is vague since it does not 
specify the target of the “influence**. “Influence management operations” is even more 
accurate, but not enough. In fact in order to clarify this issue one must first specify the amount 
of control the investing company needs over the company that receives the investment. This 
differs according to what the investing company expects from the investment.
Through the years, many theorists studied the concept of investing abroad, and foreign direct 
investment in particular. What FDI is, cannot be defined in a four-line definition, since it 
involves much more than a simple money transaction, which aims to profit. The 
complications begin with the very first step economists might take; measuring and comparing 
FDI flows among several countries. This is because each country may have different 
standards for a foreign investment to be considered direct. The OECD has recommended 
that the minimum equity stake for an investment to qualify as direct should be 10%. The 
differences, though, among countries are distinct. For example in the US, Canada, and 
Australia the minimum is 10%, in France and Germany 20% (or 25% according to Brewer 
(1994) p. 117) and in New Zealand 25%. It is obvious that any comparison among the state 
records of these countries on FDI would be unequal. [Dunning, 1993, pl2]'*^
Another difficulty is to specify the components included in FDI measurement. The 
following components should be used in FDI, when reporting to the IMF.
• Equity Capital: the value of the initial investment
• Reinvested earnings: all earnings of the affiliate company that are reinvested on the 
initial investment.
• Other capital: the transfer pricing between the mother company and the affiliate, (short 
and long-term capital)
[Barrell et al., 1997, p64y^
The problem arises because many countries leave out in the reports at least one if not two of 
those components [Brewer 1994, pi 17]"^ .^ “The reinvested earnings component o f FDI is 
particularly problematic. It is the most difficult component to measure because the data are
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not collected from foreign exchange records, hut are based on surveys o f the firm ” [Brewer 
1994, pi 17]"^ .^ That is one of the reasons why this component is left out in many national FDI 
records. This problem is also distinct in Bulgaria, in which the Bulgarian Foreign Investment 
Agency (BFIA) includes in its official catalogues the reinvested earnings, while the Balance of 
Payments (BP) of the Bulgarian state, which is the source of data used by official institutes, 
does not. Although the BP is projecting the obvious foreign capital flows, it excludes the 
reinvested earnings and also investments applied in gray/black/unofficial ways (shadow 
economy) or even individual investments (not derived from a registered company). The clear 
capital inflows, or individual acquisitions appearing in BP is the minimum FDI volume, which 
the country may have, but still the actual investment is usually much higher. The Bulgarian 
official catalogues (National Statistical Institute -NSI) generally present distinct problems, 
since they often present different data for the same variables for the same time period and they 
are usually not updated them properly and in time. Also, some of the companies, which have 
invested in Bulgaria do not appear in the catalogues (BFIA) or appear with smaller amounts 
(see chapter 5). The author’s questionnaire research has revealed at least 20 companies, which 
have invested large amounts of money (over 1 million USD), but do not appear in the 
Bulgarian official lists. Another problem is the manipulation of the economic facts, either 
because of incompetence or with intent, so that companies, which have withdrawn their 
investments through the years, still appear in the catalogues. An example of this problem is 
Rover, which withdrew an investment made in the end of 1994 almost immediately and still 
appears in the official catalogues of Privatisation Agency.
Inaccuracies and s ta tis tica l problem s regard ing  FDI
The sources from which one may find data on FDI are several. The primaiy sources of 
information are the company itself and the government of the home and the host country; the 
secondary sources are the international and regional economic agents. Some of them are 
United Nations on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations (UN), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), The Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU), the World Bank, EUROSTAT, industrial and commercial trade associations and 
academic scholars. In general, one should be careful when using statistical data because of 
several inaccuracies. Dunning (1993) has presented some of them^^.
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• The book value of the capital assets of the MNEs is noticeably underestimated 
compared to the replacement value estimated with current market price.
• The way home governments deal with foreign currency translation adjustments, 
regarding outward FDI, differs from country to country, so the affiliated firm’s capital 
gains and losses are included or not in the parent firm’s reports.
• The accounting techniques concerning depreciation are different from country to 
country.
• Some countries base the data on FDI intentions (passive and active) while others that 
are in progress (active only). An interesting example regarding Bulgaria is that from 
1989 and onwards more than 1500 Greek investors registered. At present time, less 
than half are active.
• The collection of data by governments is derived in different ways and at different 
time periods. There are also many variations of the quality and accuracy of the 
research depending on the level of confidentiality and how willing the firms are to 
produce all the data the government asks for.
• Because of cross border transfer pricing, some of the economic data of a company may 
be inaccurate.
Besides the above, there are also some less general, but with high occurrence rate, especially 
for the case of Bulgaria.
• When investigating the origin of an FDI one may be mislead if the investment is 
contacted through a offshore company, which is directed by a third country firm.
• Companies may overestimate their capital assets in order to be able to repatriate more 
profits. This was a usual tactic with Greek entrepreneurs in Bulgaria, until both 
governments ratified (late 2000) the agreement for double taxation avoidance.
• Many of the entrepreneurs choose not to take the legal way of transferring/repatriating 
money, and move great quantities illegally through the borders. This is easier if the 
countries are neighbors, and this was also a common practice for Greek entrepreneurs 
in Bulgaria (mainly small Greek firms). This, results to underestimation of the total 
FDI inflows, since a lot of money capital is invested in a foreign country without being 
declared anywhere.
Sometimes the deviations are so significant that the FDI outwards are not so close when 
measured as inwards (e.g. according to Greek sources- the Greek FDI outflows in Bulgaria is
1 9 1 .
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not SO close in figures when compared with the Bulgarian FDI inflows derived from Greek 
MNEs -  according to Bulgarian sources). Such deviations also exist when the data is derived 
from two different sources regarding the same variable. According to the Polish research 
department of PAIZ, (until September 2000), Poland had received 43,017 billion USDS, while 
at the same time (until the end of 2000 -  table 14) according to UN, Poland had received less 
than 30 billion USDS.
Table 14: FDI Inflows In Poland
1990 11991 il992 993||T994 l | l9 9 5 ^ ^
Source: UN
Since, there is little, anyone can do about those inaccuracies a researcher should always 
“...reminds himself that all estimates are only as good as the data on which they are based*’^ ^
S tatis tica l problem s and inform ation gaps at the beginning o f the transition
At the beginning of transition, the general view, among the policy makers in all the transition 
economies, was that the information tools were inadequate to help them in taking significant 
decisions and using the analysis of the past trends as an indicator to improve policy design. 
Balcerowicz et al. (1995) argued that “Even in established market economies standard 
statistical data provide only an incomplete description o f economic reality, but in countries in 
transition data deficiencies and biases are much more serious
Most of those statistical problems are presented in this thesis:
• During the transition years, there was a need for replacement of the material product 
system with the system of national accounts, because the former did not measure all the 
parts of GDP (particularly the service sector)^^
• The statistical offices of the planned economies were adequate to keep under control the 
statistical information regarding state-owned enterprises with strong governmental control 
of the bookkeeping system. In the post-communist era, the introduction of a significant 
number of private firms, created problems to these statistical agencies, which did not 
expect and were not ready to prepare and measure economic facts of a market economy 
with quickly increasing private sector.
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The introduction of the private sector created the underground economy, which exists in 
all the economies, even in the Western ones. Thus, there is no experience in the Central 
and Eastern statistical agencies to deal with such as calculations.
Different methodologies create inaccurate data, and comparisons with data derived from 
other countries are impossible. There is a need for a revision of all these data, which 
belongs to the pre-transition period. Nowadays, it is believed that a significant progress 
has been made, and many of the sources obtained have finalized the macro-economic data 
for both periods (pre/ post communist period).
All the countries suffer from heavily distorted relative prices. Energy and household 
necessities were heavily subsidized
Under the planned- economy there was a continuous attitude for an increase in output. 
This was apparent in the figures, but at the same time does not mean economic growth. 
There was an exaggeration of the data.
The exchange rate was overvalued, and as a consequence in many countries and especially 
in Bulgaria, there was a significant black market exchange rate in the pre-transition period 
(1985 and onwards). This black market rate was heavily depreciated in relation to the 
official rate.
Balcerowicz^'*(1995, p.257) has argued that “even in the established market economies 
statistical indicators do not provide a fully adequate description o f the economic reality, 
because, fo r  example, o f  well known problems o f  statistical representation o f changes in 
produce quality, or the inadequacy o f comparing data on unemployment in various 
countries. Even in these countries there are many instances o f the poor interpretation o f  
statistics” The newly emerging output in Central and Eastern Economies is more closely 
geared to the consumers’ welfare than the planned economy’s output.
Martha de Melo et al. (1996, p.399) have pointed out that^^ “Under central planning the 
output o f  state enterprises was often exaggerated, whereas during the transition, output o f  
the private sector has tended to be underreported, sometimes by large margins. ” During 
the transition period to a market economy, there were strong tax incentives for the output
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to be underreported by the private entrepreneurs.
Lipton et al. (1990, p.79) have argued that^^ “Real growth has been routinely overstated 
and inflation routinely understated in the data o f  Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
Lipton et al. (1990, p.79) have also argued^^ that “in a market economy, a fa ll in real 
wages usually means a drop in living standards. But in a shortage economy (in which 
goods are not available at official prices), a fa ll in real wages can simply mean the 
elimination o f queues, and therefore arise o f living standards”.
There was also an underreported unemployment rate at the beginning of the transition 
period in most of the Central and Eastern economies.
Furthermore, the fiscal deficits were understated due to the fact that central bank supported 
state-owned enterprises with cheap loans
Finally, cross-border transactions were poorly reported, giving significant errors in the 
trade volume.
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Q u e s t io n n a ir e  Sam ple
Questionnaire - Survey of the Determinants of FDI inflows 
Reasons/ incentives and Obstacles/ Barriers for Foreign Direct Investment 
_____________________ Inflows in Bulgaria (1989-1999)_____________________
The purpose of this questionnaire is to extract valuable information regarding the determination of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Bulgaria during the post-communist period 1989-1999. The developer of this questionnaire is a 
Ph.D. student at the Department of Russian and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow and his 
name is Aristidis BITZENIS. Its purpose is to identify the kind and the type of reasons for foreign direct 
investment (inward) that the foreign firms (home country) have considered in order to invest or not in Bulgaria
(host country).
The results will be included in his thesis for the Ph.D. degree.
It Is necessary for the validity of this survey to inform us 
your name and the name of the company that you represent (both names will not appear in the
results) for the purposes of this questionnaire.
FIRST PART
(a) How did vou complete this questionnaire? (Please tick)
pyFAX CD Ey WEBSITE CD j
|By E-MAIL D [sy INTERVIEW D  |l
(sy POST LETTER CD Ijsy TELEPHONE CD |
(b) Could vou Please give us som e general information? Please, complete the following 
_______________________background Information:_________________
Company's Name: I.............................Core:
: Your Name: I”™'™..'". .I.ZjCore:
Do you have an E-mail?
Your E-Mail Address:
r Yes □ r No □
Do you have fax number? r Yes □ r No D
Your fax number:
I Enter your Company's Web Site Address:
(c) Your Home Country:
(d) Kind of Business:
(e) Year of Investment in Bulgaria:
(f) Amount of Investment in $ US:
(g) Which of the following wavs have vour company used in order to invest in Bulgaria?
(Please tick anv aoprooriatel
• ^  Acquisition opportunities through Bulgarian Privatisation Program CD
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• ^  Investment opportunities through PHARE or other EU Programs, grants and subsidies C D
• ^  Has your company made EXPORTS in Bulgaria in previous years and then proceeded to an FDI
project? C D
• ^  Has your company used Licensing or Franchising together with FDI? C D
• ^  Acquisitions C D
• ^  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - Greenfield Site / Wholly Owned Subsidiary C D
• ^  Joint Ventures / Strategic Alliances / M & A C D
• ^  Portfolio Investment C D
• ^  Representative Office / Branch C D
•  ^  Other, Please specify___________________________ C D
(h) Is your company planning on making additional investments
in Bulgaria? ^  Yes C D  ^  No C D  
SECOND PART
In this part of the questionnaire there are SEVEN groups of Incentives that might have attracted 
your company to Invest In Bulgaria. Please tick where appropriate and then after studying all 
the seven groups, please specify the three (3) most Important groups of Incentives for Investing
In Bulgaria
1. Locational hunters
^  Economic Stability C D  
^  Political Stability C D  
^  Social Stability C D  
^  New currency board after June 1997 C D  
^  The attraction of the East European market - to have a link to other members of CMEA C D  
^  Geographic Proximity - Low transportation costs C D  
^  Historical Links between home and host country C D  
^  Lack of Infrastructure (services, telecom etc.) as an incentive/opportunity for investment C D  
Cultural Closeness -  Consumption of Goods and Services based on their country-origin C D  
Cultural distance - Consumption of Goods and Services based on the Western life style C D
^  Climate for Tourism C D
□
□
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^  O th e r , P le a se  s p e c ify  C D
2. Factor hunters
•  ^  Skilled Low-cost Labour Force C D
• ^  Seml/Un-skllled Low-cost Labour Force C D
• ^  Low cost Labour-Intensive production for exports (textiles) C D
• ^  Low cost of Raw Material (energy, oil, gas, etc.) C D
• ^  Searching for resources, availability of Raw Material C D
• ^  Inexpensive Land C D
• ^  Low-cost Production and Creation of an export base □
• ^  Access to High Technology C D
• ^  Other, Please specify____________________________ C D
3. Market hunters
•  ^  The size of the Bulgarian market (Customer base) C D
• ^  Prospects for market growth C D
^  New market -  expand the operation - Increasing the profits (Market Share) C D
• ^  Other, Please specify____________________________ C D
□
4. Market hunters from a strategic point of view
•  ^  First mover advantages C D
International Pressures from Competition - Physical Presence In different countriesC D
e ^  Acquiring the assets of an existing foreign corporation -  Globalisation C D
• ^  Lack of Local Competition In the Host Country C D
• ^  Pressures of Competition In the Home Country C D
• ^  A Way to Survive (Market Share) C D
• ^  The Product Cycle Theory C D
^  Follow the Competition (counter-attack, ATTACK, offensive/defensive, follow the
leader) C D
• ^  The market In Home country Is saturated C D
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• ^  Follow the clients (Z D
•  ^  Follow the suppliers (Z D
•  ^  To avoid trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, currency constraints, etc.) - FDI is substitute
or supplement to trade (Z D
• ^  Local Unsatisfied demand for products (Z D
• ^  Other, Please_specify___________________________ ( Z ]
5. Efficiency hunters
• ^  Economies of scale (Z D
• ^  Economies of scope (Z D
• ^  Risk Diversification (product, location sites) (Z D
• ^  Other, Please specify___________________________ (Z D
6. Exploiting the Ownership advantages
^  Existing Business Links (Z D
^  Brand Name, know-how, and innovation (Z D  
^  Past experience of Business contacts in Bulgaria (representative office, exports) (Z D  
^  Ability of adopting the local tastes, needs, customs, language, (Familiarity, Multinationality) (Z D  
^  Other, Please specify__________________________ (Z D
7. Hunters of Financial aspects
• ^  Favourable Investment Law Framework (Liberal Character) (Z D
• ^  Any favourable regional trade agreements for surrounding countries (Setting up an
export base) (Z D
• ^  Tax Holiday Regulation (Z D
• ^  Corporate Tax Relief on Profits for 3 plus 2 years (acquisition of 67% and over of
the total shares) (Z D
• ^  Corporation Tax Rate (Z D
• ^  50% Corporate Tax Relief for 10 years (Z D
• ^  Avoidance of Double Taxation (Z D
• ^  Profits re invested In certain sectors are tax-deductible (Z D
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• ^  Discounts through debt swaps (Bradles/Zunk) C D
• ^  Technology-based Investment project C D
• ^  Subsidies (Financial Assistance) for Infrastructure through PHARE Program or
other C D
• ^  Special Incentives In regions with high unemployment or special subsidised zonesC D
• ^  Exception from VAT, customs duties and taxes for the Import of machines,
technological equipment C D
• ^  Loss carry forward mechanism (next 5 years or 10 for banks) C D
• ^  Free Trade Zones C D
• ^  Availability of financing C D
• ^  Strong Currency of the home country C D
• ^  Other, Please specify___________________________ C D
Please tick u p  to three (3) groups of Incentives that are considered to be the most Important for
your company In undertaking an FDI project:
^  Locational hunters C D  
^  Factor hunters C D  
^  Market hunters C D  
^  Market hunters from a strategic point of view C D  
^  Efficiency hunters C D  
^  Exploiting the Ownership advantages C D  
^  Hunters of Financial aspects C D
THIRD PART
Please tick the most Important barriers - u p  to five (5) In total, which you would consider as 
discouraging your company to Invest In Bulgaria or was hard to cope with them In the
operation of the FDI project
1. ^  Low Progress In Privatisation, In Banking Reform, In Liberalisation, In Transition 
Process, etc. C D
2. ^  Unstable Legal System, Lack of appropriate laws. Insufficient enforcement of the 
laws C D
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3. ^  Exchange rate volatility, macroeconomic instability (inflation) (Z D
4. ^  Political Instability (Z D
5. ^  Lack of managerial skills (Z D
6. ^  Lack of natural resources (Z D
7. ^  Corruption, Crime - Insufficient protection of the Investors from Illegal actions, 
organisations -  cost of protection from ‘mafia’ (Z D
8. ^  Unstable Banking system, lack of financial Intermediaries (Z D
9. ^  Lack of favourable bilateral treaties (Z D
10. ^  Culture, local behaviour regarding consumption, labour (Z D
11. ^  Low Income per capita, consumers’ consumption patterns (low tendency In 
consumption) (Z D
12. n Bureaucracy (Z D
13. ^ Tax System - Repatriation of the profits (Z D
1 4 . 0 Stage of development of technology In Bulgarian Industry (Z D
1 5 . 0 High Investment Risk (Z D
16. O Lack of Infrastructure (Z D
1 7 . 0 High Level of Strikes (Z D
18. O Difficulties In securing financing (Z D
1 9 . 0 High V.A.T. (22%) -  High taxation Rates (Z D
20. O Other. Please soeclfv (Z D
All contents ©1998 Bitzenis' Questionnaire. All rights reserved.
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The survey “Research into the D isincentives that Greek Companies face in  their B usiness Activities in  
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) countries, Y ugoslavia, and Russia, Decem ber 1998” was 
conducted by the Federation o f Industries o f  Northern Greece w ithin the framework o f  its involvement in  
Southeast E uropean  C ooperative In itia tive  (SEC I). The field  o f  investigation were com panies active in tlie 
SECI countries, nam ely Albania, B osnia  and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, M oldova, Romania, 
Slovenia, the former Y ugoslav Republic o f  M acedonia (FYROM). The survey did not include one SECI country, 
Turkey, but did include Y ugoslavia, w hich is not included in SECI. The survey also included the Russian 
Federation, w hich supports SECI. In total, questionnaires were sent to a total o f tliree hundred and eighty (380) 
com panies and organizations. Two hundred and seventy (270) questionnaires were returned for processing from  
92 com panies and organizations. The last completed questionnaires were received on N ovem ber 17, 1998.
Approximately 200 foreign investors have been addressed, including the top 50 foreign direct investors 
identified by the BFIA. These investors have received questionnaires o f  20 m ultiple-choice questions, focusing  
on company data and m anagers’ opinions o f the Bulgarian business environment. The response rate was 35.4%. 
88% o f  tlie respondent com panies were considering further investment. Origin o f foreign investors were 
American (26%), German (20%), Austrian 9% and Sw iss (8%), Greek (6%), and from  Netherlands (6%). About 
38% o f the respondent com panies have invested less than 250 thousand dollars. Another 13% o f  the respondent 
com panies have invested less 1 m illion  U S$ (large part o f  the saniple-com panies had lim ited in amount 
investm ent interest!! M ore than 50% o f the total sam ple com panies were invested less than 1 m illion USD$).
The usual way o f replying questionnaires, the post way, in  any research study, failed (i.e. only 4.7% o f the 
com panies replied in this way). H ence, it seem s that the best replying rate cam e from  one to one interviews 
(35,9%  o f the total response rate, follow ed by e-m ail or w ww  w ith 29.7%). The fax and telephone methods had 
success in  about 30% cases togetlier. D ue to the above bad response rate by post (despite the fact that the 
questionnaire was sent to all the com panies) and the possibility o f a failure to collect the sufficient data, a 
multiple approach o f  the target group was decided by applying som e pressure w ith various methods o f  contacting  
and getting their attention.
”  From the questionnaire survey the services sector accounts 28% and tlie FDI inflow s in  Bulgaria in tlie same 
sector were 18% (Finance 11,4%  +  Tourism 5,1%  +  Telecom m unications 1,8% =18.3% ). Trade in the 
questionnaire survey accounts 36% and the FDI inflow s in Bulgaria in  the sam e sector were 19,2%. Finally, the 
answers from  the industrial sector w ere 22% and textiles 14% (total 36%) and at the sam e tim e the FDI inflow s 
in Bulgaria in the industrial sector were 55% o f  the total.
1 8  b i t z e N I S  ARISTIDIS, 2002, “The Determinants o f  FDI in  Transition Countries; Incentives and Barriers 
Based on a Questionnaire Research: the Case o f Bulgaria, 1989-2000”, International and M onetary Aspects o f  
Transition in Southeastern Europe, D . Chionis and G. Petrakos (eds.), p. 89-144
[P u b lish ed  in the O ffic ia l G azette  Issue N o  109  o f  D ecem ber 27th, 1 9 9 6 ]  and article 3 on the Right to 
Make Investments (Title amended. O fficial Gazette issue N o 109 o f  1996) (Amended, Official Gazette issue N o  
109 o f 1996)
[The A ct was adopted by the 36th National Assembly on 16 January 1992 repeals the act published in  the State 
Gazette N o. 47/1991; amended in  No. 48/1991]
(Published in  tlie Official Gazette issue N o 97, o f  1997; supplemented, O lficial Gazette issue N o 29 o f 1998; 
N o 153 o f  1998, N o 110 o f  1999 amended and supplemented. [Tliis law also repealed the Law on Promotion and 
Protection o f  Foreign Investments (published, State Gazette, issue 8 o f 1992; amended, issues 92 and 102 o f  
1995, issue 109 o f  1996; corrigendum, issue 110 o f  1996; amended, issues 55 and 58 o f 1997).]}
[according to the IMF Balance o f  Payments Manual, Fifth Edition, 1993 and OECD's issue Benchmark  
D efinition o f Foreign Direct Investment, OECD, 3^  ^ Edition, 1996 and appeared in  the Balance o f Payments 
M anual]
In accordance w ith the standard presentation o f  the balance o f payments, the D irect investm ent in  the country 
item com prises:
A. Equity capital -  acquisition/disposal o f shares and equities (in cash and in kind) by non-residents in/from the 
share or equity capital o f  Bulgarian enterprises. The acquisition o f  equities and shares in  the capital is reported as 
increase in  the direct investm ent in  the country, and the disposal -  as decrease.
B. Other capital -  principal received and paid on loans (both on short- and long-term ones) between the direct 
investor and the direct investm ent enterprise. The receipt o f  a principal is treated as an increase o f the direct 
investm ent abroad, and the repayment o f  the loan -  as a decrease.
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c .  Reinvested earnings -  the share o f  non-residents in  the undistributed earnings/ loss o f  tlie enterprise for the 
reporting period. The share in  the undistributed earnings is reported as increase o f  the direct investment in the 
country, and the share in the loss -  as decrease.
In the com pilation o f  the balance o f  payments, the BN B uses data from  the follow ing sources:
- Privatisation authorities
- A gency for Privatisation and branch m inistries
- Insurance Supervision Directorate at the Ministry o f Finance
- Central Depository
- Financial sector enterprises
- Foreign investm ent enterprises from the non-fm ancial sector
- N ational Statistical Institute
([Promulgated State Gazette N o. 83/21.09.1999], w hich Law repealed the Law on Transactions with Foreign  
Exchange and Foreign Exchange Control, in  the additional provisions
‘D irect in vestm en t’ shall be:
a) the establishment or acquisition o f  a comm ercial enterprise;
b) the acquisition in  a company, o f  the rights o f unlim ited liability partner, or
o f an equity stake giving the right to over 20 percent of the votes at a general meeting;
c) granting a loan for a period not less than 5 years for the purpose o f  direct investm ent under ‘a’ or ‘b ’, or related 
to an agreement for participation in  the profit distribution;
d) additional investm ent to the investm ent under ‘a ’ or ‘b ’.
According to Foreign Exchange Law (Adopted by the 38th N ational Assembly on 8  September 1999; published  
in the State Gazette, issue 83 o f  21 S eptem ber 1999)
SU RV EY  METHODOLOGY: Sample: National representative survey o f the population aged 18+ o f  each  
comilry. Sample Size: A lbania 1002, Bulgaria 1144, FYROM  1007. Survey method: The survey used the method 
o f the face-to-face interview. Field work: Field work was conducted between January 15 - January 25, 2000. 
CORRUPTION INDEXES: Corruption assessm ent index numbers assume values from 0-10. The closer the value 
of the indexes is to 10, the more negative are the assessm ents o f  the evaluated aspect o f  corruption in Bulgaria. 
Index numbers closer to 0 indicate approximation to the ideal o f  a “corruption-free” society. Corruption indexes 
have been grouped into several categories: - Attitudes towards corruption; - Corrupt practices; - Assessment o f  
the spread o f corruption; - Corruption-related expectations.
It was conducted in the capitals o f  Albania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Hungary and 
Lithuania. The results o f the survey show that victim ization by conventional offences. This survey was a part o f 
an international project o f  the U nited N ations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and 
was coordinated by Gallup-Hungary. UNICRI’s extended research project consisted of: (1) International Crime 
V ictim  Survey, based on public opinion polls, and (2) International Crime Business Survey, based on interviews 
w ith business’ persons. T his initiative made it possible to analyze victim ization by comparing two overlapping 
periods, 1993-97 and 1996-2000.
Albania, B osnia and H erzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the former Y ugoslav Republic o f Macedonia, 
Malta, Romania, Turkey, the Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia (Serbia and M ontenegro)
The survey “Research into the D isincentives that Greek Companies face in their Business Activities in  
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) countries, Yugoslavia, and Russia, December 1998” was 
conducted by the Federation o f Industries o f Nortliern Greece within the framework o f its involvement in 
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). The field  o f investigation were com panies active in the 
SECI countries, namely Albania, B osnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, 
Slovenia, tlie former Y ugoslav Republic o f M acedonia (FYROM). The survey did not include one SECI country, 
Turkey, but did include Y ugoslavia, w hich  is not included in  SECI. The survey also included the Russian  
Federation, w hich supports SECI. In total, questionnaires were sent to a total o f  three hundred and eighty (380) 
com panies and organizations. Two hundred and seventy (270) questionnaires w ere returned for processing from  
92 com panies and organizations. The last completed questionnaires were received on November 17, 1998.
P ite lis  e t  al (2000) carried out in  1995-96, as a part o f  an ACE Project supported by the European Commission  
on the econom ic integration through FDI in  tlie less favoured CEECs, a study titled “FOREIGN DIRECT  
IN VESTM ENT A ND  “LESS FAVOURED REGIONS” : GREEK FDI IN BULGARIA A ND  ROM ANIA” (also
2 0 >f
Chapter 3: The Determinants o f  Foreign Direct Investment inflows in Bulgaria: 1989-2001
presented in  D ublin Conference, A ugust 1999). The original database from w hich the sam ple was drawn included 
220 Greek and Portuguese investors (The database included 120 Greek and the remaining were Portuguese 
investors) in Bulgaria, Rom ania and the Slovak Republic and the response rate for that initial project is not 
known to us. The E U  investing countries considered in  the ACE Project (N o 9 4 -0719-R) w ere Greece and 
Portugal and the survey addressed also to their subsidiaries in  CEECs, allow ing a database o f 220 firms in  total. 
In this paper Pitelis et al. considered only the results for Greek parents w hich invested in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Only 96 Greek firms responded to the questionnaire. 76 firm s were used w ith 85 direct investments in  the two 
CEECs (Bulgaria and Rom ania) as the rem aining Greek firms had invested in Slovak Republic.
PITELIS, C. and S. lAMMARINO, 2000, “Foreign Direct Investment and Less Favoured Regions: Greek 
FDI in Bulgaria, and Rom ania”, Global Business Review, 1, 2
Approximately 200 foreign investors have been addressed, including the top 50 foreign direct investors 
identified by the BFIA. These investors have received questionnaires o f 20 m ultiple-choice questions, focusing  
on company data and m anagers’ opinions o f  the Bulgarian business environment. The response rate was 35.4%. 88% o f the respondent com panies were considering further investment. Origin o f foreign investors were 
American (26%), German (20% ), Austrian 9% and Sw iss (8%), Greek (6%), and from Netherlands (6%). About 
38% o f the respondent com panies have invested less than 250 thousand dollars. Another 13% o f  the respondent 
com panies have invested less 1 m illion U S$ (large part o f the sam ple-com panies had lim ited in amount 
investment interest! ! M ore than 50% o f the total sam ple com panies were invested less than 1 m illion U SD$).
According to the V itosha research (Febmary 2000 -  a sociological program) in a sam ple survey o f  1144 face- 
to-face interviews w ith agencies, international organizations, financial institutions, SMEs, trade organizations, 
ministries and state agency officials w e found the follow ing results: unemployment rate (65,3% ), low  incom es 
(50,6% ), poverty (41,2% ), corm ption (37,5% ) and crim e (27,9% )
The Cormption Perceptions Index, w liich Transparency International (TI) first launched in 1995, ranks 
countries in terms o f  the degree to w hich corm ption is perceived to exist am ong public officials and politicians. 
The surveys embrace the perceptions o f  business people, the general public and country analysts. The surveys 
were undertaken over the last tluee years and no country is included in  the CPI unless there are results from a 
minimum o f three surveys (a perfect 10.00 w ould be a totally corraption-free country). Standard Deviation  
indicates differences in  the values o f  the sources for the index: the greater the variance, the greater the differences 
o f perceptions o f a country am ong the sources. The number o f  surveys used had to be at least 3 for a country to 
be included in  the CPI. H igh-Low  Range provides the highest and low est values o f  the sources.
The author must note that tlie profit the parties are seeking for in  FDI is not necessarily financial profit. Some 
of the groups o f  incentives or individual incentives lead to non-m oney benefits that may eventually lead to 
financial profit.
BITZENIS ARISTIDIS, 2003, “Universal M odel o f Theories Determ ining FDI; Is there any dominant 
theory? Are the FDI inflow s in  CEE countries and especially in  Bulgaria a myth?”, European Business Review, 
2003, No2, Forthcoming
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examined topics such as the privatisation and restructuring process in Bulgaria as 
a part of foreign direct investment. Incentives and barriers regarding the whole privatisation 
process have been considered. Moreover, topics such as foreign financial reform in general, 
cleaning up of the balances of the banks, their debt cancellation and the problem of bad loans 
have been discussed. The role of financial institutions and commercial banks in the 
privatisation process (if any) together with the stock market development, legal framework 
and the presence of foreign banks in Bulgaria are also examined. There is also a criticism 
about the slow privatisation process in Bulgaria, and its choice of different methods of 
privatisation.
In addition, there is a discussion about the development of small and medium enterprises, 
property rights, and corporate governance, ownership and private sector development. All the 
laws are presented together with graphs and examples of all the privatisation and FDI deals 
and the progress from the beginning until now are presented in this chapter.
Case studies with foreign MNEs that participated in the privatisation process, together with all 
the BCG deals taking part in the Bulgarian privatisation of the banking system, are also 
presented in this chapter.
4.2 W HAT WAS BEHIND The Delay IN The BULG ARIAN Privatisation  
Process? DETERM INING  INCENTIVES AND BARRIERS OF 
P rivatisation  As a Way O f Foreign Entry
''The word “privatisation”... is used in two senses. In the narrower sense, it means the 
transfer o f  assets hitherto owned by the state into private hands. The broader interpretation 
covers the property relations in the economy as a whole, so that privatisation o f the economy 
must be understood to mean that the share o f the private sector grows until it ultimately 
becomes the dominant economic sector.''\Kornû 1995, p32] An extension of the broad 
definition provides more insight in the process of privatisation. Besides the selling or leasing 
of public property, the term implies the abandonment of any government control over all units
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of the economy, as well as the state monopoly in certain sectors. It also includes the return of 
property, which had been illegally confiscated to it rightful owners, the promotion of private 
enterprises and the effort to attract foreign investors^
Under, the broad definition, privatisation may also be called "the restructuring o f the 
independent and private sectorsT [Hare 1994, p34-35] The creation of small private firms 
may, eventually, achieve the revival of the private sector, even without the help of 
Privatisation of state firms, [Koves, 1992, p40] or in other words privatisation represents the 
transfer of state-owned assets to private ownership, alongside the creation and fostering of “de 
novo” private business. Privatisation is an alternative way of distributing and choosing means 
of generating wealth so it may also be considered as a distribution of political and economic 
power over the long run.
Especially in the context of former communist countries, Estrin S. (1995) views privatisation 
as a “reversal o f communism ”, considering the restoration of the private property rights which 
are essential to a free market economy. In the same sense, the emergence of “de novo” private 
sector using the fixed assets of former state owned firms purchased after bankruptcy or 
liquidation, can lead to industry-level supply responses to demand changes even in the 
absence of supply responses from current and state owned firms. [Estrin, S. p5 (1994)]
In contrast with the Western economies, where privatisation represented only “a  ti^ansfer 
ownership o f few  state-owned enterprises, functioning in a fundamentally market economy, 
dominated by private property” [Frydman, R. et al, 1992], and do not command an entire 
restructure of the national economy, in the planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe, 
privatisation plays an invaluable role in the transition process toward a free market economy. 
The privatisation process and the emergence of de novo private entities in Eastern economies 
require institutional reform that relies on an effective property system, together with economic 
stabilisation (at a macroeconomic level) and price liberalization.
Since the question of whether privatisation should preside or follow restructuring emerges, a 
definition of restructuring is needed. Restructuring is a "...multidimensional, encompassing: 
“reactive ” policies brought about by the hardening o f firms * budget constrains (e.g. labour- 
shedding, wage reductions, plant closures); strategic aspects, including export reorientation, 
changes in the mix o f  products and changes in management structures; and “deeper
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restructuring”, generally involving substantial new investment, that can deliver large 
improvements in enterprise performance and growth over the long rw«.”[EBRD Transition 
Report 1995, p i28]
Restructuring may also be viewed from a macroeconomic perspective. As companies 
restructure by adopting policies and strategies, which increase their efficiency, governments 
restructure by adopting laws, regulations and policies in the same direction, meaning to 
increase the efficiency of the state economy. From the macro economic point of view, the 
adaptation of companies to new market standards can also be called restructuring.^
If the state decides to undertake restructuring before privatizing a firm, it needs to spend 
additional capital time and effort for state-owned companies for the sake of higher revenues 
derived from the sale. On the other hand, if it avoids restructuring, the state achieves quick 
privatisation and relieves the burden of financing the loss-making company. Restructuring 
before privatisation holds another, hidden, drawback. The managers and employees of the 
company, which is under restructuring procedures, (in order to be privatised in the future) will 
probably not be motivated to participate in a specific restructuring program, given that 
privatisation may result, in the long run, in the loss of their position in the company. What 
governments may fail to consider is that the restructuring they intend to apply on the company 
may be far from what the potential investors expect.^ A close inspection of the company 
should determine the path that is more profitable for the state. Sometimes, governments use 
restructuring prior to privatisation as an excuse for delaying the process in order to avoid the 
political burden of mass dismissals of employees and generally postpone hard restructuring 
methods imposed by the new owners. A long restructuring period allows space for corruption 
and increases the possibilities that the nomenklatura will profit by wild privatisation.
4.3 Privatisation and R estructuring in an ex-com m unist country: the case 
of Bulgaria
The sequence, path or the pace of the adaptation of each policy is very important in the 
transition process. Rapid changes are favoured by most countries, but have been sometimes 
criticized by theorists. Stanley Fischer et al. [2000, p.I] mentioned that "the faster is the 
speed o f reforms, the quicker is the recovery and the higher is growth”. Stanley Fischer (1992, 
p.227) has also concluded that
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"small firms should be privatised by sale almost immediately... larger industrial firms 
should be corporatized, as soon as possible ...plans envisage the corporatization phase 
being completed within a year or two... the key to the long-run transformation o f the 
formerly socialist economies may lie less in the privatisation o f the very large industrial 
firms ... than in the development o f new firms and the growth o f existing smaller firms... 
fo r  that reason, rapid progress in other areas, such as the creation o f a suitable legal 
environment, price decontrol ... is as important to the development o f  a vibrant private 
sector as privatisation o f large firm s”.
The supporters of the big-bang approach argue that the level of poverty and income inequality 
is higher in countries following the gradualist method, which is a method that provides more 
space for the satisfaction of personal interests and corruption.'^ The characteristics of ‘big 
bang’ sequencing favour fast privatisation techniques including mass privatisation plans, 
leaving the task of restructuring to the owners of the privatised firms.
On the other hand, others object on the premise that the shock-therapy approach leads to 
drastic increases in the level of poverty and income inequality. Especially in the case of 
privatisation of state owned firms, the rushed moves have often led to the disorganization of 
valuable operational enterprises, a fact assisting the drop of the output level. ^
Although early analysts have seen Bulgaria as a country, which undertook a ‘big bang’ 
transition, a transition study of eleven years of Bulgaria indicates otherwise. The instant 
price liberalization of more than 70% of commodities in 1989 was the only sign to point 
toward a ‘big bang’ strategy. On the other hand there was a delay in the liberalization of 
prices in remaining commodities, preservation of the big state monopolies, late 
introduction of bankruptcy laws and hard budget constraints as well as accumulation of 
bad loans and inability to stop inflation before the introduction of the currency board, 
which them all resulted in the reinforcement of the nomenklatura, development of wild 
privatisation, and in overall a very slow progress of the privatisation and restructuring 
process.
The developments in Bulgarian privatisation are not only far from a ‘big bang’ path, but also 
raise doubts on whether it falls under gradualism. It can be argued that political constraints 
impose a gradual approach to restructuring, which has implications on the speed and
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sequencing of privatisation.
Lipton et al.(1991, p.231) in an article argued that "In Eastern Europe, privatisation is a very 
difficult task, involving nothing less than the complete redefinition o f property rights fo r  
literally thousands o f enterprises ...Advocates o f  rapid privatisation are typically confident 
that even i f  quick Privatisation initially leads to an inappropriate distribution o f ownership 
with, fo r  example, too diffuse ownership, or firms in the wrong hands, then the capital markets 
will encourage a reshuffling o f ownership through takeovers, mergers and buy-outs so that 
there is a proper matching o f  owners andfirms.... ”
The situation in Bulgaria showed that the Bulgarian government tried to promote restructuring 
prior to privatisation, continued to finance state companies and erased some of the old debts. 
This resulted in an accumulation of debt and the creation of the so-called ‘bad loans’ 
problems. The problem of accumulation of debt was enforced because the country was 
borrowing in foreign currency and because the national currency was devaluated. The 
postponement of privatisation in hopes of a higher return proved to be an illusion, because the 
debt that the government undertook during the time of the restructuring was not covered by 
the alleged higher price, not to mention that during the years of the ‘restructuring’ the country 
suffered great economic instability and lacked the revenues to cover its deficits. The question 
that arises is whether a country should privatise before or after restructuring or should both 
proceed simultaneously. Another question is whether there is a need for sequencing in 
privatisation or not and if so what principles should underline it
4.4  G enera l A sp ec ts  on P riva tisa tio n  in B u lg a ria
At the beginning of the transition, Bulgaria had more than 80% state-ownership, one of the 
highest percentages among the former communist countries, and co-operative ownership had 
been turned into a variety of state ownership. In the 1970s, state and co-operative ownership 
covered 99.9 per cent of the national economy. A steady policy of restriction and liquidation 
of private ownership, and a merger of co-operative and state ownership, was pursued even 
until the mid 1970s. In the 1980s, shifts in the ownership pattern were observed, mainly in 
two directions (to provide autonomy to state-owned enterprises or to pass the management of 
state enterprises to employees). The attempt to share the ownership rights between the state
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and the employees failed due to the preserved and centralised character of the economy and 
the minimal opportunities for workers' self-initiatives.
Although, Bulgaria started its transition and liberalization of prices earlier than most of the 
other CEE countries, the actual privatisation process started later. This could have been an 
advantage if Bulgaria had studied and tried not to repeat other’s mistakes. The Bulgarian 
economy went through institutional and economic change after the attempts towards 
decentralization, de-monopolization and liberalization in the early 1990s. The SOEs were 
allowed full legal autonomy and were transformed into joint stock or public limited 
companies, aimed at encouraging a sense of managerial responsibility and corporate 
competitiveness.^
Privatisation in Bulgaria, as in many countries, included the privatisation of small, medium, 
and large enterprises (SMEs, SOEs, agriculture, housing and mass privatisation), which were 
either owned by the state, or by municipalities or even were co-operative firms. The 
distinction of the size of the enterprises is determined by the nominal value reported in their 
balance sheet. According to the Bulgarian Law of 1999 small and medium enterprises are 
characterized as micro-enterprises when the maximum average number of employees is 10. In 
small enterprises the maximum average annual number of employees is 50 and their annual 
turnover do not exceed the BGN 1 million or their fixed tangible assets do not exceed BGN 
800.000 and in medium enterprises the maximum average annual number of employees is 100 
and their annual turnover do not exceed the BGN 3 million or their fixed tangible assets do not 
exceed BGN 2,4 million.
The Law on Incorporating Single-Owned Firms provided guidelines for the management of 
the converted firms and was, in turn, covered by the Privatisation Law issued in April 1992 
regulating the corporatization and privatisation of state owned firms.®
The party competent to undertake the privatisation of an enterprise is determined by the book 
value of the fixed assets of the enterprise. According to the initial law^ of 1992, enterprises 
worth under 10 million \pld\ leva (BGL), were handled by one of the five branch ministries 
and enterprises worth between 10 and 200 million BGL by the Privatisation Agency (PA)^°. 
Decisions for enterprises worth over 200 million BGL were undertaken by the PA and had to 
be endorsed by the Council of Ministers.
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Although, in 1992 Bulgaria chosen a rapid road toward privatisation (at least there was such a 
belief from each government) the results for the time period 1993-2002 showed very little 
progress (figures 1 & 2).
Figure 1: Privatisation Deals, Total Number, By Year, Feb. 2002
□ PRIVATISATION DEALS TOTAL NUMBER
m m #mm
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
total 9590 * Privatisation deals (enterprises +  separate parts)
Source: PA
Figure 2: Total Revenues from Privatisation Deals in Bulgaria, Feb. 2002
Revenues from privatisation deals in Thousands 
USDS
3000000
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: PA
Especially in the time period 1993 - end 1997, there was a significant low progress. This 
limited number of completed privatisation deals and the low accumulation of revenues can be 
explained either by the weak Bulgarian privatisation authorities, or by the general instability 
of the Bulgarian economic environment, together with the political instability or inability of 
the Bulgarian governments and the limited western investment interest. Actually, the gap 
between the annual goals of the PA’s and the other privatisation authorities’ programs, and the 
concluded privatisation deals, led to frequent changes at the executive director level of the 
Privatisation Agency (see table la).
A . B itz e n is ,  O cto b er  2 0 0 2 2 1 5
CHAPTER 4: Incentives for an increased Foreign Participation in the Bulgarian Privatisation Process and Banking System and the Role o f
Financial Intermediaries during the Privatisation Process
Table 1a: The Executive Directors of the  PA from 1991-2001
1. WVtnAiVWVWVIMV«VVWVWVWWV«WVVVWVWtriA1 Alexander Boshkov 1 First executive director, then Deputy Prime Minister j |
2. 1 Reneta Indzhova I s h e w o i k ^  under Berov’s government. She became the next Prime ! 
1 minister
3. \ Vesselin Koev 1 Became popular by several sales of small units
4. 1 Ivan Sabctinov f  Left his position shortly afterwards
5. fs^ a r i Zhelyabov [An Executive Director of PA from Haskovo. _____________ ___ j
6. 1 Levon
1 Hampartsoumyan
fOn 04.09.2001, the government released Levon Hampartsoumyan from 11 
1 the position of Executive Director of the Privatisation Agency
7. 1 Apostol Apostolov 1 Ex Executive Director of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange
Source: Various Sources, Author’s Research
The issue of restructuring before privatisation or leaving the restructuring process for new 
investors should have been considered more carefully by the Bulgarian authorities. However, 
the bad loans accumulation and the debts recorded in the balance sheets of the majority of 
state-owned enterprises made it necessary for the Bulgarian governments to proceed into a 
general restructuring program, especially after the second general economic crisis occurred in 
Bulgaria in 1996 (the first was in 1994 and the third was in 1997).
The first privatisation program (approved in the autumn of 1992) planned the initiation of the 
privatisation procedures for 92 enterprises. The program did not totally meet its goal. No 
privatisation deal was achieved in 1992, initiating the first in a line of many, unfulfilled 
privatisation plans, so the privatisation process actually started in 1993.
The 1999 privatisation forecast was the only one that was met. The estimated number of 
privatisation transactions was 1083 and over 2400 transactions were concluded by all state 
bodies. This was the only year that the PA met its annual privatisation program forecast and 
the other state bodies have managed to meet their goals. The year 1999 also fostered some 
major privatisation deals in the banking sector. This year was the zenith of Bulgarian 
Privatisation when there were 1373 million USDS investments contracted (figure 3), 655 
million USDS payments and 498 million USDS liabilities paid (figure 4) and only half million 
USDS liabilities assumed. In other words, at that year a percentage of 34.4% of the total 
privatisation revenues has been fiilfilled. Furthermore, 60% of all the privatisation deals were 
made in the three-year time period 1998-2000 (figure 1). Finally, 55% of the total privatisation 
revenues were collected in the same three-year period (figure 2).
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Figure 3: Liabilities Assumed +  Investments contracted -from Privatisation Deals in Bulgaria (up to Feb 2002)
□  LIABILITIES ASSUM ED  
0  INVESTMENTS CONTRACTED
6 0 0  m
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: PA
Figure 4: Total R evenues (Payments) +  Liabilities Paid from Privatisation Deals in Bulgaria (up to Feb 2002)
□  PAYMENTS
SW
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total payments: 2887 m illion U SD S, liabilities undertaken 947 USDS, liabilities paid 97 U SDS, investments 
contracted 3408 USDS  
Source: PA
The data also indicates the significant delay that the privatisation process experienced until 
June 1997, a fact that is also be demonstrated by the yearly progress, which shows that yearly 
goals were rarely met. Despite the delay and the constant reconsideration of the facts, the 
amount of Privatisation deals offered and completed surpasses the initial target and indicates a 
wide range of enterprises offered for Privatisation and a serious attempt to totally privatise 
state assets, thus encouraging the operation of an open market.
Most of the privatisation deals have been carried out by all state bodies (2605 enterprises + 
2190 separate parts), followed by all ministries (2082 enterprises + 1765 separate parts) and 
by the Privatisation Agency (PA) (523 enterprises + 425 separate parts).
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The percentages of the contracts concluded are quite deceptive regarding the PA’s 
performance considering that the PA only handles the privatisation of large companies (over 
BGL70 million according to the law of 1997). The Privatisation Agency has often been 
accused of not performing its tasks efficiently and playing a key role in the delay of 
privatisation. Nevertheless this author, based on statistical data and qualitative facts, insists 
that the privatisation agency has been moving on the same levels as the other privatisation 
authorities and demonstrated no additional disadvantages. There were many rumours in the 
Bulgarian press about the termination of the PA or the drastic reduction of its duties by 
increasing the minimum value of the companies handled by the PA. The 1994-7 minimum 
was BGL70 million; in 1998 it was increase to BGL350 million, and finally reached BGNl 
million in 1999. The rumour was that in March 1998 Bozhkov, the Deputy Prime Minister, 
demanded that the minimum would be raised to BGL 4-5 billion an amount met at the time 
only by approximately 10 companies. These rumours have been proven wrong by the present 
situation since the PA is operational and the possibility of its termination is close to zero since 
Bulgaria is so close to the completion of the entire privatisation program.
Considering that December 2002 could be the deadline for Industrial Privatisation, one 
understands that the plan of the Privatisation Agency is ambitious and difficult to meet. By 
the end of 2003, privatisation procedures in industry, construction, transport, agriculture and 
service sectors should be completed and all liquidation procedures should be concluded.
The control functions of the Privatisation Agency over the privatised groups is to be increased. 
Nevertheless, the performance of post-privatisation commitments is not considered as one of 
the main priorities. The transparency of transactions considered to be increased through the 
regulation of the negotiations with potential buyers, if the declared intentions are to be trusted.
4.5 The main reasons for the delay in the Bulgarian P rivatisation  process
Privatisation in Bulgaria in the transition years was very slow and difficult both for reasons of 
insufficient planning and implementation of Privatisation schemes resulting from uncontrolled 
circumstances. The delays in Bulgarian Privatisation were sometimes so striking that they 
affected (very negatively) the trustworthiness of the Bulgarian government. For example the 
Privatisation of 51% of Balkan Airlines was announced in the Wall Street Journal in 1993, 
after an already failed attempt to sell 49% of the company in June of the same year. The
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company was loss making and the agreement contained several unclear elements, although it 
was first privatised in June 1999. On the other hand, in 2000 there were rumors that the license 
will be revoked from the owner Israel’s Zeevi Group. This finally happened due to the 
inability of the Group to invest 20 million USDS, which was included in the privatisation deal 
as an obligation, and in the end, a bankruptcy procedure was launched early in 2001 due to the 
poor financial position of the airline.
The obstacles for privatisation are generated by the considerations each government has to 
make before, and during, the privatisation process. The issues a government should consider 
in order to efficiently start the privatisation process are:
• The selection of the companies to be privatised in different time periods,
• The specific methods to be used in each company, the use or not of a mass 
privatisation method,
• The speed and sequence of the entire privatisation process (restructuring of companies 
before privatisation or passing of this task to the new owners),
• The selection of the percentage that the state will maintain, and the time limit for the 
abolition of all monopolies.
However, two of the most important adverse initial conditions, which were very strong in 
Bulgaria and affected the privatisation process, were the state bureaucracy and the unstable 
business environment. A striking example was the case of Rover. In November 1994, Rover 
acquired a manufacturing company in Bulgaria investing $1.4 million. Some time later the 
company withdrew the investment, because of the problems faced regarding state bureaucracy 
and certain “bridges” in the agreements already signed with the Bulgarian government.
Another two obstacles responsible for the slow Bulgarian privatisation process were the 
political instability (and the conflicts of interest among politically strong parties) and the fact 
that Bulgarians are either indifferent or negative towards privatisation. [Mladenova et al. 
(1997), p.505] A report prepared by the Centre for the Study of Democracy revealed that in 
1992, 74,6% of the population had no intention in participating in the privatisation process.
Until the end of 1997, the above underlying factors responsible for the delay proved Tethal’ 
for the Privatisation process. The unstable political environment and the inability of the acting
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governments to plan and coordinate the economic restructuring had a direct effect on the 
Privatisation process. The negative attitude of the Bulgarian people, especially toward 
Privatisation when there was participation of foreign investors, worsened the situation and led 
many government plans to failure. There were also some functional problems, which 
undermined the Privatisation procedure. The first was the widely discussed valuation problem. 
The former communist countries had an enormous problem firstly in defining the assets 
owned by each company, and then in attributing the proper value on each asset, mainly 
because of the shared use of assets by companies and insufficient accounting records. 
Bulgaria had a large valuation problem, which was underlined by the fact that the so-called 
‘valuation experts’ used in the early years by the Privatisation Agency were Bulgarian citizens 
that were trained in a one or two week seminar and hardly gaining the expertise needed.
The second problem was that after any valuation of the respective companies, the competent 
authorities failed to realize that the price of the company should not merely represent the value 
of the company. In order for the Privatisation deals offered to be attractive to foreign investors 
the potential risk they would undertake by investing, given the unstable and high risky 
business environment and the political and economic instability should be reflected on the 
price in the form of a price reduction. Since it is next to impossible to incorporate all the 
potential risks in a given situation, the instruments, which better approximate financial risk are 
inflation and exchange rates, which, if incorporated in the price accounting for a 5-year 
estimation, may make the price more attractive. This did not happen in Bulgaria so the 
privatised companies were offered at prices much higher than what the investors could 
consider an opportunity.^^ Actually, the situation after the introduction of the currency board 
in mid 1997 and especially in 1998-99, accelerated the whole privatisation process, as 
mentioned above, when Bulgaria faced moderate inflation rates and stable exchange rates.
In general, the parties authorized to conduct Privatisation deals, and especially the 
Privatisation Agency have often been accused of improper judgment in important decisions 
and insufficient planning and control of the procedures.
Another factor, which played an important, negative, role in the Privatisation procedure in 
Bulgaria was the extensive power of the nomenklatura, which was heavily involved in 
informal, or illegal Privatisation. An indicative reference appears in research by Bulgarian 
economists, which suggests that in the time period 1991-1996, assets worth about 100 billion
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leva, and profits of several tens of billion lev were acquired or ‘privatised’ under suspicious 
circumstances (either illegally or by ‘side methods’)/'*
The problem of inconsistent data is apparent in the official citations and reports of the 
Privatisation Agency. Most of the updated data retrieved from yearly reports include changes 
throughout the years. Given the fact that evidence on Privatisation deals appears different in 
separate reports and in different time periods, this research will present the latest data from 
official PA reports after the modifications and calculations done by the author for the purpose 
of higher credibility. Another important note is that according to the Article 1*^  the Bulgarian 
lev shall be re-denominated whereby 1,000 old levs (BGL) shall be exchanged for one new lev 
(BGN). In the data presented in this chapter 1 BGN is equivalent to IDM while lOOOBGL is 
equivalent to IDM. However, there are different results when comparing statistical data using 
different sources such as the Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency (BFIA) and that from the 
PA (see table 2a and figures 2 & 4)* .^
Table 2a: FOREIGN DIRECT IIWESTME  ^IN^^ ^^^
1 i| Privatisation Greenfteld+ I TotaTbyyeiars P" Number
I 1992 1 f ......................... "■■■■]!■........................34,4 r  34,4 P ”  127li ^ Ij ^
r............................... I ........................ n  ^ 6 i |
1 i994 ij 134,2 I................................ 1 ........................ 5 ! 1 210,9 [ ...............
1 1995 ij 26,0 I i j 162,6 1 41:3!
[ 1996 iP" 76,4 P  J  ièôTd 256,4 1......................
I 1997 1 421,4 [ 29,7|j 185,1 j 636,2 1 407^
[ 1998 1  i55;s I 64,2| 400,0 j 620,0 1 4613!
1999 1 226,7 L ...... ...............................................- j" J 359(^1 1  3661 i20,0 615,5 1 1001,5 1 530O;
1 2001 ( la n d une)* jf 390.6 j  409,6 j 2500!
I T o u .u m .2 0 0 ,-  1 167 2638,3 1^ 4252,8 1 3552»;
“GREENFIELD+” - Greenfield investment + additional foreign investment in companies with foreign participation + reinvested earnings + joint ventures + credits by direct investor 
Source: BFIA AGENCY
Except for the above, the following reasons resulted in the slow speed and low effectiveness 
of the Bulgarian Privatisation process.
• The lack of transparency and the existence of corruption and bribery in the 
Privatisation progress discouraged both investors, who had dealt with Bulgarian
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bureaucracy, and potential investors who were informed about the situation by the 
experience of others.
• The macroeconomic environment of Bulgaria that was highly unstable in the time 
period 1989-1997, until the introduction of the currency board, discouraged investors, 
which in any case are heavily affected by the macroeconomic environment of a 
country in investment decisions. After 1997 the Privatisation process was accelerated, 
a fact that resulted from several changes, but was mainly predicated on the initiating 
macroeconomic stabilization.
• The inadequate legal framework and its constant changes did not provide investors 
with any security; instead, it made the trustworthiness of Bulgarian deals rather 
questionable, thus increasing the risk of the investment.
• The effort of Bulgaria to get the highest proceeds possible for the larger and more 
significant state companies, led the government to decide on restructuring before 
Privatisation. Besides the extra financial burden on the state budget, this resulted in 
companies that constituted greater investment opportunities to either be offered at 
unreasonably high prices or not to be offered at all for long time periods until they 
were restructured. Moreover, the delay in offering significant SOEs resulted in low 
value added projects for privatisation offered by the Bulgarian state, and thus resulted 
in low western investment interest.
• Most of the SOEs had high accumulated debts that the Bulgarian state did not 
restmcture rapidly. The restructuring of debt through the restructuring of the 
company, through isolation, or through debt swap operations, either delayed the 
companies’ offering for Privatisation or diminished the value of the companies that 
were offered without settlement of their debts.
• The geographical situation of Bulgaria, which places the country far from the 
advanced western economies, was one of the factors that affected investors in their 
decision to seek Privatisation opportunities in transition economies closer to their own 
countries or to economically developed countries.
• The implementation of methods such as spontaneous Privatisation, MEBO etc,, which 
were not efficiently supervised, allowed the insiders and the nomenklatura to exploit 
inside information for acquiring state property through informal ways. The interest 
was personal profit rather than the effective and prosperous development of the firms.
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• The complex criteria of selecting the buyers, a process that was in many cases anyway 
corrupted by the insiders and the nomenklatura, and the barriers of state bureaucracy, 
delayed the Privatisation process and discouraged potential investors.
• The Kosovo war and the embargo that the Western countries imposed in the area cut 
Bulgaria off from its main export channels. This resulted not only in a drastic increase 
in transportation costs, but also a decrease in the export potential of the area and the 
possibility of expanding markets. The turmoil of war and its economic consequences 
on the wide area hardly indicated a period suitable for investments in a country so 
much affected by the situation as Bulgaria was.
• The economic crises of both Asia and the former USSR discouraged investors from 
investing in Eastern emerging markets, because they indicated that the risk of the 
investment was high compared to the potential return or, despite any return, they were 
not capable of undertaking such high risk.
• The lack of experience in Bulgaria, which led to decisions that negatively affected 
Privatisation, such as the choice of inexperience valuation ‘experts’, as well as the 
state bureaucracy that was inherited from the communist years, created an insecure 
environment for investors. The positive changes that occurred after 1997, such as the 
introduction of international consultants in the Privatisation deals, were a product of 
the experience acquired as well as the response to external pressures.
• Until 1997, the inability and unwillingness of the changing governments to facilitate 
Privatisation led to decisions that stalled both the process of Privatisation and the 
process of restructuring. The political instability was both a cause and an effect of the 
delay in the transition to a market economy.
• The problem of the correct valuation of the state owned firms brought about 
significant delays and inefficiencies in the Privatisation process. Initially, the lack of 
proper and accurate accounting records and the missing documents that clarified 
property rights and other information about the firm, made the valuation of separate 
firms very difficult.
• There was a lack of information regarding the companies, which were offered for 
privatisation. The information was based on misleading data from the former 
management and different accounting rules and techniques, which should have been 
resolved through a proper evaluation of past performance together with the value of 
the assets. Specifically the data provided lacks evidence of profitability, because the
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State was not profit oriented and the intermediate goods were discriminatorily priced 
through either internal means or through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) trade, a fact restricting predictions on the future profits of the company. 
Many companies were missing evidence on purchasing prices, and those which had all 
of the papers needed, appeared to have been purchased again at discriminatory prices.
• According to Bulgarian law, a Privatisation deal is consummated with the sale of more 
than 50% of the state company to a private investor. The 49% which belongs to the 
state may be sold later to other investors or remain in the ownership of the state. 
Nevertheless, Bulgarian Corporate law allows a shareholder, or a group of 
shareholders, which own more than 33% of the shares, to block strategic decisions 
concerning the company. Thus, the IMF and other institutions put pressure on the 
Bulgarian government to offer more than 67% of the total shares of each state-owned 
company. The investors are discouraged by the fact that the government may offer 
more than 33% of the state-owned company in MEBO, Mass, or other kinds of 
Privatisation, since this will create problems in corporate governance and may restrict 
foreign investor’s strategic moves if the decisions are blocked by employees or other 
investors.
• The late abolishment of monopolies, or the delay of this abolishment, the absence of 
an adequate competitive environment together with the lack of strong structural 
reforms, the lack of sound stock market and financial intermediaries and the high risk 
Bulgarian environment led again to the absence of significant western foreign 
investment interest.
• The limited savings of people led to limited participation in mass privatisation 
programs and in the inadequate creation and establishment of new private firms
4.6 Privatisation as a way of foreign entry in Bulgaria; Questionnaire Results
Examining table 3a, we can argue that from 64 companies, only 23 of them (35,9%) 
participated in the Bulgarian privatisation procedure.
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Table 3a: Statistical Analysis -  Questionnaire Survey________________________________________________________________________________________
Privatisation as an entry way o f foreign Involvement and the sector Privatisation as an entry way o f foreign involvement and the origin o f  
MNEs
Knd of business
Total
Productiveflrrdustry
•flextits Services/Banks Trade/Food
Wvatisabori No Count 11 11 19 41
% 28.8 Ï 28.8% 48.3% 100,0%
t 47,811 61.1% 82.6% 64,1%
Yes Count 12 7 4 23
X 62.2% 30.4% 17.4% 100D%
X «2.2% 38.8% 17,4% 35,9%
Total Court 23 18 23 64
X 35,«% 28.1% 35,9% 100D%
X 1D0i)% 100.0% 100 J)% i m %
Origin of MNEs
TotalGreece
Europe & 
Other
Privatisation No Count 
%
%
30
73.2%
81,1%
11
26.8%
40.7%
41
100,0%
64.1%
Yes Count 
%
%
7
30.4%
18.9%
16
69.6%
50.3%
23
100.0%
35.9%
Total Count 
%
I
37
67.8%
100.0%
27
422%
100D%
64
100.0%
100.0%
Low progress in transition process (privatisation, banking reform, etc.) Bureaucracy [Y72] as a barrier and privatisation as a way of foreign.«îîtry..
Total0 1
Wnd of Productive/Industry+ Count 
business Textiles %
%
23
100.0%
42.8%
23
100.0%
36.9%
Services/Banks Court 
%
%
8
44.4%
14,9%
ID
66.6%
100.0%
18
100.0%
28.1%
Trade/Food Count 
%
%
23
100.0%
42.6%
23
100.0%
35.9%
Total Count 
\
%
54
84.4%
100.0%
ID
15.6%
100.0%
64
100.0%
100.0%
Y72
No Yes Total
Privatisation No Count 18 23 41
% 43.9% 56.1% 100.0%
% 66.7% 62.2% 64.1%
Yes Count 9 14 23
% 39.1% 60,9% 100.0%
% 33.3% 37.8% 35.9%
Total Count 27 37 64
% 42.2% 57,8% 100.0%
% 100,0% 100D% 100.0%
Crime, Corruption, illegal actions (Y67) and Privatisation as a way o f High Investment risk (Y75) and Privatisation as a way of foreign entry
Privai sation
TotalNo Yes
Y67 No Count 
%
%
15
50,0%
36,6%
15
50.0%
65.2%
30
100.0%
46.9%
Yes Count 
%
%
26
76.5%
63.4%
8
23.5%
34.8%
34
100.0%
53.1%
Total Count 
%
%
41
64.1%
100.0%
23
35.9%
100.0%
64
100.0%
100.0%
Privatisation
TotalNo Yes
Y75 No Count 
%
%
19
61.3%
46,3%
12
38.7%
52.2%
31
100.0%
48.4%
Yes Count 
%
%
22
66.7%
53.7%
11
33.3%
47.8%
33
100.0%
51.6%
Total Count 
%
%
41
64.1%
100.0%
23
35.9%
100,0%
64
100.0%
100.0%
Privatisation deals (from MNEs which participated in the questionnaire research) in Bulgaria 
have been taken place mostly in industrial or textile sector (12/23 with 52.2%), followed by 
the services sector (7/18 with 38.9%). At the same time, 17.4% (4/23) of the companies, 
which belong to the trade/food sector have invested in Bulgaria using a privatisation 
programme. We can argue that MNEs participated in the Bulgarian privatisation process 
preferred to invest mostly in the above sectors, mainly because the Bulgarian governments 
privatised the specific SOEs*^ from these sectors.
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Figure 5: Privatisation Concluded Transaction by Sectors (up to Feb. 2002)
D istribu tion  o f  th e  P riv a tisa tio n  C o n c lu d e d  
T ra n s a c t io n s  By S e c to r s  in B u igaria  (up  to  
F e b ru a ry  2002)
0 Industry 33%
B Trade 23%
□ Agriculture 12%
□ Tourism 11%
a Construction 9% 
H Transport 8%
B Others 4%
Source: PA
The later is also apparent, when observing the official data provided until February of 2002 
(figure 5), in which it is pointed out that 42% of the concluded privatisation deals belong to 
the industrial sector (industry and construction), followed by the trade sector with 23% and the 
services sector with 19% (tourism and transport).
Examining table 3a, we can conclude that only 18.9% of the responding Greek companies 
(7/37) participated in the Bulgarian privatisation programs, while at the same time 59.3% 
(16/23) of foreign MNEs (other than Greek MNEs) have also invested in Bulgaria using a 
privatisation program. In other words, geographical proximity played a significant role for 
Greek companies to choose other ways to establish an FDI project in a neighbour country, 
such as Bulgaria. Most Greek MNEs preferred greenfield FDI. It is quite easy and most 
probable for a company, which is about to invest in a neighbour country, to proceed with 
market research searching for a bargain acquisition of land, or a building and/or moving its 
machinery fi*om the home country in order to establish a greenfield investment. Thus, the 
origin of MNEs was found to be significant in the consideration of participation in a 
privatisation program or choosing other ways of foreign entry. With the help of statistics we 
underpinned the above results, and we found that the p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 table) 
is 0.002 and thus <0.01. Therefore, we accept the Ha hypothesis, and so, there is strong 
association between the two variables (entry modes of foreign involvement and the origin of 
MNEs) at a 1% level of significance.
Examining table 3a, we found only ten responding MNEs (a small percentage of 15,6%
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(10/64)), who had invested in Bulgaria using a privatisation programme and mentioned that 
the delay in the privatisation process and the whole transition process was a barrier for 
considering an FDI project in Bulgaria. The most interesting thing was the fact that all such 
companies belong to the services sector, primary banks. In other words, it can be concluded 
that foreign MNEs, which have invested in Bulgaria, did not consider the above barrier as a 
significant one, with the exemption of the majority of MNEs, which belong to the services 
sector (10/18 equals to 55.6%). This can be partially explained by the fact that banks being 
financial intermediaries, are concerned with the whole privatisation process upon which their 
progress depends. At the same time, an MNE, which belongs to other sectors, is interested in 
the completion of a privatisation deal rather than in considering the whole delay in the 
privatisation or in the transition process of a country as a significant barrier. From a statistical 
point of view we can conclude that according to the Pearson chi-square test the p-value is 0 
and thus <0.01. Therefore, we accept the Ha hypothesis, and suggest that there is strong 
association between the two variables (low privatisation and transition process and the sector 
that an MNE belongs to) at the 1% level of significance.
Examining table 3a, we can argue that 37/64 (57.8%) of the sampled MNEs mentioned 
bureaucracy as an important barrier when considering FDI. However, 14/23 (60,9%) 
companies, which have been involved in Bulgaria with a privatisation deal, have also 
mentioned that bureaucracy was a barrier for their investment plan. At the same time, 23 out 
of 41 (56,1%) companies, which used other ways of foreign entry in Bulgaria, have argued 
that bureaucracy was a barrier for an FDI project. Thus, the research suggests that bureaucracy 
affected all the ways of foreign involvement and all the levels of foreign investment. The 
statistics also underpin the above argument. The p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 table) is 
0,915 and thus >0.1. Therefore, we reject the Ha hypothesis, and we accept the null (Ho) 
hypothesis and suggest, there is no association between the two variables (bureaucracy as a 
barrier and privatisation as an entry mode of foreign involvement).
Examining table 3a, we can point out that 34/64 (53,1%) MNEs have also considered 
corruption and the lack of transparency together with other illegal actions (crime, bribery etc.) 
as a barrier for an FDI project in Bulgaria. However, corruption has not been considered as a 
significant barrier from MNEs, which invested in Bulgaria using a privatisation programme 
(8/23, 34,8%). On the other hand, corruption was an important barrier for other forms of 
foreign involvement in Bulgaria, such as green-field FDI or joint ventures. In other words,
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68% of MNEs, which used a green-held FDI entry mode and 58% of MNEs, which 
established joint ventures in Bulgaria have also considered corruption as a barrier for their FDI 
projects. However, MNEs did not consider corruption as a barrier when investing in Bulgaria 
through acquisitions. This result may be explained by the fact that although corruption is still a 
fact in Bulgaria, companies, which became higher bidders in the privatisation deals and finally 
acquired the state-owned companies, did not mention corruption as a barrier (because of the 
“happy end” of the privatisation deal). However, the majority of other MNEs (not 
participating in privatisation programme, mentioned corruption as a barrier - 26/41 thus 
63.4%) may failed to acquire a State Owned Enterprise (SOE), through a privatisation 
program, due to corruption, or have chosen other ways of foreign involvement, such as joint 
ventures or green-field FDI, in which corruption is strongly associated. The high percentage of 
53.1% (34/64) sampled companies, which considered corruption as a barrier for an FDI in 
Bulgaria, is not a surprise. In fact, during the first years of transition, when clear property 
rights did not exist, the unstable legal system and the inappropriate/inadequate enforcement of 
the law, left space for cormption. Thus, corruption did not affect privatisation, when 
corruption significantly affected other foreign entry modes in Bulgaria. The statistics underpin 
this argument. The p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 table) is 0,052 and thus <0.1. 
Therefore, we accept the Ha hypothesis, and so, there is association between the two variables 
(corruption and ways of foreign entry) at the 10% level of significance.
Examining table 3a, we can point out that 33/64 (51,6%) MNEs mentioned the high 
investment risk as a barrier for establishing an FDI project in Bulgaria. Moreover, 47.8% 
(11/23) of the companies who participated in the research, which used Bulgarian privatisation 
program, have also considered Bulgaria as a high risk environment. However, there is a 
similar percentage of 53.7% (22/41) of the companies, which chose other ways of foreign 
involvement in Bulgaria, and which, at the same time, have also considered Bulgaria as a high 
risk environment. Thus, this questionnaire research concluded that the chosen way of foreign 
involvement was indifferent when considering risk as an FDI barrier. Foreign MNEs, which 
successfully participated in privatisation program, did not mention that the risky environment 
was a barrier for them, due to the fact that they acquired SOEs in lower prices and thus it was 
supposed that the risk has been embodied in the price. On the other hand, the consideration of 
risk as a barrier is connected with other elements such as the sector that an MNE belongs to, 
the idiosyncrasy of the entrepreneur, the existence of prior trade relations etc. The statistics 
underpins the above argument. The p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 table) is 0,851 and thus
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>0.1. Therefore, we reject the Ha hypothesis, and we accept the Ho hypothesis and so, there is 
no association between the two variables (high risk environment as a barrier and privatisation 
as an entry way of foreign involvement).
4.7 Foreign P artic ip ation  in the B ulgarian  B anking System  during its 
tran sition  period (1989-2001)
4.7.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
This section outlines most of the aspects, which seem to have a more direct impact on the 
functioning of the financial system and on the process of its transformation. The role of 
financial intermediaries such as banks, and investment fonds and stock market exchange is 
significant in the privatisation process. A stable and developed banking system helps the 
economic stabilisation and development in general, and it is also a factor, which encourages 
foreign investors in their decisions for undertaking FDI projects. A sound banking system, 
which helps the companies in their investment plans through financing their projects, as well 
as a functioning stock market exchange, which is a basic tool for mass or market privatisation, 
are essential parts o f a stable economy.
The banking environment of an ex-communist country was difficult to change in order to 
provide a competitive and efficient banking system and to facilitate the different banking 
activities of investors. There was a need to encourage foreign investors to participate in the 
general privatisation process, and also in the specific privatisation, restructuring, and 
corporatization of the state-owned banks, which process was very slow and inefficient for the 
case of Bulgaria. The history of the banking system in the communist years clarifies the 
significant delay in the establishment of a sound banking system and the difficulty of 
privatising it.
One of the main difficulties was the establishment of an adequate legal framework, which 
could support and control the banking sector. Moreover, the delay of adopting laws regarding 
the bad loans, liquidation and bankruptcy led to the instability of the sector and the delay of 
the transition to a market economy.
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The creation and the increase of private sector is precondition for the market economy, thus, 
the establishment of new private banks, the establishment of foreign branches and the 
participation of the foreign banks through privatisation of whole or part of state owned banks, 
help the transition to a market economy, and it is actually a form of FDI. The creation of BCC 
(Bulgarian Consolidation Company) helped the privatisation process, through the mergers of 
59 banks into 4 big banks and their subsequent privatisation. The significant economic 
development and the inflow of significant FDI amounts in Bulgaria coincided with the 
development of an efficient banking system and the entrance of foreign banks either with new 
branches or with privatisation and acquisition of state-owned banks. Foreign bank can 
participate in a host country:
• with a branch (e.g. Pireus Group (ex Xios Bank), Alpha bank of Greece (ex Ionian 
Bank), National Bank of Greece, HypoVereinsBank, TNG, and Ziraat Bankasi in 
Bulgaria),
• or creating a new private bank (e.g. Demirbank-Bulgaria and Raiffeisenbank in 
Bulgaria)
• or making direct acquisition (e.g. Commercial Bank of Greece in Bulgaria)
• or through the BCC’s privatisation programme (e.g. Eurobank + Alico and Société
Generate in Bulgaria),
• or with a joint venture (e.g. BNP + Dresdner Bank in Bulgaria),
• or with limited (minority) participation (e.g. EBRD in Bulgaria).
4.7 .2  Bank C on solid ation  Com pany (BC C )
The Bank Consolidation Company (BCC) was established by the Bulgarian government 
with the purpose of reorganising the banking system by consolidating the small weak banks 
and creating strong large banks to be offered for privatization. Hunter (1993)*® has argued "the 
Bulgarian government has established the BCC - similar in some respects to the Resolution 
Trust Corporation in the United States, which is charged with liquidating financially failed  
savings and private risk capital and the absence o f established markets fo r  asset liquidation. 
Thus, unlike the United States in recent cases, Bulgaria can not rely on the formation o f  
private companies to purchase and liquidate the failed companies”. The BCC was established 
in order to deal with the large number of stated-owned banks that decreased the efficiency of 
the banking system. Established on 4, January, 1992, the BCC is a share-holding company
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owned jointly by the Ministry of Finance, the BNB and the BFTB. The initial capital of BCC
was BGL933 million; 20 % from the BFTB and 80% from the BNB.*^ The BCC represented
the state's interest in approximately 70 small state-owned banks^°.
The first consolidation project started in the second half of 1992 when the BCC encouraged 
the merger between Doverie Commercial Bank and 21 other smaller banks. This consolidation 
led to the establishment of the United Bulgarian Bank at the end of 1992, which was firstly 
privatised in August 1997 [for more details see section 4.7].^*
Table 4a: Consolidation of the UBB
Doverie Bank Construction Bank i Rousse Pleven Vratza i 
LovechShoumen Haskovo i Gabrovo Kaijaii
I  Montana Pazardzik i|lPeshtera | Siiven Nova Zagora j
Iskar Elhovo Ij Botevgrad Samokov Targovishte
Pemik Popovo x : ...............
Source: Dobrinsky (1994), Chapter 14, p. 343
In April 1993, the BalkanBank received permission from the BNB and the BCC to acquire 
three small regional banks. This project completed in 1994, and then BalkanBank was closed.
Table 5a: Consolidation of the Balkanbank
i LBalkanbank |  Vidin j| Lyaskotetz jj Goma Oriahovitza 11
Source: Dobrinsky (1994), Chapter 14, p. 343
During the second-half of 1993, BCC created ExpressBank, by a merger of 12 state banks 
(one sectoral and 11 regional), which was privatised in September 1999,
Table 6a: Consolidation of the Expressbank
rwvw w w vw ww w w ww w w ww vvw vvv^çTransport Bank nnnfvvvvvvvvwvvvvvvvvvvxçVarna Vazrazhdane Bank Kyustendil |  Silistra
Razgrad Smolian • Cherven Briag Rila Bank if Gotze Delchev
I  Provadija Devin :.......................................................... _.......: ...................................................
Source: Dobrinsky (1994), Chapter 14, p. 343
and Hebrosbank, by a merger of 8 state banks (one sectoral and seven regional).
Table 7a: Consolidation of Hebrobank
Plovdiv Veliko Tamo V O Blagoevgrad
Vitosha Bank Mezdra |  Troian i Chepelare
Source: Dobrinsky (1994), Chapter 14, p. 343
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In 1994, the BCC encouraged the merger of Hemus Commercial Bank, Sofia Commercial 
Bank, Electronika Commercial Bank and Kazanlik Commercial Bank to create Sofiabank (one 
sectoral and three regional). In September 1995, the BCC forced another merger between the 
Sofiabank (1993), Commercial Bank Biochim (1987), Commercial Bank Serdika (1995) and 
several smaller banks (Sredetz Bank, Burgas, Stara Zagora, Karlovo, Trakia Bank, 
Asenovgrad, Parvomai, Elin Pelin). This was the basis for establishing the BiochimBank. 
Within two years of its establishment, the BCC facilitated the mergers o f approximately 50 
commercial banks into 5 large organisations.^^
Consolidations were envisaged to produce stronger banks, but the consolidation of weak banks 
without restructuring, is bound to lead to bigger, but equally weak banks. The situation of 
BalkanBank that experienced liquidity problems and loan collection problems (in 1995, and 
especially in 1996) that brought the bank close to insolvency, prove this point, BalkanBank 
was eventually bankrupted in 1997, E* of August.
Maybe, this was one of the reasons that the privatisation of the large banks was delayed and 
no deals were achieved until 1997. The privatisation of the state banks begun gradually and 
the BCC sold most of the minority shares in several private banks, like First International 
Bank, Commercial and Savings Bank and Crystalbank. During the second half of 1995, and 
in 1996, the BCC played a significant role in the development of the program for the 
restructuring of the banking sector in Bulgaria. In the second half of 1997, and after the 
government had clarified the banking sector development strategy the BCC was authorised to 
accelerate the privatisation of the state-owned banks and to promote the expansion of activities 
of foreign banks in Bulgaria. The first bank privatisation project that had started in 1994 was 
completed in August 1997, soon after the announcement of the strategy. The United Bulgarian 
bank, one of the six largest state owned banks, was firstly privatised by the EBRD (35% of the 
shares) and Oppenheimer & Co. Incorporation (30% of the shares). This privatisation was 
followed by the initiation, in September 1997, of extensive efforts for the sale of the Bulgarian 
Post Bank. The bank received three very competitive offers and was finally sold to the 
strategic investing consortium of the American Life Insurance Company (ALICO, AIG) with 
the Consolidated Eurofinance Holdings (Greek Eurobank) in November 1998. The BCC's 
strategy preferred a strong well-managed financial institution as a strategic investor for each of 
the banks because although the price is a important issue of the offer, the investors ability to
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invest additional capital (if necessary) and management expertise into the Bulgarian banking 
system is a major factor in evaluating prospective offers (spillover effects from FDI inflows).
In any case the BCC was relatively successful since "... by mid-1994 the BCC has succeeded 
in merging most o f the 59 banks into 6, whilst 6 others were left unmerged and 2 were put 
under BNB administration fo r  possible liquidation.” [Wyzan (1996)]^^
BCC has managed to sell five of the six state-owned banks (four created from the 
consolidation, together with Postbank and Bulbank) and only Biochim is remaining. 
Although BCC’s task was very close to its conclusion, in a general meeting held in end-July 
2000 the state decided to extend the BCC's life until February 2004, thus keeping on function 
BCC for another three years. The BCC has also a new mandate to compile, a strategy for the 
sale of a 25-percent stake of Banka DSK's shares (former State Savings Bank), the 
privatisation of a minority stake of the state-owned Central Co-operative Bank (CCB). Under 
IMF's requirement the state-owned share in the CCB should drop under 33 percent. As the 
CCB is a public company the privatisation deal may be completed through the stock exchange.
4.7.3 B ulgarian  B anking P rivatisa tion  deals (up to the end 2001)
4.7.3.1 UNITED BULGARIAN BANK (UBB)
The first trial for a privatisation deal for the United Bulgarian Bank (UBB) was concluded two 
months after the election o f Ivan Rostov's Government in (June) 1997, after years of 
preparation. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the 
Bulbank bought 35% of UBB's capital each, and the remaining 30 per cent was sold to the 
Oppenheimer & Co, from the United States. In 1999, the latter (under the name CIBC 
Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.) sold part of its stake (17.19 per cent of the total) to the AIG New 
Europe Fund, a subsidiary of the American International Group (AIG) of New York. In July 
1999, in the “third part” of the privatisation of the UBB, the National Bank of Greece (NBG) 
acquired 90 per cent of UBB for 215 million dollars from Bulbank and the other shareholders. 
The EBRD retained a 10 per cent stake.
4.7.3.2 BULGARIAN POST BANK
The bitterest experience of the BCC was probably the sale of the Bulgarian Post Bank, which 
was one of the most controversial deals of 1998, although it was declared the best deal of the 
year among all privatisation deals. The problem started when the deadline for submitting
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offers was extended, regardless of the fact that only two investors had made their bid. One of 
the bidders was the National Bank of Greece, backed by the EBRD. Following its investment 
policy, the EBRD was planning to buy a minority stake in the Post Bank (in case the National 
Bank of Greece would win in the bidding) with the intention to sell it years later. The other 
bidder was ALICO/CEH Balkan Holdings Ltd, a joint venture set up by the American Life 
Insurance Co. (ALICO) (an AIG subsidiary), and the Consolidated Eurofmance Holdings S.A. 
(CEH S. A., a Greek subsidiary of the European Financial Group Eurobank based in Geneva, 
Switzerland). After the extension, the European branch of Japan's Nomura bank and Bulgaria's 
Eurobank also joined in the bidding. The latter dropped out in the initial stage of selection. 
Then, Nomura was selected as exclusive buyer, though the other bidders were not rejected 
either. After nearly half a year of negotiations with Nomura, the BCC invited all three bidders 
to review their offers. Then Nomura withdrew, and ALICO/CEH took possession of a 78.23% 
stake in Post Bank for USD$38 million in cash. Following an increase of the bank's capital 
from BGN12 million to BGN51 million, ALICO/CEH currently owns an 86.24% stake in 
Post Bank. The remaining is distributed among Bulgarian Posts, the Bulgarian 
Telecommunications Company, the State Insurance Institute, DSK Bank and the National 
Palace of Culture. The Post Bank now holds 6.85 per cent of the national banking market, and 
its capital adequacy is 35%.
4.7.3.3 EXPRESSBANK
The approved buyer of the Varna-based Expressbank, which was established in 1993, was the 
French bank Société Generale with a payment of USD39.1 million for the 97.95% of the 
capital of Expressbank, previously held by the Bank Consolidation Company. The other 
bidders for Expressbank (now SG Expressbank) included the Regent Pacific Group, Bulgaria's 
First Investment Bank, and a consortium of two Turkish companies. In their offers the bidders 
were required, among other things, to state which of the three proposed methods they would 
choose to settle the USD23.5 million debt of the Varna Shipyard to the bank. The options 
were; a USD 15.5 million government guarantee, the BCC repaying the debt, or the buyer 
assuming the liability. The negotiations between Société Generale and the BCC started on 
August 9, 1999 after the French bank had been chosen as exclusive buyer by the company on 
July 27, 1999. Under an agreement, which entered into force on November 30, 1999 all loans 
and guarantees extended by the bank to the shipyard were transferred to the BCC. The fixing 
of the bank's price was depended mostly on the settlement of the debts of its biggest debtor 
under ZUNK - the bankrupt Varna Shipyard. The deal was finalized on November 30, 1999
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when the whole sum (39.1 million USD) was transferred and the shares were endorsed. Thus, 
Bulgaria complied with IMF's requirement to privatise Expressbank by the end of 1999.
4.7.3.4 Hebrosbank
Regent Pacific Group became the owner of a 97.75 stake in Plovdiv-based Hebrosbank by 
paying USD 23.5$ million in cash and undertaking investment obligations of USD5$ million 
in the year 2000, USD3 million in 2001, and USD2$ million in 2002. Regent prevailed over 
two other bidders, a consortium formed by Kentbank and Finansbank of Turkey, and a 
consortium formed by the Turkish Municipal Bank, the Bulgarian Holding Company and St. 
Sofia Holding. On the day of signing the contract (December 10, 1999), Regent Pacific 
Group’s Director predicted that soon Hebrosbank would become Bulgaria's second largest 
financial institution in terms of capital volume, a promise that never became true.
4.7.3.5 BULBANK
Bulbank is the largest Bulgarian bank with total assets of BGN2.26 
billion as of September 30, 1999. Before the privatisation deal in 2000, Bulbank was 98% 
owned by the Banking Consolidation Company, while afterwards it was oftered for 
privatisation, preferably by a strategic investor, which would bring fresh technical expertise in 
Bulbank. After many postponements, three bidders presented their offers by April 19, 2000; a 
consortium of Unicredito Italiano and Germany's Allianz; the Canovas S.A. consortium 
controlled by interests of the Greek tycoon Vardinoiannis and the Credit Agricole of France; 
and Belgium's KBC Bank. None of the three bidders wanted to buy less than a 67% share, that 
the BCC offered aiming at to registering the remaining shares at the stock exchange, and to 
keeping a percentage for the managers. On May 10, 2000 Unicredito/AIlianz was selected as 
a preferred buyer. Canovas's offer was ranked second best. In case the negotiations with 
Unicredito/AIlianz failed, the BCC would proceed with at least one of the other bidders. 
Bulbank was finally acquired by the UniCredito/Allianz consortium that paid EUR360 million 
for 98% of the bank. The price was EURIO million higher from the initial offer by Unicredito 
and Allianz. The Italian Unicredito will get 93% of the bank and Allianz will get 5%. The 
consortium members have undertaken the obligation not to sell their shares for at least three 
years.
Bulbank was also rated as the best local institution trading in securities and owns 27% of the 
assets of the Bulgarian banking system. Bulbank was credited by a Single B long-tern and
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short-term rating by Standard & Poors, at the beginning of 2000. The rating takes into 
consideration the economic and banking environment of Bulgaria, which is still considerably 
risky, but at the same time assesses the banks' high commercial position, its steady liquidity, 
and its relatively low-risk asset profile, especially compared with the other financial 
institutions in the emerging economies.
Bulbank has also been rated as the best local bank by the Euromoney magazine in 1999. The 
data for the rating is based on the annual reports o f the central banks of Central and Eastern 
European countries, and the prize is awarded to institutions whose majority stake is owned by 
local persons. This means that from next year Bulbank will no longer participate in the rating 
under this indicator since it is 98% owned by foreign investors. The sale of Bulbank, 
Bulgaria's most profitable bank with a market share of about 30% is the biggest privatization 
deal in the Balkan region in 2000.
Ranked by 1997 & 1998 Revenues in US$ Millions (from the TÔP 100 linking Table -  Best i Banks)
1997 i
P* place i Komercnv Banka as CzechRepublic Assets billion 14,704 i 29 million net profits j
36^ place i Bulbank Bulgaria Bulgaria Assets Billion USD ; 1,358 USD $ million 97 net j : profits
80^ place ; State Savings Bank Bulgaria Assets Million USD i 496 profits
86^ place : United Bulgarian Bank Bulgaria Assets Million USD j 457
USD $ million 72 net : profits
1998
Komercnv Banka as.
CzechRepublic
Bulbank Bulgaria Assets Billion USD j . . . . . . . . . . . 1,2. . . . . . . . . . 1 USD $ million 42 net i | profits
80^place i1 State Savings Bank Bulgaria Assets Million USD i 580 USD $ million 3,6 net | profits
9iP^lace ii United Bulgarian Bank Bulgaria 512 profits
l^ ,^ MVWWW«VMWWyVV«W«MVV>>>MV«WI^ WyyWI>VMVVWVVV«V«VyV«>iV«WVVV«V«V«V««WWVVWVWkVV«VV^ ^Source: Deloitte & Touche 1997 & 1998, Ranked by 1997 & 1998 Revenues in ÜS$ Millions
Bulgarian Banks pfier One Capital |  Total assets
T BIEb ANK (31/12/1998) l^rUr^lTmfifio^^ 2.196.595
2. UNITED BULGARIAN BANK (31/12/1998) I Î98,076 million Leva if 867.703
3. STATE SAVINGS BANK (31/12/1998) 1 72,134 million Leva ij 881.224
4. EXPRESSBANK (31/12/1998) fôl^zTm illion Leva^^l^6L584^^^
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5. BULGARIAN POST B A N K  (31/12/1998) 29,537 m illion Leva 397.780
Source; the Banker, June 1999.
Table 10a: Top 100 Central Europeans Banks (The Banker April 1999 +M ay 1998)
PLACE (END 1997) COUNTRY CAPITAL ij PLACE (END 1996) i| COUNTRY CAPITAL i
KOMERCNI B A N K A  
1“
CZECH
REPUBLIC
970 mil 1 KOMERCNI 
U S$ ij B AN K A  1“
CZECH
REPUBLIC
1084 mil 
U S$ j
BANK HANDLOW Y  
W W ARSZAW IE 2 ^
POLAND 718 m il 1 ËÀMC
U S$ ! HANDLOW Y W
Ij W ARSZAW IE 2*® 1
POLAND 787 mil US$ i
Bulbank 2 r Bulgaria 235 m i l~ ir B u lb a n k  27® j 
U S$ II
Bulgaria 140 mil US$ i
United Bulgarian Bank 
64*^
Bulgaria 42 mil if United Bulgarian 
U S $ _______i  Bank 66'*’____________ 1
Bulgaria 44 mil US$ 1
State Savings Bank 
68^ ^
Bulgaria 40 m il ij State Savings Bank - i
u s $ ______ ij__________  i
Bulgaria
Bulgarian Post Bank  
73'*’
Bulgaria 38 mil ij Bulgarian Post B aîE  i 
U S$ ij -___  ___________ j
Bulgaria
Expressbank 106® Bulgaria 25 mil if Expressbank 64“’
u s s  il
Bulgaria 64 mil US$ i
Source: The Banker (1998, 1999)
Author’s Comment: From the above three tables it is clear that Bulbank, U BB, SSB, Postbank and Expressbank 
are the strongest five Bulgarian Banks, w hich also appeared in the TOP 100 Central & Eastern European Banks. 
Four out o f  five o f them have been privatised (except the state-owned SSB).
4.7.3.6 BIOCHIM
Biochim is another bank owned by the BCC, and the latest deadline for its privatisation, set by 
the IMF and the World Bank, is the May of the year 2002. The case of Biochim is maybe the 
most complicated privatisation deal in the Bulgarian banking system. During the second trial 
of the privatisation of Biochim, the BCC was supposed to signed confidentiality agreements 
with the Austrian Bank Austria Creditanstalt International, the Raiffeisen Zentralbank AG, the 
Commercial Bank of Greece, the Italian Banko Nazionale del Lavoro, the HebrosBank and the 
French BNP-Paribas. Experts in Bulgaria believed that the battle for Biochim would have 
been only between Bulgaria's Hebrosbank and the Commercial Bank of Greece. The reality 
was even worst. The bid of the only candidate buyer was opened on January 24 2001. For 
Bulgarian officials it was much more important to find a strategic buyer for Biochim rather 
than rush the sale of the bank. On the other hand, it was the first deadline of IMF (end March 
2001), which push the government to “finalize” the privatisation of Biochim with the sole 
tender, Hebrosbank, which offer to the BCC board of directors about USD$20 million for the 
state interest in Biochim (99.3%). Since no other offer was submitted, the Bulgarian officials 
compared the previous uncompleted trial of Hebrosbank's bid to Neftinvestbank one of last 
year. At that time, Neftinvestbank was also chosen as an exclusive buyer through a tender. It 
offered $10 million for 67 percent stake in Biochim (plus 27 million levs to be used for
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capital increase). The officials also figured out that if Neftinvestbank had bidden for the entire 
state-owned stake, for which now Hebrosbank bids, the price would have risen to around $15 
million, together with an amount of another $6 million - the worth of the capital increase, 
which the state completed last year. Though, the calculations prove that if Neflinvestbanks 
participated in that tender, it would offer $20-$22 million (exactly as much as Hebrosbank 
offers) or even a little more. The fact is that nothing has been finalized after the above trials 
(two privatisation failures for the case of Biochim) and the Bulgarian government is very 
worried for the completion of this deal before the latest deadline of the IMF. At the beginning 
of 2002, the BCC has announced that signed confidentiality agreements (under the third 
privatisation trial of Biochim) with the Roseximbank, Hebrosbank, the Commercial Bank of 
Greece. However, there are a few more candidates such as the Bank Austria, the Société 
Generale, Bulbank and the TBI Holding.
4.8 Foreign banks and financial interm ediaries in Bulgaria; Incentives and 
Barriers for their  FDI projects
The establishment of the currency board in July 1997 brought a significant increase in foreign 
participation in the privatisation of the Bulgarian Banking system, which also holds a 
significant part in the FDI inflows’ statistics. Author’s research in Bulgaria has shown that 
foreign investors, especially from Greece, have participated in most of the 41 Bulgarian banks, 
braches or representative offices (tables 11a & 1 lb).
Table 11a; Total Bank
License Type Number i i
Commercial banks with an international banking license jl 27
i Commercial banks w ith dom estic and lim ited license if 1  i l
Branches o f  foreign banks in Bulgaria j | 8
Representative offices if 4 i l
Bulgarian National Bank i f 1
TOTAL 1 41 i
Source: Bitzenis ' Research
Bulgaria, like all Central & Eastern European countries experienced many difficulties in 
establishing a stable banking system, and is still far from reaching the level of a western-type 
banking system in terms of broadness of activities and quality of infrastructure. Few domestic 
banks, which play an important role in the sector, are willing to make efforts to that extent, but 
the presence of foreign banks will help their efforts in broadening their services as well as the 
efforts of the Bulgarian government in attracting further foreign direct investment inflows.
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The presence of the foreign banks that offer western style services, assist the local banks to 
work better and adopt the western banking approach more quickly, since the co-existence of 
foreign and domestic banks, will not only establish competitive trends, but encourage the 
development of current investments and invite potential investment decisions. The 
introduction of the currency board greatly assisted the development of the banking system 
since it stabilised the lev, thus provided a less risky environment for the foreign investors both 
in banking and in other fields.
The presence of many private banks and several foreign banks or foreign bank branches, have 
assisted in the development of relatively competitive environment. Tsantis A. (1997) '^  ^ has 
argued ''that the evolution o f the banking system reflects on one hand the achievements o f  
BCC to consolidate the state-owned banks and, on the other, the entry o f  private banks. The 
number o f commercial banks is declining because o f  the consolidation.... There is still very 
little foreign banking presence. Greek banks are particularly active, as much o f  Bulgaria's 
trade activities are with its southern neighbour."'
According to official statistics, seven foreign banks (5 branches of foreign banks) were 
established in Bulgaria between 1994-1996. Before 1997, there was no legal constraint for the 
foreign banks to provide all services permitted by the Law on Credit Activities, but none of 
them performed the full range of their banking activities. None of the foreign banks accepted 
deposits from the household sector nor provided consumer credit. Given their comparative 
advantages with respect to prestige, reliability, international contacts and experience, they 
were in a position to exert substantial competitive pressure on Bulgarian banks, but they 
limited their own activities to specialised services mainly for international business firms.
Table 11b; Foreign Banks and Foreign participation in the Bulgarian Banking system
No. ij Bank N am e [Previous N am es -  Ownershipj[ Country if Type
1 nn p iK E U S  G R O U P  p rev io u s  name oif M O SB A N K  S.À). -  
i SOFIA BRANCH (M & A OF PIREUS, XIOS, M ACEDO NIA &! 
ilTHRACE)
GREECE i|B Î^N C H
2 ijlNG N.V. -  Sofia Branch iÆ T H Ë F ffÂ N bS ipR A N C H
3 jlALPHA B A N K  O F G R E E C E  (Previous Ionian and Popular j 
ifeank o f  Greece S. A). - Sofia Branch (changed its name to 
ifcredit Bank o f  Greece, because o f  the M&A o f Credit Bank o f  j 
iGreece and Ionian and Popular Bank o f  Greece S. A. in 1999.
GRÎËEŒ i^ R A N Œ  j
4 (N ATIO NA L B A N K  O F G R E E C E  -  Sofia Branch GREECE IpRANCH
5 ! H Ÿ PÔ V ÈiÜ Ë ÏN S^ B U L G A R IA  -  Sofia Branch 
I (Bayerische Hypotheken-und-W echsel Bank and Bayersiche 
ijVereinsbank were merged)
G E R M A I^  ijBRANCH
6 i j s b c I E t È  G Ë N Ë K Ü vÈ  - Sofia Branch ipRANCE llBRANCH
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E  W f m À N i É c __________  ________  "  ^ ' 1 U SA ______________jpR A N C H ____I
8 j | r . C .  ZIRAAT BANKASI -  Sofia Branch j TURKEY ipR A N C H
9. iIbNB -  PARIBAS (ex BNP-Dresdnerbank, Sofia) ]
1 1
GERM ANY, p o in t Venture j 
FRANCE and ij 
EBRD Î
10 i RAIFFEISENBANK (Bulgaria), Sofia AUSTOÎA ijPrivate 1
11 jCOMMERCIAL BANK OF GREECE [ex ïntemationaîi 
Commercial Bank (ICB), (ex  Bulgarian Investment Bank), Sofia! 
90% the Greek Investor
(COMMERCIAL B A N K  OF GREECE) + EBRD 10 %]
GREECE and 1  
EBRD
Acquisition +i 
Joint Venture!
12 IBULGARIAN POST BANK, Sofia - 
84% (50%  Greek Investor (EFG EUROBANK) 
+ 50% from U SA  (A1G))(CYPRUS)
GREECE BCC
Privatisation | 
+ Joint 
Venture
ECONOMIC AND INVESTMENT BANK AD [ex
BRIBANK (former Bulgarian-Russian Investment Bank)]
RUSSIA I Joint Venture!
M J EUROBANK, S q % ............. ...................................................................J SLOVAKIA Acquisition !
UNITED BULGARIAN BANK (UBB), Sofia (In first ilGREECE 
Privatisation Oppenheimer & Co.Inc.and EBRD), (Nowadays, | 
the owner is the N ational Bank o f Greece) |
BCC
Privatisation j 
+  Joint 
Venture
1 /  i DEMIRBANK (Bulgaria), Sofia [after its bankruptcy the UK ilTlJRkEY  
financial group HSBC has acquired the Turkish Demirbank. |
However, HBSC has sold Demirbank (Bulgaria), Sofia to a |
Turkish Consortium (end 2001)] i |
Private j
18 i ÜNÎONBÂNK, Sofia (London Investment Partners Ltd) U K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ! X cq m sifio n ^
19 !i NEFTINVESTBANK Sofia (ex St N icholas International Orthodox Bank)
RUSSIA Acquisition |
20 I
DEVELOPMENT, Sofia and USA
Acquisition •
21 1TÔkÛDÂ CREDIT EXPRESS BANK, Sofia (ex Credit 
Express Bank) Commercial Banks with Domestic and 
Limited License
JAPAN jLimited j 
Participation !
.......................... i
22" | FIRST INVESTMENT BANK, Sofia (Austrian Investor -  
Vienna based EPIK)
AUSTRIA and" "“ "^1 
EBRD
Acquisition !
23 IEXPIŒS^BANK (French Investor -  Société Generale) ^ N C E  1 BCC  ^ I 
Privatisation i
|24 CAIB INVESTMENT BANK (ex Creditanstalt Investment i 
Bank AG and Creditanstalt Bank, Sofia)(Bank Austria and 
Creditinstalt were merged) j
AUSTRIA 1
..................................... i
Representative 
e Office
25 CORPORATE COMMERCIAL BANK PLC (by jlRUSSlA 
Vneshekonombank) i[ i
A cquisition !
26 BULBANK (Unicredito 93% +  A llianz 5% Consortium) [ex 
Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank] j
Italy / German BCC ! 
Privatisation !
27" =HEBROSBANK (Regent Pacific Group) RÏJSSÏA '  !
28 ilb C H IM STATE ÔW ÏÆ D BCC ???? 1 
Privatisation !
29 BULGARIAN A ^  CREDIT BANK LTD , Sofia 
(by Bulgarian American Enterprises Fund)
USA Joint Venture!
30 EBRD (UK based) International Representative 
e Office
31 World Bank International Representative 
e  (jffice
32 BLACK SEA TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BANK
(Greece based)
International Representative 
e Office !
33 PROCREDÏT BANK [EBRD + ÏFC (World B ^ j  20% +  
consortium o f  German fimds and banks]
German Joint Venture!
34
i
BANKA DSK [Former ssb -  State savings bank] STATE ÔWTÆD BCC ???? ! 
privatisation !
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3 5 j | o n 8  [Central Cooperative Bank] [32.77%  by the BCC and 24%; 
i|by the corporate bank]
STATE OW NED B C C  ???? i 
{Privatisation j
36. ipR O M O TlO NA L BAN K  OR ENCOURAGEM ENT BAN K STATE OW NED pÆ nistiy o f  i 
{Finance 99% i
37 IIbU LG ARIAN N ATIO NAL B A N K  (STATE OW NED L _ ................ 1
38 j|PRlVATE ENTREPRENEURIAL B A N K  TEXIM  j|
39 !WUNICIPAL^ B A N K  i|STÀTÈ OW NEDI 1 [Sofia[Municipality ! 1+ others
40 iIf i r s t  e a s t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a n k  I [____________ I
41 ijCB BULG ARIA-INVEST OR BULG ARIAN-INVEST B A N K  if ||
Source; Bitzenis ' Research
The first banking permissions were given in 1994 to the Greek Xios Bank and to the Dutch 
ING Bank. After those pioneer banks, three more were licensed; the Raiffesenbank- Bulgaria 
(Austrian), the BNP- DRESDNER Bank (French- German) and the Ionian Bank (Greek). 
Nowadays, (2/2002) in Bulgaria there are 8 foreign branches, 3 from Greece, and 1 from the 
USA, Turkey, France, Germany and the Netherlands. There are also 27 banks with an 
international licence for banking activity, four representative offices and one, the Tokuda 
Bank, with a domestic and limited banking license. [The author’s research presents the 
foreign participation in the above banks in the Bulgarian territory in table 11b].
The first Greek banks, which opened branches in Bulgaria, aimed at the promotion of Greek 
enterprises into the Bulgarian market (follow the clients). These Greek banks also developed 
in the corporate banking sector as well as in the management of the disposable. Another three 
Greek banks have tried to expand their operations in Bulgaria, Egnatia Bank, Macedonia & 
Thrace and Agricultural bank of Greece, which, for several reasons, closed their representative 
offices. Nowadays, five Greek banks (National Bank of Greece, Commercial Bank of Greece, 
Eurobank, Pireus Group (Xios Bank), and Alpha Bank (Ionian & Popular Bank)) have active 
participation in the Bulgarian banking system due to several reasons such as the large 
participation of Greek enterprises, geographic proximity, lack of foreign competition, etc. [see 
also figures 6, 7, 8]
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Figure 6: Incentives for the Bulgarian F’rivatisation Process in the Banking system
In cen tiv e s  fo r FDI P ro je c ts  o f th e  F oreign  B a n k s  th a t a r e  a c tiv e  in
B ulgaria
Geographical Proximity 
Low Cost of Labour Skilled force 
Lack of Infrastructure as an incentive 
Inter. Pressures, Physical Presence 
Loss Carry Mechanism 10 years 
Follow the Clients 
Lack of Local Competition 
Market size
0 %  2 0 %  4 0 %  6 0 %  8 0 %  1 0 0 %
Source: Bitzenis’ Questionnaire Results
Figure 7; Barriers for the Bulgarian Privatisation Process in the Banking system
Barriers for FDI Projects facing by Foreign Banks in
Bulgaria
High Investment Risk 
Bureaucracy 
Lack of Managerial Skills 
Low Progress in Transition 
Macroeconomic Instability 
Unstable Legal System
m m
WWYiWhi-iW
MW
20% 40% 80% 100%
Source; Bitzenis’ Questionnaire Results
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Figure 8: Factors that influence Foreign Investors in participating in the Privatisation Process in the Bulgarian Banking system
The Foreign Banks in Bulgaria are...
100%
Market Strategic Locational Exploiting
Hunters Market Hunters Ownership
Hunters Advantages
Source: Bitzenis' Questionnaire Results
As it is with other sectors foreign involvement brought spillover effects in the Bulgarian 
Banking Sector. What is special about the banking sector is that its development greatly 
affects the other aspects of the economy. The establishment of foreign banks required 
intensive efforts of organisation, but the results, after the first years of operation, were 
encouraging. The foreign banks have well trained managers, which provide very good services 
not only to the foreign enterprises, but also to the Bulgarian ones. The foreign banks brought 
new technology, management systems and an advanced contact network. Overall, they 
introduced different and more competitive conditions into the sector. Nevertheless, the foreign 
banks’ activity in the Bulgarian market and their co-operation with other banks is mostly 
conservative, in order to avoid their involvement in lending, which is still a risky field.
Ten foreign banks, which are active in Bulgaria and have participated in the questionnaire 
analysis of this author have underpinned that the major incentives for their FDI decision were; 
the market size, the lack of local competition, the theory of follow the clients, the financial 
incentive of the loss carry mechanism for the following ten years, the international pressures 
from competition and their physical presence in many countries [figures 6-8]. The major 
obstacles that they had faced in the Bulgarian environment were; the unstable legal 
framework, the macroeconomic instability, the low progress in the transition, the lack of 
managerial skills, bureaucracy and the high risky environment. It must be considered that the 
author’s research ran in the period Jan 1998-June 1999, and most of the questionnaires have 
been completed at the end of 1998. Thus, it is not a surprise this ranking of barriers such as the
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macroeconomic instability (2"^) and the low progress in the transition (3'^ '^ ), since the positive 
signs of the currency board were obvious in mid 1999.
The significant Greek presence of 3 banks and 3 branches must be explained mainly by the 
geographical proximity.
Table 12: NUMBER OF FOREIGN BANKS IN SELECTED EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (the Banker)
ALBANIA I BULGARIA j CZECH R. HUNGARY I ESTONIA i POLAND \ CROATIA ROMANIA
3 Greek 
Banks
1 3 Greek 1 Banks 4 from Italy 16 from I Germany 3 from i Finland 7 from the USA I 6 from ^Austria 2 from France
1 from the 
USA
fT from  1 
1 Germany
10 from 
Austria
3 from Italy
i
I from 
Germany
14 from 
Germany
1 4 from 
1 Germany
3 from Greece
1 from 
Bahrain
1 I from j 
1 France i
16 from 
Germany
2 from the 
USA j
I from j 
Sweden 1
7 from 1 2 from 
France Italy
2 from the USA i
1 from Italy 1 2 from :| 7 from 
I Austria If France
3 from
France I
4 from 1 I from 
Austria jf France
2 from Turkey j
1 from 
Malaysia
i  1 from
j Turkey 1
4 from the 
USA
5 from 
Austria
1 3 from 1 | 
; Italy II
2 from 
Netherlands
J lf ro m  ijsfrom the  
1 Netherlands ] | UK
3 from 
Netherlands
2 from Austria
Source: From the Banker, April 1999
From the table 12 it is argued that in Poland most of the banks come from the neighbour 
Germany, in Croatia most come from neighbour Austria, in Estonia most come from the 
neighbour Finland, and in Albania and Bulgaria most come from neighbour Greece etc. The 
extreme interest of Greek banks not only in Bulgaria, but also in the whole region of Balkans 
can be explained by the following: "...firm ’s preferences fo r near, similar markets was a 
function o f lack o f international experience. Firms with broader international operating 
experience were more ready to extend their operations to less familiar markets than were
firms with less experience. "25
In tables 1 la  and 1 lb appeared all the Bulgarian Banks active up to the end of 2001. The 
banks with foreign participation have under their control over 80% of the Bulgarian Financial 
Capital. The Greek participation in the banking system is over than 35%. In comparison to 
other CEE countries, like the Czech Republic and Hungary, the development of foreign banks 
in Bulgaria until 1998, was delayed. The limited number of foreign banks in Bulgaria until the 
mid 1997 is mainly attributed to six major reasons. Firstly, Bulgaria was insufficiently 
developed, compared to the international banking system, the needs of multinational 
enterprises and the economies of the other CEE countries. Secondly, the investments’ risks in 
Bulgaria were considered very high. This was also the case for investments in the banking
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sector since the inflation was in very high levels. Thirdly, the institutional framework of 
businesses’ operations was very unbalanced and this did not attract multinational enterprises, 
which are usually followed by international banks. Fourthly, the central authorities did not 
help the broad privatisation of enterprises and the significant foreign participation in the state 
banks. Fifthly, the distrust to foreign investors and a kind of unjustified alertness limited the 
operations permissions granted to foreign banks so as to limit their broad expansion over the 
public banks that were facing many problems. That alertness, though, had no basis since all 
the foreign banks that went in Bulgaria just wanted to be represented rather than expanded in 
an economic and banking environment with serious problems. Sixthly, the delay in the 
corporatization, privatisation and restructuring of state banks and the delay in the political and 
economic stability that came only after the establishment of the currency board, in the mid 
1997 affected the foreign participation in the banking sector as it has affected the foreign 
participation in all other sectors. In general, all the factors, which have affected the total FDI 
inflows in Bulgaria like the inadequate legal framework, the delay of adoption of significant 
laws, the cultural distance from the western investors, the lack of managerial skills, the limited 
consumer power, the limited establishment of foreign companies, affected also the whole 
banking system as well. It was inevitable for the new banks that entered Bulgaria to face 
negative economic results due to their volume of investments and the limited number of 
customers, which they initially have. However, this is a normal phenomenon even for banks 
that opened their branches into international advanced economic centres.
4.9 STA T ISTIC A L A N A LY SIS
Examining Table A l, we observe that 50% of the foreign banks in Bulgaria (that participated 
in the questionnaire research) have considered risk as a barrier for their investment projects. 
At the same time 28 out of 54 (51.9%) foreign companies (other than banks) have also 
considered risk as a barrier for their investment projects in Bulgaria, as well. It can be pointed 
out that there is no difference in the way of considering the Bulgarian business environment 
and its level of risk if we are interviewing foreign banks or other MNEs. Thus, the majority of 
both of them characterized the Bulgarian economy as a risky one. Each bank or any enterprise 
from a different sector have more or less the same reasons for considering or not the risk as a 
barrier for its investment plans. From a statistical point of view, we can conclude that 
according to the continuity correction test (because we have 2X2 Table), the p-value is 1 and 
thus >0.1. Therefore, we neglect the Ha hypothesis, and we accept the Ho hypothesis,
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concluding that there is no association between the two variables (high risk environment as a 
barrier and the sector which a MNE belongs to).
Considering Table A2, we observe that 80% of the foreign banks in Bulgaria and 54% of the 
other foreign companies have considered bureaucracy as a barrier for their investment project. 
Although bureaucracy was a significant barrier for the majority of MNEs, on the other hand, 
foreign banks mentioned bureaucracy as a crucial barrier for making foreign direct 
investments in Bulgaria and found coping with the Bulgarian business environment under 
bureaucracy a hard job. Moreover, from the statistical point of view we can support the above 
result. According to the continuity correction test (2X2 Table), the p-value is 0,231 and thus 
>0.1. Therefore, we neglect the Ha hypothesis, and we accept the Ho hypothesis, concluding 
that there is no association between the two variables (bureaucracy as a barrier and the sector 
which an MNE belongs to).
Examining Table A3, we discover that all the foreign banks (100%) which participated in the 
questionnaire research have considered the Bulgarian unstable legal system as a significant 
barrier. At the same time, 68.5% of the other 54 companies have considered the above as a 
barrier. The unstable legal system has been considered as an extremely significant barrier for 
all the banks when only the majority of other MNEs considered it as an important barrier. This 
means that the unstable legal framework negatively affects specific sectors of the economy 
and it has been considered differently by all MNEs regarding its importance/significance. It 
also constitutes a unique barrier for foreign banks which strongly prefer to avoid it. We can 
also point out the same conclusion from statistics. The p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 
table) is 0,093 and thus <0.1. Consequently, we accept the Ha hypothesis, concluding that 
there is an association between the two variables (unstable legal system as a barrier and the 
sector that an MNE belongs to) at 10% level of significance.
Examining Table A4, we can mark that 90% of the foreign banks that participated in the 
questionnaire research have considered the lack of managerial skills as a significant barrier, 
while at the same time only 7.4% from the other 54 companies have considered the lack of 
managerial skills as a barrier. It is very important, especially for the banks, to consider the 
managerial skills of the labour force. The lack of such skills creates significant problems to the 
establishment of foreign banks in a host country. With the help of statistics the author 
underpinned the above results, and found that the p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 Table) is
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0 and thus <0.01. Therefore, we accept the Ha hypothesis, concluding that there is strong 
association between the two variables (lack of managerial skills and the sector that an MNE 
belongs to) at 1% level of significance.
Considering Table A5, we can show that 90% of the foreign banks that participated in the 
questionnaire research have considered the low progress in banking reform, privatisation 
progress, liberalisation reform and the low whole transition reform from a plan to a market 
economy, as a significant barrier, while at the same time only 1.9% of the other 54 companies 
have done the same. The liberalisation in most of the economic aspects (prices, trade, 
exchange rates, interest rates) of a country together with various structural reforms and the 
privatisation of state-owned companies are basic elements of a market economy. It is also 
necessary for a host country to proceed to the above reforms in order to have the attraction and 
establishment of foreign banks. The statistics confirms the above. The p-value (continuity 
correction, 2x2 Table) is 0, thus <0.01. Therefore, we accept the Ha hypothesis, implying that 
there is strong association between the two variables (low progress in banking reform, 
privatisation, liberalisation and transition as a barrier and the kind of business for a company) 
at 1% level of significance.
Looking at Table A6, we can denote that none of the foreign banks that participated in the 
questionnaire research have considered corruption, crime or mafia and illegal actions as a 
barrier, when at the same time an important percentage of 63% from the other 54 companies 
had significantly considered this as a barrier. From the statistical point of view we found that 
the p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 table) is 0,001 and thus <0.01. Therefore, we accept the 
Ha hypothesis, concluding that there is strong association between the two variables 
(corruption, mafia, crime, illegal protection from suspicious people, insufficient protection of 
their investment projects etc. and the possibility of being a bank or another kind of enterprise) 
at 1 % level of significance
Examining Table A7, we can point out that 90% of the foreign banks that participated in the 
questionnaire research have considered the lack of local competition in Bulgaria as a barrier, 
when at the same time only 31.5% from the other 54 companies have significantly considered 
this as such. The significant lack of local competition in the Bulgarian banking sector left 
space for an extremely high percentage of foreign banks to enter the Bulgarian market, using 
this as a major incentive. From the statistics we have the p-value (continuity correction, 2x2
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Table) to be equal to 0,002 and thus <0.01. Therefore, we accept the Ha hypothesis, implying 
that there is strong association between the two variables (the lack of local competition in 
Bulgaria and the sector that an MNE belongs to) at 1% level of significance.
As it was expected, examining Table A8, we can prove that almost all the companies (both the 
banks and other enterprises) have considered the Bulgarian market as an incentive for their 
investment project, although Bulgaria is not such a big market as Germany, France or the 
United Kingdom. There is a high percentage of MNEs (100% of the banks and 92.6% of the 
other MNEs) which is considering Bulgaria for an FDI project due to its market size. This was 
not a surprise for the author. Firstly, this happened because 37 out of 64 interviewed 
companies were Greek (5 out of 10 banks were also Greek). Thus, these companies considered 
Bulgaria as an important market with a population of over 8,000,000 people (which is 
“another Greece” for them). Secondly, for companies such as Coca Cola, McDonalds or even 
for banks such the Banque Nationale de Paris from France or the Dresdner Bank from 
Germany, evei-y country and every market is significant and their policy is to participate in 
almost every country (market hunters) in the world (even in Bulgaria). Thirdly, in a host 
country in which there is a lack of local competition there is an expected high market share 
and thus a large enough number of possible customers. From the statistical point of view and 
according to the continuity correction test (2X2 Table), the p-value is 0,859 and thus >0.1, so 
we confirm the above. Therefore, we neglect the Ha hypothesis, and we accept the Ho 
hypothesis, implying that there is no association between the two variables (market size as an 
incentive is indifferent to the sector which a MNE belongs to).
Examining Table A9, we observe that 90% of the foreign banks that participated in the 
questionnaire research considered the theory of “following the clients” as an incentive, when 
at the same time only 11% of the other 54 companies have significantly considered this as an 
incentive. Foreign banks have many customers, especially from the industrial sector in their 
home country. When most of these companies (customers of a bank) move part of their 
activities to the host country, then it is obvious that there is a need for the bank to proceed to 
an FDI project in the same host country, in order to continuously support the business 
activities of the existing customers (“following the clients” theory). The statistics supports the 
above argument, when the p-value (continuity correction, 2x2 table) is 0 and thus <0.01. 
Therefore, we accept the Ha hypothesis, implying that there is strong association between the
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two variables (following the clients as an incentive and the sector that each MNE belongs to) 
at 1% level of significance.
As it was also expected (Table AlO), geographical proximity has been considered as a strong 
incentive for an investment project in the Bulgarian market only by MNEs which have their 
origin in neighbouring countries such as the example of Greek and Turkish banks. However, 
we concluded that geographical proximity is not an incentive which supported or positively 
affected specifically the foreign banks or the other MNEs or a specific sector of the Bulgarian 
economy. Thus, this incentive has been considered indifferent from the sector that each 
foreign MNE belongs to (foreign banks 50%, other foreign MNEs 59,3%). Looking closely at 
Table 10 and with the help of statistics, we can conclude that according to the continuity 
correction test (2X2 Table), the p-value is 0,845 and thus >0.1. Therefore, we neglect the Ha 
hypothesis and we accept the Ho hypothesis, implying that there is no association between the 
two variables (geographical proximity as an incentive is indifferent with the sector that an 
MNE belongs to).
Examining Table A l l ,  we can see that 80% of the foreign banks in Bulgaria, which have 
participated in the questionnaire research, have considered the international pressures from 
competition and/or physical presence in many countries as a significant incentive for their FDI 
decision, when at the same time only 38.9% from the other 54 companies have considered the 
above as an incentive. The statistics also underpin this argument. The p-value (continuity 
correction, 2x2 table) is 0,04 and thus <0.05. Therefore, we accept the Ha hypothesis, 
implying that there is association between the two variables (international pressures from 
competition and/or physical presence in many countries and the sector in which an MNE 
belongs to) at 5% level of significance.
Observing Table A12, we can point out that 60% of the foreign banks in Bulgaria, which have 
participated in the questionnaire research, have considered the low cost of skilled labour cost 
as a significant incentive for their FDI decision, when at the same time only 28% from the 
other 54 companies have considered the above as an incentive. It is necessary for the banks to 
pursue a skilled labour force. It is also important for them to search for a low -  cost skilled 
labour force. We come to the same conclusion using statistics. The p-value (continuity 
correction, 2x2 Table) is 0,04 and thus <0.05. Once again, we accept the Ha hypothesis.
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concluding that there is association between the two variables (low cost of skilled labour as an 
incentive and the sector that an MNE belongs to) at 5% level of significance.
Tab/e A: Statistical Analysis -  Questionnaire Survey
Table 1 : Banks and Risk a s  a barrier
Hioh Investmi»nt Risk (Y75)
TotalNo Yes
banks other Count
sectors Obsen/atlons 
%
%Y75
26
48,1%
83,9%
28
51,9%
84,8%
54
100,0%
84,4%
banks Count
Observations
%
% Y75
5
50,0%
16,1%
5
50,0%
15,2%
10
100,0%
15,6%
Total Count
Observations
%
%Y75
31
48,4%
100,0%
33
51,6%
100,0%
64
100,0%
100,0%
Table 2; B anks an d  B ureaucracy  a s  a barrier
Bureaucracy (Y72)
TotalNo Yes
banks other Count 
sectors %
% Y72
25
46,3%
92,6%
29
53,7%
78,4%
54
100,0%
84,4%
banks Count 
%
% Y72
2
20,0%
7,4%
8
80,0%
21,6%
10
100,0%
15,6%
Total Count 
%
% Y72
27
42,2%
100,0%
37
57,8%
100,0%
64
100,0%
100,0%
Table 3: Banks and unstable legal sy stem  as  a barrier Table 4: Banks and lack of managerial skills as a barrier
Unstable Legal System (Y62)
TotalNo Yes
t>anks other Count 17 37 54
sectors % 31,5% 68,5% 100,0%
% Y62 100,0% 78,7% 84,4%
banks Count 10 10
% 100,0% 100,0%
%Y62 21,3% 15,6%
Total Count 17 47 64
% 26,6% 73,4% 100,0%
%Y62 100,0% 100.0% 100,0%
Lack of Managerial Skills (Y65)
TotalNo Yes
t)anks other Count 50 4 54
sectors % 92,6% 7,4% 100.0%
%Y65 98,0% 30,8% 84,4%
banks Count 1 9 10
% 10,0% 90,0% 100,0%
% Y65 2,0% 69,2% 15,6%
Total Count 51 13 64
% 79.7% 20,3% 100,0%
% Y65 100,0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table S: Banks and the low progreee In privatisation, In banking reform, In 
transition process, In libéralisation as a barrier Table 6: Banks and crime, corruption etc. a s  a barrier
Low Progress In ...(Y61)
No Yes Total
banks other Count 53 1 54
sectors % 98.1% 1,9% 100,0%
%Y61 98.1% 10,0% 84.4%
banks Count 1 9 10
% 10,0% 90,0% 100.0%
%Y61 1,9% 90.0% 15,6%
Total Count 54 10 64
% 84,4% 15.6% 100.0%
%Y61 100.0% 100,0% tOO.0%
Crime, Corruption... (Y67)
TotalNo Yes
banks other Count 
sectors %
% Y67
20
37,0%
66,7%
34
63,0%
100,0%
54
100,0%
84,4%
banks Count 
%
% Y67
10
100,0%
33,3%
10
100,0%
15,6%
Total Count 
%
% Y67
30
46,9%
100,0%
34
53,1%
100,0%
64
100,0%
100,0%
Table 7: Banks and the lack of local com petition In the host country as  an 
Incentive
Table B; Banks and the size o f th e  Bulgarian m arket (custom er base) as  an 
Incentive
Lack of Local Comoetltion (CX231
TotalNo Yes
banks other Count 37 17 54
sectors % 68,5% 31,5% 100,0%
%CX23 97,4% 65,4% 84,4%
banks Count 1 9 10
% 10,0% 90,0% 100,0%
%CX23 2,6% 34,6% 15,6%
Total Count 38 26 64
% 59,4% 40,6% 100,0%
%CX23 100,0% 100.0% 100,0%
Customer Base (CX21)
TotalNo Yes
banks other Count 
sectors %
%CX21
4
7,4%
100,0%
50
92,6%
83,3%
54
100,0%
84.4%
banks Count 
%
%CX21
10
100,0%
16,7%
10
100.0%
15,6%
Total Count 
%
%CX21
4
6,3%
100,0%
60
93,8%
100,0%
64
100.0%
100.0%
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T ab le  9; B an k s  a n d  "fo llow  th e  c lie n ts"  a s  a n  Incen tiv e Table 10; Banks and geographical proxim ity as  an Incentive
Follow the Clients (CX34) Geographical Proximity (AX8)
No Yes Total No Yes Total
banks other Count 
sec to rs %
% CX34
48
88,9%
98,0%
6
11,1%
40,0%
54
100,0%
84,4%
Isanks other 
sectors
Count
%
%AX8
22
40.7%
81,5%
32
59,3%
86,5%
54
100,0%
84,4%
tjanks Count 
%
% C X 34
1
10,0%
2,0%
9
90,0%
60,0%
10
100.0%
15,6%
banks Count
%
%AX8
5
50,0%
18,5%
5
50,0%
13,5%
10
100,0%
15,6%
Total Count
%
%AX8
27
42,2%
100,0%
37
57,8%
100,0%
64
100,0%
100,0%
Total Count 
%
% C X 34
49
76,6%
100,0%
15
23,4%
100,0%
64
100.0%
100,0%
Table 11 ; Banks and International p ressu res from com petition o r physical Table 12: Banks and skilled low-cost labour cost as an Incentive
Skilled Low-cost labour cost (BX1S)
International Pressures (DX41) No Yes Total
No Yes Total banks other sectors
Count 42 12 54
banks other Count 
sectors %
33
61.1%
94,3%
21
38,9%
72,4%
54
100,0%
84,4%
%
% BX15
77,8%
91,3%
22,2%
66,7%
100,0%
84,4%
%DX41 banks Count%
%BX15
4
40,0%
8,7%
6 10
100,0%
15,6%banks Count %
%0X41
2
20,0%
5,7%
8
80,0%
27,6%
10
100,0%
15,6%
33,3%
Total Count
%
46
71,9%
100,0%
18
28,1%
100,0%
64
100,0%
100,0%Total Count 35 29 64 % BX15%
%DX41
54,7%
100,0%
45,3%
100,0%
100,0%
100,0%
Source: B itzen is’ Questionnaire Survey; Statistical Results 
4.10 C onclusion
Privatisation in Bulgaria proceeded very slowly, despite the motives provided by the World 
Bank and IMF in the form of aid packages. The delay in Bulgarian Privatisation is attributed 
to the political instability of the country and governmental inability or unwillingness during 
the years of the transition, the social dislike towards Privatisation as well as to several 
economic factors. The public reaction was studied by a sociological investigation, which 
indicated that Bulgarians are indifferent, and some times negative, towards privatisation^^. 
Another social factor is the fact that any substantial private capital in Bulgaria in the first years 
was obtained illegally and thus was unlikely to be used for Privatisation purposes given that 
the Privatisation Law requires that all owners of any Bulgarian capital, which enters the 
Privatisation process, must explain its origin.
Considering the economic factors contributing to the delay, one must pay much attention to 
the collapse of COMECON, which also contributed to other factors like the prolonged 
recession, decrease in real income, and the very low internal demand. The political 
uncertainty, underdeveloped infrastructure and communications, delay in structural reforms 
and delay in the establishment of a legal background, resulted in reluctant foreign investors.
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Both domestic and foreign investors were further discouraged by the low net present value of 
the enterprises offered for Privatisation.
One of the most difficult tasks in a privatisation process in a transition country is to determine 
the market value of public enterprises. Thus, in Bulgaria, an administrative rather than a 
market approach to valuation was adopted. The problem was intensified not only by the 
inexperience of evaluators, but also by the high inflation that often necessitated re-evaluation. 
The valuation of the company was made even more difficult because of difficulties in 
allocating the appropriate assets to each company (the legal analysis of enterprises). Since in 
the communist years ownership was always considered public, the enterprises’ assets were not 
clearly defined since many companies might use the same asset, so the documents identifying 
their assets, including land and physical plant, usually, are not available or non-existent. The 
asset allocation problem becomes even more complicated if the claims for restitution are 
considered. Delays in the privatisation process became even more complicated, when 
disagreements led the cases to courts. The valuation problems were often solved by artificial 
valuations of enterprises, resulting in abuses of authority and corruption by the agents in 
charge of the process.
Corruption is another significant factor responsible for the delay of Privatisation. The former 
Bulgarian authorities were determined to obtain ownership of state-owned property for 
themselves (or friends) at preferential prices and without public auction. This kind of 
ownership transfer is considered "quiet" if the information concerning the sale is not made 
public, or "illegal" if working rules are violated.
From this research we can conclude that the delay in the privatisation process affected 
multinationals’ FDI decisions (MNEs, which belong to the banking sector). Moreover, the 
way of privatisation as an entry mode has been chosen mainly from MNEs other than Greek 
ones. Privatisation deals mostly took part in the industrial sector, because most of the 
Bulgarian SOEs, which were offered to the privatisation programs, belonged to this sector.
In addition, although bureaucracy and corruption were important barriers for establishing an 
FDI project in Bulgaria, only about 1/3 of MNEs who participated in the research suggested 
that bureaucracy or/and corruption was an important barrier for them, when taking part in a 
Bulgarian privatisation program. Finally, Risk was also an important barrier in the decision of
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making an investment in an environment such as Bulgaria. However, risk was considered 
indifferently by MNEs, when it came to choose either privatisation as a way of foreign entry 
or other ways of entry mode.
The most important determinants for economic stabilization and development in Bulgaria 
continue to include further acceleration of privatisation and abolishment of monopolies, thus 
providing a well-functioning market economy in order to attract further foreign investments. 
All the authorized Privatisation agents, including the Privatisation Agency, should target their 
efforts on the improvement of the country’s image in the eyes of foreign investors, the real 
improvement of the entrepreneurial environment and the marketing of Bulgarian enterprises 
abroad.
The transition to a market economy needs a sound banking system, which is a crucial factor in 
attracting foreign investors. Foreign direct investment in the banking sector can be of 
particular importance to the transition countries since experience has shown that countries 
around the world in which FDI has concentrated have enjoyed accelerated economic growth, 
easier integration into world markets and less painful structural reform. With the help of 
Bulgarian official statistics, we can argue that one third of the total FDI inflows in Bulgaria 
are through privatisation deals and more than half of the latter inflows are a result of 
privatisation deals occurred in the banking system.
The analysis through questionnaires revealed important aspects of the FDI flows, which may 
not be captured by the standard analysis. The derived results indicate that the high risk 
business environment, the market size and bureaucracy have been considered similarly by 
foreign banks and any other MNEs participating in Bulgaria and macroeconomic instability, 
unstable legal framework, low transition progress and lack of managerial skills have been 
considered by foreign banks as highly positive factors responsible for the FDI inflows in the 
banking sector. On the other hand, an unexpected finding was that corruption, crime and mafia 
have not been taken into account at all by foreign banks. Lastly, the low cost of a skilled 
labour force together with the theory “following the clients”, lack of local competition and the 
existence of international/globalisation pressures were significant incentives for foreign banks 
in order to enter Bulgaria. The findings that multinational firms may be discouraged to invest 
by factors such as macroeconomic instability and inadequate institutional framework are in 
accordance with a previous work (Liargovas and Chionis (2001)). Our main hypothesis is that
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besides the role of the conventional determinants of FDI, factors such as the form of monetaiy 
stability and the progress of economic and institutional reforms, which constitute the essence of 
the transition process, might be responsible for stimulating FDI flows. Given the fact that 
Bulgaria moved slowly towards a market-based economic system, relative to other transition 
economies, and that the investments in the banking sector consist of a large proportion of the 
total Bulgarian FDI flows, we insist that this comparative analysis constitutes of considerable 
importance in determining the role of the transition process on the FDI flows.
The privatisation of the state-owned banks has a direct effect in the Bulgarian FDI inflows and 
the delay of the transition process greatly affected the volume of the inward FDI. The 
Bulgarian stock market is still not well-functioning and a market economy needs a developed 
system with institutions, reliable regulation, strong foreign participation, comprehensive 
consumer protection, lack of uncertainty and general stability in all of the economic activities, 
along with guaranteed governmental credibility. The development of the secondary markets is 
crucial for the transition progress. Bristow (1996) has argued that^^ "the least inflationary way 
to finance a budget deficit is to sell securities to the non-bank public... a huge volume o f 
capital has to be mobilised to finance enterprise resti'ucturing... and the absence o f secondary 
markets could seriously inhibit privatisation programmes, whether they involve the selling o f  
shares or are mass privatisation schemes".
There was a need for new corporate governance in the banking system, and it is necessary to 
grant bank managers enough independence from their customers, the loss-making enterprises. 
There was also a need for quick privatisation of the new consolidated large Bulgarian banks 
and re-capitalisation and restructuring whenever appropriate (much before 1997). Re­
capitalisation should prevent banks from accumulating more non-performing loans, provide 
new corporate governance and provide with incentives for collecting the remaining bad loans. 
The western help is needed not only for financing the projects, but also on the way of 
upgrading the skills of bank managers and supervisors with their own participation in the 
Bulgarian banking environment being participants as shareholders (like the example of the 
EBRD).
An important policy question was how much entry of foreign banks should be permitted. The 
answer was that there is a need for foreign participation. The Bulgarian Banking laws (among 
the most liberal in the region) permits 100% of foreign participation in any bank that is going
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to be privatised, and unlimited foreign participation in the banking system if the banking rules 
are ensured. The advantage of large foreign bank participation in Bulgaria was that Bulgarians 
could learn new skills by working in branches of foreign banks and learning and adopting new 
payment methods, marketing skills, new products, advanced computerised techniques etc. 
Bulgarian banks can also learn from the example set by foreign banks. On the other hand, the 
local banks will need time before they are folly able to compete with foreign banks, due to the 
burden of bad loans and lack of skills and experience.
The results of the first four years of the BNB fonctioning as a currency board indicated a 
gradually reviving confidence in the lev and the banking system. Moreover, as a shareholder 
in the Bank Consolidation Company, the BNB supported the government in privatisation of 
state banks. Given the general Bulgarian performance the BCC was very successful since it 
managed to consolidate 59 small banks into 4 (together with Bulbank, Postbank) and to 
privatise 5 out of 6 banks to foreigners, up to the end of 2001.
The privatisation of large state-owned enterprises with the help of the BCC significantly 
helped the FDI inflows in Bulgaria. Around 1/6 of the total FDI inflows belong to these five 
privatisation deals with strategic foreign investors. Incentives for this foreign participation in 
the banking sector is the market size^ ,^ the geographical proximity, the presence of other 
companies of the same origin with the home country of the foreign bank (follow the clients), 
lack of competition, or exploiting ownership advantages such as brand name, superior skills, 
multinationality, physical presence in many countries, globalisation pressures etc. Other 
incentives, which may encourage foreign investors are: economies of scale, ethnic minorities, 
foreign exchange arbitrage, knowledge of the host country, MNE’s experience at operating 
internationally, past experience, etc.
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5. Introdu ction
Greece and Bulgaria have had trade relationships for centuries, mainly because of their 
geographic proximity, their cultural closeness and common religious beliefs. Bulgarian 
people have always admired Greek traders’. The fact that the two countries were 
historically connected both by the Byzantine Empire and the occupation of the Ottoman 
Empire brought the two countries even closer. The rise of the communist regime and the 
‘cold war’ between Eastern Europe and Western countries, deactivated more or less the 
relations of the two countries, but after the fall of communism the relationship recovered 
significantly and the two countries are currently on very good terms with each other.
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the advanced countries from Central & Eastern Europe 
(CEE) such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland created close ties with neighbor 
Europe's strongest economy, Germany. On the other hand, Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania and 
Yugoslavia created ties with their neighbor, Greece, one of the European Union’s poorest 
members. Still, Greece is the closest EU member to Bulgaria, in fact it is the only EU 
member in the Balkans and one of the richer countries in the Balkan region, and since 
Greece supports the membership of Bulgaria, in the EU, Greek entrepreneurs and their 
products are very welcome in the country.
There are many more reasons why Greek enterprises, both small and large, are so 
economically active in Bulgaria, as well as in other South East European countries 
(SEECs). Greek entrepreneurship and trade flourish in the Balkan area due to the strategic 
geographical position of Greece in the Balkan region and the fact that it is the only country 
in the region that is close to Western standards.
The subject of this chapter is the presentation of the incentives and barriers of Greek 
foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows in an ex-communist country, Bulgaria, during its 
transition period. The main reason that the case of Bulgaria is of great interest is the fact 
that the adverse initial economic conditions of the country in the initial stages of its 
transition were one of the worst among the CEE countries. Another reason is the external 
shocks the country suffered, which were more severe than the other countries of the region 
had to face. Reference is made to the specific reasons and obstacles that the Greek 
entrepreneurs had to confront during the establishment of their FDI projects in Bulgaria. 
Finally, an analysis is also presented of the issue whether Greece is the main investor in 
Bulgaria and if this holds, whether this is due to lack of Western investment interest or due 
to the great number of Greek private companies accumulated in Bulgaria or maybe even
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due to investments made by Greek state companies.
5.1 G reek FDI A ctiv ity  in B ulgaria  during the T ran sition  Period
The Greek business presence in Bulgaria started in 1992 and it is possible to distinguish 
five time periods.
The first period is between 1992-1994, the main characteristic of which was the ability of 
Greek firms to obtain quick and easy profit. The CEE market in general was viewed as an 
‘El-Dorado’ country, so dozens (over 500) of small entrepreneurs registered for entry in 
the Bulgarian market paying a trivial amount. Most of them, though, never activated their 
business. The core activity of the vendor -traders in this period was focused on food 
products, clothing and footwear, as well as the export to Greece of industrial products, 
such as scrap, sheet-iron and building's iron. Some big companies started gradually to carry 
out the first market research programs and an increase of exports to Bulgaria of final food 
products was observed.
During the second period, between the end of 1994 and well into 1995, the main 
characteristic was the entry of significant Greek firms with their own representative offices 
inside the Bulgarian market targeting their business activity mainly in the food products, 
the durable consumer goods and the services sectors. With the increase of the number of 
important Greek firms in the Bulgarian market, the share of each vendor was reduced. 
Many of these traders transfer their activity into other sectors where it was possible to get 
higher and easier profit. Moreover, during this period, Greek industrial activity was 
focused on the manufacturing industry, trade activities and recreation services.
The main characteristic of the third period, from 1996 until the end of 1997, was that 
although there was a significant amount of new companies registered in Bulgaria, those 
companies did not actually become active. Some even withdrew due to the three financial 
crises the country went through, which lead to high inflation rates, instability, corruption 
and very limited per capita consumption for the Bulgarian citizens.
In the fourth period when the situation had changed and the country had become politically 
stable, with a fixed exchange rate, a currency board and a significant lower inflation rate, 
the remaining large Greek companies slowly overcame their doubts and cautiously entered 
the Bulgarian market. There was a distinct predominance of firms bigger in size and the
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creation of vertical and horizontal joint ventures, focusing again on the sectors of food 
products, beverages, durable consumer goods and services.
In the fifth period, from 1998 and onwards, there is intense interest from all the big Greek 
banks to participate in the Bulgarian market through acquisitions. Eurobank, National 
Bank of Greece and Commercial Bank of Greece have succeeded in the Bulgarian 
privatisation programmes, while at the same time Pireus Group, Alpha Bank of Greece and 
the National Bank of Greece have also established local branches in Bulgaria.
In the years 1992 and 1993, there was a registration of less than 100 Greek companies. 
Then in 1994 there was an accumulation of around 450 new Greek companies and in the 
years 1995-1997, there were around 750 new registered companies. In the years 1998- 
2001, there was a registration of additional 2400 Greek companies. Thus, we reached the 
total number of 3746 registered Greek companies in the Bulgarian business environment at 
the end of 2001 (see Table 1).
JVt COUNTRY OF 
INVESTOR
BOURGAS VARNA PLOVDIV SOFIACITY
STARA
ZAGORA
HASKOVO TOTAL BY 
COUNTRIES
1. TURKEY 400 205 1153 1203 152 586 6366
2. RUSSIANFEDERATION
350 743 302 1225 88 59 4004
3. GREECE 60 52 547 1575 43 96 3746
4. CHINA 4 12 51 2733 I 2 2878
5. SYRIA 43 136 216 1747 31 3 2399
6. ARMENIA 378 323 564 356 34 39 2254
7. ITALY 56 69 360 895 30 7 1867
8. FYROM 6 9 38 232 10 4 1606
9. UKRAINE 163 255 123 490 23 26 1578
10. GERMANY 89 146 115 757 31 15 1554
11. YUGOSLAVIA 27 35 94 918 10 6 1496
Source: BFIA August 2002
An increasing number of Greek companies became active in the areas of South Bulgaria, 
near the Greek borders because of the low labour and transportation cost, which helped the 
creation of an export base. Indicatively, around 200 to 300 Greek textile and clothing 
companies operate in these particular areas, despite the fact that they have to employ 
almost twice as many workers -  over 90% of them women -  as they would in Greece 
because of the inferior skills of Bulgarian textile workers (especially in the earlier 
transition years). Still, the companies make high profits because of the comparatively low 
salaries they pay. This accumulation of textile companies has greatly contributed to the 
appearance of a strange phenomenon in these areas: a very high rate of women 
employment opposed to very high rate of male unemployment. An interesting issue was 
the fact that there were no textile workers available due to the operation of a great number
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of Greek textile companies. The pressing need for more workers had pushed several 
companies to try to attract workers already hired by competitors, by promising them higher 
salaries. The situation was deteriorated from the 300 small and medium-sized local 
tailoring and textile companies, which were released by the Bulgarian trade unions and 
may export ready-made clothes to Greece.
Greece holds the first position among the European community countries, as far as the 
number of firms registered is concerned (Italy is in the second place). On a worldwide 
scale, Greece is in the third place after Turkey and Russia (table 1).
Greece, Turkey and Russia share the same statistical problem of many registered but not 
active firms. The bulk of the small-scale Greek firms which expand their operations in the 
Bulgarian market, have a family character and they avoid employing personnel specialized 
in management. Moreover, there is an absence of continuity in the main productive 
direction (absence of long-term planning and innovations). A key factor behind the above 
problem is also the inability of the firms to promote a quick transformation of the business 
structure and the re-adjustment of the existing human resources to the changing 
competitive conditions. In general, there is a low level of application of methods for 
improving productivity in the development of the business plan of the firm. A great 
drawback is also the relative shortage of executives with sufficient knowledge of the 
conditions in the Balkan market.
Nevertheless, Greek traders have a relatively good knowledge of the specific features and 
conditions of the Bulgarian market; low transportation costs, low management- transaction 
costs and high quality of goods sold at relatively affordable prices form their competitive 
advantages in such as environment. Bulgaria is considered and in practice is the gate of the 
Balkans towards the market of Russia, Moldova and Ukraine, while its role in the trade 
with countries of Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Takzikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) as 
well as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan is also growing in the course of time.
Large Greek companies invest in more than one country in the Balkan region, since they 
find more opportunities than simply the geographical proximity and low labour cost, 
factors that constitute the main reasons for investments by small companies. These large 
companies recognised among other things, the lack of local competition, the lack of 
intensive Western investment interest and the opportunity to become multinationals. 
Therefore, they made successful strategic investments. Most of these Greek enterprises
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have also invested in Romania, FYROM and Albania (except for Bulgaria).
5.2 Greek investors in Bulgaria: Are they leading in investm ents in 
Bulgaria? Is the s ign ificant Greek interest in Bulgaria a fact or a myth?
A few Greek entrepreneurs and Greek MNEs (together with Turkish and Russians) used 
the tax heavens of Cyprus and Luxembourg to create offshore companies in these tax 
paradise centers and then invested in Bulgaria (and in the whole Balkan region) for 
financial and tax reasons.
Table 2. The biggest Greek interest investments in Bulgaria using an offshore centre
1 NAME il COUNTRY 1 BULGARIAN PARTNER i| DATE i| $ M. 
1 SECTOR i| 11
1. r ÀLÏcb/CEH (EUROBANK I  CYPRUS 1 43%) CONSORTIUM
POSTENSKA BANKA |  98 f  24,08 
1 FINANCE jl jl
2. KLARINA if LUXEMBOURG 
HOLDING 1
\ FOOD INDUSTRY \l 93-99 38.6 
VARIOUS BEVERAGE i !
1 COMPANIES 1  1
3. r SOFTBUL Ï  CYPRUS 
INVESTMENT j 
1 LTD 11
FOOD I  97 if Î2.2 
INDUSTRY i 97 j
4. f O l ^ I N ^ S f  ....... g-nmm,
1 l t d  i| 1 STIND i| i|
[B A R E ck  j| CYPRUS 
OVERSEAS i 
1 LTD._______________________ j |_____________________________
1 GLASS T  98 ,99  i| 23.2 
DRUZHBAJSCO. 1 I 
1 PLOVDIV i| i|
I TOTAL li GREEK INTEREST 
I INVESTMENTS
1 in million USDS dollars T  1989- 1  130,78 
1.......... .......................................1..... 2000..............................
Source: BFIA and author’s research
If the cases of CocaCola -  
Group) and Eurobank (Table 
place as far as investments 
invested.
3E (HBC), Frigoglass, Yioula (Leventis and David family 
2) are taken into account, Greece is to be considered in first 
are concerned with a total amount of around 750 USDS
We can also point out that there are some countries such as Cyprus, the Bahamas, 
Luxembourg, Malta and Liechtenstein that seem to appear to MNEs as offshore centers or 
tax heaven centers. The total FDI outflows from these countries having Bulgaria as a 
target, were about 300 USD millions. Half of these inflows have been exploited by Greek 
MNEs (table 2). The remaining inflows of 300$ millions in Bulgaria belong mainly to 
Russian and Turkish entrepreneurs. Unsurprisingly, the tax havens of Cyprus and 
Luxembourg are in the top ranking in the table of FDI inflows in Bulgaria. This shows that 
most of the stakes of Bulgarian companies were bought by companies registered in Cyprus 
or Luxembourg. Offshore registration helps avoid paying taxes on the proceeds from 
capital market transactions and dividends in Bulgaria and provides a handy cover up for 
the buyer's identity. It is a common way for the Greek companies, not only to invest in 
Bulgaria, but also in other foreign countries due to the high Greek taxation base.
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5.3 The decisive  role of Greek investm ents in the Balkan region; the low  
western investm ent interest
"Although, Greece is a small country with a weak economy in global 
economic figures, Greek investments are significant both in volume o f 
invested USD$ and in the number o f  FDI projects (data -end 2001) in most 
o f the countries o f  the Balkan region and especially in Bulgaria (more than 
700$ million), Romania (more than 1000$ million), FYROM (more than 
300$ million), Albania (more than 250$ m) and Yugoslavia (FRY) (more 
than 500$ million). The lack o f  significant western investment interest for  
FDI outflows in the Balkan countries has given Greek enterprises, the 
advantage fo r  becoming MNEs, by investing in neighboring countries a large 
amount, in respect to their worldwide economic figures and their home 
country’s [Greek] economy” [Bitzenis, A, 2003, p.9]^.
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.1^1?..?.. (over $20 Million USD e ^ h  one)
Ten Greek Inyesfanents oyer $20 M
I A d d it io n a "
I n v e s tm e n
N a m e  o f  MNE HomeCountry HostCountry LocalForeignPartner
o r  I PurposeInvestment o f  i % of i i  Partiel patjpn j!
Amount of ;lInvestment $
O T E  + C o sm o te G re e c e B ulgaria GLOBUL
Coca-Cola (3E or I HBC) + Athenian i Brewery S.A.
Frigoglass + Yioula S. A. + Leventis/PsyM.Grpup 
National " Greece Bank
EUROBANK
Greece
Greece
Bulgaria KLARINA HOLDING, BREWINVES I. SOFTBUL INVEST LTD.
Greece
Greece
National Bank i Greece
Coca-côlâT" (3E) + ipSreeceAthenian Brewery llS.A........................... if .......
Hellenic Petroleum i! Greece
13 GreeceTTAN
OTE* •I Greece
Coca-Cola (3É or if Greece HBC)
Delta International i 
Mytilinaios Holdings i
Delta International | Holdings (Lux)
Bulgaria STIND,DRUZHBA
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
WrOT
FY ^3
FYROW
iFYRO^
"Romani
RomanTa
UNITEDBULGARIANBANK
POSTENSKA BANKA ALICO INC. USA (57%, 43%EUROBANK)
BottlingCompanyHolding, AD I PIVARA_____
REFINERY
(SK OPJE).
A.D.CEMENTARN ICA USJE OF .^I^PJE
RomTelecom
MoHno~ Beverages, CocaCola Beverages
Romania
Romania
Yugoslavia
Danone
Serbia
Greece if Yugoslavia Danone Delyug A.D. Chlpita S.A.
IBP Beograd
1 Syear license i for second GSM i 
.ojgeratQC  i
100%
BottlingCompany
Glass Industry
100%80%
100%51%
Bank
Bank
Oil refinery, Petrochemicals
cément factory! (JOINT WITH i HOLDERBANK,SWISS)  I
Telecom ServicesB^ottiing^Company
90%
78%
65%
?00%51%
85%
^VWS>.W-.<WVS
Food Industry 
TîetaNÏÏrç^^
Telecom Sen/ices (49% withTelecom 
.!!.a!ia:.S.IET)...........
65,6
|WWWVWVW«IWW*IVW*-'88%
20%
Food Industry 90%
USDmillion $1 3 5  i $80-$250million
USD $78 million
USD million
“uSD“ $270 imillion
LJSb $24.08 Imillion
USD $58.6 million
USD $35 million
USD $32 million
USD $30 million
W^W-.WWWW>-«-»V.Vi $675 i|USD millionVVW«AfW.Vi.V>USD $60 million
USD $25 million
'USD#OmlK^
tjSD^1®^(b^ 675,070,000 June 1997)
USD $35 million
Coca-Cola (3E or j HBC), Balkaninvest j Ltd
Greece if Yugoslavia Softproducer drink 68% i USD $30 million i (84 million dinars ji if in 1997)______
USD $24
Cosmo-Holding Albania (97% OTE and 3% Telenor /Noryyay)...................
i! AlbaniaGreece
Panafon-Vodafone
Albanian if Mobile Services 1 Mobile i| - license for firstCommunicatio i| GSM operator I ns jAMC) .............................
85% I USD $85.6i million + USD ii $21 million iil =106.6 USD$
USD $80 Million
Greece Albania Vodafone l| Mobile ServicesInternational it - license for
Holding (UK) || second GSMi| operator
100% if USD $38 million
j U SD  $2.037 billionTOTAL (USD $2037 m illion) -  in the Balkan Region (exc. Turkey, Bosnia, Slovenia,
Croatia) * there are extra Investments of OTE In Romania__________________________
Source: Author’s research
The total amount of the ten Greek FDI outflows  ^ (according to Table 3) is more than $2 
billion USD. The Greek FDI outflov/s in the Balkan region (in 5 SEE countries) account 
for around 3 billion USDS (see Tables 4 & 5).
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END, 2000DATA GREECE CYPRUS GERMANY
IN FYROM 124,9(16%) 67 (8%) 41 (5%)
END, 2001 DATA ITALY GREECE GERMANY
IN ALBANIA (47.9%) (34.2%) (1.3%)
END, 2000DATA NETHERLANDS* GREECE
IN YUGOSLAVIA 560(52%) 481(45%)
SOURCE: VARIOUS SOURCES
Thus, around 70% of the total Greek FDI outflows belong to those 10 (see table 3) large 
Greek MNEs. At the same time only four companies (OTE/Cosmote, National Bank of 
Greece, Coca Cola/HBC and Frigoglass/Gioula/Leventis/David Family Group) have 
invested more than 80% of the total Greek FDI outflows in one country such as Bulgaria 
These four companies have also invested more than 60% of the total FDI outflows in the 
above-mentioned five countries of the Balkan region. The Greek FDI outflows in these five 
countries are around $3 billion USD (26% of the total), when at the same time the total 
FDI inflows are about 14 billion USDS (end 2001 -see Table 5).
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 TOTAL
Eastern Europe
Albania^ - - 20 58 53 70 90 48 45 41 143 180* 748
Bulgaria ^ 4 56 42 40 105 90 109 505 537 819 1002 651 3960
Romania - 40 77 94 341 419 263 1 215 2 031 1 041 1 040 1 137 7698
Yugoslavia - 740 113 112 25 90 1080
FYROM‘S - - - - 24 9 11 16 118 32 170 420* 800
TOTAL for 5 countries 4 96 139 192 52 3 5 88 4 7 3 25 2 4 2 8 4 4 20 4 5 2 3 8 0 2478
Bosnia and Herzegovina . _ 100 90 150 164 504
Croatia - - 16 120 117 114 511 533 932 1479 1115 900* 5837
Slovenia 4 65 111 113 128 177 194 375 248 181 176 442 2214
BALKAN REGION 22841
Hungary ^ 311 1459 1471 2339 1146 4454 2275 2173 2036 1970 1649 2443 23726
Poland (cash basis) ^ 10 117 284 580 542 1 132 2 768 3 077 5 129 6 471 8 294 6 929 35333
Czech Republic 132 513 1004 654 869 2562 1428 1300 3718 6324 4595 4500* 27599
Slovakia 18 82 100 195 269 308 353 220 684 390 2 075 2 000* 6694
CENTRAL EUROPE
VISEGRAD
COUNTRIES
93352
Eastern Europe 479 2332 3125 4193 3594 9335 8002 10202 15691 18950 20434 19856 116193
Baltic states 119 238 460 454 685 1142 1863 1139 1173 1457* 8730
CIS 1777 1875 1770 4065 5288 8856 6726 6735 5367 7021* 49480
Russian Federation - 100 1454 1211 690 2066 2579 4865 2762 3309 2714 2921
Estonia 82 162 215 202 151 267 581 305 387 600* 2952
Latvia 29 45 214 180 382 521 357 347 408 257 2740
Lithuania 8 30 31 73 152 355 926 486 379 600* 3040
Total atx)ve 479 2332 5021 6306 5824 13854 13975 20200 24280 26824 26974 28334 W i m
Source; Bitzenis' calculations and modifications - National balance of payments statistics, IMF, Balance o f Payments Statistics (Washington, 
D C ), various issues and Staff Country Reports (www.imf.org); UNECE secretariat estimates.
Note: Changes in coverage are available in LJNECE, Economic Survey o f Europe, 2001 No. 1, chap. 5, box 5.3.1.
« Inflows into the reporting country, c  Net of residents' investments abroad. Bulgaria, 1990-1994, Poland, 1990-1992.
^  Reinvested profits have t»een excluded.
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The low western investment interest in the Balkan region is very profound from the 
statistical data. In the Balkan region we have only 23 billion USDS FDI inflows when in 
the whole CEE region we have 174 billion USDS (accumulated in 12 transition years). In 
the above-mentioned 5 countries of the Balkan region, we have only 14 billion USDS FDI 
inflows. This interesting finding can be supported also by the economic figures of GDP per 
capita and FDI per capita (see Tables 6 & 7). Countries of the CEE region that have 
received limited FDI inflows display low levels of GDP per capita as well as low levels of 
FDI per capita. For example, countries from Central Europe such as Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and even a country from the Balkan region such as Slovenia, all 
have over 200 USDS per capita annual FDI inflows and more than 10,000 GDP per capita 
at PPP prices when countries such as Bulgaria, Albania, Romania and the remaining 
Balkan countries (except Slovenia) have less than 100 USDS per capita annual FDI inflows 
and only around 7000 USDS GDP per capita at PPP prices. Thus, we can conclude that the 
advanced CEECs attract more FDI inflows that the remaining countries. The same is true 
for the rest of the world when countries such as the USA, the UK, Germany etc. received 
significant FDI inflows having at the same time significant and high per capita annual FDI 
inflows and GDP per capita at PPP prices.
POPULATION GDP GDP/CAPITA GDP/CAPITA GDP GROWTH, REAL, IN %
T h o u san d  of 
p e rso n s
in USD 
m illion
USD a t ER* USD a t PPP** 1991-
2001
2001 2002 2003
average W IIW
forecast
Albania 3435 4186 1219 1.5 6.5 6 6
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3750 1) 4618 1231 26.3 4) 5.6 3
Bulgaria 7929 13557 1686 7650 -1.6 4.0 4 4
Croatia 4381 20263 4625 9660 -0.9 4.1 3.5 4
FYROM 2041 3426 1674 6400 -1.3 -4.6 0 2
Romania 22456 39714 1772 6180 -1.1 5.3 3.8 4
Yugoslavia 8319 10500 3) 1260 . -6.2 6.2 4 4
SEEC-7 55951 97741 1747
Czech
Republic
10280 56728 5514 15170 0.4 3.3 2.4 3
Hungary 10195 51917 5092 12960 1.0 3.8 3.3 4
Poland 38632 176256 4561 9890 3.4 1.0 0.8 1.3
Slovakia 5379 20462 3804 12660 0.8 3.3 4 3.5
Slovenia 1990 18810 9443 17740 2.0 3.0 2.8 3.5
CETC-5 66476 324175 4875 11630 2.1 2.2 1.6 2.5
*ER = Exchange rates. **ppp = Purchasing power parity - estimates by WIIW.
Notes: 1) Excluding refugees. - 2) Excluding Kosovo. - 3) WIIW estimate. - 4) 1994-2001. 
Source: National Statistics and WIIW estimates.
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1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Albania 18 17 22 27 14 13 12 42 58 1)
Bosnia and Herzegovina 27 24 40 35
Bulgaria 0 5 12 11 13 61 65 100 123 86
Croatia 26 25 26 115 121 225 359 257 343
FYROM 10 5 6 8 59 16 87 217
Romania 4 15 18 12 54 90 46 46 51
Yugoslavia . . 70 11 13 3 20
SEEC-7 0 6 12 13 17 54 69 68 68 79
Czech Republic 7 63 84 248 138 126 361 615 485 478
Hungary 30 227 112 435 223 214 201 196 163 240
Poland 2 45 49 95 116 127 165 188 242 207
Slovakia 34 51 48 67 41 127 72 384 274
Slovenia 2 57 64 89 97 189 125 91 88 222
CETC-5^) 7 75 65 167 132 135 196 243 274 260
Notes: 1) Estimate. - 2) Calculated weighted average. Source: Gàbor Hunya and WIIW Database.
5.3.1 Did the Greek governm ent encourage FDI outflows in the Balkan  
region?
Although the results from the interviews imply that the Greek government did not 
encourage (direct) individual investors to proceed to an FDI project by offering financial 
incentives, tax exceptions, loans and grants, it is clear that two big national companies 
(OTE / Cosmote and the National Bank of Greece -  see Table 3) have themselves invested 
around 1.6 billion USDS, corresponding to 55% of the estimated amount of money totally 
invested in the five countries in the Balkan region by Greek MNEs (author’s research). 
However, from the analysis the author has also found that the two national companies have 
undertaken these FDI projects due to the following reasons; absence of other significant 
foreign investment interest, lack of local competition, belief of a profitable investment 
project, geographical proximity, interest for expansion of their activities in neighbor 
countries, follow the clients theory, increase of market share, participation in new markets, 
acquisitions in affordable and reasonable prices (the high investment risk was embodied in 
the low price of privatisation deal) and their knowledge of the Balkan market. Thus, it can 
be concluded that although these national companies primarily invested in the Balkan 
countries for the above-mentioned strategic reasons, simultaneously they encouraged 
(indirectly) the other Greek MNEs and entrepreneurs to invest in these countries.
Moreover, except for the specific amount spent on Greek FDI projects in the Balkan 
region, there are more than 5000 active Greek enterprises in the Balkan area (more than 
10,000 are registered -  see section 3.5 for the reasons behind the difference in registered
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and active companies). As mentioned before, there are also about 1500 companies active 
(around 3800 registered companies) in Bulgaria. These companies may have not invested 
significant amounts of money, however they have made value-added activities, thus 
offering job positions, variety and quality of services and goods, all the while playing a 
vital role in the local market growth.
5.4 The causes o f the great accum ulation  of G reek com panies in 
B ulgaria
There are many reasons'^ why Greece is such a significant investor in Bulgaria. Following, 
is a cumulative reference according to their importance:
• The Greeks took advantage of the fact that there is a lack of interest in the 
Bulgarian market on the part of Western investors (market hunters). They grasped 
the opportunity to become multinationals, only a short time period after the 
liberalisation and opening of the Bulgarian borders. Before 1989, only a few (one 
digit) Greek MNEs appear to have invested in a neighbouring foreign country.
• The Balkans and in particular, Bulgaria offer Greece and Greek MNEs a 
completely new market (market hunters).
• This new market is located very close to Greece (geographic proximity).
• This market displays a lack of local competition (strategic market hunters).
• Due to the high growth of the Athens Stock Exchange Market (ASE) in the summer 
of 1999, a large enough number of Greek companies received extremely high 
capital inflows (cash flows) from various increases of their capital (stock issues), 
which in turn was used mostly to invest in the Balkan region
• The selling out of Bulgarian state owned companies through privatisation or the 
creation of several joint ventures, tempted large Greek companies such as the 
Hellenic Bottling Company-Coca Cola, Titan, Intracom, Titan, Delta, Goodys, 
Nikas, Thrace Papermill et al., to step in and acquire a share in the market. This 
participation of the Greek companies boosted their power and their position in the 
world market and increased their global market share (e.g. the Hellenic Bottling 
Company became the second bottler in power in the world) (pressures from 
competition).
• Historical ties, a common religion and cultural closeness (Greek business mentality 
rather the Western mentality is at least closer to the Bulgarian one). Between the 
West European countries and Bulgaria there is a cultural distance, which according 
to a recent economic theory [Morosini et. al., 1998], encourages investments (this
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apparently contradicts the commonly held view that the opposite is the case, i.e. 
that culture closeness encourages investments). However, there is a tendency 
among modern Bulgarians (just like most other East European citizens) to mimic 
western consumer activities and thus the cultural distance becomes cultural 
closeness. As Greece has been a member of the EU since 1979, in the eyes of the 
Bulgarian public, Greek goods and services are West European and therefore of 
higher quality. The fact that Bulgarian people often travel to Greece also affects 
their attitude since they become more familiar with the Greek brands.
• There was a general euphoria arising from the collapse of the communist regimes 
and the subsequent need for goods and services in these countries that point to 
quick and easy profit. This euphoria encourages Greek entrepreneurs to act in haste 
and without prior thorough investigation of the market. In other words, there is a 
common practice among Greek investors -especially the small ones- to move 
quickly and en masse towards Eastern European markets without proper 
preparation and adequate experience in economic activities. Furthermore, they set 
up small companies with limited capital and second hand machinery that produced 
low quality commodities (products that have gone out of fashion or with expired 
sell-by date) [Labrianidis L., 1997]. They even offer inadequate services. Many of 
these Greek companies in Bulgaria have already closed down or become passive. It 
was a hard lesson for the Greeks to realize that Bulgaria was not the market 
paradise as they had initially thought (emigrant entrepreneurs). Labrianidis 
(1996/97, p.219) has argued, "... most o f  these companies have been thrown out o f  
the Greek market, some o f them having left the country overnight, leaving debts 
behind as well as unpaid employees” [Labrianidis L., 1996/97].
• The low labour energy and raw materials cost. Bulgaria offers cheap labour and 
unfortunately the transferred enterprises contribute to the increase of 
unemployment in Greece and in particular in Northern Greece (resource hunters).
• Greece specializes in textile production (esp. Northern Greece), which also relies 
on the low cost of unskilled labour. The neighbouring Bulgaria offers extremely 
good conditions in this respect. It will suffice to note that the ratio of wages 
between Greece and Bulgaria was 1:10 at the beginning of the transition and is now 
1:5. However, the productivity of the Bulgarian labour in the early transition years 
was 1:3 but with the experience gained in certain areas, the productivity is catching 
up to that of the Greek workers. The latter development is due to the accumulation 
of a great number of Greek textile companies (esp. in South Bulgaria) that created a 
higher demand for labour and subsequently raised the salaries (low cost hunters).
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• Prior to and during the transition years, many Greek companies already had trade 
relations with Bulgaria. The success of these relations and the good reception of the 
Greek products in the Bulgarian market encouraged the Greek companies to 
undertake FDI projects (from trade to FDI). The main reasons for the Greek FDI 
projects to replace or complement trade relations are to overcome trade barriers, to 
minimise the production cost, to avoid transportation cost, and to gain brand 
preference utilising the ‘locality’ advantage.
• Many Greek companies aim at creating an export base in Bulgaria, which again 
offers the advantage of low cost due to both cheap labour and transportation. The 
latter is greatly facilitated by the geographic proximity and especially the low cost 
of Bulgarian transportation means (export base).
• The existence of very favourable trade agreements (tax relieves, lack of quotas and 
tariffs etc) between Bulgaria with other neighbour countries (favourable investment 
law hunters).
• Bulgaria provides a crucial link between Greece and the Commonwealth 
Independent States (CIS) countries (strategic reason).
• Bureaucracy, briberies, a high risk environment and corruption while discouraging 
factors for Western investors were viewed by Greeks as a more or less familiar 
reality as they were in practice in Greece during the 1980s. The Greeks are very 
experienced in the black economy prevalent in the Balkans (knowledge of similar 
markets)(see Table 8). Most of the Greek participating companies in Bulgaria are 
small in size with limited invested capital. Thus, they did not really take into 
consideration the high risk Bulgarian environment, especially in the early years of 
the Bulgarian transition [Labrianidis L., 1999b], because there were high 
anticipated earnings.
Table 8: The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index: 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)5
Rank Coimby CPI 2002 
score
Surveys
used
1 9.7 8
2 kDecHBQjtfk;.;;; 9.5 8
New Zeiüiujut 9.5 8
27 6.0 9
29 'Estoraa';:;i^:-;\ 5.6 8
31 iiM; . : itWyxWxx :: 5.2 11
33 Hungary 4.9 11
44 4.2 8
45 4.0 10
!. Bulgaria 4.0 7
Poland 4.0 11
51 Croatia. 3.8 4
52 L zed t RepuDlic 3.7 10
Latvia 3.7 4
Slovak. Republto 3.7 8
81 SSjl '.'^Albaw 2.5 3
101 Nigeria 1.6 6
102 Bangladesh 1.2 5
Source: Transparency Index (TI)
The intensive competition within Greece (due to the presence of many foreign
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companies) pushed many companies to move towards markets like that of Bulgaria 
[Chatzidimitriou Y., 1997]. Those companies were mostly small in size. However, 
other small companies made the same move because they had lost their share in the 
Greek market and even faced bankruptcy (survival or defensive reasons, follow the 
competition).
• Bulgarian laws have given incentives (such as tax relieves, profits when invested 
are deductible) for establishing FDI projects. There are also significant incentives 
for very limited taxation for foreign companies established especially in the 
Southern part of Bulgaria (which is also the nearest to Greece) where there is a high 
unemployment rate (favorable investment law hunters).
• A few Greek companies, mainly small and a step before bankmptcy moved in 
Bulgaria, hoping to survive in a new market mainly because of the low cost of 
labour and energy and the lack of local competition [Labrianidis L., 1996]. 
Moreover, their hope was to export these products back to Greece (a way to 
survive).
• In Bulgaria, Greek constructing companies such as Michaniki and Sarantopoulos, 
Latsis Group have undertaken large infrastructure projects, which have also been 
subsidized by the Greek, Bulgarian and Russian governments and through 
European funds such as Phare, Intereg II, III, etc. [Petrakos C. G., 1997]. Greece is 
a member of the EU and Bulgaria is a road for connecting Greece with other EU 
members. Also, there are several other projects in Bulgaria, like the pipeline for 
gas, which will help Greece in its energy shortage (market strategic hunters).
• Greek banks established branches or acquired existing Bulgarian banks not only 
because of the geographic proximity and the lack of foreign and local competition, 
but also because of the influx of Greek companies in Bulgaria (follow the client)
• The presence of thousands of students in Bulgarian universities attracted Greek 
entrepreneurs to invest, especially, in the areas of entertainment, restaurants and 
food industry (follow the clients).
As a result of the abovementioned reasons, about 1500 Greek companies (3800 registered 
companies, 1500 active -  data up to the end 2001) entered the Bulgarian market.
5.5 F ailure or in ab ility  to in itia te  M N E s’ operations in the Balkan  
region? The case o f G reek com panies in B ulgaria
The number of the announced Greek investment projects did not correspond with the real
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number of firms under operation. It appears that several Greek companies existed only in 
name in the Bulgarian market awaiting better days to come for them to act. Out of 3800 
registered Greek investments in Bulgaria, less than half are active today. The same stands 
for the Turkish and Russian companies in Bulgaria.
One should assume that the difference between the registered number of Greek companies 
in the Bulgarian market and the real number of firms operating in this market, is due to the 
departure, the bankruptcy or to the failure of a significant number of small and medium 
sized Greek firms to become active in the Bulgarian market. Some of the reasons for their 
departure are related to the improvement in the structure of control of the domestic market 
and also to the intensification of the competition from domestic businessmen.
More specifically and according to their importance, we can point out the following 
reasons:
• That only half of the Greek companies are active in Bulgaria is primarily due to the 
fact that Greek entrepreneurs wanted easy and quick profits, using limited capital 
and with no previous experience in economic activities. Their fast produced low 
quality commodities are no longer bought by the Bulgarians, leaving them with no 
option but to return to Greece.
• In the early years of the transition, many Greeks hastened -without any plan for 
investment and without any market research- to create and register firms in 
Bulgaria. However, they quickly understood that their hopes for easy profits were 
unfeasible.
• After severe economic crises, a slow transition reform, an increased unemployment 
rate and a low per capita income resulted to low per capita consumption. This 
deteriorated Bulgarian companies’ revenues and profits. It affected the small 
enterprises more, since their target market is the individual household, which most 
experienced the economic crises.
• The three economic crises in Bulgaria made a lot of Greek companies return back 
to Greece. Especially in the third period (see Section 3), when the companies had 
already been weakened by the two in a row Bulgarian crises in one year (1996- 
1997), there was a great amount of withdrawals.
• A number of small Greek companies that were established in the very early years of 
the Bulgarian transition lasted particularly little as, the multinationals from western 
advanced countries that very soon came along, offered the same products with 
better quality and at affordable prices (increased competition).
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• Bureaucracy, bribery, high risk and corruption are some of the factors that led a lot 
of Greeks to close down their companies in Bulgaria and return home.
• Some joint ventures due to the inability to cooperate with the local investors were 
led to failure.
• Some Greek companies in the textile sector returned back to Greece because of the 
insufficient skills of the Bulgarian workers, which resulted in low quality products. 
The low labor cost was not enough to keep these investors in Bulgaria.
• Some of the follow the leader cases failed because the profits the entrepreneurs had 
expected to gain after a few years did not come. Many of them gave up their efforts 
either because the losses were significant in the first years of their establishment or 
the market did not seem to have the potential growth they had hoped for.
In fact, it is not easy to be exact with the number of those companies that are still active or 
have left Bulgaria. This is due to a problem with the Bulgarian data, which do not deduct 
from the total number of investments, the companies that never acted in Bulgaria or are 
inactive now.
5.6 P oten tia l in cen tives and barriers for G reek FDI outflow s in 
B ulgaria; R esults o f a q u estion n aire survey
As far as the Greek investors in Bulgaria (results of our questionnaire survey) are 
concerned, Figures la-4a show the differences between them and the other worldwide 
investors (see also previous section). Greek investors have proved to be factor hunters with 
a percentage of 84%, closely followed by a percentage of 78% that are locational hunters 
(Figure la). Apart from the obvious reason of geographical proximity, this change in the 
ranking of the group of incentives is due to the fact that most of the thirty seven (37) Greek 
companies participating in the research were in the textile sector, industrial and food sector 
that required low cost manual labor.
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Figure 1a. Greek entrepreneurs in Bulgaria are...
84% 2S%-
Factor
Hunters
Locational Market Financial
Hunters Hunters Hunters
Source: Author’s Questionnaire Analysis’ Results
As far as the separate incentives (Figure 2a) are concerned, Greek investors, as expected, 
ranked geographical proximity (100%) as the main motive for their FDI activity. Other 
important factors were the market size (92%) and the low labour cost for unskilled workers 
(84%).
Figure 2a. Determinants (Incentives) for the Greek FDI outflows in Bulgaria
Local unsatisfied demand 
Prospects for market growth 
Create an export base 
Prior trade relations (from trade to FDI) 
Cultural closeness 
Lack of local competition 
A link to other neighlxir countries 
Low latx>ur cost unskilled 
Market size 
Geographical proximity
V 3 0 %
b 3 0 %
1
4 0 %
0
9 2 ° /
" * 1 0 0 V (
X ---  -!-- . . . ' - r = — ------- ^
0% 20% 4 0 % 6 0 % 8 0 % 100%
Source: Author’s Questioruiaire Analysis’ Results
Regarding the ways of investing (Figure 3a), Greek investors have also preferred the 
green-field way, while at the same time, they have rejected the way of privatisation as a 
means of FDI.
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Figure 3a. Ways of investment in Bulgaria for the Greek entrepreneurs 1989-1999
Acquisitions 
Representative Office / Branch 
Joint Vertures / Strategic Alliances / M  & A Whol 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - Greenfield Site / 
Has your company made EXPORTS in Bulgaria in previ.. 
Acquisition opportunities through BulgarianPrivatisatio...
W  5.4%
' i n  8.1%
21,6%
' 24 3%
- jJbiHiimR 18 9%p  / /  / . 7
Source: Author's Questionnaire Analysis ' Results
The main barrier (Figure 4a) that Greeks had to face in their investment was corruption, 
crime and mafia (78%) followed by the unstable legal system (59%), the bureaucracy and 
the low per capital income being in the same position with 57%. These results are 
somehow surprising because the same conditions as far as bureaucracy, unstable legal 
system and corruption are concerned also prevail in Greece. However, the “Balkan 
Enlargement Spirit” that dominates the behavior of the citizens in the Balkan region is a 
factor that explains this situation.
Figure 4a. Barriers for Greek FDI projects in Bulgaria
High Taxation
High Investment Risk.
Bureacracy 
Low Per Capita
Unstable legal System. 
Corruption, Crime, 'mafia'
kioo/ 138%
41%
1 1 0 f /o57%
59%------- 1--------1-------- ------- 1--------
^------- ----- /
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Source: Author's Questionnaire Analysis ' Results
It was a surprise for the author that although the Greek origin MNEs have the knowledge 
of the Balkan business ethics and the know-how to cope with risky environments, half of 
them made mention of the high investment risk as a barrier. Unexpected was also the fact 
that the barrier corruption, crime, bribery, mafia and illegal actions (Y67), has also been
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mentioned by 29/37 (78,4%) of the Greek companies.
34/64 interviewed companies (53,1%) considered as a significant barrier corruption, 
bribery etc. At the same time, only 18,5% (5 out of 27) of foreign MNEs except for the 
Greek ones, looked upon this barrier as a crucial one. Although, Greece is a country where 
most of the every -  day economic activities are characterized by bureaucracy and 
corruption, unanticipated was the fact that more than half of the Greek MNEs (56.8%) 
have also regarded bureaucracy (Y72) as a decisive barrier in their investment plans.
Interviews and personal contacts in a time period of 18 months were enough for the author 
to find out that the Greek investments and the Greek entrepreneurs were among the first 
and maybe the only cases among the foreign investors that received threats, patronage acts 
and other illegal actions from the mafia. Such acts are explainable as most of the Balkan 
countries and the majority of their citizens down through histoiy have held a grand idea of 
their nationality and their origin. Similar examples are Greece with Alexander the Great’s 
walk, the Greek expansion movement and the 1900s Asia Minor catastrophe. Other 
examples are: the Great Idea of Albania, the expectations of Bulgaria to expand its borders 
to the south with the union of Greek Thrace and to the West with the union of a part of 
FYROM (because of the minorities), the expansionist expectations of Romania during the 
Balkan Wars, the creation of the Republic of Yugoslavia with the leadership of President 
Tito and its subsequent dissolution, and finally, the Turkish occupation (Ottoman Empire) 
for almost five centuries in most of the Balkan countries. The above mentioned are proof 
that there has been a “Balkan Enlargement Spirit” (strong cultural and historical linkages 
are accompanied by strong historical rivalries within the Balkans), among the citizens of 
this region throughout the years for an expansion of their borders and their desire to 
become predominant in the region. Having in mind this last argument, we can explain the 
behavior of a small percentage of Bulgarians against Greek entrepreneurs. It may be 
difficult for some of Bulgarians to accept that Greeks at this time of the history are 
economically stronger and that Greeks have the opportunity to become economically 
dominant in the region. Thus, during the transition years, events of patronage, nepotism 
and mafia for the sake of quick and easy profit for nonexistent reasons (asking money for 
protection from thieves, asking money for the avoidance of losses and damages, even 
asking for money from an entrepreneur in order to balance the supposed illegal avoidance 
of taxes or the low level payment of tax rates) have existed. Moreover, reasons such as the 
fact that Greek entrepreneurs have come from their neighbor country to acquire or create 
enterprises at low cost and to employ citizens with very low wages, have been received
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from the underground people (mafia) as a good enough reason to gain illegally money. 
From the research, the author discovered that the mafia did not react the same against the 
other foreign investors such as the Germans or the Americans.
5.7 Conclusions
Bulgaria has made significant progress towards becoming a functioning market
economy, although it is not yet able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces 
within the European Union in the short term. Bulgaria is establishing a satisfactory track 
record of macroeconomic stabilisation and performance. However, the volume of invested 
inflows is very limited and there is a lack of western investment interest. Under this 
situation the Greek entrepreneurs have found enough space to make large enough 
investments compared to their home country’s economic magnitude on a worldwide scale. 
This regional attitude can be seen by the fact that the Greek investments are significant 
both in volume of invested USDS and in number (tables 9 & 10).
COUNTRY OF INVESTOR BOURGAS
VARNA PLOVDIV SOFIA
CITY STARAZAGORA
HASKOVO TOTAL BY COUNTRIES
TURKEY 400 205 1153 1203 152 586 6366
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
350 743 302 1225 88 59 4004
GREECE 60 52 547 1575 43 96 3746
Table 10: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS IN BULGARIA BY EACH COUNTRY BY YEARS In USDS
Nr. Cou nt r y 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Jan-June
2002
Total by 
countries
1 GREECE 0.2 5.1 3 29.8 14.6 I6.I 3.3 14.9 241.1 213.6 78.2 619.9
2 GERMANY O.I 56.6 II I 16.2 53.1 31.4 55.7 101 72.3 65.1 23.0 586.2
3 ITALY 0 0.2 5.2 2.3 1.2 0.4 2.1 23 339.7 77.3 13.9 465.3
4 BELGIUM 0 O.I 0.3 10 0.8 264 31.2 66.2 39.8 3.1 0.6 416.5
The lack of significant western interest for FDI outflows in Bulgaria has given to the 
Greek enterprises, and especially the large ones, the advantage to become MNEs and 
the opportunity to invest in neighbor countries such as Bulgaria a large enough amount of 
USDS if we consider and compare the Greek economy with the German or the British one.
We can point out that the Greek investments in Bulgaria exceed the amount of 750 
millions USDS instead of only 620 million USD that appear in the BFIA catalogue. This is 
attributed to the fact that there are a few Greek entrepreneurs (others that followed the 
same investment way were the Russians and the Turks) that have invested in Bulgaria 
through offshore companies, established in Cyprus or Luxembourg.
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We can conclude that the leading incentives for the Greek entrepreneurs were 
geographical proximity, market size, low labour cost and using Bulgaria as a link to 
neighbour countries instead of market size, low labour cost, geographical proximity and 
international pressures from competition and globalisation. From the results, it can also be 
argued that the Greek enterprises’ decisions for FDI outflows were based upon the 
geographical proximity, the low labour cost, the lack of foreign competition, and the 
cultural closeness. The Greek firms were planning to use Bulgaria as a bridge for further 
investments in other neighbour countries and previous trade relations have proved very 
helpful in their decision for FDI.
Problems such as corruption, a shadow economy, bureaucracy, and the primitive market 
infrastructure, discourage foreign investors and additionally decrease the competitiveness 
of the Bulgarian economy. However, the significant growth in most of the macroeconomic 
data of the Bulgarian economy and the political stability provide the author with signs that 
in the following six years, Bulgaria will enjoy substantial growth and development and that 
a possible date of 2007 for EU membership may not be so far from becoming a reality.
As previously mentioned, the importance in the consideration of corruption, bureaucracy, 
mafia and briberies as a barrier for the Greek MNEs came as a surprise. However, we 
based our arguments firstly on the fact that a lot of small in size Greek MNEs participated 
to the Bulgarian business environment which were vulnerable to the mafia (it was easier to 
be approached and to be frightened by the mafia), secondly on the Balkan enlargement 
spirit and thirdly on the tendency of Bulgarians (the same is valid for most of the ex 
communist citizens) to respect and mimic western civilization and thus the large western 
MNEs and their business activities.
Although we have concluded that ten Greek MNEs have invested around 80% (2 out of 3 
billion USDS) of the total Greek FDI outflows in the whole Balkan region, on the other 
hand more than 5000 active Greek companies (especially small ones) offered and are 
offering value added activities to the Balkan economies such as job placements, quality, 
variety of products, production, contribution to the GDP etc.
We also presented unique and very important reasons (ranking them according to their 
significance) responsible for the great accumulation of Greek MNEs in Bulgaria, together 
with the reasons that resulted in their failure, bankruptcy, departure or their inability to 
start operations. This accumulation of Greek entrepreneurs during the twelve transition
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years in Bulgaria has been divided into five time periods.
The Greek enterprises have found the opportunity to become MNEs and to participate in 
many Eastern European countries. The following decade (2001-2010) is a crucial decade 
for them and for the entire Greek economy. If these companies take advantage of the 
absence of foreign interest for FDI in the region, and their investments become healthy and 
profitable, then it will not be a surprise if the Greek firms become dominant and strong 
enough economical entities in the near future.
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6. Conclusions
Although earlier analysts have seen Bulgaria as a country which undertook a ‘big bang’ 
transition path, the eleven years of Bulgarian transition studied by the author indicate 
otherwise. The instant price liberalization of more than 70% of the commodities in 1989 was 
the only sign pointing towards a ‘big bang’ strategy, when even the prices of the remaining 
commodities have not been liberalized after those years and the big state monopolies are still 
under state control.
Having chosen the road of economic reforms and introduction of the market principles, in the 
past several years, Bulgaria has taken a number of steps to introduce a liberal economy and 
attract foreign investment, which are the prerequisites to a modern economy with developed 
infi'astructure. This is particularly true for the legislative initiatives, where many new acts 
have been adopted or old ones amended. Currently there is an acting legal framework for 
doing business by modem standards, in favour of the inward investment. The conditions for 
doing business in Bulgaria are quite liberal and there are no restrictions for foreign 
investors to settle in the country.
All the signs of economic life were negative until mid-1997. The governmental had failed to 
increase the private sector and to create adequate financial intermediaries, having at the same 
time one of the weakest stock markets in the region even to the present day. The development 
of Bulgarian privatisation is not only a far cry away from a ‘big bang’ path, but also raises 
doubts on whether it falls under gradualism. An explanation may be that Bulgarian 
governments in the sense of thinking political cost take a gradual approach in the privatization 
programmes, thus first to restructure and then to privatize.
However, after mid-1997, things changed and only positive signs in the Bulgarian economy 
can be seen. There is acceleration in privatisation and restructuring, an increased private 
sector, an one-digit inflation rate, low interest rates, macroeconomic stability, increased FDI 
inflows, a significant participation of foreign banks, a start towards the abolishment of the 
remaining monopolies, imposing of hard budget constraints and adequate legal framework.
Although the signs for economic growth (after July 1997 and especially in 1999-2001) are 
obviously positive, Bulgaria is still behind most of the other CEE countries since it has not yet
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recovered economically, neither in GDP and industrial output nor in trade balances. Thus, 
increases in the real GDP, in volume of exports and imports and in industrial output are 
needed. Moreover, the Bulgarian government should try to decrease the high unemployment 
rate, to increase the low level of stock market performance, to balance the current account 
deficit and to proceed to the finalization of the remaining privatisation deals together with the 
abolishment of the remaining monopolies.
The Bulgarian government may very well consider all the above as the most important tasks to 
achieve or to overcome. Simultaneously, keeping to the same level or increasing the growth 
rate of the macroeconomic performance within the period of the following years (up to 2007), 
may well give Bulgaria the chances for nominal convergence and thus to become one of the 
next members of the EU. This will be true if Bulgarian economy succeed in the Copenhagen 
criteria. However, the real convergence of the Bulgarian economy with the other western 
economies will be mainly based on the minimization of the level of the black economy 
which occurs in the CEE countries and especially in the Balkan countries. This is around 40%- 
50% of the GDP level of each country (the EU countries have around 10%-15% level of 
underground economy, and Greece is the only country among the EU, with the highest level 
of hidden economy - around 30%-35% of GDP). Considering firstly that the GDP per capita 
of Greece (a member of the EU), Cyprus and Malta (both are countries that satisfy the 
Copenhagen criteria for an accession to the EU in the year 2004) is around 13,000 US$ each 
and secondly the GDP growth for most of the CEE countries is around 5%-7% per year, then 
we conclude the following: with such a growth rate, if we assume the level of black economy 
in 50% of the real GDP, then we also conclude that the GDP per capita of one country, such as 
Bulgaria, will reach the level of 13,000 US$ in a period of 7 - 10 years.
It is conventionally thought that to develop competition in a transition economy, 
privatisation, restructuring and creation of new firms should take place first. Restructuring 
involves changes in corporate governance, organizational and managerial rules, labour 
behaviour, composition and quality of the products, output and sales’ goals, introduction of 
new technology and capital along with settlement of the bad loans. Bulgaria’s experience 
raises the question of whether its chosen methods of privatisation reform and the pace of this 
reform are sufiTicient enough to promote competition in such a market. To answer this, we 
need to explore the barriers and the incentives faced by foreign MNEs during their
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participation in the Bulgarian privatisation programs. This thesis investigates those questions 
on the basis of a survey of both theory and empirical evidence (using questionnaire and 
statistical analysis). It was determined that Bulgarian privatisation deals have been accelerated 
since 1997. On the other hand, Bulgaria still lacks in transparency and it follows slow paths in 
abolishment of monopolies. At the same time, it displays bureaucratic procedures and shows 
little progress in the transition process and in macroeconomic development.
Privatisation in Bulgaria proceeded very slowly, despite the motives provided by the World 
Bank and IMF in the form of aid packages. This delay is attributed to the political instability 
of the country (up to 1997) and governmental inability or unwillingness during the years of 
the transition, the social dislike towards privatisation as well as to several economic factors. A 
sociological investigation that studied public reaction was indicative that Bulgarians are 
indifferent and some times negative towards privatisation. Another social factor is the fact that 
any substantial private capital in Bulgaria in the initials years was obtained illegally and thus 
was unlikely to be used for privatisation purposes given that the Privatisation Law requires 
that all owners of any Bulgarian capital entering the Privatisation process must explain its 
origin.
Considering the economic factors contributing to the delay, one must pay close attention to the 
collapse of COMECON, which also contributed to other factors like the prolonged recession, 
the decrease in real income, and the very low internal demand. Political uncertainty, 
underdeveloped infrastructure and communications, delay in structural reforms and delay in 
the establishment of a legal background, resulted in reluctant foreign investors. Both domestic 
and foreign investors were further discouraged by the low net present value of the enterprises 
offered for privatisation.
One of the most difficult tasks in a privatisation process in a transition country is to determine 
the market value of public enterprises. Thus, in Bulgaria, an administrative rather than a 
market approach to valuation was adopted. The problem was intensified not only by the 
inexperience of evaluators, but also by the high inflation that often necessitated re-evaluation. 
The valuation of the privatized company was made even more difficult because of difficulties 
in allocating the appropriate assets to each company (the legal analysis of enterprises). During 
the communist years, ownership was always considered public. The enterprises’ assets were
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not clearly defined since many companies might have “use” the same asset. Hence, the 
documents identifying these assets, including land and physical plant, are usually not available 
or non-existent. The asset allocation problem becomes even more complicated if the claims 
for restitution are considered. Delays in the privatisation process became even more complex 
when disagreements led the cases to courts. The valuation problems were often solved by 
artificial evaluations of enterprises, resulting in abuses of authority and corruption by the 
agents in charge of the process.
Corruption is another prime factor responsible for the delay of Privatisation. The former 
Bulgarian authorities were determined to obtain ownership of state-owned property for 
themselves (or friends) at preferential prices and without public auctions. This kind of 
ownership transfer is considered as “quiet” if the information concerning the sale is not made 
public, or “illegal” if working rules are violated.
From our research we can conclude that the delay in the privatisation process affected 
multinationals’ FDI decisions (MNEs which belong to the banking sector). Moreover, the way 
of privatisation as an entry mode has been chosen mainly from MNEs other than Greek ones. 
Privatisation deals mostly took part in the industrial sector because most of the Bulgarian 
SOEs which were offered to the privatisation programs belonged to this sector.
A sound banking system that helps the companies in their investment plans through financing 
their projects, as well as a functioning stock market exchange, which is a basic tool for mass 
or market privatisation, are essential parts of a stable economy. A sound banking system is a 
very crucial factor in attracting foreign investors. The privatisation of the state-owned banks 
had a direct effect in the Bulgarian FDI inflows and the delay of the transition process greatly 
affected the volume of the inward FDI. The Bulgarian stock market even today is still not 
well-functioning and a market economy needs a developed system with institutions, reliable 
regulations, strong foreign participation, lack of uncertainty and general stability in all of its 
economic activities, along with guaranteed governmental credibility. The development of 
secondary markets is also essential for the transition progress.
The privatisation of large state-owned enterprises with the help of the BCC significantly 
helped the FDI inflows in Bulgaria. Around 1/6 of the total FDI inflows belong to five
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privatisation deals with strategic foreign investors. Incentives for this foreign participation in 
the banking sector is the market size, the geographical proximity, the presence of other 
companies of the same origin with the home country of the foreign bank (follow the clients), 
lack of competition, or exploiting ownership advantages such as brand name, superior skills, 
multinationality, physical presence in many countries, globalisation pressures etc. Other 
incentives which may encourage foreign investors are: economies of scale, ethnic minorities, 
foreign exchange arbitrage, knowledge of the host country, MNE’s experience at operating 
internationally, past experience, etc.
An important policy question was to what degree of entry should foreign banks be permitted 
to engage in. The answer was that there is a dire need for foreign participation. The Bulgarian 
banking laws (among the most liberal in the region) permit 100% of foreign participation to 
any bank that is going to be privatised and unlimited foreign participation in the banking 
system if the banking rules are ensured. The advantage of large foreign bank participation in 
Bulgaria was that Bulgarians could learn new skills by working in the branches of foreign 
banks. They could learn and adopt new payment methods, marketing skills, advanced 
computerised techniques, initiating new products etc. Bulgarian banks can be taught from the 
examples set by foreign banks. On the other hand, the local banks will need time before they 
are fully able to compete with foreign banks, due to the burden of bad loans and lack of skills 
and experience.
The transition to a market economy needs a sound banking system, which is a crucial factor in 
attracting foreign investors. Foreign direct investment in the banking sector can be of 
particular importance to the transition countries since experience has shown that countries 
around the world in which FDI has concentrated have enjoyed accelerated economic growth, 
easier integration into world markets and less painful structural reform. With the help of 
Bulgarian official statistics, we can argue that one third of the total FDI inflows in Bulgaria 
are through privatisation deals and more than half of the latter inflows are a result of 
privatisation deals occurred in the banking system.
The analysis through questionnaires revealed important aspects of the FDI flows, which may 
not be captured by the standard analysis. The derived results indicate that the high risk 
business environment, the market size and bureaucracy have been considered similarly by
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foreign banks and any other MNEs participating in Bulgaria and macroeconomic instability, 
unstable legal framework, low transition progress and lack of managerial skills have been 
considered by foreign banks as highly positive factors responsible for the FDI inflows in the 
banking sector. On the other hand, an unexpected finding was that corruption, crime and mafia 
have not been taken into account at all by foreign banks. Lastly, the low cost of a skilled 
labour force together with the theory “following the clients”, lack of local competition and the 
existence of international/globalisation pressures were significant incentives for foreign banks 
in order to enter Bulgaria. The findings that multinational firms may be discouraged to invest 
by factors such as macroeconomic instability and inadequate institutional framework are in 
accordance with a previous work (Liargovas and Chionis (2001)). Our main hypothesis is that 
besides the role of the conventional determinants of FDI, factors such as the form of monetary 
stability and the progress of economic and institutional reforms, which constitute the essence of 
the transition process, might be responsible for stimulating FDI flows. Given the fact that 
Bulgaria moved slowly towards a market-based economic system, relative to other transition 
economies, and that the investments in the banking sector consist o f a large proportion of the 
total Bulgarian FDI flows, we insist that this comparative analysis constitutes of considerable 
importance in determining the role of the transition process on the FDI flows.
The results of the first five years of the Bulgarian national Bank (BNB) functioning as a 
currency board indicated a gradually reviving confidence in the lev and the banking system. 
Moreover, as a shareholder in the Bank Consolidation Company (BCC), the BNB supported 
the government in the privatisation of state banks. Given the general Bulgarian performance, 
the BCC was very successful since it managed to consolidate 59 small banks into 4 (together 
with Bulbank, Postbank) and to privatise 5 out of 6 banks to foreigners, up to the end of 2001.
Our survey tried to specify the main incentives and barriers for a specific country case study, 
namely Bulgaria during its post communist period. The size of the market, low unskilled 
labour cost, geographical proximity, prospects for market growth and using Bulgaria as a link 
to other neighbour countries were considered as important reasons for undertaking FDI 
projects in Bulgaria. On the other hand, unstable legal framework, bureaucracy, corruption 
and the high risky environment were the most decisive barriers for foreign MNEs, when 
considering investing in Bulgaria. We concluded that the constant changes in the legal 
framework, lack of adequate and efificient laws, insufficient enforcement of laws, which
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leaves space for corruption, bureaucracy and bribery, discourage foreign investors in 
participating in such an environment.
In addition, although bureaucracy and corruption were important barriers for establishing 
an FDI project in Bulgaria, only about 1/3 of MNEs who participated in the research 
suggested that bureaucracy or/and corruption was an important barrier for them. Finally, risk 
was also a significant barrier in the decision of making an investment in an environment such 
as Bulgaria.
More specifically, in our survey the findings regarding the significance of geographical 
proximity were in accordance with Pye (1998), Pitelis et al. (2000), OECD (1994), Meyer 
(1995-6) and SECI (1998)) and the low labor cost were in accordance with with Pitelis et al 
(2000), OECD (1994) Altzinger (1999).
On the other hand, the finding regarding the importance of low labour cost is against with 
Meyer’s findings, who considered that for British and Germans MNEs were interested in low 
labour cost as a secondary incentive. Our survey in which Greek, Turkish and Russian MNEs 
prefer to invest in the neighbor Balkan region and in particular in Bulgaria, exploring low 
labour cost especially for labour intensive industries and export oriented industries. 
Geographical proximity and the importance of low labour cost for export- oriented companies 
were also in accordance with Tanks and Venables (1997) and Pitelis et al. (2000).
We agree with Tanks and Venables (1997) who argued that “The importance o f factor costs 
seems to depend, not surprisingly, on the purpose o f the investment They found that export 
oriented firms place much greater importance on production costs and cheap skilled labour". 
Our findings regarding the importance of cultural closeness together with the importance of 
strong historical links and strong cnltural ties was in accordance with Andersen (OECD), 
SECI and Altzinger.
The absence of political stability as a major incentive for the case of Bulgaria can be 
explained by the fact that Bulgaria faced political instability from the start of its transition 
period and up to the year of 1997 (8 governments in 8 years). So, it was not evident the 
Bulgarian political stability at the time period when this survey was conducted.
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Meyer (1995-96) found that the qualified labour force was an important reason for 
investment in Hungary together with its political and economic stability. Also Pye (1998) 
mentioned the importance of skilled labour force in Slovakia. However, sometimes the 
absence in consideration of the low labour cost as an significant incentive and the searching of 
the availability of qualified labour force is the key difference for foreign investors who prefer 
to invest in the Central European countries such as Hungary and Poland instead of investing in 
the Balkan region. This also clarifies the lack of western investment interest in the SEE region 
and the preference of British and German MNEs to invest in Hungary or Poland and not in the 
Balkan region or even more not in Bulgaria. The Central European countries are neighbor 
countries to the advanced economies of Germany, the UK etc. and they provide more stable 
environment and they are more advanced economies with qualified labour force compared to 
the Balkan ones. On the other hand, the MNEs from advanced economies are less considering 
the low labour cost as the Greeks, Turkish and Russians are considering this.
We can also conclude in this paper that there is a specific finding in the KPMG research 
which we believe that it is a biased one and not in accordance with our findings. This is 
regarding the above-mentioned incentive of skilled labour force which has been highly 
considered by the KPMG. In other words, the skilled labour force has been one of the driving 
considerations for more than a third (36%) in KPMG research. This author argues that this 
high percentage is biased and it depends on the sample. So, we can conclude that there was a 
participation of a large enough number of companies (in KPMG sample), which belong to a 
sector which prefers/needs skilled labour force and not that the skilled labour force is a so 
significant factor for foreign MNEs which prefer to invest in Bulgaria.
We disagree with Lankes and Venables (1997) who found that almost half of the investors are 
positively influenced by similar investments by competitors in the same country (following 
the competitors’ theory). The explanation behind our disagreement is the fact that our survey 
mentioned that only 12.5% mentioned the theory of following the competition theory because 
for the case of advanced economies such as German or British there are a lot of strong MNEs 
so the first movers are not the only MNEs interesting in investing in Central Europe. This is 
not the case of Greeks or Russian or Turkish MNEs which have only limited number of MNEs
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which prefer to invest in the Balkan region. Thus, it is difficult to have a lot of strong Greek or 
Turkish MNEs in order to follow each other in their investment paths.
The finding of market size and its prospects for growth are in accordance with Lankes and
Venables, Meyer, OECD. However, another unique finding of this survey was the high 
consideration of Bulgaria as a link to other neighbor and prospective countries. We agree with 
SECI regarding the finding that the investors are considering Bulgaria as an investment link 
to other neighbour countries.
The finding of KPMG regarding limited purchasing power which was scored with 71% we 
can argue that this high percentage it was an expected outcome for the KPMG research 
because of the chosen time period (April 1998) that the survey was conducted. In other words, 
we have to consider that in February 1997, Bulgaria experienced its third economic crisis in a 
row, after the 1994 and 1996 crises. In our survey we have also found a significant percentage 
of 50% and this difference in the importance from 71% to 50% can be partially explained by 
the later time period that our survey was conducted and the positive outcomes for the
Bulgarian environment due to the introduction of the currency board.
Lack of competition was also a significant incentive and it was in accordance with Meyer’s 
survey. At the same time, the importance of following the clients’ theory as an incentive was 
also in accordance with OECD.
Furthermore, our finding regarding corruption and its consideration as an important barrier 
was in accordance with only the SECI survey and it was not followed by OECD and Pitelis et 
al. The finding of corruption ranking in such a high place of importance for an MNE project 
was a significant and unique outcome of this survey and it was revealed as an incentive from 
Greek entrepreneurs. However, our finding was in contrast with the KPMG research in which 
corruption ranked at the end with a very low percentage of only 8%.
The outcomes regarding the unstable legal system and bureaucracy in high levels in the 
ranking were a surprise. They were in accordance with OECD, Pitelis et al. and KPMG. 
Moreover, political and macroeconomic stability were of minor importance for the MNEs
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because of the successiul establishment of the currency board in mid 1997 and the political 
stability that has existed in Bulgaria from early 1997.
Finally, the fact that only half of the interviewed MNEs considered the Bulgarian environment 
as a risky one and not by all the MNEs (if you considered that the whole region is associated 
with the high risk consideration) is in accordance with all the surveys presented in the 
literature review with similar percentages and similar ranking places.
The significant sample used in this questionnaire survey consisted of sixty-four MNEs. These 
MNEs made a significant volume of investment, over one million $US dollar each one. 
According to the literature the present survey is a significant contribution to the field because 
was conducted for an ex-communist and isolated country from the western investment interest 
in the specific chosen time period, having a large enough sample, high response rate and a 
proportional distribution of the participants in all the sectors of the Bulgarian economy.
Finally, we discussed the special role of the Greek investments in Bulgaria and examined 
the Greek -  Bulgarian relations. The geographical proximity, the absence of western interest 
for investments in Bulgaria and the relatively cultural proximity (at least Greece and Bulgaria 
were closer compared Bulgaria to other western countries) were proved to be significant 
factors for Greek entrepreneurs to invest in Bulgaria. Moreover, it is believed (by the 
researcher) that the cultural distance instead of cultural proximity is another incentive. This 
view is supported by the Bulgarian policy for transition to a market economy along with the 
tendency of Bulgarians to behave and mime the “westernalised” style of life. Thus, 
cultural distance led to cultural proximity. A later argument supporting this view is also 
presented and the results from the questionnaire validate it.
Greek investments in Bulgaria exceed the amount of 750 million USD (end 2002) instead of 
620 million USD that appears in the BFIA catalogue. This is due to the fact that there are a 
few Greek entrepreneurs that have invested in Bulgaria through offshore companies, which 
have been established in Cyprus or Luxembourg.
It can be concluded that the major incentives for the Greek entrepreneurs were 
geographical proximity, market size, low labour cost and using Bulgaria as a link to neighbour
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countries instead of market size, low labour cost, geographical proximity and international 
pressures from competition, globalisation, which were the incentives from the whole 
questionnaire. The Greek firms were planning to use Bulgaria as a bridge for further 
investments in other neighbour countries and previous trade relations had proved very helpful 
in their decision for FDI.
We also presented unique and very important reasons (ranking them according to their 
significance) responsible for the great accumulation of Greek MNEs in Bulgaria, together 
with the reasons that resulted in their failure, bankruptcy, departure or their inability to start 
operations. This accumulation of Greek entrepreneurs during the twelve transition years in 
Bulgaria has been divided into five time periods. The existence of around 1500 Greek 
companies in Bulgaria (especially small ones) offered and are offering value added activities 
to Bulgaria such as job placements, quality, variety of products, production, contribution to 
the GDP etc.
The Greek enterprises have grasped the opportunity to become MNEs and to participate in 
many Eastern European countries. The following decade (2001-2010) is a crucial decade for 
them and for the Greek economy in total. If these companies take advantage of the absence of 
foreign interest for FDI in the region, and their investments become healthy and profitable, 
then it will be of no surprise if the Greek firms become dominant and strong enough 
economical entities in the whole Balkan region in the near future.
Western interest in Central and Eastern Europe is very low considering that only a 
percentage between 2-5% of the worldwide FDI outflows goes to these countries. The lack of 
significant western investment interest can be viewed from the following (1998-2000 figures) 
the USA has over 100-150 billion USDS FDI outflows each year, the UK over 150-200 billion 
USDS and Germany over 50-100 billion USDS, etc. Moreover, the world’s foreign direct 
investment inflows exceeded SI trillion in 2000 according to UNCTAD -  it was 865 billion 
USDS in 1999, 209 billion USDS in 1990, and 58 USDS billion in 1982. At the same time, 
145 billion USDS are the total FDI inflows, from 1989 and onward in the whole Central and 
East European region, when at the same period the Balkan region has received only 13% of 
the total FDI inflows in the CEE region. The FDI inflows in the Balkan region is insignificant 
when the total FDI INFLOWS in the eight countries of the Balkan region account for less than
294
CONCLUSIONS
20 billion USDS in the last 11 years (1989-2000). In other words, these eight countries in a 
period of time of 11 years, have not managed to receive an amount that equals to one- year 
German or British FDI outflows.
Bulgaria has made significant progress towards becoming a functioning market 
economy. Although it is not yet able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces 
within the European Union in the short term, Bulgaria has established a satisfactory track 
record of macroeconomic stabilisation and performance in the last years (after 1997). 
However, the volume of invested inflows is very limited and there is a lack of western 
investment interest. Under this situation, the Greek entrepreneurs have found enough space to 
make large enough investments compared to their home country's economic magnitude on a 
worldwide scale. This regional attitude can be seen by the fact that the Greek investments are 
significant both in volume of invested USD$ and in their number. Although Germany 
(according to the BFIA catalogue) appears in the first place of foreign FDI inflows in 
Bulgaria, the amount of approximately 600 million USD$ is significantly low, having in mind, 
the strong economy of Germany, the worldwide existence of large-scale in economic figures 
MNEs of German origin and the amounts that German MNEs have invested in other CEE 
countries. This lack of significant German interest for FDI outflows in Bulgaria and the 
similar absence of British, French and American interest has given to the Greek enterprises, 
and especially the large ones, the advantage for becoming MNEs and to invest in neighbor 
countries such as Bulgaria a large enough amount of USDS in respect with the Greek 
economy and their worldwide economic figures.
Problems such as corruption, shadow economy, bureaucracy, and the primitive market 
infrastructure, discourage foreign investors and additionally decrease the competitiveness of 
the Bulgarian economy. However, the significant growth in most of the macroeconomic data 
of the Bulgarian economy and the political stability after 1997 provide the author with signs 
that in the following six years, Bulgaria will enjoy significant growth and development and 
that the deadline of 2007 for EU membership may not be so far from becoming reality.
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